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In recent years, Human Computer Interaction (HCI) designers and 
researchers have shifted focus from a primary concern with procedural, 
generic, and task based applications to applications that address messy, 
personal, and aesthetic experiences. These difficult to formalize experiences, 
such as feelings of intimacy, spirituality, or a sense of place, are 
conceptualized as experiences of the ineffable. In this work, I use a reflective 
design practice to look at two primary approaches to designing interfaces with 
the ineffable, one emphasizes reduction and the other openness to 
interpretation. I discuss issues of control and reification that result from the 
reduction approach and develop the interpretation approach as a viable 
alternative requiring a re-thinking design and evaluation strategies and criteria. 
These issues and approaches are explored in detail through the development 
of two case studies. Case study one addresses the ineffable experience of art 
and presents a series of applications for interfacing with the ineffable in the art 
museum. Case study two details the ineffable experience of affect and 
presents a system designed for augmenting affective presence in an office 
environment. To further this work, I examine new thinking in both HCI and 
Communication for understanding every day interpretive acts and the 
implications for design. In addition, I advance reflective design as a new 
process based practice for the field of Communication.  
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Chapter 1. The Ineffable, the Interface and Interpretation  
We can touch more than we can grasp.  
-- Gabriel Marcel 
 
This work examines the concept of the ineffable and the paradox that 
arises when designing technological interfaces with the ineffable. The ineffable 
is considered as a phenomenon and a process of movement between the 
unknown and the known, between invention and convention, between 
transformation and standardization. It suggests the mysterious and magical 
but also relates to the seemingly more mundane but still remarkable every day 
achievement of people’s meaning making practices. Yet, in designing 
technology for experiencing the ineffable, the dominant approach is to remove 
the mystery and the unknown – to render the ineffable understandable and 
replicable. This is the paradox of interfaces with the ineffable. We aspire to 
understand the ineffable even as it continues to allude us, and as we attempt 
to define it, we ultimately define ourselves.  
This chapter begins with a personal case study of designing for 
innovation that illustrates what I will demonstrate as the larger recurring 
pattern of reducing the ineffable to something codifiable. I will suggest how this 
pattern persists in current areas of interest in Human Computer Interaction 
(HCI) but how breaking this pattern provides a compelling new perspective, 
one rooted in providing space for multiple interpretations, for the design and 
evaluation of computing technology. Following this introduction, I provide two 
case studies of defining, designing for, and evaluating interfaces with ineffable 
experiences. These case studies ground the inductive development of new 
ways of thinking about and approaching interpretation in design. Although HCI  
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has a rich but changing history in the role of interpretation, this dissertation 
adds the voice of communication theory. In addition to adding to the discourse 
in HCI on interpretation, I propose to add to the field of communication from 
the practice of HCI. In particular, I present this work as a new method for 
communication inquiry: design as theory. This work concludes with a return to 
the ideas described in this introduction of the ineffable, interfaces, and 
interpretation. 
A Personal Case Study: Innovation Practice and Technology 
Toward the end of the 1990s, I worked as a consultant and technology 
designer with Strategos, a leading strategy innovation company, founded by 
management consultant and professor of business Gary Hamel (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1994; Hamel, 1996; Hamel 2000). Strategos promoted innovation by 
arguing that whereas the Total Quality Movement (TQM)
1 once provided 
competitive advantage for companies, it now serves primarily to optimize 
existing products and practices rather than generating new ones. TQM 
provides for efficiency, but innovation provides for new growth and 
regeneration. The process of innovation is presented as overturning standard 
practices and static knowledge and replacing them through a rich discovery 
process founded on the principles of active learning (Argyris 1993; Schön, 
1983). My role with Strategos was to help develop technology tools for 
spreading the competency for and practice of innovation throughout a 
company. It was through this design project that I first encountered the 
paradox of interfaces with the ineffable. Although Strategos presented 
innovation as a process of change, we ultimately coded for a process of 
convention. 
                                                 
1 For more on TQM, see the work of W. Edwards Deming (Deming, 1986).  
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A quick example of our work at Strategos will help illustrate this 
paradox. On one engagement, I worked with a client to develop new growth 
opportunities in the leisure industry. As a large corporation with a market 
capitalization of more than $40 billion, the client could afford hiring not one but 
two consultant companies for this effort. Our companion would be one of the 
most prestigious and largest consulting companies worldwide, known 
internally and externally as  ‘the Firm.’ On the first day of a week-long 
workshop, the Firm presented their contribution: a binder of market research 
(later nicknamed by the client as “the Brick”) for every workshop participant 
with 300 pages of charts and graphs depicting industry players, forecasts for 
product segments, and related trends. On the second day, Strategos 
introduced our contribution: teams of five to six people in the workshop each 
received an envelope of money, a street map, an instant camera, and 
instructions to experience an assigned borough of London. Upon their return, 
participants were to illustrate their experience with pictures, purchases, and 
stories. This day-long excursion became a solid basis for animated 
discussions and insights throughout the week, but the Brick was consulted 
only on rare occasion for verification. At the end of the week, most of the client 
participants left the Brick behind for the bin, whereas all the participants 
carried away their memories of experiencing leisure on the London streets. 
It is for such experiences of active learning, and turning this discovery 
into new growth opportunities, that Strategos wanted to create a technology 
platform for innovation. The platform would include tools for: ideation 
(generating new ideas), attraction (team building around opportunities), 
valuation (tracking and evaluating ideas as they became viable business 
ventures), and commercialization (a marketplace for ideas, capital, people,  
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and projects). Furthermore, I was to explore with my colleagues how we might 
use technology to extend our own reach. As a smaller consultancy outfit with a 
prestigious client list, we competed for work against much larger consulting 
companies (such as the ‘Firm’). Therefore, we hoped to use computer 
technology as both an online learning space and as a toolkit for managing 
innovation processes.  
To a large degree, many of these design efforts were successful in that 
we created and deployed tools that met our objectives to teach about 
innovation as a process. Where a company may not have had an innovation 
process or at best an ad-hoc sporadic process, our tools provided companies 
with a tested means for pursuing innovation on a more systematic and larger 
scale. Despite the success of our tools, however, I noticed a discernible shift 
from our active learning perspective on innovation and our application of 
technology. For example, during our discovery days in London with the client 
described above, participants came back from their experience energized and 
the flow of ideas and conversations during the workshop were animated by the 
richness of their experience ‘in the field.’ Yet, translating the sharing process 
online with pictures and captured anecdotes felt more like recreating ‘The 
Brick.’ Capturing the richness of the day was proving to be elusive.  
Furthermore, part of our definition of innovation involves the process of 
constantly identifying conventions and recognizing when these conventions 
have exceeded their usefulness and flipped into blinders to new insights. 
However, application of technology seemed to do the very opposite. It 
supported a process of innovation, but it supported a defined process of 
innovation. Why wouldn’t this process be subject to the same precepts of 
active learning and discovery that every other business process is? Whereas  
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we proposed the ‘world’ is ever changing and requires innovation to stay 
relevant, the design of our technology systems to support innovation seemed 
to suggest that innovation itself stayed largely the same. To continue with the 
TQM analogy introduced earlier, when technology was introduced into the 
Strategos toolkit, it was for streamlining, standardizing, and making the 
process of innovation scalable. It was for the efficiency of innovation, not the 
innovation of innovation. 
In critiquing our designs from this perspective, I questioned whether our 
success came at some cost as well. I began to compare this experience with 
previous experiences of working with knowledge management systems 
(Boehner, 1996) where when we boiled down expert experiences into best 
practices suitable for a database, something was lost in the translation. This 
same phenomenon seemed to be at play with our technology tools for 
innovation. In systematizing a process through technology design, whether for 
knowledge management or innovation, the process becomes more formulaic 
and seems to lose “something.” What this something was I could not articulate 
or pinpoint. I questioned if perhaps we were simply using technology systems 
for what they were best at: e.g. scale, speed, standardization. Perhaps the 
best application of technology was indeed for the part of the innovation 
process that relied on conventions, but the part that was difficult to codify 
would happen outside these systems or even in spite of them. This would 
require a slight shift to approach the tools we were designing for innovation 
capture and documentation rather than stimulating and enhancing new 
practices.  
The observation that technology is good for promoting efficiency spurs 
the immediate counter reaction that perhaps our thinking around technology  
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had been too narrow. Technology not only codifies practice but can 
revolutionize practices as well, yet that was not the initial direction when we 
set out to make the tools for innovation. We wanted to help revolutionize how 
companies defined and operated within their industry but we didn’t think to 
provide ways to continually revolutionize the process for doing this. This 
question about what technology was useful for with regards to the innovation 
process spurred a meta-question as well: who is in control, and what are the 
implications, of making this decision? I reflected that as my colleagues and I 
set out to design the tools for innovation, we implemented our own vision both 
of what innovation as a process is about and what we thought a useful 
application of technology would be. We drew the line between what would be 
in and what would be out of our technical specifications and requirements.  
In summary then, as a designer for Strategos, I worked with my 
colleagues to first articulate and systemize the innovation process we used 
with clients to a degree that it could be readily operationalized. We sought to 
capture some of the unpredictability and inspiration that emerged through 
workshops such as the one described in the beginning of this section and re-
create the same scenarios through using different technology applications. 
After all, the workshops themselves were simply a ritualized practice, so why 
should the application of technology prove any different? To some degree this 
approach was successful but it spurred important questions: what parts of the 
innovation process are codifiable and what is left behind? What happens to 
innovation in the process of codification? Who draws the line between what 
can and cannot be codified? And finally, how could technology support 
innovation beyond codification?  
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From Innovation to Interfaces with the Ineffable 
My personal work experience with Strategos uncovered a paradox of 
designing for innovation as an ineffable, complex, dynamic process. Our first 
step in the design was to make innovation describable, componentized, and 
static. In designing the technology this way, something was lost in this 
translation: something escaped our codification.  Yet, this paradox is not 
specific for innovation. This same paradox of coding for what seems to escape 
codification plays out across the history of HCI. In this section, I will both 
broaden my scope but refine my questions as I define the constructs in this 
study. 
The Ineffable 
The first broadening step is to move from examining the relationship of 
technology and innovation processes to examining the relationship between 
technology and the ineffable. There were many terms I could have chosen to 
describe this concept, for example: the indescribable, the non-discursive, the 
irreducible, or the un-formalizable. What I wish to focus on are the messy and 
complex experiences that are currently a central focus for HCI design. I chose 
to use the term ineffable after first encountering this term in Karen Armstrong’s 
History of God (Armstrong, 1993). As a descriptor of that which is unknown in 
the discursive sense but experienced, the ineffable is an apt phrase for the 
aspects I wish to explore. The ineffable includes the ‘something’ that is often 
left behind in the process of codification.  This reading of the ineffable fits with 
new movements in HCI focusing on experience design because of the 
relationship between the ineffable and experience. The ineffable cannot be 
fully known or understood through explanation alone but must be experienced. 
John McCarthy and Peter Wright (2005) discuss experience as the “irreducible  
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totality of people acting, sensing, thinking, feeling, and making meaning in a 
setting” (p. 54). Because experience is personal and felt, it cannot be fully 
explained to another. 
The ineffable is not the same as the term ‘tacit’, popularized by Michael 
Polanyi (1983) and often described synonymously with implicit knowledge – 
what we know but cannot tell. Tacit knowledge also often escapes codification 
and describes the expert knowledge generated through repetition and intimate 
experience. Tacit knowledge is known but difficult to articulate because it has 
become second nature. The ineffable is experienced but difficult to articulate 
because the articulation always falls short. Furthermore, the ineffable is 
experienced by everyone, it is not limited to a kind of expert status. It may be 
possible to identify component parts of an ineffable experience, but the actual 
experience of the ineffable is more than the sum of its parts.  
The ineffable is an important construct for understanding in HCI for 
three inter-related reasons: practice, politics, and personhood. In terms of 
practice, all academics must contend with the relationships between their 
abstracted or simplified theories, models, and constructs and the lived, 
complex phenomenon of study (e.g. Geertz, 1973; Hayles, 1999; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1979; Robinson & Bannon, 1991; Wittgenstein, 1958).  Likewise, the 
practice of design must also struggle with translating the ineffable from 
something formless into a form. For instance, I have already described some 
of the challenges in designing systems for the process of innovation where the 
critical component of change and transformation was left behind.  
With our practices, we must consider politics, as any action will bring 
intended and unintended consequences. Katherine Hayles brings the political 
implications of representing the ineffable into sharp relief with her description  
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of the “Platonic forehand and backhand” (Hayles, 1999, p. 12-13).  Hayles 
examines the shift between an embodied, rich, and complex reality to abstract 
representations of this reality as information. In the Platonic backhand, a 
situated experience, for example participating in a brainstorming activity, is 
simplified into an abstraction of this experience, for example identifying the 
stages or the rules of a good brainstorming session. It is the Platonic forehand 
that Hayles suggests needs more consideration because of its generative, and 
therefore political, power. In the Platonic forehand, the abstraction shifts to 
becoming the stimulus, the guide, or the source for later situated experiences. 
It not only shapes the later experience but is also positioned as the cause.  
As another example, more closely related to Hayles’s work, consider 
the popularity of the information-processing model in cognitive studies. 
Developed partly in response to behaviorist and Piagetian stage models of 
how our mind works, the information-processing model relies on the language 
of computers and machines, with input and output, encoding and decoding 
(Flavell, Miller & Miller, 2002). It is difficult to pull apart which is the overriding 
metaphor, our brains as human computers or our computers as human brains.  
But, the important point is that the models drive our research. To use a 
Strategos metaphor, the research lens of our brains as a computer influences 
how we approach the brain as an object of study. The research lens of the 
computer as a brain influences how we study and design computers.  
This example brings us to the final reason for understanding the 
ineffable: personhood. Lucy Suchman (2004) describes how we design and 
describe our machines in our own image and how in this process, we define 
not only our machines but what we believe it means to be human. In other 
words, she argues, in our drive to create human-like computers, we  
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‘configure’, as in figure together, the human and the computer. This 
configuration consists of drawing and redrawing the boundary between 
humans and non-humans, an activity that brings us to the interface. 
The ineffable therefore provides an umbrella term for describing rich, 
complex experiences that are difficult to fully articulate or understand through 
a mere explanation. This concept of the ineffable is very relevant for HCI as 
interest has shifted from more narrowly defined problems such as task 
completion to designing for experience. The thrust of this work is not to create 
a theory of the ineffable: an exercise that I doubt is even possible. I will touch 
on the evolving nature of the ineffable through the case studies, but I am not 
proposing to deconstruct and reconstruct this phenomenon or process. 
Instead, I am using the ineffable as an area of interest for design in HCI. The 
main focus of this work is to argue that there are experiences which we 
consider ineffable (and this changes over time) and there are contrasting 
approaches for designing interfaces with the ineffable in HCI. This leads to the 
second term requiring clarification: interfaces. 
The Interface 
The interface is at once both an appropriate term and an unfortunate 
one. I believe for today’s audience it immediately suggests digital technology 
and probably more specifically computer technology. This is appropriate as the 
focus of this work is on the design of computer applications for aspects 
considered ineffable. However, the ‘interface’ is also unfortunate because of 
current response to its use during the early 1990s regarding graphical 
interface design. Because of the predominance of desktop computing and the 
preeminence of the screen, several critics (e.g. Winograd, 1996) have 
suggested that interface design became a superficial process focused only on  
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the surface interactions of input and output. This concern is still raised today. 
When McCullough states “building better interfaces remains the goal of much 
of the CHI community” (2004, p.20), this is a critical accusation not a casual 
observation. The term interface design, and interest in the interface, has thus 
given way to calls for interaction design or experience design, something I will 
take up in a later section.   
I wish to use the term interface, however, for its dual meanings of a 
digital meeting point and a boundary. My use of the term is more in line with 
current interests in the human computer interaction community for identifying 
seams, boundaries, and borders whether these are in designs themselves or 
in the practice of design (Chalmers & Galani, 2004; Rudström, Höök & 
Svennson 2004; Sengers, 2006; Sengers et. al., 2004). The construct of the 
ineffable causes first the question of what is considered ineffable and what is 
not considered ineffable. This line has often set the agenda for new 
developments in computing. Whereas intelligence was once considered an 
unapproachable black box, for example, pioneers in cognitive science have 
redrawn the boundary between what we know and don’t know about 
intelligence. With this new frontier, computer scientists began the pursuit of 
artificial intelligence. In a somewhat different articulation of Suchman’s 
configuration argument, where the line of the ineffable is drawn gives insights 
into what we consider essentially human, what separates us from machines, in 
other words what sets us apart as opposed to what draws us together. This is 
the nature of a boundary: it both divides and joins, it is the site of difference 
and the site of union.   
Furthermore, as a boundary, the interface suggests that it is something 
contestable and therefore malleable. Phil Agre’s metaphor of centers and  
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margins (Agre, 1997) is a useful analogue for this concept. Agre describes a 
historical shift in the research and practice of artificial intelligence as an 
inversion of what was once considered on the margins versus the historical 
focal point for the field. Traditional approaches to artificial intelligence had 
prioritized the process of representing the ‘world’, in other words creating all 
the players and the stage upon which they would act for the duration of the 
play. The secondary concern was the interactions that would eventually 
transpire during each scene. The focal point then was getting an accurate and 
comprehensive model of the world right. Agre suggested however that the 
show never made it out of rehearsals (to continue with the theatre metaphor) 
as more sets continued to be required. This breakdown stimulated an 
inversion of positions around the boundary – what was focal became marginal 
and vice versa. The new play for artificial intelligence was about the immediate 
and local interactions, the scenes, as opposed to the modeling the entire story. 
For the purposes of this work, I will be examining where we currently draw 
boundaries for the ineffable and how we approach this boundary with regards 
to the design, use and evaluation of computer technology. 
Designing Interfaces with the Ineffable 
In the above sections, I defined the terms for this investigation. I will 
now turn to the methods. For this work, I will examine how the ineffable is 
demarcated and subsequently approached with computer technology by both 
examining existing systems and by building new systems. It is this latter part 
of building that is the heart of this investigation and the primary research 
method: research through design, and in particular through a new practice of 
reflective design (Boehner, David, Kaye, and Sengers, 2004; Sengers, 
Boehner, David, and Kaye, 2005). Reflective design draws from a number of  
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existing practices including critical technical practice (CTP) (Agre, 1997), 
participatory design (e.g. Greenbaum and Kyng, 1991), reflection-in-action 
(Schön, 1983), critical design (e.g. Dunne and Raby, 2001), and value 
sensitive design (Friedman, Kahn, and Borning, in press).  
The uniqueness of the reflective design approach is in its emphasis on 
reflection as an on-going process, not simply something that happens at an 
impasse or at the bookends of a project. Reflection in the reflective design 
approach refers to a continuous critical examination of design choices and the 
socio-cultural factors and assumptions influencing these decisions. For 
instance, CTP argues for reflection on existing practices when there is a 
technical impasse, when the technical problems from a particular approach 
outweigh the benefits. Likewise, participatory design may be invoked as a 
method to anticipate and avoid social impasses between different 
stakeholders (for example between those funding a software design and the 
eventual users of the software). Reflective design argues for maintaining a 
critical perspective on technology design even when no impasse seems to 
exist. 
The second important distinction of reflective design is its stance not 
only on when reflection occurs but also on who engages in the reflection. 
Reflective design is not simply a process for designers to follow in questioning 
design choices but it is a process for engaging users as well in a critical 
examination of technology, its design, and its implications. This engagement of 
users in reflection may occur through engaging users in the design process, 
such as in participatory design and user-led design approaches, but it also 
occurs through the use of the eventual design. In this way, the goal of 
reflective design is different from many current trends in technology design  
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where the aim is to hide the technology from the user, for the complexity of the 
technology to become invisible. In reflective design, how the technology 
functions, and inferences of why it functions in one way as opposed to 
another, are highlighted for reflection. 
Just as Agre proposed building new technologies and experimentation 
as a form of technical research, I see reflective design as a useful method for 
social science to gain new insights into human behavior. Whereas 
experimental social scientists design experiments to create a testing 
environment from which to make observations and draw inferences, I will 
follow an emerging approach of designing systems for use in real world 
situations (e.g. Gay and Hembrooke, 2004). In other words, these systems are 
not designed for laboratory studies but will instead be introduced into contexts 
for use by people in their daily interactions and environments. As another 
analogy, consider how work in a field such as neurology advances by studying 
conditions of impairment. A brain with a damaged frontal lobe, for example, is 
a useful condition for scientists to discover not just the how a damaged lobe 
compensates or the impact of a damaged lobe, but in comparison, how a 
healthy frontal lobe operates.  In a much humbler way, building new 
technology systems as a form of research is akin to designing for different, i.e. 
‘not normal or status quo’ experiences of the world.  How people respond to 
non-traditional designs offers insight not only into how they appropriate novel 
technologies but into how and why they maintain practices and perpetuate 
expectations with more familiar technologies. 
The importance of building systems as a form of research is motivated 
partly from the work with Strategos outlined in the beginning of this chapter. 
The act of trying to match what we could do with the technology, or our  
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expectations of what technology can do, with how we understood the 
innovation process was an act of discovery. Even if in my critique of this 
translation we drifted away from our original perspectives of innovation, the 
exercise of design and subsequently evaluating these designs generated 
further discussion and analysis within the firm about how innovation actually 
happens. This reciprocal connection between theory and design continues to 
arise for me in human computer interaction studies. Although the ideal 
sequence is often presented as a linear one with designs being informed by 
theory, I believe the practice of design being informed directly by the 
environment and subsequently informing theory is also valid. In this model, the 
designing is a form of theorizing. 
Therefore, I am proposing to use the act of design both as a method for 
theorizing and as a method for conducting research. Again, a very brief 
comparison with a traditional empirical social science will help to clarify. For 
example, to understand the phenomenon of equivocal communication, i.e. 
ambiguous and indirect communication, Janet Bavelas and colleagues 
(Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett, 1990), begin with phenomenological 
observations and theoretical perspectives.  Whereas rule-based cognitive 
theories indicate how individuals may construct or understand equivocal 
speech, Bavelas proposes a situational theory for understanding the rules of a 
social situation for predicting equivocal acts. This conceptual work, as well as 
observations of equivocal acts, leads to a theory for explaining why equivocal 
communication occurs, namely in response to situations that could be 
categorized as avoidance-avoidance, where the safest most desirable 
response is to avoid direct communication in order to avoid negative 
consequences. This is the heart of the theory, outlining the constructs for  
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modeling and the predictions for testing. In order to test their theory, Bavelas 
discusses possible approaches of exemplification, i.e. finding existing 
equivocal acts and comparing the situations in which these occur, and field 
studies, i.e. looking for avoidance-avoidance situations and seeing if equivocal 
acts result. Ultimately, Bavelas outlines what she refers to as the ‘creation’ 
approach of designing a series of experiments in order to control as many 
variables as possible. In this way, Bavelas’s design of experiments is similar to 
designing different communication systems: both constrain activities and 
through these constraints offer opportunities for research. 
The role of equivocality and ambiguous language use will be discussed 
later in terms of its relationship with the ineffable, but at this point, I am using 
the example as an analogue for design as a method of theory and research. 
Suppose as a designer I wish to create a communication system to support 
equivocal communicative acts. Two useful starting points would be to examine 
theoretical perspectives (e.g. Bavelas et al., 1990) and to observe people 
communicating equivocally. These are the same starting points as for Bavelas 
and colleagues.  An additional step for a designer would be to look at other 
systems designed for equivocal and related communication acts. These 
insights would all be drawn together and just as Bavelas creates a model for 
why equivocal communication happens, a designer would also create a 
conceptual model of what type of communication it is supporting, when, and 
why. Just as with models of language use, design models will also vary greatly 
in terms of scale and goals. Once a model for a system is developed, this 
model is then tested by instantiating the design. For a systems designer, this 
could be a prototype or an actual designed system for use within a laboratory 
setting with tight controls or out in the field. For Bavelas, her conceptual model  
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is instantiated through an experiment conducted through lab settings. The 
results of the experiment reflect on the veracity and generalizability of her 
theory, and in turn reflect back on the phenomenon of equivocal 
communication. Likewise, analysis of how a designed system for equivocal 
communication is used provides evidence not only about the system (e.g. its 
usability) but about the underlying model or theory of equivocal 
communication. Whereas Bavelas creates experimental designs in the form of 
scenarios to invoke avoidance-avoidance situations, I will propose technology 
designs that invoke experiences with the ineffable. 
Designing systems as a research method works with both typical social 
science objectives and human computer interaction design objectives, but I 
would like to add a new objective as well. A social scientist might study the 
use of a new technology, such as computer mediated communication, in order 
to understand some aspect of the human condition. For instance, in previous 
work, I examined learning conversations as a means for developing efficacy in 
communities of practice (Boehner, 1996). I looked at how computer mediated 
communication influenced these conversations and in turn influenced the 
development of efficacy. As a designer, I might look at some aspects of the 
human condition in order to build better designs. For example, given a better 
appreciation of learning conversations, this might influence how I develop 
computer mediated communication systems to support this. But I would like in 
the designs created for the work described subsequently to take one more 
step. In addition to the designs being used for myself as a social researcher to 
understand the human condition or myself as a designer to improve designs, I 
want the designs to provoke users of the technology to reflect on aspects of 
the human condition and the role of technology.  Returning to the previous  
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arguments about both the ineffable and the interface being contested 
domains, I recognize my privileged position in articulating where I see the line 
and designing to meet this. Therefore, I want the designs to draw attention to 
and reflect this demarcation to allow for people’s own critical examinations of 
their own condition. 
Approaching the Ineffable  
As indicated above, the ineffable has presented a design and research 
agenda throughout the history of HCI and computing.  Whatever was once 
considered out of reach, because it either escaped the codifiable requirements 
or the tolerable roles of a computing system, becomes the bar for progress. 
Creating a computer system that could think strategically and logically, the 
epitome of human processing, was once a singular focus of artificial 
intelligence. Creating a computer that could mimic conversation, to the point 
where a human conversant could not tell the difference between a computer-
generated response and a human one was another benchmark. This goal 
continues to evolve into not just wanting a conversant, but a friend, a true 
other with autonomous thoughts and feelings. New frontiers for the ineffable 
as a point to interface with in HCI include an interest in designing for creativity 
(Boden, 1991; Wilson, 2002; Mitchell, Inouye, and Blumenthal, 2003), for a 
sense of place (Boehner, Gay, Hembrooke, 2005; Harrison & Dourish, 1996), 
spirituality (Muller, Christiansen, Nardi, and Dray, 2001; Bell, 2005), and 
enchantment (McCarthy, Wright, Wallace, and Dearden, 2005). In all of these 
frontiers a complex, rich, and difficult to demarcate experience sets the 
agenda for new technology design. 
Both Suchman (2004) and Paul Dourish (2001) have recently explored 
the history of HCI development along these lines, from an initial interest in  
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simply mechanizing and replacing identifiable human actions to addressing 
fuzzy and less discrete phenomenon. They both identify three areas for future 
development: embodiment, sociality, and emotion. By arguing that what we 
know we know through being or acting in the world, a focus on embodiment 
entails moving away from abstracted and generalized views of the world to 
building systems that allow for contingencies and local peculiarities. By 
recognizing that the world we live in is constructed, a focus on sociality 
emphasizes not static rules and preconditions but emergent interactions. 
Finally, by demonstrating that reason divorced from affect is an untenable 
relationship for living in the world, a focus on emotion requires addressing this 
omission in designing our computing systems.  
Exploring the Frontier 
In the frontiers described above, namely work in HCI on creativity, 
sense of place, spirituality, and enchantment, a variety of approaches exist for 
design and evaluation of interfaces. Technology may be designed to support 
practices considered ineffable, such as the increase in applications for creative 
production. Ben Schneiderman (2002) suggests for example that since we 
have cracked the code for supporting tasks based on efficiency and usability, 
the new focus will shift toward support for tasks requiring creativity and 
imagination.  Technology may also be designed for an experience of the 
ineffable, such as Bill Gaver and Heather Martin’s (2002) Prayer Device, a 
device for communicating wishes, prayers and desires with the realm of spirits. 
A third goal appearing is one where the technology itself embodies the 
ineffable – where the technology is able to take on the experience of felt life. In 
this last goal, we aspire to build technology that can take on the irreducible 
qualities of being human.    
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How one sets out to explore these frontiers impacts the design and 
evaluation choices for the technology. One may set out to design the ineffable 
into the technology or to design for approximation to it. The evaluation choices 
follow in a similar vein – if the ineffable has been designed in, then presumably 
it can be measured, but if the design only approximates the ineffable then the 
evaluation will not focus on precision as a metric of success. For example, one 
aspect of experience design that has become popular is designing for ludic 
(Gaver, 1999), hedonic (Brown, 2005), or fun (Blythe et al., 2003) experiences. 
Hassenzahl, Beu, &  Burmester (2001) discuss how one could assess these 
types of experiences resulting from new technology designs.  
One approach is to bolt on these new overlooked aspects into existing 
evaluation methods – for instance in a questionnaire about a web site 
experience adding questions regarding how much fun or enjoyment the user 
had. Yet, the authors argue that capturing a sense of fun or enjoyment along a 
Likert scale or semantic differential misses the important questions of how or 
why something was experienced as enjoyable. In the following section, I will 
examine these tensions and trade offs between alternate approaches to 
building and assessing interfaces to the ineffable.  
Reduction versus Augmentation 
Although a variety of approaches exist for interfacing with the ineffable, 
this range can be simplified into two broad categories. The first categorical 
approach is what could be considered the reduction or the codification 
approach. The method here, once something ineffable is identified, is to first 
make the ineffable effable, i.e. to take a complex, amorphous phenomenon 
and to break it down into identifiable or discrete components. As described by 
Hayles, it is the Platonic backhand where a particular phenomenon is  
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abstracted into a general model or representation and this in turn is used to 
shape or control the phenomenon. This is the approach, for example, in 
attempting to engineer joy into a system or attempting to design an affective 
computer that accurately detects and adequately responds to a user’s 
frustration level.  In the reduction approach then, an interface to the ineffable 
requires pinning the ineffable down. Furthermore, it depends upon getting the 
ineffable ‘right’ as the system response depends upon the accurate 
measurement of the ineffable as input. For example, in the subsequent case 
study, I will explore approaches to modeling affect, such as frustration, by 
computers. The success of the computing application depends upon being 
able to correctly model the users’ frustration levels.  
In the second approach, what I have referred to in other work as the 
augmentation approach (Boehner, Sengers & Gay, 2004), the ineffable is 
allowed to remain complex, particular, and non-discrete. In the augmentation 
approach, attention is drawn to the uncertainty and malleability of the ineffable. 
For example, an affective computer might detect and display changes in 
biometric information that may or may not indicate changes in frustration level. 
The user is alerted to these biometric changes and can choose to label this 
change as frustration or perhaps excitement. In this example, the user assigns 
the meaning to the detected change. The difference between the 
augmentation and the reduction approach is that in the former meaning is not 
embedded in the system’s computational model but negotiated with the 
system. 
The reduction approach dominates over the augmentation approach in 
HCI. Despite claims that we live in a post-modern age, or even a post-post-
modern age, our technology design is largely still directed by modernist  
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pursuits of finding order in chaos, standardizing away variance, and pursuing 
greater efficiencies of scale (McCullough, 2004). The deep roots of the 
reduction approach are philosophical, practical, economical, and cultural. 
From the philosophical side, we have the pervasive legacy of mentalism. The 
ability to retreat seemingly into a mental abstract world is often held as a 
defining characteristic of humans
2. From a practical perspective, this ability to 
create abstractions and use them to guide behavior works and makes intuitive 
sense, at least much of the time. To repeat a successful experience, such as 
the innovation workshops at Strategos, the logical step seems to be to break 
down what happened once and then repeat this same sequence of activities. 
Suchman also explores the common sense prominence of and reliance 
on abstract models in her discussion of plans (1987). It seems counter intuitive 
to suggest that action does not follow plans and instead brings plans into 
being. This is partly because we can all probably remember an experience of 
making plans – an activity that preceded our ensuing actions. What we often 
fail to notice, however, is how often we divert from these plans and create new 
ones on the fly. From an economic perspective, the drive for scale and 
efficiency favors this type of standardization through abstraction and modeling. 
A model or representation acts as a template – once the work of modeling has 
been complete, it becomes a generative form without much additional cost or 
effort. All of these ideas lead to the cultural resonance of the reduction 
approach. As a generative form, representations and models create culture, 
meaning they create and reify our ways of thinking and doing, just as our 
                                                 
2 As Wittgenstein (1963) argued, for example, a cat navigating through a city’s streets can only 
see the world from the cat’s current point of view, whereas humans can remove themselves 
from their specific place and time, to survey and draw an overview or cognitive map of the city.  
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culture in turn creates models. The recursive nature of this loop suggests why 
it is difficult despite post-modern rhetoric to escape the modernist ideals.  
However, this critique of the reduction approach does not suggest there 
is no value to abstract representation. Language as a system of abstract 
representation, for instance, that does not necessarily limit our ability to 
engage in rich communicative exchanges. Furthermore, technology design 
based on abstraction has been wildly successful in terms of new 
communicative potential, scientific discoveries, educational opportunities, 
economic development, and a host of other advancements. However, I wish to 
argue that the reduction approach needs a balance. The danger I believe is 
best expressed by Hayles’s argument of the Platonic forehand and the 
recursive nature of representations and models. Once a model has taken hold 
it is very difficult to see beyond it or to challenge it, and without new models to 
draw from we run the risk of cultural stagnation.  
This dynamic between models as both generative and restrictive is the 
same interplay we identified at Strategos under the rubric of orthodoxies. 
Orthodoxies, as discussed earlier, were defined as the conventional business 
practices and perspectives that identified a company and an industry. The 
mobile phone industry, for example, was once defined and directed by its 
market of primarily business workers. The mobile phone was either designed 
as a tool for extending the office or perhaps a personal safety device to be 
kept in the car for emergency phone calls. Thinking about the mobile phone as 
a fashion accessory flipped this conventional view and led to whole new 
markets and practices. Now, new conventions for conceptualizing the mobile 
phone as a device for enchantment, leisure, and game playing are beginning 
to take hold (McCarthy & Wright, 2004). Conventions are not inherently bad.  
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Conventions provide a ground on which common and shared practices 
develop, but conventions can eventually become limiting. Representations and 
models, which are the abstract articulation of conventions, must therefore be 
balanced with methods that evoke change. 
The augmentation approach described above is one suggested 
balancing method to the over dependence on reduction. In an augmentation 
approach to the ineffable, the interface acts as a mirror or an amplifier drawing 
attention to complexity and uncertainty rather than trying to explain it away or 
simplify it. However, although a useful strategy, the construct of augmentation 
is perhaps not the right conceptualization of the balance I wish to strike. I 
originally thought of augmentation as the obvious counter approach to 
reduction, but just as the reduction approach depends upon abstraction and 
representation, so too does the augmentation approach. Let us return to the 
previous example of an affective computer that detects indices of frustration. 
In the reduction approach, the affective computer contains an internal model 
that defines what frustration looks like (in terms of discrete information like 
biometric impulses) and how to respond to it. In the augmentation approach, 
the affective computer is less prescriptive and instead only provides feedback 
to the user that some change in emotional indices has occurred.  However, the 
augmentation approach also depends upon representations. The 
augmentation approach requires taking a point of view in terms of what indices 
may be meaningful to the user and must then taking a point of view in terms of 
how to represent this information back to the user.  
I originally chose the term augmentation because it suggested a 
heightened awareness, a directing of attention toward something that was 
always there but perhaps had faded into the background. This then suggests a  
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design strategy, something that the designer is in control of and can 
manipulate. It is this locus of control that gets to the heart of what is required in 
contrast or balance to a reduction approach. In both the reduction approach 
and the augmentation approach, the designer is in control of how the ineffable 
is defined and experienced through the technology interface. In the reduction 
approach, the designer also maintains control over the meaning or the 
interpretation of the ineffable, whereas in the augmentation approach, the 
meaning or interpretation of the ineffable is co-interpreted between the 
designer, system and user.  It is the opening up of interpretation that provides 
the needed balance to the reduction approach. The openness to interpretation 
acts against representations that only work in one direction to codify meaning 
and ultimately restrict new meaning, practices and perspectives from 
developing. 
The Interpretation Approach  
The development of the interpretation approach as a method for HCI is 
currently being explored in the work by Phoebe Sengers and Bill Gaver 
(Sengers and Gaver, 2005, 2006). Sengers and Gaver propose that the 
interpretation approach is not just critical for interfaces to the ineffable but all 
interfaces of interaction. Traditional HCI approaches tend to take a narrow 
view of interpretation, where interpretation is a problem to be resolved. Much 
of the past research in HCI, for example, is directed toward making the user’s 
interpretation of a system coincide with the designer’s intent, or making the 
system’s interpretation of a user’s actions coincide with the user’s intent. 
Sengers and Gaver argue that interpretation is not a problem of matching 
interpretations but a process of constructing meaning.  
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As an example of the interpretation approach, Sengers and Gaver 
discuss the development of a project called the Home Health Horoscope, a 
sensor based system that provides daily readings reflective of the emotional 
climate or well-being in the home. Home Health Horoscopes is designed partly 
in response to smart home initiatives that follow what Intel Corporation refers 
to as proactive computing. Proactive computing follows the closed 
representation approach outlined in the previous section, where sensors are 
embedded in an environment, such as the home, with the purpose of learning 
inhabitants’ patterns and eventually anticipating inhabitants’ needs. A 
proactive home would conceivably be able to tell, for example, if grandma fell 
in the shower or forgot to take her medicine.  As with other representation 
systems, the control is placed in the designer’s hands and the intelligence or 
interpretation of the system is prioritized over that of the user.  
In contrast, Sengers and Gaver propose using ‘shy sensors’, sensors 
that are shy not only in what they sense but in the control they are afforded to 
respond to this information. In the Home Health Horoscope system, 
idiosyncratic sensors are designed for a family’s current way of detecting the 
well-being of their own home. The sensors are well known to the family and 
become part of the material for deducing what is happening – just as a closed 
door that is usually open is a signal that something is different and an 
invitation to speculate on what it means. The combined input of the sensors 
will produce a horoscope, coded for emotional content, at the beginning of 
each new day. The selection of horoscopes as one of the interfaces with the 
system is a deliberate nod to the shy sensing and interpretation approach. We 
all have experience reading into fortunes or horoscopes while at the same 
time holding a degree of skepticism for them. In other words, we can choose  
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to find meaning there or not: we (in general) tend not to take horoscopes as 
literal predictions or proclamations of truth. 
The Home Health Horoscopes project uses both representation and 
augmentation in its effort to allow for more open interpretation. In terms of 
representation, certain indices are chosen to be proxies for emotion or well-
being. These indices, such as amount of water used throughout the day or 
pressure sensed in a particular love seat, are given an emotional code based 
on what these events ‘usually’ mean. In other words, the emotional codes are 
abstractions or representations of typical practices. The fact that sensors are 
added to this everyday information amplifies or augments their importance in 
the home’s daily rhythms. Also, the appearance of a slip of paper every day 
can stimulate reflection on the role of rhythms or patterns in the home and 
their contribution to the home’s well being. However, interpretation is firmly 
established as a collaborative process. The ambiguous nature of a horoscope 
gives license to the inhabitants of the home to either question or accept the 
opinion of the sensor system.  
The Home Health Horoscope system suggests there are design 
choices we can make in HCI that allow for more open interpretation. However, 
the idea of interpretive flexibility as advanced in the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) undermines the role of the designer in this process 
to some degree. According to an STS perspective, the desire to design for 
interpretation may be construed as redundant (Pinch & Bijker, 1995; Oudshon 
& Pinch, 2003). All systems, according to the idea of interpretive flexibility, are 
re-interpreted and re-configured by users. Yet, the degree of interpretive 
flexibility appears to be qualitatively different in Intel’s proactive home and the 
Home Health Horoscope. The implication of this qualitative difference is  
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apparent when the systems are evaluated. As discussed above, a proactive 
home must be right in its modeled inferences in order to be successful. The 
Home Health Horoscope is successful if it causes reflection on and active 
interpretation of the well-being in the home. However, this evaluation is less 
clear cut than the proactive home’s benchmarks of accurate responses. Is the 
benchmark of success for the Home Health Horoscope that it created ‘more’ 
reflection than before? Or ‘better’ reflection? How would ‘better’ be defined? 
More engaged? More accurate? More longevity of interest? Would a sign in 
the kitchen asking “What is the emotional climate of the home today?” be 
considered more similar in spirit to the Home Health Horoscope or the 
Proactive Home? Would a random horoscope generator tied to no sensors at 
all be just as effective in causing reflection on the well being in the home? 
Sengers and Gaver outline that although the idea of interpretation is not 
new to the field of HCI, considering it as a fundamental perspective requires 
new practices in design and evaluation. In this effort, they look to lessons from 
psychoanalysis, philosophy (particularly the fields of hermeneutics), and 
critical theory. I propose to add to this exploration theoretical approaches and 
perspectives from the field of communication.  There are a number of reasons 
why communication should be included in this exploration of interpretation. 
Many designers for instance characterize the interaction between humans and 
computers as a form of conversation and communication theories provide 
insight into how conversations are maintained and negotiated. Secondly, 
communication theories offer insights into the conversations that not only 
happen with a designed system but the communication that happens through 
or around a designed system. The main reason in this work for including 
perspectives from communication is because of theories of communication as  
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a process of interpretation, a balancing act of convention and invention, syntax 
and semantics. We adeptly use language in everyday conversations and 
engage in everyday acts of meaning making and interpretation. Understanding 
this collaborative process of language use should provide insights into the 
design and use of technology systems for interpretation.  
Driving Questions 
The motivation driving this work began with an exploration of how 
interfaces to the ineffable are established and move through the development 
of new computer technology. Therefore, through the case studies I will 
illustrate how the ineffable is defined for two different experiences: art and 
affect. The application of technology for experiencing art has a long history 
whereas the application of technology for experiencing affect is a relatively 
new area of interest. By looking at both, I can describe how the dominant 
approaches to technology persist regardless of the maturity of the technology 
or the specific instantiation of the ineffable. The first set of driving questions 
concern how the interface to the ineffable is constructed and the implications 
of this configuration: 
 
Q1: How have the boundaries of the ineffable been 
configured for the experience of art and for the experience 
of affect? What is the dominant approach of interfacing with 
this configuration? What are its practical, political and 
personal implications? 
 
I have argued that once an interface is established, a common 
approach is to try and formalize the ineffable into a codifiable representation. 
In the best case scenario, this approach can ultimately be limiting and in the 
worst case scenario the codification of the ineffable kills the very quality one is  
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trying to address. In contrast, I propose following the alternate emerging 
approach of designing for interpretation. The second set of driving questions 
then are concerned with a particular design approach to the ineffable: 
 
Q2: How do we design for co-interpretation? If systems are 
ultimately interpreted by users, what strategies enable the 
designer to play a role in anticipating or contributing to this 
conversation?  
 
Q3: How do we evaluate designs for co-interpretation? How 
can we move beyond one-off descriptive accounts of design 
and use and work toward a more systematic understanding 
of this design space? 
 
The third set of questions looks at the interplay between communication 
theory and approaches to interpretation from this field and parallel or 
contrasting approaches in HCI:  
 
Q4: What insights from communication theory, particularly 
studies of language use, can we draw from for insights into 
the design, use, and evaluation of systems designed for 
openness to interpretation? 
 
Q5: What insights from the process of designing and 
evaluating systems designed for openness can we draw on 
for the field of communication? 
 
These questions are all related to the topic of concern: interfaces with 
the ineffable. However, a final question revolves around evaluating my 
approach to tackling this question within a social science framework. As I am 
proposing to use design work as a research method, part of my analysis will 
be to evaluate and critique the effectiveness of this approach.  
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Overview of Work 
This chapter outlines the area of concern by first explaining my 
personal connection to the motivating question of designing for the ineffable. I 
have subsequently defined the constructs I will explore and presented a 
number of areas where these constructs are currently under review. I have 
proposed that in order to design interfaces with the ineffable, an approach 
allowing for co-interpretation is required. As this is a new approach, more work 
is needed for understanding what this entails for design, evaluation, and 
ultimately theory development.  
Summary of Approach 
This work is an inductive approach toward exploring design as a 
process for critical reflection and research. I will begin with two case studies 
that each explore how technology is traditionally defined for a particular 
experience of the ineffable and through the application of reflective design, I 
will propose alternate design goals, strategies, and evaluation methods.  The 
first case study looks at interfaces for the ineffable experience of art and 
results in designing applications not for dictating an experience of single art 
object but opening up the experience of art in the highly scripted environment 
of the art museum. I will provide a detailed account of two installations created 
by myself and colleagues in the HCI lab and discuss their iterative progress 
and responses both from visitors, curators, and ourselves as designers. The 
second case study revolves around the ineffable experience of affect. In this 
case study, I play the role of an evaluator but one who is very close to the 
design process as well. This case study looks at a particular installation for 
supporting the construction and interpretation of affective presence in an office 
environment. Therefore, the first case study will focus more on designing  
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interfaces and the second case study will focus largely on evaluating 
interfaces although both case studies contain elements of the whole process 
from inception to implementation to final review and future considerations. The 
importance of including both case studies is to attempt to draw more general 
lessons about designing and evaluating an interpretive approach to the 
ineffable.  For each case study, I will review relevant literature, detail the 
design process, present evaluation results, and discuss implications. 
Both case studies introduce issues that must be addressed for the 
interpretation approach of designing interfaces with the ineffable to advance in 
HCI. In particular, both case studies struggle with the goal of designing 
systems that are open to interpretation, and therefore open to unique and 
personal experiences where meaning is not dictated or determined a priori. I 
describe a resulting tension, for example, between the desire to be open and 
yet to still provide footholds for uptake. Furthermore, the goal of designing for 
openness challenges existing roles of the designer (of being in control and 
orchestrating experience) and goals of evaluation (of defining success as 
matching some pre-determined experience). In an effort to answer these 
questions, I take a step back to look for more theoretical grounding. In 
particular, I outline current changes in the HCI field for conceptualizing 
interpretation such as ideas of interpretive flexibility from STS (e.g. Bijker, 
1995) and the idea of designing for multiple interpretation advanced by 
Sengers and Gaver (1996).  
However, the view of user interpretation in STS tends to be one sided, 
looking at how stakeholders other than the designer appropriate designs in a 
multitude of ways that potentially diverge from the designer’s original intent. 
This work does not pick up the question of what the designer should or could  
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do in order to work with (as opposed to shut down) this constant appropriation. 
The work of Sengers and Gaver makes advances in addressing new roles and 
practices of designers and to add to this perspective, I look to the field of 
communication. The reason for this turn is because of communication’s own 
history in addressing ideas of interpretation and meaning making but in 
particular because of research into the design and use of everyday tools by 
everyday practitioners, namely the use of language in our everyday lives. By 
looking to the field of communication, I explore what this field adds to the new 
directions in HCI as well as suggesting how this new approach to 
interpretation in HCI can provide a process of inquiry for communication. 
Intended Audience and Contribution  
This work is presented to the field of communication but with a special 
emphasis toward researchers and practitioners in HCI. As a work that will 
draw across a range of disciplines (from communication, sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies, computer science, and the arts and humanities) 
it will find most resonance with scholars who value an interdisciplinary 
approach as opposed to an in depth pursuit of an established tradition. It is 
also directed toward researchers interested in new qualitative methods for 
understanding acts of interpretation in communication. Although several 
methods are used and several iterations run with the systems, this is not an 
experimental study of main effects and significant differences. I believe 
experimental studies may be useful in later stages, but at this point of the 
research, the work is still largely exploratory and directed more at theory 
grounding and development.  
As such, the main contribution of this work is to advance alternate 
design and evaluation strategies for interfaces with the ineffable as well as to  
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illustrate a new approach to research for the field of communication. 
Approaching the ineffable as something open to interpretation requires a 
fundamental rethinking not just of standard HCI methods but of what it means 
to design and what it means to evaluate systems in the first place. 
Outline of Chapters 
The goal of this chapter has been to provide the background motivation, 
define the focus of study, and present the driving questions behind the case 
studies and their approach. In chapter two, I introduce the first case study on 
designing technology for the ineffable experience of art. I will begin with a 
historical review of how the ineffable is conceptualized and debated in art 
museums, art, and regarding the role of technology in museums. I then 
present an interpretive approach toward developing a series of alternate types 
of designs that transform the visitor from passive recipient of information to an 
active participant in the construction of the museum experience. In chapter 
three, the case study is about the ineffable experience of affect and the design 
of technology for this experience. Again, I present a historical trajectory of 
conceptualizing affect and designing for affect before describing the design 
and evaluation of an open-ended system called Affector.  
A key result from the case studies is the need for further exploration 
and theory development regarding designing for interpretation. Therefore in 
chapter four, I begin with an overview of work in the field of HCI on 
interpretation, drawing from the fields of STS, the arts, and the humanities. In 
particular, I look to studies in the field of communication for understanding 
everyday interpretive acts. I explore new understandings of interpretation in 
communication and the implications for design and evaluation methods in HCI. 
I conclude this chapter by reversing the discussion from what the field of  
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communication can add to HCI to identifying what the field of HCI, and in 
particular the practice of reflective design, can add to the study of 
communication. The concluding chapter provides an overall summary of and 
themes emerging from this work as well as looking forward to future studies 
and practices. 
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Chapter 2. Art and the Ineffable 
“The emergence of mixed-reality technology marks a 
further step in our quest to control our own evolution, to 
redefine what it is to be human and to become actively 
responsible for the construction of our own realities.”  
– Roy Ascott 
 
The quote above from interactive artist Roy Ascott reflects a belief in 
both the transformative potential of new technologies as well as in the 
distinctly human capability to engage in the creative and artistic pursuit of 
constructing new realities (Ascott, 2004, p. 113). This presents a view of new 
technology as supporting the ineffable capability of humanity for 
transformation. However, there is an alternate view of technology as well, one 
where technology prevents us from pushing toward new experiences and 
instead codifies existing standard practices. It is this tension between 
supporting new experiences and codifying existing practices that is at the 
heart of this chapter.  
This chapter will survey how technology has been introduced into the 
art museum as art, as a tool for understanding art, and as an interface for 
reconstructing the experience of the art museum. The first two categories 
examine how technology is designed for experiencing the ‘ineffable’ 
communion with art, i.e. how technology influences the interaction with art, 
interactions that have been described as experiences of the sublime or the 
transcendent. The third category looks at the transformative potential of 
technology to support new experiences in the art museum, not necessarily 
experiences of an artwork, but new roles and practices for the visitor in the 
tightly scripted environment of the museum. In this study, I will draw out how  
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and why some new experiences are taken up in the art museum and others 
are not.  
The case study for this chapter was inspired from an initial review of 
how new technology was designed for museum visitors. Despite rhetoric of 
communing with art as a transcendent experience, the design of technology 
aides was one primarily of information transfer. Supporting only information 
transfer positioned technology not as Ascott’s tool for creating new worlds but 
as the alternate view of technology as a reification apparatus. Therefore, this 
case study details an approach, its obstacles, pitfalls, and eventual lessons 
learned, for building technology in the art museum environment to support 
alternate experiences. 
Framing the Art Museum 
Before turning to the case study, I will begin with a closer look at the 
context in which this case is situated, specifically in the art museum, and 
reintroduce the issues of the ineffable and interpretation. It is important to 
situate this work with an appreciation of how these issues have played out, 
and continue to evolve, within the confines of this particular institution. As Bell 
(2002) notes, there are enormous differences between the mission and 
experiences of different museum types, or ecologies in Bell’s terms, such as 
art museums versus science and natural history museums versus cultural 
heritage sites. Since this case study takes place in an art museum, this is 
where I will focus my review, although occasionally I will draw from the insights 
of other museum literature where relevant. Just as there are enormous 
differences between types of museums, there exist vast differences between 
types of art museums as well in terms of focus, funding (i.e. private or public), 
size, location, and a host of other variables. In reviewing the art museum, I will  
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draw out major themes but will gloss over some of the distinguishing 
characteristics until discussing the specific museum where this case study is 
situated. In sum, this review will not be an attempt to present an exhaustive 
history or critical analysis of the art museum, but an attempt to highlight some 
of the important discourses with regards to the different roles and practices in 
the museum before turning to the role of technology.  
The earliest collections of art resided in monastic buildings or houses of 
worship and aristocratic palaces. The term museum is thought to derive from 
the Greek mouseion, a “temple dedicated to the Muses, the nine goddesses of 
inspiration, learning, and the arts.” (Pitman, 1999, p.1). Eventually, art artifacts 
housed in religious institutions made their way to the public, for example the 
Capitoline Museum was founded in 1471 from artifacts donated by Pope 
Sixtus IV. Collections from artistocrats began their journey to the public 
sometime later culminating in the ‘paradigmatic turn’ from princely palace into 
a public art museum of the Louvre at the height of the French Revolution in 
1793 (McClellan, 2003, p.5). Besides being a traditional place to start a 
history, namely at the beginning, this origin story and etymology introduces 
some of the main themes that have continued throughout the art museum’s 
history, namely issues of access, connection with the divine, and learning.  
From these auspicious beginnings of privilege, during the Renaissance, 
art museums were the ‘cabinets of curiosities’ and the parlor room art of 
individuals. The cabinets of curiosities, as the name suggests, tended to be an 
odd assortment of man-made artifacts, jewels, and natural specimens, high art 
and mere trinkets, all combined together. One of the first examples originated 
with the private collection of the Tradescant family in the 1600s, which was 
gifted to Elias Ashmole and subsequently passed onto Oxford University in  
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1659 to establish the Ashmolean Museum. Two important details that 
historians of museums often point out regarding this period were the lack of 
labels and the conversations stimulated around the objects (Hunt, 1998; 
Kester, 2004; Pitman, 1999). The lack of labels is often referenced as an 
example of letting the objects speak for themselves and arouse wonder and 
curiosity naturally whereas the conversations engendered around the 
paintings are generally held as drawing room conversations among people 
with similar backgrounds and experiences. “Painters and landscape artists,” 
Kester writes, “shared a symbolic vocabulary with their patrons. The objects 
and environments they created facilitated exchanges that were central to the 
life of an (admittedly elitist) community of viewers.” (Kester, 2004, p. 26).  In 
this context, there was no need for labels or aides for interpretation as viewers 
and artists shared a common ground for communicating through art. In other 
words, art objects were considered ineffable in the sense that there was no 
need for explanation, the communion was considered immediate. A final detail 
to note of this period is that most of these collections were restricted to 
aristocrats, wealthy individuals, members of the clergy, and scholars (Pitman, 
1999). It is not until the mid to late 1700s that societies such as the Salon in 
Paris and the Royal Academy in London began to present their members’ 
collections to the general public.  
As collections grew and access to the public expanded, the perceived 
need for ordering the collections crept in, the mandate of the museum was 
refined, and the professionalization of the museum curator began. Values of 
order and hierarchy identified with Enlightenment and later Victorian values 
began to appear through clear labels, spatialized divisions, and concerns with 
traffic flow through the demarcated space (McClellan, 2003). In terms of  
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mandate, art museums differentiated themselves from the commercial art 
houses providing entertainment
3 and from applied art museums. As an 
institution reportedly open now to the general public, the mission for the art 
museum was to contribute to the moral and intellectual refinement of all 
people.
4 The method of this refinement process was still viewed as a 
transcendent, or ineffable, experience - mere exposure to refined objects 
would lift people to a state of enlightenment (McClelland, 1993). As Matthew 
Prichard, assistant director of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts in the early 
1900s, stated: “The Museum is for the public and not for any caste or section 
of it, whether student, teacher, artist or artisan…Joy, not knowledge, is the aim 
of contemplating a painting by Turner or Dupré’s On a Cliff…in accordance 
with the teachings of Aristotle, who recognized that the direct aim of art is the 
pleasure derived from a contemplation of the perfect” (cited in Wallach, 2003, 
p. 103).   
Because of the dominant belief that authentic works of art could serve 
as “messengers of universal truth and beauty” (McClelland, 1993, p. 19), the 
main thrust for curator scholarship and standardization then revolved around 
the quality of selection and methods of display. Most of the aides for 
interpretation provided to visitors were aides in the sense of promoting the 
gaze or beholding: a holy communion between the viewer and the art. 
Although labeling increased throughout the collection, these were largely for 
                                                 
3 In the U.S., these museums were called dime museums (Pitman, 1999) and P.T. Barnum 
had a famous variation of these with a mass of collections and curiosities acquired from 
various sources. Pitman (1999) suggests that Barnum’s sensibilities for shock, intrigue, and 
scale anticipated the contemporary museum’s blockbuster movement. 
4 From a 1953 UK Parliamentary report regarding museums, as reported in (McClelland, 2003, 
p. 8). Note that this report drew from the sentiments of John Ruskin who felt the museum 
should provide examples of ‘perfect order and perfect elegance…to the disorderly and rude 
populace.’ (ibid.)  
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classification purposes and the architecture and interior design began a 
progression toward the ‘white cube’ mentality in an attempt to provide a 
neutral backdrop for the art itself. The connoisseurship or appreciation of art, 
what is also referred to as an essentialist position (Pierroux, 2005), was valued 
over developing an understanding of art history in general or an individual art 
object’s context in particular. 
The distinction between essentialist and contextual positions regarding 
art became embodied in both separate museums and in separate museum 
departments. In the early 1900s, critics of the elitist development of art 
museums formed alternate institutions with a social and activist outlook, 
concerned with their relevance for the particular community’s interest and 
needs. Likewise, within art museums themselves a split developed between 
the curatorial and the education departments. Although most museums 
claimed to value each equally, the education departments were often 
relegated a secondary status, “often housed in basements and staffed by 
women [only], [while the male] curators became increasingly concerned with 
refining conditions of display.” (McClelland, 2003, p.25). The view that 
masterpieces could speak for themselves and that providing too much 
information about an object would get in the viewer’s way dominated museum 
sentiment throughout the first half of the 1900s and continues through to 
today. In other words, the dominant point of view was that the ineffable nature 
of art defied explanation. 
Partly in a move to redress the balance of essentialism over 
contextualism, partly in response to declining museum attendance and 
questions of relevance, and partly due to the zeitgeist of social and political 
activism of the 1960s and 1970s, changes in the declared orientation of the art  
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museum began to appear around this time. Museums began making new 
efforts, mandated to some degree by government funding agencies, to expand 
and diversify the museum visitorship, through varied programs and exhibits, 
educational offerings and public outreach. One such effort involved adding 
more temporary exhibits, shepherding in what Wallach (2003) calls the 
Blockbuster age of the art museum, beginning in 1963 with the Mona Lisa at 
the Metropolitan Museum in New York City. The expense of staging such 
shows led to the need for more corporate sponsorship and, according to 
McClellan, an interest in shows with a high selling profile, “namely 
Impressionists, mummies, and anything with gold in the title.” (McClellan, 
2003, p. 33). Blockbusters would eventually take the shape of universal crowd 
pleasers, such as Monet’s and Vermeer’s works, or alternatively crowd 
dividers such as the provocative Sensation exhibition, with cut-up sheep, 
portraits of child killers, and soiled bed sheets, at the Royal Academy in 
London in 1997. Crowds are drawn to the ‘Yes, we all agree this is art’ as well 
as the ‘I can’t believe this is art’ shows. The ineffable seems to shift here then 
from the sublime to the uncontested or the controversial. 
Throughout this introduction so far, the voice of the visitor has been 
absent, or only indirectly referred to as a mass public. This is largely reflective 
of museum studies literature, where the visitor comes after discussions of art 
and the unique role of the art museum as an institution for collection, 
preservation, and education. Visitor studies literature is often focused on the 
numbers and profiles of visitors, and one common charge is that the growth of 
visitor attendance is due to increases in the educated middle class, but that 
the profile of visitors has not changed much over the years (Rice, 2003).  
Behind the presentation of statistics, the visitor appears as a faceless mass,  
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referred to during the Enlightenment as the poor downtrodden wretches living 
on the edge of anarchy for whom the museum would be a refuge. This 
perception of visitors en masse continues in more contemporary critical 
studies, ostensibly attacking the power elite of the museum, where the visitor 
is portrayed as moving inside the modern panopticon (Bennett, 1995), 
behaving as swarming locusts around masterpieces or as cultural livestock 
corralled through exhibit halls (Baudrillard, 1994), or building their cultural 
capital and status as a member of the in-group (Bordieu, 1984). In contrast to 
these accounts, Rice (2003) and Prior (2003) both argue against portraying 
the visitor as a mindless dupe, claiming that visitors just as likely come in with 
their own agendas and will pick and choose the experiences and messages of 
interest to them. The visitor’s agenda may range from studying a particular 
piece, seeking the transcendent experience, eating lunch, finding a quiet 
space to meditate, ticking off a tourist check list, killing time, or simply looking 
for a clean lavatory. 
Falk and Dierking (2000) argue that one reason why museum education 
studies have not made more progress is because of the predominant 
reductionistic view of both the visitor
5 and the process of learning. Most 
studies have approached the visitor as a blank slate entering the museum and 
the learning process as one of information transfer. There is a new emphasis 
on expanding the learning studies approach to recognize individual viewer 
motivations and prior experiences as well and approaching learning as a 
durational process, not a self-contained visit. Falk (1999) references science-
                                                 
5 During a visit to the Smithsonian American Art Museum’s label writing department in 2003, I 
learned that the writers are instructed to produce copy for the average eight year old. 
Therefore not only are visitors generally faceless but they also haven’t reached puberty. There 
are obvious reasons why this guideline is helpful but it further underscores how much of the 
work in visitor studies is about the ‘mass’ and not the individual.  
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center director Tom Krakauer’s comment that museums teach the public “what 
they almost already know” (Krakauer, 1999, p. 7). Although Krakauer refers to 
science museum visitor, the comment echoes experiences in art museums 
where people draw from their existing backgrounds and experiences. Critics of 
the essentialist approach to art appreciation argue that this works for a limited 
population who enter the museum with an understanding of art history 
(McClellan, 2003). More to the point however, is the idea that the museum as 
an institution and the art it holds is more open to interpretation and a variety of 
experiences, and that the visitor is also more complex than many studies 
acknowledge.  
To this point, just as social critics have caused a rethinking of the art 
museum and its role, and just as new critics are calling for a more qualitative 
understanding of visitors’ active roles in museums (Prior, 2003; Rice, 2003), 
so too are there critics calling for a more complex understanding of the art 
museum beyond the view of the repressive and “evil political side” (Rice, 
2003).  In Rice’s examination between the gap of museum theory and practice, 
she notes that by the time a theory has formed, practitioners have moved onto 
new practices both informed from their own experiences and drawing from 
such critiques. She acknowledges the gain from greater awareness of the 
power and politics of an art museum’s role as an institution, but she also 
affirms that just as the visitor is not a mindless dupe set to play out a 
predetermined script, so too are museum practitioners more empowered in 
their ability to challenge and work within or around imposed constraints (Rice, 
2003).  Curator’s today are just as saavy about the criticisms of museums and 
language of power discourses with an increased awareness due to not only 
social critics, but art that began in the mid 60s to take the institutions of art as  
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their subject. Diamond (2005) argues that many new curators have arrived in 
their positions from the periphery of the established art world, often influenced 
by digital art, and bring with them new ideas on the role of the curator acting 
as a producer, facilitator and even co-collaborator with artists and visitors as 
opposed to arbiter of art and non-art. Prior (2003) and Gere (2004) both argue 
that curators are aware of pursuing a more dynamic role, acting not as 
historical conservators lagging behind and merely reflecting society, but 
playing a performative role as well in creating the collective past and therefore 
influencing the future. 
The debates and issues marking the birth of the art museum as an 
institution continue into today, namely questions of access, roles of 
participants, the primacy of an art object, and debates regarding how to 
support the ineffable communion (if it even exists) with art. McClelland (2003) 
and Rice (2003) remind us that the essentialist and contextualist positions, the 
argument for the non-discursive nature of art and the drive to provide more 
interpretive aides is an ongoing tension. Rice points to a perhaps curious 
flipping between the traditional proponents of such views with curators 
beginning to present more and more information on museum walls, for 
instance, and educators adopting movements such as the Visual Thinking 
Strategies (VTS). Rice characterizes VTS as  “an anti-information 
movement…founded in research and fueled by a frustration with the perceived 
inadequacy of information to help visitors decode and derive meaning from 
works of art” (Rice, 2003, p. 91).  
One primary conclusion from this brief historical account is the need to 
continually recognize the complexity of the at museum context. Visitors are not 
categorically cultural dupes, nor are curators the wicked arm of the institutional  
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elite. Perhaps more interesting is to ask where these characterizations come 
from and why they persist. In the subsequent section on technology design, I’ll 
demonstrate how the designs often tend to pick up on conventional, 
categorical views of the art museum rather than its rich complexity of 
paradoxes and tensions. As Boniface and Fowler summarize (2003): 
“Museums are wonderful, frustrating, stimulating, irritating, hideous things, 
patronizing, serendipitous, dull as ditchwater and curiously exciting, tunnel-
visioned yet potentially visionary. The real magic is that any one of them can 
be all those simultaneously” (Boniface and Fowler, 1993, cited in Prior, 2003, 
p. 64). Finally, the introduction of new technology both as art and as a tool or 
interpretive aide has added new dimensions to the ongoing debate about the 
role of art museums.   
Technology and Art in the Museum 
Perhaps the one continually defining characteristic of an art museum in 
the face of shifting curatorial, educational, and visitor roles is the simple fact 
that the museum houses art. Although many critics may today argue that more 
art exists outside the museum than inside, and although consensus may not 
exist over a given individual object’s status as art, what remains is that objects 
inside the museum have been stamped as art by the establishment. Before 
examining the influence of digital technology
6 on art, it is important to review 
some of the important transitions in what objects enter the museum and 
become art. Just as a brief history of the art museum cannot pretend to be 
exhaustive, a cursory history of art, and a fragment of that history as well, will 
                                                 
6 One could argue that all art is made through technology of different forms, in fact, Clement 
Greenberg, modern art commentator during the 1950s and 1960s, suggested that the 
progression of art is actually defined by the technology (or medium) of the day – for example, 
modern art’s progression was its ongoing reaction to dismantling or breaking out of the 2 
dimensional structure (Kester, 2004, p. 27).  
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leave many passages unexplored. I will start with a focus on art that troubles 
the boundaries of the museum but eventually becomes assimilated before 
moving into a discussion about the introduction of digital technology and its 
implications for the roles and practices in the museum.  
Artists have been challenging the role of the art museum and the canon 
of art it cultivates since the early 1900s (Rice, 2003). For example, Marcel 
Duchamp, who referred to the museum as a mausoleum, created one of his 
most famous works in jest for an exhibit of avant-garde art. His “Fountain”, an 
actual urinal, so angered the panelists of the exhibit that the piece 
mysteriously went missing. Ironically, the same piece now holds an iconic 
place in the art museum, currently on display at the Tate Modern in London. 
Contemporaries of Duchamp, the Dadaists and the Surrealists, created art not 
only in reaction to the atrocities of the first World War, which some attributed 
to the culmination of the Industrial Age mentality, but they also created art in 
reaction to the predominant view of the Enlightenment aesthetic cultivated by 
museums at the time. The Surrealists positioned themselves against reason 
and dualism. Instead, they created art from or to represent the subconscious, 
dreams, and chance in order to evoke the imagination of the viewer.  Artists of 
this persuasion seemed to be saying that if there is an ineffable communion 
with art, the interface is not met not through reason or cognitive processes 
separate from the body and emotion. Examples of Surrealist work include 
André Masson’s automatic drawing, where his hand would move randomly 
across the page as a means of expressing the subconscious, and René 
Magritte’s La trahison des images (The Betrayal of Images 1928-9), a picture 
of a pipe with the words underneath: “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” (This is not a 
pipe). Kester refers to this as a growing movement of the avant-garde against  
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objectification and normalization in the experience of art and a view that art 
should “radically challenge the very possibility of rational discourse” (Kester, 
2004, p. 12). 
In contrast to the art of Renaissance and Enlightenment ideals that 
promoted communication between artist and viewer around a shared symbol 
system, artists of the avant-garde sought to challenge the viewer’s 
expectations. This provocation, denial of a common language, and resistance 
to easy assimilation had the added benefit, or so it was believed, of eschewing 
the commodification of commerce (Kester, 2004). However, although 
proposed as a break from the past, the view of art that can speak for itself 
shares with its predecessors echoes of a type of elitism. The abstract 
expressionist Mark Rothko and his fellow contemporaries
7 wrote that “critical 
exegesis” were for the “simple minded” and that “no simple set of notes can 
explain our paintings” as they resisted translation and were from “the world of 
imagination, fancy-free, and violently opposed to common-sense” (cited in 
Kester, 2004, p. 39-40). It is only through abandoning the familiar (e.g. familiar 
modes of communication, familiar means of security) that, according to 
Rothko, “transcendental experiences become possible” (cited in Kester, 2004, 
p. 40). Here we have the idea of the transcendent again, although not through 
cognitive or discursive means, and the idea of exclusion or accessibility to only 
an elite. The elite in this case are the anti-establishment, those who are aware 
of the establishment and comfortable with railing against it. 
Another example, offered by Kester, of artists not trying to ‘say 
anything’ or communicate with the viewer their own intentions but let the art 
                                                 
7 From a statement issued to the New York Times in 1943 by Mark Rothko, Adolph Gottlieb 
and Barnett Newman.   
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stand on its own is the work of Jackson Pollock (Kester, 2004). Kester argues 
that Pollock was inspired by community art murals, a form of expression that 
relied heavily on shared symbol systems and communication between artist 
and audience. What Pollock took however was the scale of the mural and 
placed it in the gallery – where the form of the art itself was to immerse the 
viewer into the painting. “For Pollock and Rothko the painted image became 
an elegy for the lost promise of a more fully public and collective art practice 
(rendered impossible by the failure of communism and the unfettered advance 
of the market system)” (Kester, 2004, p. 40-41). However, the claims of non-
discursiveness did not stop critics or curators from writing about abstract 
expressionism and eventually these forms found their way into popular 
museum exhibits, drawing a crowd due not only to its form but to the story 
around the form. Furthermore, its non-discursiveness did not save it from the 
commodification of post-cards and tee shirts.  
A number of movements in the 1960s and 70s including minimalist, 
conceptual and performance art
8 began to bring the idea of communication 
between artist and audience back into the picture. The work of minimalist and 
conceptual artists often referenced the context of the gallery in which they 
were situated or required the visitor to take different positions in order to 
engage with the piece. Wen-Ying Tsai’s sculptures of stainless steel rods, for 
example, with a light strobe flashing across them responded to the proximity of 
the visitor and sounds like the clapping of hands (Popper, 1975, p. 214). 
Critics holding onto the tenets of abstract art discounted this type of 
expression as it gave visitors cues in terms of how to participate and therefore 
distracted viewers from the transcendent (Kester, 2004). Many conceptual 
                                                 
8 These classifications are slippery and artists and their work slide between them.   
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artists used their art to evoke change, and change specifically of institutions 
such as museums. Hans Haacke, for instance, famously proposed (and was 
denied) an exhibition showing the real estate holdings of all the museum 
trustees at the Guggenheim Museum in New York City in 1971 (Gere, 2002). 
Around this same time, in 1967, Herbert Marcuse, then a professor at the 
University of Berkeley, proposed that the role of art should be for the “total 
reorientation of life in a new society…not political art, not politics as art, but art 
as the architecture of a free society” (cited in Popper, 1974, p. 272) – a quote 
reminiscent of the one from Roy Ascott that introduced this chapter.  
This is the same time period, shortly after World War II, when the 
theories of cybernetics, information, and structural linguistics that were 
influencing the development of computer technology were also influencing 
artists (Gere, 2002).  Gere specifically points to the work of John Cage as 
being concerned with the same ideas as mathematicians Shannon and 
Weaver who were separating the message from the medium and concerned 
with signals, symbols, and noise. As a musician, much of Cage’s work takes 
place outside of the art museum yet his work is important to highlight because 
of its influence on all forms of art. Gere, for example, traces the interactivity of 
today’s digital arts to Cage’s composition 4’33”, premiering in 1952 at the 
Maverick Concert Hall in Woodstock. Throughout the three movements of the 
piece, the pianist, David Tudor, sat at the piano guided by a stopwatch and 
turned the pages of the written score (which simply said “Tacet” -- silence on 
the part of the performer). In other words, Tudor played not a note. The 
inspiration for the piece, according to Cage, came from an earlier visit to an 
anechoic chamber at Harvard where he could hear only his heart, suggesting 
to himself that there is never true silence (Gere, 2002). Gere, and others,  
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interpret this piece as interactive because it requires participation from the 
audience to fill in the void with the sound of their own heartbeats and other 
ambient noise. This reliance on the audience is a hallmark of other works of 
this period such as the all white canvases of Robert Rauchenberg and the rise 
of happenings and performance art that played deliberately with the 
relationship between artist and audience. Whereas in abstract art, the artist 
diminished into the formalism of the art, in minimalist, conceptual and 
performance art, this formalism moves more into the background and the role 
of the view moves into the foreground.  
This more active role of the viewer however is not immediate or a given. 
In this new space of defying conventions and explanations, the challenge is in 
bringing viewers into this process in a meaningful way and without alienating 
them. Cage for example talks about losing many friends over 4’33”  – people 
who were sympathetic to the aims of avant-garde art but still felt this piece had 
gone too far
9. Whereas in the ineffable experience of art in the Enlightenment 
people were assumed to ‘get it’ because of a common sense of beauty and 
the aesthetic, in the avant-garde, the ineffable experience of art suggests 
there is no common sense. Yet, people are still presumed to ‘get it’ through 
the experience, not through explanation. Rice suggests that in the 1980s 
artists began “to not only question collection, installation, and fundraising 
practices but the interpretive practices of the museum as well” (Rice, 2003, 
p.81). Rice gives the example of performance artist Andrea Fraser’s persona, 
Jane Castleton, who would give ‘tours’ at the Philadelphia Museum of Art in 
1989. During the tour, Fraser as Castleton would lead visitors around to 
                                                 
9 Cage conversation with Michael John White (1982), in Kostelanetz 1988, 66, in: Solomon, 
Larry J.: The Sounds of Silence, in: http://www.azstarnet.com/~solo/4min33se.htm)  
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explore the museum’s highlights including places such as the restroom or coat 
room all the while affecting a typical docent’s speech using language from art 
history critiques, the museum’s catalogue, and her own additional 
commentaries from people such as Michel Foucault. Rice points out that 
Fraser eventually abandoned her performances as she became uneasy about 
the distinction between those on the tour who ‘got it’ and came to see the 
performance or who clued in during the tour and those who ‘didn’t get it’ and 
were subsequently the butt of the joke.  
This tension between implicitly getting something or indirect knowing 
and understanding comes up again in the work of Joseph Beuys an artist 
associated with the Fluxus movement and famous for the slogan ‘everyone is 
an artist.’ In an interview regarding his work Beuys stated, “Art is not there to 
provide knowledge in direct ways. It produces deepened perceptions of 
experience. More must happen than simply logically understandable things. 
Art is not there to be simply understood, or we would have no need of art. It 
could then just be logical sentences in a form of a text for instance. Where 
objects are concerned it’s more the sense of an indication or suggestion” 
(Shellmann, 1977, p.20). Knowledge without understanding is another way of 
describing art as ineffable. This still begs the question however of how a 
viewer gets into this indirect but deepened experience. The role of language 
and symbol systems as a common path to understanding and communication 
is challenged through other artists of this period as well such as Sol LeWitt’s 
work from the late 60s entitled “Ten thousand random straight lines drawn by 
one draughtsman, 1,000 lines a day, for ten days, within a 120” square”. The 
title of the work constituted the work itself in perhaps an exaggeration of  
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Beuys’ comment and the extreme of conceptual art that suggests the idea of 
art itself is enough to classify as art.  
LeWitt’s instructions could be viewed as a commentary on the 
emptiness or futility of explaining the ineffable nature of art or alternatively it 
could be viewed as an early precursor to algorithmic art. Gere places this 
piece at the end of the decade, the 1960s, when cybernetic thinking, computer 
art, and collaborations between artists and technologists had enjoyed a brief 
period of ferment. The first computer art exhibition was held in Germany in 
1965 for example and in 1967 artist Robert Rauschenberg and engineer Billy 
Kluver formed Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) (Gere, 2002). In 
1968, EAT hosted a competition in technological art and the first prize went to 
Jean Dupuy’s Heart Beats Dust which was an apparatus that worked only in 
response to the visitor’s heart beat. (Popper, 1974, p. 219-220). Dupuy wrote: 
“Is there not a basic difference between an object which is presented as a 
physical experiment in the Palace of Discovery (Science Museum) and the 
same object presented by an artist in a gallery or art museum? If some artists, 
when they acquiesce in making ‘technological ready mades’, manage on 
occasions to achieve this basic difference, others go much further and adopt 
with regard to technology that distance which often allows them to happen 
upon amusing, absurd or occasionally mysterious relationships” (in ‘Pourquoi 
l’art et la technologie cited by Popper, 1974, p. 220). Dupuy’s quote presages 
the question asked by many curators today in terms of whether digital art is 
more science than art
10.  
                                                 
10 For instance as of March 2005, in the city of London, the only museum with a permanently 
installed collection of digital artworks is the Science Museum (Graham, 2005).  
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Around the time of Dupuy’s installation, in 1968, the Institute of 
Contemporary Art in London curated a show titled Cybernetic Serendipity: The 
Computer and the Arts with three sections of work on display. Section one had 
painting, art, animations, and music all generated by computers built by 
engineers. Section two had technological machines, cybersculptures, and 
robots built by artists. Section three had machines demonstrating the use of 
computers, such as an IBM computer for making airline bookings
11. This 
stratification of the installation is interesting in terms of defining art. The first 
section appears to define art by the product, i.e. engineers producing artifacts 
in a familiar art form. The second section, by the artist, i.e. the product of an 
artist’s work is art. The final section however seems to define art through the 
gallery walls, i.e. what is selected by a curator for an exhibit becomes art. 
The ideas and fashion of cybernetics during the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, soon became the target as opposed to the inspiration of artists. Just 
as artists reacted to the order imposed on complexity and chaos during the 
Industrial Age, artists also began reacting against the order and instrumentality 
imposed through the systems based thinking of cybernetics (Gere, 2002). 
Cybernetic artists or technology artists were beginning to be sidelined in favor 
of conceptual artists
12 and artists such as Roy Ascott began moving from 
cybernetics to theories of second-order cybernetics and ideas of poeisis. From 
this period, into the 1970s and 80s, computer art and practices combining art 
and technology became more marginalized (Gere, 2002), although there 
                                                 
11 for an account: http://www.akademie-solitude.de/stuttgart1960/3_text_reich.html 
12 Gere (2002) relates the anecdote of an exhibit titled ‘Software, Information Technology: Its 
Meaning for Art’ at the Jewish Museum in New York in 1970 with conceptual artists such as 
Hans Haacke and Joseph Kosuth alongside multimedia and computer specialists such as Ted 
Nelson and Nicolas Negroponte. Later in the same year, the MOMA in New York curated a 
similar show yet only the conceptual artists were present.  
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remained room on the margins for growth from organizations supporting new 
media such as the Ars Electronica Festival founded in 1979 and the Zentrum 
für Kunst and Medientechnologie (ZKM) founded in 1980. These efforts 
focused largely on video arts but were well placed for the resurgence of 
interest in digital technology during the mid 1990s with the explosion of the 
World Wide Web.   
With the rise of the internet, net.art began exploring many of the same 
issues and using similar methodologies of their predecessors such as the 
correspondence art of the Fluxus movement and the randomness of 
Surrealism. As the name suggests, net.art takes place through the internet 
and therefore not in the museum, but its developments are beginning to 
challenge some of these boundaries. An illustrative example of net.art is 
Silophone, started in 2000, by [the User], a collaboration between architect 
Thomas McIntosh and composer Emmanuel Madan. Silophone takes place by 
connecting the net to an abandoned grain silo in Montréal that has been 
reclaimed for public performance. People from around the world can submit, 
via their phone or the web, sound files to the silo and then listen to their choice 
of sound as it reverberates through and is transformed by the interesting and 
unique acoustics of the abandoned space. As of December 2005, there were 
over 15,000 sound contributions that could be played at any time ranging from 
Vivaldi’s La Primavera to original music to recorded dog farts. As [the User] 
explains, Silophone “combines sound, architecture, and communication 
technologies to transform a significant landmark in the industrial cityscape of 
Montréal.”
 13 Silophone represents many of the characteristics of net.art: 
collaboration between artists across disciplines, collaboration with the 
                                                 
13 http://www.silophone.net  
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distributed audience, an open-ended or durational performance, a site-specific 
creation of place and a nod toward social activism. It is many of these 
characteristics of net.art that challenge its inclusion in a museum space. 
Beyond the net, other digital arts practices such as robotic art and art 
that plays with the concepts of artificial intelligence and artificial life also tend 
to elude the museum walls. Natalie Jeremijenko’s Feral Dogs for example 
works as a type of activist art, or a social sculpture in the Beuysian sense. 
Jeremijenko works with local communities to appropriate robotic dogs toward 
community goals such as locating and documenting toxic wastes in the local 
environment
14. The dogs are fitted with sensors for their task, but this is a 
performance as well and one additional critical modification is a camera to 
document the community event of releasing the dogs into the wild. Unlike most 
robots who take after their ‘real’ counterpart and use cameras for optical like 
perception, in the Feral Dogs, the camera sits at the opposite end in the dog’s 
hindquarters in order to film not what the dog sees but the people following the 
dog and their narration about what is happening. The role of the dog as a 
collaborator in the performance is similar to the idea of alien presence that 
Michael Mateas uses in his systems for Expressive AI (Mateas and Romero, 
2005). Alien Presence, rather than artificial intelligence, suggests that the role 
of the agent or system is markedly as an ‘other’, not simply a computational 
machine returning expected results and not an authoritarian system that vies 
with our own intelligence. Instead, the work of many digital artists such as 
Jeremijenko and Mateas requires collaboration between the artist, the 
audience, and the system. 
                                                 
14 http://xdesign.ucsd.edu/feralrobots/  
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In sum, avant-garde art, and specifically the introduction of technology, 
has challenged the institution of the museum from the inside and outside. 
Digital art specifically challenges existing taxonomies, crosses museum 
departments (and therefore is difficult to find a home or champion), and its 
open-ended durational nature requires a different type of exhibition (Graham, 
2005). Gere notes that although digital art tends to be excluded from the art 
museum (Gere, 2004) it explores many of the same issues and techniques of 
its predecessors who have since earned a passport stamp into the museum 
(Gere, 2002).  
Two important new threads however underscored by Kester (2004) are 
the dialogical and the durational emphasis of this new art form. As Ascott 
states, “Ours is a work that is dialogical…canons of Connectivity, Immersion, 
Interaction, Transformation, and Emergence. Meaning is created out of 
interaction, and dialogue can transform attitudes and behaviors” (Ascott, 2004, 
p. 112). The dialogical suggests a different type of interactivity than that first 
explored by Cage between artist and audience, one where gross 
demarcations between those who get it and those who don’t seems more 
troubling. Yet at the same time there remains a spirit of not simply explaining 
art in the didactic sense but in meaning becoming constructed through use. 
This durational and performative nature of art suggests further challenges for 
how this could be communicated, in a non-didactic fashion, within the confines 
of the museum and a museum visit. It may be that digital art resists the 
constraints of the art museum or it may play out that the museum also 
continues to evolve with new forms of expression. 
The notion of the ineffable and art during the Enlightenment was one 
where an essentialist meaning could be communicated and known through our  
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common sense of cognition. It was recognized that the ineffable of art would 
not be understood by all, but that the universal potential was there. Those who 
did understand it were aided by a shared symbol system with the artist for 
communicating the Englightenment values of order, precision, and harmony 
with nature. The idea of the ineffable and art shifted during the diverse period 
of avant-garde art. During this time, communion through a common sense of 
cognition was contested and art began challenging shared symbol systems. 
The artist’s intent or message ostensibly faded into the background and the 
form or idea of the art became preeminent. As John Cage said, “I have nothing 
to say and I am saying it, and that is poetry.” Although this form of art may still 
require a shared symbol system, for instance knowing what canon it is 
reacting to, the emphasis is a move from cognitive knowing to bodily or 
affective knowing. But it is again a kind of knowing where the meaning is 
universal – perhaps not knowable by all but a universal meaning even if this 
meaning is ‘nothing.’ Dialogical art however has become more concerned with 
meaning that is constructed, not necessarily communicated. The ineffable in 
this sense then is the unknown of what could be – a potential that perhaps 
remains open for each new encounter. In the following section, I will now turn 
to how technology enters the art museum as a tool for understanding the 
range of art from the Enlightenment through to the Dialogical.  
Technology for Art in the Art Museum 
Digital technology has played a role in redefining the art museum 
through its influence on art practices but also through its uptake as a tool in 
the art museum, whether as a tool for preservation and collection 
management or as an interpretive tool for visitors. I will focus on this latter 
development, and although technology as an interpretive aide in the art  
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museum has taken many forms
15, I will focus on the most recent addition of 
digital technology to the art museum’s toolkit in the form of context-aware 
computer guides. Whereas early laserdiscs and CD-ROMs and later the use of 
the World Wide Web focused on supporting virtual visits to the museum, and 
providing additional interpretive assistance to the visitor at a remote location, 
context-aware systems generally focus on the presence of the visitor in the 
physical art museum space.  Although information kiosks and on-site micro-
galleries also support information and educational needs inside the museum, 
context-aware systems provide the added benefit of moving with the visitor 
rather then being rooted to one spot.  
In this way, context-aware computer guides most closely resemble the 
audio guides, in particular the digital audio guides, that allow for viewing 
objects in any order as opposed to a pre-defined sequence. Context-aware 
guides extend this functionality with the added feature of maintaining some 
sense of the visitor’s context, variably defined to include things such as 
location, path, and preferences. Some context-aware guides will also include a 
visual element in addition to the audio channel.  In sum, the context-aware 
guides in museums can be marked by their characteristics of portability, multi-
media support, and some degree of customization and personal choice. In this 
section, I will describe a characteristic context-aware guide and then introduce 
some of the issues regarding interpretation and the ineffable that the 
introduction of such guides has introduced into the space of the art museum 
                                                 
15 A broader definition of technology would require looking at use of lighting, space 
configuration, signage, brochures, etc. that have been part of the curators, designers, and 
educators trade to manage and shape the visitor’s experience. Anderson (1999) notes that 
some of the earliest visitor manipulated technology in the museum existed in the mechanical 
form of spindles and levers used to rotate statues in order to see them in different light or from 
different positions.   
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as described above. I will outline a number of recent attempts to address 
these issues and end with how the case study of this chapter approaches the 
issues from a different angle. 
Just as artists kept pace with developments in new technology as 
described in the previous section, museum professionals have also been at 
the forefront in the adoption of technology as tool. Preservationists began 
using database technology in the early 1960s to help with the tracking and 
organization of collections and new technology continued to be explored 
behind the scenes and on the floor. The first handheld interactive tour for 
visitors, the iGo on an Apple Newton was piloted at the Minneapolis Institute of 
Art in 1994, just one year after the Newton was launched (Amirian, 2001). 
Perhaps because of their high profile within the community (providing good 
marketing and PR value) and because of their somewhat closed conditions, 
museums are a popular playground for the showcase and exploration of 
prototype technology tools. The Smithsonian American Art Museum’s Renwick 
Gallery in Washington D.C., for example, was among one of the first art 
museums, and public spaces in general, to test the latest advancements in 
handheld technology with a context-aware guide for their contemporary craft 
collection in 2000. I worked with the Renwick Gallery through the Cornell 
Human Computer Interaction Group during this time and it is this project that 
will provide a prototypical example of context-aware guide design, use and 
evaluation in the art museum
16. 
The Renwick Gallery Handheld Education project began with the 
objectives of wanting to help the casual visitor learn more about the ‘hidden 
                                                 
16 This example is drawn from a much longer evaluation of the Renwick’s design and use of 
their handheld guides, see: (Boehner, Gay, and Larkin, 2005).  
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secrets’ of the objects. The casual visitor was described by the staff as 
someone going through the motions of the museum visit, wandering from 
piece to piece but not really sure what to look for or how to connect with the 
objects on display. In terms of the ‘hidden secrets’, these would be revealed in 
two ways. First, many of the objects must be manipulated in order to be 
understood but the goal of conservation prevents inviting visitors to handle the 
objects. For example, the “Bureau of Bureaucracy” by Kim Schmahman is a 
large bureau cabinet with fake doors and drawers that open into each other at 
cross-purposes.  By providing an animation on the handheld device, visitors 
can now experience the piece as opposed to having a text description 
explaining what the piece represents about bureaucracy.  
The second type of hidden secret revealed by the guides is the voice of 
the artist and a view into the piece’s beginnings.  As a collection of 
contemporary craft, the Renwick had the opportunity to work with the living 
artists to interview them and often film them in their studio creating their crafts. 
Because of the multi-media support of the handheld guides, these video clips 
could be provided to the visitors. One of the metaphors the designers of the 
system used was that they were creating mini-TVs where the programming 
featured the artists themselves. In addition to revealing the hidden secrets, the 
designers also described the manner in which these secrets would be 
imparted. On the one hand, they wanted people to ‘experience’ the secrets, 
suggesting an active and exploratory role for the visitor, and on the other hand 
they wanted it to be like ‘television’, suggesting a somewhat more passive role 
for the visitor. But they also discussed wanting the guides to use their location-
aware functionality to act as a “magical mind reader” (Boehner, Gay, & Larkin, 
2005, p.222). In this sense, the device was meant to surprise the visitor by  
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providing the appropriate information or potential for exploration at the right 
time. 
The evaluation of the Renwick handheld guide measured its success 
against the original design objectives. In particular, the designers sought 
evidence that the guide did in fact appeal to a general visitor where general in 
this case was measured as universal. They wanted the device to appeal to 
young and old alike, people familiar with arts and craft and people with no 
background knowledge, and to people with varying levels of technology 
experience. For this objective, based on the wide range of visitor profiles for 
people who used the guides (e.g. young to old, tech savvy to tech newbie, 
etc.), the project was successful. Furthermore, the designers wanted survey 
and interview questions to tease out whether visitors enjoyed the experience 
and if they thought the guides added value to their visit. As the guides were 
expensive to produce and required additional administrative support in use, 
the design team needed to know if their investment was returned or if more 
traditional interpretive aides such as docent led tours and catalogues were 
sufficient. For these questions, the evaluation revealed high degrees of visitor 
satisfaction based on responses to scaled rating questions (e.g. How usable 
was the guide? How much did you learn from using the guide?). However, 
contrary to the design objective of creating a mini-TV, several of the 
interviewed visitors expected the guides to act more like a web portal and were 
subsequently disappointed when more information or the ability to find more 
information was not available. Overall, however, visitors appreciated the visual 
nature of the device, they liked finding the hidden secrets and enjoyed hearing 
the artists’ stories.  
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The above description is not meant to provide a full account of the 
Renwick handheld education project but to give an example of a typical 
context-aware guide, how it is designed (i.e. for what purposes), and how it is 
evaluated (i.e. what constitutes success). As I was the interviewer in this 
process, I would like to reflect on one of the interviews in particular. One of the 
visitors who had taken a handheld and was subsequently approached for an 
interview by chance happened to be an artist with a piece being exhibited by 
the Renwick Gallery at that time. As an artist, his concern with the guided tour 
was that it added a second selection filter in terms of what objects a visitor 
would see. He worried that people would only visit objects on the guided tour 
and ignore or downgrade others that did not have additional information. This 
suggests the guides may have an interesting twist on the curatorial and 
selection process, where art is what makes it in the museum but some art 
deserves additional attention. Several other visitors also commented that the 
guide tended to dictate what they would see rather than letting something 
simply catch their eye. When the artist spoke about his experience using the 
guide as a visitor, he had a different concern. Contrary to all the other visitors 
interviewed, he did not like the style of many of the artist interviews. As 
someone versed in reading an object, he was accustomed to listening to a 
curatorial point of view and either agreeing with it or disagreeing with it. In 
other words, the information provided from the curators on the tour he took as 
a resource to be used or not. However, when the artist spoke, he felt this could 
not be challenged as much – it therefore closed the object to interpretation for 
him. If the artist said, “This piece means X, Y, Z” then he felt he could not look 
for new meaning in it.   
64 
I highlight this remark from the artist because of its resonance with the 
tension described in the previous sections regarding interpretation. The artist’s 
reaction echoes Beuys’ comment that art is not about being understood or 
explained and echoes the essentialist position of art appreciation, that 
explanations get in the way of the art speaking for itself. His comment sparked 
the realization that the artists being interviewed for the handheld guide could 
choose how to use this channel of communication. They could choose to 
describe their work in closed terms, “it means X, Y, Z”, or they could choose to 
use the channel less didactically. Perhaps they could pose questions instead 
of providing answers for example. Imagine, for instance, if René Magritte 
created La trahison des images during a time when handheld guides were 
pervasive and he was given the opportunity to provide additional information 
about the piece for the guided tour.  Would he use this as an additional canvas 
to play with the juxtaposition of words and images? Or would he simply explain 
the incongruity between the words and the image in the painting? The 
question here is whether the device is seen as an extension of an artistic 
experience or if it is separate from it. 
These hypothetical questions led to further reflection about the typical 
design of a context-aware guide as a tool for information transfer about the 
objects in the museum. When viewed as part of the essentialist versus 
contextualist debate, the device seems to be employed for contextualism, 
describing what a piece means, how it was created and why. Proponents of 
essentialism charge that this closes off what the piece could mean to the 
individual viewer. To put this sentiment in terms of approaching the ineffable, 
the technology as a tool for understanding art favors explanation over 
experience. A further criticism of the devices is that they not only close down  
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the possibility of new interpretations but they swap the object of contemplation 
from the art object to the device itself. This is often referred to as looking down 
instead of up (Boehner, Gay, and Larkin, 2005) and it resembles similar 
criticisms against earlier interpretive aides such as extensive label text. 
However, if viewed as an extension of the artist’s canvas, the design of such 
devices could perhaps take a different shape. The interesting question being 
posed here is why the devices have been designed primarily for the transfer of 
information. Elsewhere I have argued that in designing technology tools for the 
museum only for the dominant practice of information transfer, we reinforce 
this dominant practice (Boehner, Gay, Sengers, and Chen, 2004; Boehner, et 
al., 2005). This led to the impetus motivating the following case study, namely 
exploring other aspects of the design space possible for enabling new 
experiences in the art museum.  
I am not alone in questioning the narrowness of this space for 
technology in the art museum as a tool for information transfer. Before finally 
turning to the case study of this chapter, I will look briefly at how others are 
expanding how technology may be designed for this space. This work can be 
categorized into efforts for increasing immersion and engagement, exploring 
new forms of access, personalizing the guides, and addressing social 
participation. I will address each of these in turn briefly before introducing how 
this work has informed the case study. 
Immersion and Engagement 
In terms of immersion and engagement, several projects focus on the 
richness and presentation style of the information available. For example, by 
using the living stories of artists, the designers at the Renwick Gallery hope to 
create another hook through which visitors could connect with the objects, if  
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not through their form then through their maker. This is similar to the approach 
taken by the Tate Modern (Wilson, 2004) and both museums also explore the 
use of games as a way of drawing attention to different parts of the objects on 
display. Another approach to improving the level of a visitor’s engagement is 
through modeling the richness of interaction from a docent tour or a tour led by 
an expert passionate about the subject (Halloran, et al., 2005; Wakkary and 
Evendon, 2005).  
A slightly different approach to immersion is one pursued by project 
ec(h)o, an ambient soundscape system for museums developed at Simon 
Fraser University (Wakkary and Everndon, 2005). Ec(h)o was prototyped at 
the Canadian Museum of Nature, but the design idea has implications for art 
museums. In this project, a visitor carries a sensor tagged object (in this 
prototype, a small wooden box) that communicates with embedded sensors 
and receivers in the physical space of the museum. The purpose of this 
connection between the visitor’s sensor and the sensor in the environment is 
to trigger appropriate soundscapes when the visitor enters different zones, for 
instance triggering the sounds of birds when approaching a display of quail 
eggs. This provides peripheral or ambient information to the visitor. In all of 
these cases, the emphasis is still on providing information to the visitor about 
the object on display but in a more evocative, engaging, and multi-sensory 
way.  
New Forms of Access 
The ec(h)o project’s soundscape provides an example of another class 
of enhancements in context-aware guides: providing new means of access. In 
the case of ec(h)o, there are three novel access means, first the soundscapes 
are ambient and zone-based as opposed to keyed with one object. Secondly,  
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the visitor carries a wooden block or ball that triggers this information by 
passing soundmarks, or at a particular exhibit, the visitor can access 
information by manipulating the block. Turning the block clues one set of 
information, turning it another way accesses a different set. Thirdly, the ec(h)o 
project looks toward providing novel interfaces to an array of information, 
some of it not directly controlled by the museum such as other scholarly 
archives such as a scientific database on natural habitats.  
A variety of different technical interfaces are explored for handheld 
guides in terms of how information is technically accessed and this has 
implications for the visitor experience as well. In the ec(h)o case, the visitor is 
turning a lightweight wooden box. In Microsoft’s Aura platform (Smith, 
Davenport and Hwa, 2003), the visitor swipes the bar code of the object past 
their bar code reader on their device. In MIT’s Museum Wearable (Sparacino, 
2002), the visitor wears a headset and carries a CPU in a backpack and 
information is trigged through a triangulation of WiFi nodes. The issue of 
access is also taken up by projects addressing the problem of maintaining 
equipment and managing equipment costs. Nickerson (2005) presented a 
prototype for delivering museum tours directly to visitors’ own cell phones and 
the ArtMobs
17 group at Marymount College has experimented with podcasts of 
tours that visitors download to their iPods before entering the museum.  These 
advances take on the issue that access to the information on the guides is 
limited to the number of guides available (and functioning). All of these various 
projects, and similar ones, are concerned with how access to information is 
supported efficiently, seamlessly, and to the largest group of people.  
                                                 
17 http://mod.blogs.com/art_mobs/  
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Personalization 
The third theme of developments in the context-aware museum guide 
space is support for personalization. The Museum Wearable (Sparacino, 
2002) provides a characteristic example. As mentioned above, for this system, 
a visitor wears a set of headphones with an attached ‘private-eye’ display 
positioned over one eye. After a period of adaptation, the viewer’s brain 
combines the information provided about an object shown on the private eye 
display with the object that is viewed by the unencumbered eye. Also 
connected to the headset is an infrared receiver for communicating with 
terminals around the museum in order to determine the visitor’s location. 
Connected to the headset is a CPU carried in a backpack. The computer is 
used to not only serve the stored information about the objects on the tour, but 
also to calculate visitor style profile based on the visitor’s path and information 
consumption pattern. The visitor develops a profile throughout the tour as 
being either busy, selective, or greedy and information is subsequently 
presented to fit this style.  Part of the success of such a system depends upon 
the accuracy of the personal profile and typing algorithm used to subsequently 
tailor the presented information.  
Several groups are playing with refining algorithms for predicting 
information seeking behavior, often modeling visitors after other foragers such 
as ants (Jaén, et al., 2005). Many of these projects attempt to create these 
patterns of preferences somewhat implicitly based on how long a visitor 
spends in front of an object or how much information is accessed. Other 
programs ask for more direct intervention from the visitor to establish their 
profile, for example asking them to rate how useful or how much they liked the 
information they received (Goren-Bar, et al., 2005). In these examples of  
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personalization, it is primarily the system that is responsible for developing a 
greater sense of awareness of the visitor’s context and therefore adjusting the 
amount and type of available information to match the visitor profile.  
Social Participation 
The final theme for pushing context-aware guides in new directions is 
the theme of social participation. Several critics of handheld guides or 
wearable computers with audio headsets have pointed to the support for 
individual experience at the cost of social experience. One response has been 
to tie people together through the communication network, for instance 
providing a messaging function on the devices for communicating with peers 
(Wilson, 2004) or facilitating communication between people who are online 
but away from the museum and people who are in the museum and using a 
context-aware guide (Galani and Chalmers, 2004). Another approach is simply 
to remove the headphones from the context-aware guides and concentrate on 
sound as a medium that affords greater numbers of participation. For instance, 
Sotto Voce, a project by researchers at XEROX Parc, described how visitors 
to a cultural heritage site used a portable audio guide without headphones to 
increase interaction with their group as well as ‘eavesdrop’ on content being 
explored by other groups (Aoki, et al., 2002). This is similar to the findings of 
Jeremijenko’s (2006) analysis of sound cones in a museum space: compared 
to wall labels, when people activate a sound cone of information about an 
object, the number of interactions between people increases.  
Installations in science museums often seek to design for more 
collaborative learning experiences, particularly experiences where spectators 
may watch others interact with an exhibit before taking their turn (Bannon, 
Benford, Bowers and Heath, 2005; Reeves, Benford, O’Malley, Fraser, 2005;  
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vom Lehn, Heath, and Hindmarsh, 2005). Vom Lehn and Heath argue that the 
museum is a social place, with people often traveling there in pairs or groups, 
and most context-aware guides prioritize an individual experience of 
information transfer over a social experience of this information (vom Lehn and 
Heath, 2005). Furthermore, vom Lehn, Heath, and Hindmarsh (2005) argue 
that the context-aware guides tend to replace the object itself in terms of focus. 
Although well founded, these criticisms all revolve around a single visit, in 
other words, we do not know if use of the traditional context-aware guides 
actually creates more social interaction or more prolonged engagement with 
the object for an individual on a subsequent visit (for instance, later taking a 
friend to share what he or she learned). Overall however, there is a growing 
concern about designing the context-aware guides to support social interaction 
in groups as well as individual contemplation. 
All of the above themes, however, still advance the dominant practice of 
transferring information from the ‘expert’ voice curated by the museum to the 
visitor about the art object on display. In other words, all still approach the 
ineffable experience of an art object as something to be explained, and 
generally as having a preferred (expert) explanation. There have been some 
moves to push on this one-way transfer. The ArtMobs project described above 
has the potential if taken up on a wide scale to allow for anyone to add their 
voice as the role of ‘expert’. In its current form, the podcasts contain the 
discussions of Marymount College art students discussing paintings and other 
works with their art history professor. To some extent, this is similar to the 
eavesdropping experience of Sotto Voce where one could imagine happening 
upon a tour in progress and following it anonymously. It will be interesting to 
see if the casual visitor feels compelled enough to share his or her opinions  
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about an object through recording his or her own podcast. Based on our own 
experience with adding the voice of the visitor to the curator’s voice, described 
below, we believe this introduction may encounter challenges. 
In a project called MUSE
18, the Human Computer Interaction group at 
Cornell tried to allow non-curators to comment on a piece of art and therefore 
challenge the one way transfer of information on the guides. Visitors were able 
to leave a comment with the handwriting feature
19 on the handheld device. We 
found, however, that the uptake of this channel for participation was used to a 
very small degree. Comments from visitors suggested that the reason for not 
using the channel was often due to feeling like they had nothing to say or that 
what they had to say was of no value. It is this latter response that we chose to 
question more since it suggested that visitors felt they lacked the license to 
participate in this kind of expression (Boehner, Gay, Sengers, Chen, 2004; 
Boehner, et al, 2005).  Anecdotally, we have seen a similar experience 
happen with the new comment channel being tested with the second version 
of the Renwick Gallery’s guide. Visitors in our earlier experiment did participate 
in rating the objects on display in terms of favorites or preferences, and a 
similar experience at the Tate Modern (Proctor and Tellis, 2003) also suggests 
that this level of participating is non-threatening. We wanted to explore this 
type of participation more however as it begins to push in a different way on 
expanding the narrow design space of using context-aware technology for 
information transfer about objects.  
                                                 
18 http://www.hci.cornell.edu/projects/muse.htm 
19 One very plausible explanation for lack of comments would be the onerous nature of the 
input mechanism. However, we were testing a similar application at the time, with the same 
input mechanism, for a campus tour and for that tour uptake was spectacular. Nearly every 
person who used the tour left a comment somewhere around campus (Burrell, Gay, Kubo, and 
Farina, 2002). In comparing these differences, it became apparent that students feel 
ownership and expertise regarding their experiences on campus.   
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Reflective Design: An Interpretation Approach for Art Museums 
The previous discussion provides a socio-historical look at the culture of 
the art museum and in particular the view of experiencing art as an ineffable 
phenomenon. Articulating this context is an important step in the practice of 
reflective design. It begins by questioning the cultural factors, influences, and 
implications of existing designs. In this case, my observation that technology is 
introduced into an art museum as an aide for explaining the art on display, and 
more specifically for providing expert information from the curator to the visitor, 
led to speculation on why this was the dominant form of design. If the 
experience of art and perhaps even the production of art is considered 
ineffable, as the history here suggests, then why is technology as a tool for 
understanding art being primarily employed for explanation rather than 
experience? This review suggests that the tension between mediating an 
experience of art through explanation and presuming that a transcendent 
experience of art can occur either cognitively or viscerally without mediation is 
a long-standing debate within the art museum. In this sense, designing 
technology as a tool for providing explanations about art follows existing 
patterns. Furthermore, when technology enters the art museum as art itself, it 
perpetuates the same question of how to design to support the visitor 
experience of the ineffable if not through explanations. This question becomes 
more imperative in the move toward participatory art when the visitor 
involvement and engagement becomes more critical. 
The second step then in reflective design once dominant patterns are 
articulated and examined is to question what new patterns might be designed 
for and how to do so. In this case, I have pointed to the complexity of the 
museum and the range of activities that take place there as a starting point for  
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thinking about an alternate design space. Bell (2002) for example argues that 
the museum is not just a place for information about art but it is also a unique 
ecology that fosters a kind of liminality, or being apart from everyday life, and a 
hybrid form of sociality where people can be both alone and together at the 
same time. At any given time, the museum not only houses art objects but it 
houses a diverse array of people as well, all with different agendas and 
expectations and all engaging in a host of different types of communion, or 
non-communion, with the art or with each other. In this view, some people may 
be engaging in an ineffable experience, whether with an art object or with the 
unique ecology of the museum itself, whereas others may simply be seeking a 
more mundane experience such as eating in the café, reading about an artist, 
or killing time. Therefore, I chose to use technology to draw attention to these 
different experiences and by using the interpretation approach to allow people 
themselves to determine the meaning of these experiences. This is a shift then 
from mediating or representing the ineffable to increasing awareness of the 
potential for experiences of the ineffable.  
Finally, I was inspired in the review above by the distinction between 
technology as art itself in the museum and technology as a tool for 
understanding art in the museum. Whereas the former continued to trouble the 
role of the museum, the art, and the visitor, the latter tended to reify a view of 
the visitor as passive receiver of information. I felt another way of supporting 
interpretation of the ineffable experience as opposed to simply didactically 
explaining it would be to try and think of designing for the space between art 
and tool. The following case study will therefore pick up on the idea of 
highlighting existing visitor experiences and trying to bridge art and tool 
functionality.  
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Technology design that supports what we already know, i.e. the 
dominant practices in the museum, faces primarily challenges of usability, in 
other words, does it work and does it do what it set out to do? Reflective 
design for new experiences faces a different challenge – one of value and 
appropriation. Awareness of the limits or constraints of a domain space is only 
part of the work toward developing something new. The hardest and more 
elusive part is anticipating how something new will be valued, or not. We had a 
taste of the difficulty in designing for new experiences with our initial attempt to 
push on technology for one-way transfer of information in the museum. The 
poor reception of our two-way channel suggests that designing for new 
experiences in a tightly scripted environment such as the art museum is more 
difficult than simply noticing conventions and trying to upend or overturn them. 
In the following section, I will detail two attempts to tackle this issue of 
designing for new experiences within the constraints of both traditional views 
of technology and traditional views of an art museum. 
Case Study: New Technology for New Museum Experiences 
This section presents a case study in three stages of designing for 
interfaces with the ineffable in the art museum. The first stage presents the 
results from a pilot study where we first engaged with visitors and museum 
staff to brainstorm about the potential of designing for alternate experiences of 
technology in the art museum. The second stage and the third stage are 
presented in more detail and follow a design from the drawing board, to 
installation, and to final evaluation.   
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Stage One: Expanding the Design Space  
For this first stage, I worked with various members of the Cornell HCI 
group and Cornell Culturally Embedded Computing Group including Geri Gay, 
Helene Hembrooke, Phoebe Sengers, Yevgeniy ‘Eugene’ Medynskiy, and 
Joseph ‘Jofish’ Kaye in addition to working with Tim Brooke (then an 
interaction designer with the People and Practices Group at Intel), Claire 
Larkin (Head of Special Projects and the Renwick Gallery Handheld Education 
Project for the Smithsonian American Art Museum), Cathy Klimaszewski 
(Cornell Johnson Museum), Meg Elliott (Cornell Johnson Museum), and J.P. 
Pollack (head of Visual Biosystems, specialists in visualizing population data 
movement and patterns). Through these interactions, we created a number of 
ideas for how we could represent the range of visitor experiences happening 
in the museum at any given time without necessarily requiring new or 
unfamiliar behaviors from the visitor (such as the commenting feature in 
MUSE that resulted in poor uptake). For example, some representations could 
simply depict the number of people in different parts of a gallery as dots on a 
floor plan. This information could be detected through sensors or use of 
tracking technology on handheld guides and the information could be 
presented on the handheld screen or projected in some central location. 
Alternatively, we could try to represent not simply presence of bodies, but the 
different moods people were feeling. This might be visualized as a kind of 
climate map or something like abstract art with swaths of color representing 
intensity of different emotions. We also suggested depicting preference 
information – such as path displays indicating popular routes through the 
museum or highlighting popular and unpopular pieces in the exhibit.   
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After generating and mocking up these design ideas, we tested them 
with two focus groups: one group of museum staff (six participants) and one 
group of museum visitors (eleven participants). During each focus group 
meeting, I projected each display on a large screen and gave a brief 
description while participants individually rated the picture on a seven point 
scale for three different dimensions: Attention (on a scale from Boring to 
Engaging), Information (on a scale from un-Informative to Informative), and 
Behavior Change (on a scale from Irrelevant to Influential). I asked participants 
to rate the displays from their own perspective and from what they imagined 
the perspective of the alternate stakeholder would be (e.g. visitors rating what 
they imagined museum staff to think and vice versa). In addition to filling out 
these surveys, participants were encouraged to discuss the displays. Because 
of the small sample size and the prototype nature of this stage, findings will be 
presented only as general trends that informed the developments of stage two 
and three of this larger case study.  
From a qualitative analysis of the discussions held around the displays, 
additional comments left on their surveys, and our previous design 
experiences with technology in the art museum, I identified the following four 
design findings for informing the next stages of development: 
1. Digital Scaffolding for Staff and Visitors.   
Based on the initial experiences from the HCI Group with the MUSE 
platform and the difficulty in simply adding a new form of engagement into the 
museum environment, we had anticipated that visitors would need some kind 
of ‘digital scaffolding’ for the new information to be presented. This was partly 
why we chose to augment existing visitor behavior, such as where they went 
and what they looked at, and not require new behaviors. The feedback from  
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the tested displays suggested that representing their behaviors in the museum 
would have some degree of value to them. However, we were reminded 
through the focus groups that this scaffolding applies not only to visitors but to 
the staff as well. Just as visitors are familiar with the prescribed routines of the 
art museum, staff are equally if not more so. The difficulty the staff had with 
imagining how visitors might use visitor information reinforced our awareness 
that in our eventual designs we would need to build trust with the museum 
staff as well as start with designs that were less threatening and more familiar.  
2. Ambiguity for Engagement.  
The second finding is somewhat in contrast to the first idea of digital 
scaffolding which suggests grounding our designs in what people already 
know or are familiar with and not leading too far with an extreme or unfamiliar 
experience. We had originally anticipated that some of the more literal 
displays, such as the population density displays and the path displays 
showing common paths, would fare well with people because they would be 
easy to read and immediately informative. However, we found that the 
displays about emotion generated more interest and enthusiasm. The more 
abstract or ambiguous displays lent themselves to user-constructed narratives 
as opposed to the literal displays that left little room for interpretation. For 
example, for an animated display that showed objects in the museum growing 
or decreasing in size based on number of visits, one participant explained it 
looked like a collective memory map of the museum, like a view into the 
museum’s brain. For one of the more abstract displays, one participant felt it 
was an example of visitors creating art through simply participating in the 
regular museum experience.    
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3. Finding Self in the Collective.  
Some of the displays depicted only aggregation and for these displays 
participants asked to be able to identify their own place.  There was an 
expressed desire not necessarily to isolate oneself, and therefore give up 
privacy, but to be able to see how one’s own participation influenced the 
overall display. Visitors especially expressed an interest in the idea of being 
able to leave a trace that may influence the experience of others.  
4. Site Specific Displays.  
As our focus groups consisted of staff from the Johnson Museum and 
students from Cornell, when we used a floorplan for the displays, it was from 
the Cornell Johnson Museum of Art. The map provided one level of grounding 
for constructing what was happening in the displays and what they meant. 
One of the reasons the popularity display was so favorable may have been 
because it created montages based on the museum’s collection of objects.  
However, the form of the both of these displays was very generic – i.e. if we 
moved to another museum, we could swap in a different floor plan and make it 
specific for that museum. Our displays did not test the level of site specificity 
required but it was an issue we highlighted to explore in future studies.  
The main take away from the focus groups was the general level of 
interest expressed in highlighting visitor information to visitors themselves as 
opposed to a tool for a context-aware system or an evaluation metric for 
curators. It was important to have a range of displays for discussion, however, 
as this allowed not only for conversations about an individual display but about 
the differences between the different displays. The tactic of having the 
different stakeholders try to anticipate the perspective of an alternate 
stakeholder (e.g. museum staff projecting visitor’s reactions and visitors  
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projecting staff reactions) also proved a useful technique for fostering more 
discussion about what aspects of the display were valuable and why. The fact 
that museum staff consistently underestimated visitor interest in the displays 
was an interesting finding but perhaps would have been a more useful prompt 
if the discrepancies were revealed to both staff and visitors. 
This leads to a few suggestions for how to improve the pilot methods. 
The rating system ended up being less interesting in terms of the actual 
scores returned, but more interesting in terms of the disparity between what 
visitors anticipated would be interesting to curators and vice versa. 
Furthermore, the rating system acted as a prompt for discussion about the 
more or less popular displays. In future iterations of such studies, it would be 
useful to push on the role of the ratings as stimuli as opposed to output. For 
instance, if participants entered their scores into a networked device, the 
immediate results of their tabulated scores could be projected next to the 
display thereby generating reflection on the aggregate scores in addition to 
their own individual input. In addition, we chose to run the focus groups as 
separate discussions, one with staff and one with visitors. It would be useful to 
have a third group with staff and visitors to encourage more deliberation and 
discussion across different viewpoints. 
At this point, we could now move into building actual systems. In the 
following section, I will present two installations: Imprints and Birdscape. 
These installations draw from the pilot above but they also involved a period of 
intial brainstorming in order to customize the design for the particular exhibit. I 
will describe each project in detail from drawing board through evaluation.  
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Stage Two: Imprints in the Museum 
The Imprints program began with an opportunity to create a handheld 
guided tour for the Cornell Johnson Museum of Art’s temporary exhibition of 
contemporary arts and craft from the 1900s Byrdcliffe colony in upstate New 
York. The Johnson museum’s objectives for this exhibit were markedly similar 
to the objectives of the Renwick Gallery discussed earlier. The difference 
between the two exhibits however is that the Renwick features contemporary 
craft and created rich multimedia materials such as interviews with the living 
artists and clips of the artists in their studios. The Byrdcliffe exhibit featured the 
work of artisans from the turn of the century and therefore had to rely on 
existing source material found primarily in books. Another contrast between 
the Renwick and the Johnson exhibits is that the handheld guides provided the 
only source of multimedia in the Renwick gallery whereas in the Byrdcliffe 
exhibit at the Johnson, there were several stations throughout the gallery for 
listening to actors portraying the artists or watching animations of pictures 
taken from this time period.  
Despite these differences, the objectives were very similar. The 
Johnson museum’s curator for the special exhibit and the education staff 
wanted to explore the use of handheld guides as an interpretive aide for the 
works on display. The HCI group at Cornell agreed to facilitate the design of 
the handhelds, working with a tour development company called Spotlight 
Mobile, with the understanding that we could also add an element on new 
visitor experiences such as the displays we had explored with the museum 
staff in the earlier focus groups. We wanted to reflect visitor information as a 
stimulus for constructing meaning about their role and the museum itself.  
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Design Objectives  
Returning to the historical review that began this chapter, I wanted to 
explore the space between using visitor information to drive technology as art 
versus driving technology as tool. As an example of the former category, 
Simon Penny’s Traces is a 3-D cave environment where the visitor enters the 
cave and through his or her movements is able to bring into being semi-
autonomous forms that dance around the cave (Penny, Smith, and Bernhardt, 
1999). The visitor is thus immersed in a creative and reflective process 
examining the shape of his or her movements as projected in the emergent 
forms. This approach stands in contrast to the use of visitor movement 
information for the Museum Wearable (Sparacino, 2002) where the visitor is 
unaware that their movement is having any influence on the system at all and 
the information that is returned is the information about the art on display. The 
challenge for augmenting the Byrdcliffe handheld system that we would build 
was to reflect visitor presence and activity but not in a didactic way that would 
reduce visitor information to another bit of information about an object, such as 
‘5 people visited this object’ or ‘this object is the most popular.’ 
Therefore, the design and research questions motivating this stage of 
the case study were as follows: 
 
•  How can we augment the visitor’s experience in the museum through 
the presentation of visitor information? How can we present this 
information not didactically but evocatively, serving both to inform the 
visit and as a source of reflection? 
 
•  What sense will visitor’s make of this information – will they consider 
the information valuable? Will they use the information to inform their 
behavior, such as for navigation? Will they use the information to reflect 
on aspects of the museum experience beyond the art objects?  
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Design Methods 
The Imprints project was designed and implemented in collaboration 
with the curator Nancy Green, members of the educational department Cathy 
Klimaszewski and Meg Elliott, software designer Kiyo Kubo from Spotlight 
Mobile and a team of designers and students from the HCI group including: 
Geri Gay, Helene Hembrooke, Jennifer Thom-Santelli, Angela Zoss, Tucker 
Barrett, and Justin Hall. The team from the HCI Group was involved in both the 
design and the analysis (Boehner, et al., 2005) the results of which will be 
presented here. My particular role was to lead and coordinate the design, 
implementation and evaluation efforts. 
Our initial design discussions were informed by the pilot study results, 
particularly the need to support digital scaffolding to grant license for 
participation, to use ambiguity to draw in more engagement in the meaning 
making process, to allow visitors to leave a trace of their individual mark in the 
collective, and to make the eventual design site specific. I will describe how 
each of these in turn influenced our design decisions. For the last objective of 
site specificity, we oriented this toward the Byrdcliffe collection as it was a 
temporary exhibit and not rooted to the space of the Johnson museum itself. 
As we read about and discussed the exhibit with Green, the curator, we 
focused on one of the defining debates of the Byrdcliffe colony. Founded partly 
in response to the mass market and commodification impulses of the Industrial 
Revolution, the Byrdcliffe artisans were split about the use of technology in 
their work (Green, 2004). Some felt it took away from the skill and personal 
touch of the artisan whereas others felt it automated the routine aspects of the 
craft and freed the artisan to focus on the creative aspects of the art. Through 
this debate there was an emphasis on seeing the imprint of the individual  
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artisan – whether through a signature motif or an actual signature – as 
something that presented the piece as individual and not mass-produced. We 
therefore sought to translate this idea of the artist imprint to the visitor 
experience.  
One of the first ideas for the visitor’s imprint was to play off of the 
faceless museum surveys described in an earlier section regarding visitor 
studies. Since part of the evaluation of the handheld devices would consist of 
a survey asking standard demographic questions (e.g. age; experience with 
museums, arts and crafts and technology; or motivation for visit) in order to 
assess the universality of the device, we first contemplated using this same 
information and turning it into an iconic stamp for the visitor. The idea here 
would be to make the survey actually part of the creation and design process 
as opposed to an analysis tool alone. Although we felt this would provide high 
degrees of information about visitor presence, we also reflected that this kind 
of demographic information had scored poorly in our pilot study. A second idea 
suggested approaching the individuality of visitors through the literal imprints 
of their fingers. As most people would not recognize their own fingerprint 
however, and as the idea of capturing the fingerprint steered too close to 
privacy concerns, we pulled back to the idea of a handprint or a picture of 
one’s hand. We imagined visitors could come to the gallery and in order to 
check out a handheld guide, they would place their hand in front of a camera 
and this image would become their print. The visitor could make a gesture or 
simply snap a picture of their hand, similar to the clay handprints children 
make for their parents. This print would then be associated with the visitor’s 
tour. However, when we discussed this idea with Green and the education 
staff, the concern was that this design would not fit with the more simplistic  
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collection – that it would be introducing something too high-tech into an 
experience about the more low-tech means of production. 
Ultimately, the inspiration for the final form of the Imprint came from a 
page in the Byrdcliffe catalogue portraying an image of ceramic tile samples 
from Jane Whitehead. The tile samples were lined up in a grid creating a 
mosaic of colors.  The tiles immediately suggested the idea of a print to us and 
the mosaic suggested the idea of tiling each individual’s imprint with the 
imprints of other visitors. This then would address our objective of letting 
visitors create their own mark, or imprint, in the shape of a tile which would 
then be shown within an array of other imprints as the collective presence of 
the museums’ visitors. We anticipated that the imprint would be used in two 
ways. First, the imprint would be associated with each piece that a visitor 
looked at using the handheld tour. This would be like leaving one’s calling card 
upon visiting a place – the imprint would then become part of the information 
accessible about each object on the tour. Secondly, the imprints from all 
visitors would be collected and displayed in a wall mosaic. In this way, we 
imagined that the information about visitors accessible on the handheld would 
perhaps act as a source of information or a tool informing the visitor’s 
movement through the museum and the projected wall display would serve as 
more of a reflective piece for visitors to contemplate the array of presence that 
had passed through the exhibit before them.  
Regarding the principle of designing for ambiguity, we wanted the 
visitor to create tiles that would allow for personalization and therefore provide 
a range of open-ended expression. The fact that each visitor would make one 
mark would mean a literal mapping of one mark per visitor, but we felt the 
design of the marks themselves could be left up to the visitor’s discretion.  
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Originally, we talked about using ‘alien presence’ in the system, something 
that would suggest that the creator of the imprint did not have complete control 
over their final form – just as firing a tile in a kiln adds an element of surprise 
and the kiln becomes an active player in determining the final shape and color 
of a ceramic work. We described this as providing for ‘happy accidents’, 
something we thought would be an interesting part of the creation process. 
Ultimately, however, this was not implemented in any concerted way (due to 
time constraints) other than having no erase feature in the Imprint application. 
This meant if a visitor made a mistake, he had to make the best of this or start 
all over again. The eventual palette for the Imprint program would consist of 
background patterns from the Byrdcliffe exhibit and a simple drawing tool for 
embellishing this pattern (described more below).  
Finally, we addressed the principle of digital scaffolding in three ways. 
First, the Imprint and the Imprint making process was layered on top of the 
handheld tour and associated with the generally familiar process of using an 
audio or handheld guide. The Imprint program was positioned as an additional 
and optional feature. Secondly, once a visitor made an imprint, no other 
actions would be required for leaving their mark behind through the exhibit. 
Making an Imprint was part of the handheld check out process and then faded 
into the background of the tour. Finally, the Imprint making process needed to 
be simple. During the MUSE example, people felt they lacked the license to 
participate as a commentator of art and it was important therefore that we did 
not create a new barrier to participation of artistic license. Instead, we wanted 
the Imprint application to be quick and simple, but potentially expressive in the 
ways described above.   
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Implementation 
As with any design project, our design choices also became our design 
constraints. One of the biggest challenges in implementing the Imprint 
program was the decision to tie it to the handheld guided tour. In doing so, we 
would only reach visitors who chose to use the tour
20 and we were also 
dependent on the success of the traditional tour itself. This was a concern as 
the tour developed and we realized only 6 of the objects in the exhibit would 
be developed with additional information. Furthermore, the audio-visual guides 
would not only compete for attention with the additional multimedia kiosks and 
audio stations in the exhibit, but the handheld would present largely the same 
information that could be experienced elsewhere, either from label copy or 
from the other multimedia aides. We anticipated that if visitors did not enjoy or 
find valuable the handheld tour, then this sentiment would likely be transferred 
to the Imprints as well since the two were tied together. However, we 
wondered if the Imprint program could work the other way, in that it would 
provide information that was not available through any other means in the 
exhibit and perhaps the Imprint program could improve the reaction to the tour. 
One way of teasing out the role of the Imprints as a source of valuable 
information was to create a new category of objects on the tour called ‘non-
featured’ objects. When a visitor selected a ‘featured object’ on the handheld 
tour, the visitor would then have the option of asking the following six 
questions about that object: 
•  Why does the object look like this? 
•  How was it used? 
•  Who made the object? 
                                                 
20 Reports of use of interpretive aides by visitors for temporary exhibits is low, some estimate 
only 30% of visitors take audio-visual guides (Anderson, 1999; McClellan, 2003)  
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•  How was it made? 
•  How does it fit the Byrdcliffe story? 
•  Who else has visited this object?  
Clicking on one of the questions on the handheld would then return the 
relevant information such as pictures of the artist or examples of the tools 
used to make the object, all narrated by the voice of the curator Nancy Green.  
Whereas when a visitor selected a ‘non-featured object’, the only information 
returned would be additional label information as text (i.e. no audio) and the 
question: “Who else has visited this object?” We originally planned to test two 
conditions of the handhelds: one with the social information and one without. 
We anticipated that people would mainly go to the featured objects and taper 
off visiting the non-featured objects when they realized the information was 
simply a repetition of the label text. However, if we noticed a different pattern 
when the social information was present, we could infer that this information 
has a degree of attraction to it. Unfortunately, again due to time constraints, 
we were only able to test the system with the social information included.  
Although as designers of the system our intention was to make the social 
information on the same level as the information about the art, for the curators 
and educators, the social information represented a nice additional feature but 
not critical. One example of this difference in priorities manifested in the 
placement of the collective mosaic of visitor imprints – although we had 
originally intended for the mosaic to be situated near the handheld check out 
station or on a wall in the gallery, the only available wall space left for the 
display was tucked away in a back alcove. The difference in agendas between 
the HCI design team and the museum staff is mentioned not as a criticism of 
our museum partners nor as an excuse for the eventual limited delivery on the  
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Imprint program, but as a logistical feature of research through building. 
Although we defined design and research questions at the start of our project, 
these would eventually become modified in order to fit the actual 
implementation given the real world, i.e. non-laboratory, setting of the art 
museum.  
The eventual Imprint program was implemented through a combination of a 
Java-application on a Tablet PC, a network server and wireless access point, 
and the Dell Axim handheld devices with wireless modem cards. The 
handheld guides were made available at the opening of the exhibit space. 
When visitors checked out a handheld guide, they were asked if they would 
also like to make an Imprint to mark their tour. The Imprint program was 
explained as being similar to the process of the artisans in the Byrdcliffe 
colony who would mark their creations with a personalized symbol. The 
imprint, we explained to visitors, would be associated with their tour and would 
be left behind with each object they visited. Consequently, they could also look 
at the imprints of other visitors who had seen the same object before them. 
If the visitor agreed to make an Imprint, they moved to the Tablet PC and 
started the Imprint program which had two steps: 1) selecting a background 
that represented the Byrdcliffe Arts and Crafts aesthetic, and 2) using the 
calligraphy style pen to enhance the pattern with their personal addition 
(Figure 1).  If a user chose not to create an imprint, a default image was 
randomly assigned.  
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Figure 1.  Imprints interface with created imprint 
 
When the visitor began the tour, she would play an introduction about 
the guide and the Byrdcliffe exhibit in general and would then move to a visual 
menu of all the objects on the tour. The objects were ordered roughly 
according to how the visitor would encounter them if moving in a clockwise 
direction through the exhibit hall, however visitors tended to wander somewhat 
more randomly. Each object in the physical space had an icon of a dragonfly 
with a number on it (featured objects also had a star) and this corresponded 
with the numbered position of the objects on the visual menu page. When the 
visitor stood in front of an object in the gallery that he or she wished to learn 
more about, the visitor would scroll through the visual menu of objects on the 
tour’s index or home page and then tap the image/number that corresponded 
with the desired object. This action returned a page with subsequent questions 
that could be asked about the featured object (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Screen shots of an object’s exhibit page and response to the 
question “Who else visited this object?” 
 
Once the visitor selected an object to learn more about his or her 
imprint was immediately associated with that object. When asking the question 
“Who else visited this object?”, the visitor would then see a page of Imprints of 
all previous visitors including his or herself. Selecting an imprint would show 
an enlarged version of this mark. In future iterations we hope to include the 
ability to follow a particular Imprint to other objects (e.g. ‘where else did this 
Imprint go?’). In addition to leaving one’s imprint behind on the handheld, all of 
the imprints were combined into the photomosaic (see Figure 3).  
As a photomosaic, the imprints were not only collected but constructed 
into a particular image. The goal was to use the visitor imprints to create the 
shape of the most popular object (i.e. most frequently visited object) in the 
gallery. Ultimately, however, for this first iteration, the mosaic only formed a 
predetermined source image, in this case a White Pines vase. Both the 
photomosaic and the imprints to the handheld were to be displayed in real-
time, meaning once a visitor selected on object to view, this selection would be 
communicated to the server. Then, when the visitor asked the question “Who 
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else has visited this object?”, the device would ping the server to get all of the 
imprints including those from visitors as recent as one second ago. Likewise, 
the photomosaic would refresh every five minutes to present all of the imprints 
collected thus far. In practice, only the photomosaic worked dynamically 
although the computer projecting the mosaic kept falling off the wireless 
network and needed constant rebooting. The handhelds had to be active 
synched through the USB port when they were turned in therefore showing 
only the imprints of visitors who had already left the exhibit. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Projected photomosaic 
 
Once visitors completed their visit, they would turn in the handheld 
device and the device would be synched with the server and readied for the 
next visitor. Synching the device collected all of the clickstream data for what 
objects a visitor visited and what information was accessed in what order. In 
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addition, if the visitor filled out the visitor survey, one of the options on the 
handheld tour Go menu, this data was also collected at this time.  
Evaluation Methods 
The evaluation of the Imprint program used many different methods but 
primarily focused on developing a phenomenological account of whether and 
how people used the imprints. We used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to provide evidence that would allow us to infer whether 
we were successful in designing a technology device that pushed beyond the 
traditional role of serving information about the art object on display. To this 
end, we used clickstream data collected from the handhelds, surveys 
administered on the handheld, observations and video footage, and 
interviews. As the first implementation of the handheld tour and the Imprint 
program, we position this evaluation as an exploratory study. In future 
iterations when the technology is more stable, we can conduct more controlled 
studies regarding comparisons of different conditions.  
Our interview guide was informed by the Falk and Dierking (2000) 
critique of studies that overlook visitor expectations and motivation. This 
critique is leveled against studies that present visitors as simple categories 
and turn their survey results into statistics proving that information was 
transferred or not. Therefore we did not ask simple rating questions such as: 
Did you like the imprint display? (scale of 1 to 5). Instead we were interested in 
probing why people were at the museum, how they defined the museum as a 
place, and what their expectations were for their visit. During our previous 
work with the Renwick Gallery, we had used a survey question that asked the 
reason for the museum visit with options such as: to study, to learn, to explore, 
to meditate, and other. “Other” received the highest mark, suggesting not just  
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that the categories were wrong but that attempting to categorize a visit’s 
motivation in such a way was not very useful. Therefore, our interview 
questions were designed to be open-ended and thought provoking. 
Just as the design of the program and its implementation were 
exploratory, so too were the evaluation methods. A number of the methods did 
not work due to technical failure or oversight. For instance, we wished to 
discover if people navigated by using the feature on the handheld that let 
visitors sort the objects by most popular or most undiscovered. However, the 
tagging in the system code only allowed us to discern if people used the sort 
filter but not which filter. Furthermore, the imprints often failed to appear with 
the right handheld – where we had hoped to build up for each object a number 
of imprints and a variety of imprints, we often only had 4 or 5 despite many 
more visitors using the devices. However, although we knew the system was 
malfunctioning, the visitors did not unless their particular imprint was lost. We 
had a video camera stationed near the photomosaic, but since the display was 
often off-line, we collected very little footage. We do have some observations 
from around the display however that I will describe later. In addition to 
technical difficulties hampering some of our evaluation methods, we also 
discovered that several of our interview questions did not provide the kind of 
stimulus we were looking for. In particular, we experimented with using a 
semantic differential methodology (e.g. Osgood, Suci, and Tannebaum, 1975) 
as one approach in our interview guides, as an attempt to compare people’s 
perceptions of a general museum experience with their specific experience 
using the Imprint enhanced handheld guides. The differentials proved to be a 
confusing exercise for visitors however and we ultimately abandoned them.  
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Therefore, the results presented here will revolve around the content 
analysis of the imprints that were made which we are able to match with 
demographics from the online surveys, results from interviews and 
observations, and some basic survey information and the clearly coded 
clicksteam results.  This study presents the results from a period of thirteen 
days spread out over approximately four weeks (generally conducted on 
weekends) when handhelds were distributed to interested individuals. Logging 
the usage of the handhelds created a database of recorded navigation events 
from 152 visitors. Of these 152 records, 62 visitors filled out an online survey 
providing further demographic information associated with their path and their 
imprint creation. In the semi-structured interviews, we  elicited the visitors’ 
reactions to the museum, the handheld, and the collective display.  Visitors 
were asked if they would participate in a 15-20 minute interview after their 
visit. Forty-six visitors agreed, including twenty-two females between the ages 
of 19 and 60, as well as twenty-four males between the ages of 8 and 60. 
Over half of the visitors of each gender were between the ages of 19 and 29. 
Results 
The results can be categorized into evidence of three types: evidence for the 
potential of the design space we were targeting, evidence about how people 
used the Imprint program in terms of personalization and evidence for how 
people responded to the resulting imprints for reflection. These will be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Evidence for an expanded design space. 
This whole project was motivated as a form of reflective design which 
examines the dominant practices in technology design and use and questions  
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the motivating assumptions. Reflective design does not wait for a technical 
impasse before intervening, as does critical technical practice, nor does it wait 
to be led by users needs and requirements, as is dictated by participatory and 
user led design. Reflective design draws from these practices but does not 
begin with technical or social breakdown – instead, the intervention inserts 
new practices into an existing functioning space and observes what happens. 
Therefore, part of our validation for the design space hinged upon a 
level of uptake. From the tour log of 152 visitors, 73% chose to make their own 
imprint rather than use a default, suggesting that indeed visitors engaged in 
the creation of a personal mark. We did not use the metric of time as a 
measure of engagement, although in future studies this may be of interest, but 
anecdotally, many visitors spent a large amount of time playing with their 
imprint – testing out different backgrounds and working with the calligraphy 
pen until satisfied with their results. It was not uncommon for a line to build up 
behind the imprint making Tablet PC. In addition, and also anecdotally, on 
several occasions when an imprint was lost due to a malfunction, visitors 
made the repeated effort to redraw their mark. One visitor even returned to the 
handheld desk after handing in his device when he discovered that his mark 
was missing from the collective display. 
As mentioned, networking difficulties prevented the imprints from 
appearing consistently on the handheld but initial evidence suggests that 
visitors not only made their own mark but observed the marks of others. Log 
data from survey respondents showed that 95% of these visitors asked the 
question “Who else visited this object?” at least once, indicating that the 
opportunity to see traces of others provoked curiosity.  
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In addition to statistics of uptake, we also discovered evidence for 
continuing to explore the design space through our interviews. As described in 
the methods section, rather than simply asking visitors how they would define 
the museum as a place, we asked this question more obliquely in order to 
surface the salient features, feelings, or activities that people associate with 
museums. The first question was, “If there were no museums, what would be 
missing?” The second question was, “If you compared the museum to another 
public space, what would that be?” A content analysis of the first question 
identified three categories of responses. Out of 31 responses
21, 27.3% said 
that without museums we would miss the art itself, for example the visual 
interaction with an object to scale. 24.2% would miss the information about art, 
such as the historical context and the curatorial point of view.  In the final 
category, 48.5% cited the shared space, the experience of being involved, and 
expressions of community and inter-connectivity as critical aspects of 
museums.  
When asked to create a metaphor for the museum, visitors offered a 
range of responses from commercial art galleries to civic agoras. The top two 
responses, accounting for nearly half the metaphors offered, were a library or 
bookstore (30% of responses) and a public park or garden (15% of 
responses). Although the library metaphor reveals a perception of the museum 
as an information source, comments regarding both the library and the public 
park identified a special type of sociality that did not require explicit social 
interaction. Visitors can have a private, individualized experience yet still be a 
part of a social, shared place. 
                                                 
21  Our coding was performed by two independent coders with resulting Cohen’s kappa of .95 
(p<.01).  
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Taken together, these responses confirm that information transfer is a 
critical component of the museum experience, but they also reveal the 
importance of social awareness. Personalization is less directly accounted for, 
although visitors talked about having individualized experience within the 
context of a public place. This suggests an interesting tension between being 
public and private at the same time. These responses are especially 
interesting in light of the typical museum application of technology, which 
tends to be for information about the art, and promotes the private at the 
expense of the public. Critical dimensions of the museum experience have 
been overlooked. 
2. Evidence of personalization. 
In addition to the evidence suggesting that the Imprint program was 
used, we wanted to look for evidence indicating how it was used. A content 
analysis of the 112 imprints we collected offers some further insights into the 
imprint making process as an exercise of personalization. Imprints were coded 
in terms of pattern selected, type of marking added by the visitor, and the 
coverage of the visitors’ mark.
22 The most common, out of 12 possible 
patterns, were the two open frames (31.2%)  possibly indicating the desire for 
a high degree of freedom in creating one’s mark. In terms of the mark added, 
signatures and initials, a readily apparent form of personalization, constituted 
the bulk of the markings at 32.1%. The least popular mark was simply tracing 
the existing pattern (5.5%), indicating that people were not simply mimicking 
the pattern but attempting to add something unique or personal on top. Finally, 
the majority of marks used the entire background canvas (42%) whereas a 
                                                 
22 Cohen’s kappa of 1.0 (p<.01), .88 (p<.01), and .89 (p<.01) respectively  
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much smaller percentage of marks (11.9%) were minimized and pushed to 
one of the corners. In sum, these data suggest that visitors appropriated the 
patterns provided for personal expression.  
The interview data corroborate, and further describe, the content 
analysis findings regarding the importance of personalization in the imprint 
creation process. When interviewees discussed why they chose certain 
patterns, there were two predominant reasons. Popular patterns, such as the 
Japanese fish set in a circular border, provided a good canvas, felt stamp-like, 
or left space for their personal mark. Unpopular patterns, like the Morris 
tapestry (Figure 1, top right), were too complicated and felt fragmented. The 
second predominant reason for pattern choice was that it appealed to their 
personal aesthetic preferences. Only three out of 44 interviewees indicated 
that their choice of pattern was actually a non-choice (e.g. “it was the first thing 
I saw” or “I didn’t like any of the others”). 
Regarding the type of marks made, several interviewees used marks 
reflective of a personal preference (e.g. “I like butterflies”) or a personal 
symbol (e.g. “I’m a teacher, so I drew an apple”, “I’m a caver, so I drew a bat”).   
The use of signatures or initials was primarily explained as being either a 
simple or a safe form of personalization.  Two of our respondents used their 
name because they did not feel artistic and the signature was a non-
threatening expression.  However, the signature was also used as a call-out. 
One respondent noted that his friends would be able to read his signature, 
whereas strangers would not. 
In addition to the interview data, our observations also confirmed 
people were spending time on creating their marks and felt personally invested 
in the process – as discussed earlier, reactions when a mark were lost were  
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not to give up but to make sure the imprint was logged by the system. One 
final anecdote came from working with an eight year old boy as he made his 
imprint. He chose the dragonfly print, because he “just liked it”, and began to 
draw various abstract shapes at the bottom of the mark. At one point, he 
started to color over what he had done with new shapes. I asked what he was 
making and he said he didn’t know but that he had made a mistake and since 
there was no eraser he was marking over it until it looked like what he wanted. 
I asked if he knew this is probably how the painters in the exhibit corrected 
their mistakes by painting over them. He said no. I asked if he thought the 
painters knew exactly what they wanted to make or if it changed while they 
were making it and he said it probably changed. Although I don’t believe this 
exchange is representative of others who made their imprints in that I don’t 
think others were drawn to compare their mark with the work of the artisans, it 
was encouraging that for an eight year old boy the mark making could take on 
an artistic process and for others the mark could simply be a quick mark of 
individuality. 
3. Evidence of social awareness 
The above results demonstrate that personalization was an important 
part of the imprint making process, but our next set of questions explore 
whether the imprints were consequently used for social awareness. As 
indicated in the first section of evidence regarding uptake, 95% of visitors at 
least explored the question of who else visited an object. Networking 
difficulties and tagging issues in the code prevent assessing whether this 
interest was sheer novelty or if people continued to return to the question 
about social presence for each object. The log files suggest that people often  
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asked the question, but because of our tagging error
23 we can only make the 
conservative estimate that they looked at the question at least once.  
However, from the interview process and the observations of people’s 
reactions in front of the mosaic, we have further evidence that the imprints 
were used for reflection on the presence of others. For instance, the following 
quotes are from three separate visitors in response to the question of whether 
or not they looked at the imprints:  
 
“I went to a particular piece of artwork that I really liked and 
thought, 'I wonder who else has been here to look at this'? 
Maybe I could see a pattern…or recognize a kindred spirit.” 
(female, 48 yrs old) 
 
“A museum is usually a very solitary experience, so the 
notion that someone was here before you, I really like that." 
(female, 30 yrs old) 
 
“I went to one object with four other imprints, and I thought 
‘mine is better than theirs.’” (male, 60 yrs old)  
 
As the last quote above demonstrates, visitors displayed a range of 
social awareness.  Whereas some visitors looked for commonality and 
connection in the traces left behind, others looked for differences. Regardless, 
the data suggest that visitors were able to construct social narratives regarding 
the use of the imprints on the handheld.  
The display of the imprints in the mosaic (Figure 3), however, was more 
difficult for people to understand in the context of social awareness.  Several 
interviewees commented that although the mosaic was interesting, they 
weren’t sure what to read into it: was there some greater meaning to the 
                                                 
23 The question “who else looked at this object” was tagged as ‘stamp’ therefore we could look 
for this tag in the clickstream path. However, due to an oversight, we did not tag this question 
for each object differently therefore could not tell with complete certainty whether someone 
had hit the back button or if they had moved to the question for a different object.   
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collection and placement of imprints? In this vein, several people tried to figure 
out how they might design their imprint differently in order to make their imprint 
bolder or position it in the center of the mosaic. They wondered if there were 
rules they could have played with or if the mosaic was simply random. Overall 
however, the display did not seem to generate much discussion or pause for 
reflection. People would stand in front of the display, squint their eyes to find 
their imprint, and then walk away. The display suffered not only from being 
tucked back in a corner and having networking difficulties (when the display 
was down an Error File Not Found web browser page was displayed), but the 
screen resolution also made viewing the imprints difficult. Several people 
during the interviews suggested ways to improve the display however – for 
instance making the screen interactive so that if you touch an imprint, you can 
see where this imprint was left behind in the gallery. Or as another suggestion, 
grouping imprints not in order to make a photomosaic of a popular object but 
because the imprints themselves were similar based on similar content in the 
imprint or based on similar paths through the museum. The fact that people 
had opinions about how to improve the display indicated again the potential for 
turning it into a valuable addition to this type of experience.  
Overall, viewing the imprints on the handheld was more successful in 
terms of social presence awareness than viewing the mosaic of imprints 
displayed on the museum wall. Visitors could easily read an imprint’s 
significance when associated with an object, but the wall display was too 
ambiguous without inviting interpretation. This suggests that perhaps using 
social information in the museum for utility or tool-like functions (as in a 
recommender system for finding other objects) made more sense to visitors 
than portraying the social information as art itself.  The mosaic display in its  
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current form served as neither art nor tool. To be art, it needed to be more 
evocative to allow for playful or poetic interpretations; to be a tool, it needed 
more context cues for people to be able to read it. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this stage of investigation was to explore aspects of the 
museum experience that have been overlooked by technology. Previous 
attempts to use technology for more active visitor participation, such as 
MUSE, have met with limited success partly due to the institutionalized 
definitions of the museum and the visitor’s traditional role. This study therefore 
supported new forms of expression through reflection of existing behaviors 
and built upon findings from the initial pilot study with visitors and museums 
staff. The simplicity of the Imprints process acted as a scaffold for the 
realization of alternative visitor roles and the impact of presence in the co-
construction of the museum experience. The evidence collected through 
interviews and log files suggests a degree of reception to technology and use 
for personalization and social awareness. Future work with technology in the 
museum should incorporate these opportunities, adjusting the balance 
between individual expression and the larger temporal social context.   
Although this stage of work provided evidence of uptake and value, it 
also identified a number of areas for improvement in both the design and the 
evaluation methods. On the design side many of the improvements will be 
realized through a more robust implementation of the technology. We are in 
the process of building a new handheld tour system for the Johnson museum’s 
permanent Asia Gallery collection focusing on art of the Buddha and 
Bodhissatvas. The results discussed here have provided a valuable starting 
point for this process. One final mark of success is that the museum educators  
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requested that we work with them again to build in the social component for 
the device. Furthermore, they indicated that in their grant writing for funding, 
they discuss the importance of this component in addition to providing 
information about the objects. Although our evaluation focused on the visitor’s 
experience with the Imprint program, this acceptance from the museum 
educators indicates that the program was valued by the museum staff as well.  
For design improvements, we are exploring how to make the imprints 
more evocative of the ‘kindred spirit’ connection expressed by one of our 
Byrdcliffe visitors. In the Byrdcliffe marks, connections were deduced generally 
through the symbolic content or, similar to the Amazon.com model, familiar 
patterns of consumption in terms of objects visited. For the Buddha tour, we 
are planning to ask people to write a word that symbolizes something they 
wish to meditate on. These words will be stylized into a chop or stamp in 
cinnabar (the traditional color for Japanese seals). Instead of demographics or 
consumption patterns, we felt asking visitors to disclose something they were 
thinking about might afford kindred spirit connections. In addition to 
improvements on the design side, we will also address the evaluation issues. 
As discussed some of these were linked to the technical issues of coding and 
the network difficulties. Improving these will allow for greater control over 
meaningful comparisons. For instance, we can compare if objects that only 
have stamp information still receive visits on the handheld tour. We can also 
compare the tour with and without the imprint program to assess what the 
imprint program adds to the tour process.  
The issues above will be taken up at a later time (outside this case 
study), but the lessons learned in stage two of our case study also informed 
the development of stage three where we explore the question of bridging art  
104 
and tool in more depth. Whereas the imprint program combined art and tool by 
having two different interfaces – the handheld application serving as tool and 
the collective display intended to serve as art – in stage three we wanted to 
collapse these categories even more and create one installation that would 
serve as both art and tool simultaneously. 
Stage Three: Birdscape 
Stage three of our overall case study on designing new technology for 
the museum environment involves another project designed for the Johnson 
Museum, but specifically for their permanent collection in the Asia Gallery. 
While the stage two Imprints program took a fairly literal approach to reflection 
on visitor presence and tackled the art and tool divide by having two separate 
interfaces to the system, Birdscape is more abstract in presentation and aims 
to combine tool and art functionality into one experience. Furthermore, the 
Imprints program only reached visitors who self selected an experience of the 
art museum mediated by technology as tool. Visitors experienced the Imprint 
program only after they decided to take a guided tour of the museum and 
therefore we reached a smaller subset of visitors, and potentially a subset 
more familiar with using technology in museums in a standard way. For this 
next stage, we sought to reach a wider subset of the visitor population and 
therefore did not want to tie the experience to the handheld guides. Instead we 
wanted to use sensor technology that could be embedded in the environment 
and available to all visitors simply through their presence. 
In order to develop a system that better hybridizes art and tool, I 
initiated a collaboration with Xiaowen Chen, an artist and professor at Cornell 
University. Our collaboration began at an open house held by the Information 
Science program, an event designed to bring together researchers from a  
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range of disciplines. During this event, Chen and I discovered a shared 
interest in new technology and art in the museum. I wanted to draw from the 
arts and humanities as a means for pushing beyond the usability and task 
focus of tool design dominant in HCI. Chen was interested in exploring new 
artistic practices enabled by science and technology research. We therefore 
felt that the combination of our different background, and mutual interest in 
each other’s work, would facilitate this attempt to bridge art and tool. Part of 
this case study then will be about examining this strategy of addressing an 
interdisciplinary space through the simple combination of different disciplines. 
In this effort, Geri Gay of the HCI Group and Phoebe Sengers of the Culturally 
Embedded Computing Group joined us in refining the conceptual ideas. 
Throughout the following sections, I will outline how this collaboration 
developed further, the resulting design, and an evaluation of the design in the 
museum. 
Design Objectives 
The initial starting point for the project was to identify the marginalized 
aspects of the museum experience we wanted to target. To generate ideas for 
this end, Chen and I began by sharing points of inspiration. We both identified 
The Weather Project by Olafur Eliasson as a motivating piece (see Figure 4).  
The Weather Project was installed in the foyer of the Tate Modern in London, 
England in 2003. It consisted of more than 200 low-sodium lights behind a 
translucent shield generating not only light, but also warmth. The sodium lights 
generated only the bottom half of the sun; mirrors on the ceiling completed the 
top. Eliasson cited the British obsession with the weather as his point of 
departure, and indeed sun-starved Londoners flocked to bask and picnic by 
the simulated glow. People soaked up the atmosphere, but they also became  
106 
part of it as they quickly found and played with their reflections in the mirrored 
ceiling. Visitors could be seen simply waving at themselves or more 
ambitiously spelling words with the help of their friends’ bodies.   
A couple of important points emerged from our discussion of the 
Weather Project. First, it was a very site-specific piece. It fit both the outside 
(London and its characteristically horrible weather) and the inside (the 
dramatic open foyer of what used to be an industrial power plant). Secondly, 
the technology for reflection behind the Weather Project was the humble 
mirror. People intuitively interacted with the installation as it elegantly reflected 
presence in the museum.  
 
 
Figure 4. “The Weather Project” by Olafur Eliasson, view from the Tate 
Modern’s entrance foyer. Photo by Bob Binda.  
 
The simplicity of the technology in the Weather Project led to 
discussions of other media installation pieces such as The Wooden Mirror by 
Daniel Rozin and Text Rain by Camille Utterback and Romy Achituv. In both of 
these works, the technology is simple but the conceptual experience rich. In 
the Wooden Mirror, a 6-foot tall display is created out of 830 wood chips, akin 
to 830 pixels, each driven by a motor and tilting dynamically for the required 
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light intensity to reflect the image captured by a video camera behind the 
display. The artist suggests this piece plays with the divide between the 
analogue and the digital, but, whether or not the visitor grasps this distinction, 
the mirror is intuitively playful and a simple interaction causing wonderment 
about how it works. In the case of Text Rain, the shadow of visitors’ bodies or 
props provides a ground for catching the text of a poem falling from the top of 
the screen. Visitors catch words and phrases with various parts of their body, 
causing reflection on their movement and the interaction with words. These 
examples contrast with systems designed with very complex technology and 
more shallow conceptual ideas, such as the systems presented at the 2005 
Boston Cyberarts Festival and reviewed by New York Times art critic Sarah 
Boxer (2005). In her review, Boxer suggests that the technical interactivity 
employed by several of the systems at the Cyberarts Festival were about 
creating novel interfaces for interaction, a showcase for the technology, as 
opposed to a richer evocative experience. 
One caveat must be mentioned in reference to the installations just 
described. As described in the introduction, we wanted to bridge art and tool 
functionality. All of the pieces mentioned here as inspiration fall neatly into the 
category of art. They cause new reflections and new forms of participation but 
they do not necessarily engender new experiences of the museum visit, in 
other words, visitors would not likely use these pieces to inform the rest of 
their museum visit. These pieces comfortably occupy the pedestal of art as 
installations that the visitor interacts with before moving on to the next 
interaction. The installations do not permeate the museum experience except 
by the lingering effect they have in the visitor’s memory. Jennifer Crowe and 
Scott Paterson created an example for the Whitney Art Gallery in New York  
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City
24 of something closer to the experience of something permeating the 
museum visit.  With the installation Follow Through, Crowe and Paterson 
targeted visitors with handheld guides to draw attention to the disparity 
between the vibrant art on the walls and the relatively passive form of the 
visitor. This was accomplished by having posture notes displayed on the 
handheld for each piece (see Figure 5). In this way, the guide acted as a 
playful commentary on traditional postures but also alerted the visitor to 
different ways of responding. 
 
 
Figure 5. A mock-up of the Follow Through installation. Copyright Jennifer 
Crowe and Scott Paterson, 2005. 
 
                                                 
24 This project did not launch until after the Birdscape project had completed, therefore we 
could not use this as a point of initial inspiration, only as a point of subsequent reflection. 
http://artport.whitney.org/commissions/followthrough/  
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In addition to identifying art works that provide inspiration, Chen shared 
a personal anecdote that became a touch point for the resulting design. As a 
small boy growing up in China, Chen remembered visits to a modern shopping 
mall in his hometown. During each of these visits, he would gaze up at the 
ceiling to watch the fish swimming in the aquarium visible overhead. He never 
explicitly questioned where these fish came from but enjoyed watching their 
darting movements. As he got older, he realized the black silhouettes he saw 
were not fish at all but the soles of people’s feet as they walked on the 
translucent glass walkways above him (see Figure 6).  The shadows were a 
literal trace of presence – like the bodies reflected in the Weather Project – but 
these shadows only revealed themselves for what they were after the passage 
of time. 
 
 
Figure 6. A sketch of Chen’s memory of fish/footsteps 
 
Design Objectives 
From these stories and examples, I can now summarize the objectives 
guiding our new design. Specifically, we wanted to: 
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•  Encourage reflection on other aspects of museum experience beyond 
just the individual art objects. This reflection may occur during the initial 
visit or perhaps only after repeat visits. 
•  Design for openness to interpretation. Whereas the Imprints program or 
something like the Weather Project created simple one to one 
mappings between individual and impact, we wanted to leave more 
room for interpretation and adaptation. 
•  Be technically simple yet evocative. We did not want to simply create a 
technically novel interaction interface.  
•  Avoid creating a separate art installation but instead something that 
permeates the museum experience.  
•  Integrate with the specific space.  
Design Methods and Implementation 
As we worked toward the design objectives described above, a simple 
metaphor of migrating birds, hence the name Birdscape, began to materialize. 
Chen suggested the sound of birds as a proxy for presence, or rather lack of 
presence, in undiscovered areas of the museum. The connection of birds with 
visitor presence would be achieved by implementing a sensor network 
attached to speakers across the gallery space. Based on measurements of 
activity levels, bird sounds would trigger from the speakers in areas lacking 
visitor activity. If visitors are drawn to this space, or if they navigate there 
independently, the bird sounds stop as the birds metaphorically fly elsewhere. 
We felt this design embraced both the functionality of art and tool. As art, it 
had the potential to cause reflection and be open to interpretation. As tool, it 
could be used to navigate to new areas of the gallery.  
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Once this initial idea materialized, the team could align and assess the 
implementation around the guiding objectives.  In terms of a site-specific 
design, for example, the bird metaphor was a perfect fit. The gallery space 
holds Asian art with many pieces honoring or representing nature. The space 
itself is a quiet haven for contemplation. Most dramatically, however, 360 
degrees of window views surround the perimeter and look out from the perch 
of the fifth floor toward Cayuga lake and the hills of Ithaca. Many visitors come 
to the Johnson Museum simply to take in this view. Finally, Cornell University 
has a special relationship with birds as the home of one of the premier 
ornithology research labs.  
The decision to use sound helped achieve the objectives of permeating 
the museum space and designing for open interpretation. Prior to deciding 
upon the bird metaphor we had engaged in discussions about whether the 
installation should be a visual display of people’s presence or something like 
the emotional climate of the gallery. These ideas all took shape around some 
form of abstract animations or images projected onto a screen. In one design 
idea, we proposed immersing visitors in a room and projecting images of 
reflected emotion along the walls.  In these examples, however, we ran the 
risk of creating an art installation separated from the rest of the museum. 
Furthermore, the visual displays tended to be better for conveying information, 
depicting presence for example, as opposed to encouraging an alternate 
experience of the museum space. We were striving for a design that would 
indicate presence while experiencing the space as opposed to depicting 
presence at a single point in space. 
The technical apparatus for the Birdscape system is purposefully 
simple. Engineered by Eric Lee and Arun Israel, the system consists of four  
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small devices, each comprised of a PIR motion detector, a small speaker 
connected to a sound-chip, and a small PC board containing an EEPROM 
chip and a serial port. These four devices are placed into floor recesses in the 
gallery (see Figure 7), as far as possible from each other. The motion detector 
is then positioned to measure motion within a wide angle of view. Every time 
the motion detector is triggered the event is logged on the device’s internal 
memory. The motion detector thus tracks an approximation of the activity 
level, but not exact head counts or direction of traffic. If the detector is not 
triggered for two minutes, a short sound loop of wild birdcalls starts playing 
from an attached speaker. When an object crosses the detector’s range, the 
birds “fly away” and the singing stops. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  A bird sensor in one corner of the Asia Gallery, and a simple 
schematic of components. 
 
Finally, we can consider the first objective, the overarching objective of 
the entire project, to design technology for alternate activities in the museum 
by augmenting that experiences are taking place instead of dictating what 
those experiences should be. Rather than occupying the role of art itself or the 
role of providing information about the art on display, we wanted the Birdscape  
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to occupy a new design space by augmenting marginalized aspects of the 
museum experience. For the HCI group, the marginalized aspect we wanted to 
design for was the fact that the museum houses not only objects but also 
people. Any experience in the museum, whether sublime or mundane, is 
textured by this dynamic presence. Whether or not visitors attend to this 
presence explicitly, a crowded gallery influences our experiences in ways that 
an empty gallery does not. This is why the bird sounds keyed off the presence 
and absence of visitors.  
Because we were concerned about the motion sensors simply 
becoming a novel interface turning the system on and off, we provided an 
explicit ‘frame’ to the experience in the form of a small placard or sign near the 
front entrance of the gallery. Underneath the title Birdscape and the creators’ 
names, the placard read:  
 
“The bird sounds you hear in the Asia gallery today are 
generated by the absence and presence of visitors, 
including yourself. Motion detectors are monitoring the level 
of activity in various parts of the gallery. Areas with minimal 
activity will produce bird sounds. Once activity resumes in 
the these parts of the gallery, the birds ‘fly away.’ This 
movement of sound creates a dynamic soundscape of 
presence in the gallery.” 
 
Therefore, we directly linked the birds to presence in the gallery. 
Although the explicitness of this signage may seem to close off room for 
interpretation, we felt it was open enough to allow different interpretations of 
what to do with this information. In other words, if the birds are keyed off of 
presence, what does this experience mean? How might people respond to or 
make sense of this information? Originally, we had planned to remove this  
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framing device to try and gauge how much of an effect it had on people’s 
interpretations. However, the results presented here focus only on the study 
when the frame was present. 
However, Chen also brought a slightly different focus to the project. For 
Chen, the marginal experience to augment was the outdoor view. He wanted 
to play with the fact that visitors came to the gallery not just for the artifacts 
inside, but for the view to the outside. He sought to permeate the boundary 
between outdoors and indoors, bringing sounds of nature inside as art and 
directing the eye outside to the aesthetic of the natural world. Although Chen 
and I may have outlined different perspectives in terms of the marginal 
experience we wished to augment, these were not incompatible. On the 
contrary, I felt a design that could encompass both would push us toward 
designing for the openness to interpretation we hoped to achieve. 
Evaluation Methods 
Before introducing the specific evaluation methods used for this 
installation, I will outline what we were hoping to assess in addition to meeting 
our design objectives. In a standard HCI evaluation, the first step in designing 
an evaluation is identifying the criteria of a successful design in order to 
determine the appropriate metrics to measure. One of my questions in working 
with an artist outside the traditional HCI practices was whether the idea of 
evaluation would be foreign or irrelevant to him and if our evaluation practices 
would need to be transformed to have relevance for evaluating the space 
between art and tool. Höök, Sengers, and Andersson (2003), for example, 
have explored the tension between applying evaluation methods from HCI to 
the digital arts world and the reverse application of the art world’s perspective 
on evaluation for HCI. An artist may deny that evaluation even matters,  
115 
whereas, an art critic may use the term ‘evaluation’ differently from the way an 
HCI practitioner uses the term. An art critic will judge how a piece fits within or 
against an established canon or history of art, while an HCI practitioner will 
begin with a set list of objectives and criteria of success that the final design is 
then judged against. Evaluating art in terms of meeting its ‘objectives’ seems 
tantamount to treating art as something that can be reduced to a ‘tool’ as 
opposed to honoring its nature as an open ended experience.    
In our experience, however, Chen did not find the question of defining 
criteria of success a difficult one to answer. In fact, he had a very clear view of 
what would constitute a failure and what would constitute a success. Chen 
identified two main types of failure for interactive installations in general: 1) if 
people never recognize that it is there, or they choose to ignore it, and 2) if 
people interact with it only at the level of the technical interface. They may 
approach it as a novel game and once they’ve found the underlying apparatus 
(such as the motion sensor), they lose interest rapidly. We felt if these two 
types of experiences were the only ones to materialize, then we would 
consider the installation a failure. Therefore, in some ways, we defined 
success in terms of not being a failure, a condition more easily identified.  
Yet, we could also speak in positive terms about the kinds of 
experiences we hoped to engender. For example, Chen described what he 
would like if he were a visitor to the space: 
 
“I would imagine myself getting up [to the gallery], 
walking into the space, being immersed into the 
space, and seeing the works -- the art work, seeing 
the beautiful landscape. But then gradually, I might 
notice there are some bird sounds. And this might 
make me start to feel like I am not in the museum. I 
see that moment as very powerful…it’s not the  
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museum, but it is the museum. It’s nature, but it’s not 
nature. So you blur that boundary.” 
 
Similarly, when asked to articulate my own criteria, I would describe a 
successful experience as: 
 
“I would imagine walking through the space, looking at the 
art, looking outdoors, looking for something interesting. And 
then I would hear something unexpected: the sound of 
birds. Perhaps the sound would draw me toward it to see if I 
could find its source. But the closer I get, the further it goes. 
Maybe I would play with this a little bit, chasing it perhaps. 
Ideally, I might stop and watch how other people interact 
with this same event.”  
 
Both of these stories describe an ideal type of interaction, although we 
had also hoped the design was ambiguous enough that experiences we did 
not anticipate might also occur. It is interesting to note how despite the close 
affinity in terms of inspirations and objectives, at this point, the differences in 
perspectives between myself and Chen are starting to emerge. Although both 
are described narratively, Chen’s description focuses on one evocative 
moment whereas my description reads as a much more goal oriented activity 
despite my desire to move beyond the task focus of HCI.  
From defining the criteria for success, I can now move to describing the 
evaluation methods we used to assess whether or not we met these criteria. 
Birdscape was installed in the Johnson Museum for a period of three months. 
Over this time period, we had originally planned to modify various attributes of 
the system to assess how people make sense of different configurations, for 
example altering how the experience is framed in terms of the signage 
available or altering whether there is visual feedback in addition to the auditory  
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feedback of bird sounds. This first installation, however, evaluates the basic 
Birdscape design through an assessment of visitor and staff reactions.   
We used a combination of sensor data, observations, interviews, and 
feedback cards (see Figure 8). The motion sensors collected information 
about activity levels and time of day. In the original evaluation plan, I intended 
to collect activity information with the bird sounds turned on and off in order to 
compare visitor patterns that could be attributed to the absence or presence of 
the bird sounds. Unfortunately, however, the sensor implementation was not 
robust enough to present these results – the sensors would often not be 
triggered when someone was present and at times throughout the installation 
various sensors were not logging data at all
25. Instead, I will discuss evaluation 
results from the observations, interviews and feedback cards.  
In designing the evaluation cards for visitors, I specifically drew from 
our objective of openness to interpretation and from art practices in general. 
As opposed to a rigid experimental survey, we wanted to leave visitors room 
for expressing themselves in a variety of ways. As a result, we received 
comments, scribbles, pictures, and indications of emphasis such as 
underlining certain words or exclamation points. This type of feedback card is 
a departure from a traditional HCI evaluation method (although similar to 
ethnographic approaches as employed in HCI). Instead of setting up the 
exploration to allow for statistical analysis of majority opinions along 
predefined categories (e.g. ‘on a scale of 1 to 7, how much did you like the bird 
                                                 
25 The sensor kits were homemade devices with lenses literally taped to foam core and place 
precariously on the floor. If the devices shifted at all, the angle required for the sensors to pick 
up movement was disrupted. We therefore continuously had to check the devices to make 
sure they were still functioning properly.  
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sounds?’), we were primarily interested in different shades of the visitor 
experience that might emerge.   
The feedback cards were available at the entrance of the gallery near 
the sign describing the installation. The first round of feedback cards were 
postcards with two prompts: “Today I heard soft bird sounds in the gallery, 
these made me…” and “I’m visiting the gallery today because…”.  For the first 
prompt, I deliberately did not include a second verb such as ‘think’ or ‘feel’ 
because I wanted to see what kind of behavior seemed to be elicited more. 
The main problem encountered with the feedback cards was that visitors took 
the cards as keepsakes instead of leaving them behind. In our first pass, only 
10 out of 20 cards taken were returned. Therefore, as a next pass, we created 
a comment book with the same prompts on each page. Each page was 
marked with a bird bookmark that visitors could take away as a thank you. 
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Figure 8.  The front and back view of the evaluation postcards 
 
For the interviews, I interviewed the additional members of our design 
team, the curator of the gallery, visitors to the gallery, and security guards who 
witnessed visitors’ reactions to Birdscape over the length of the installation. 
The interview with the curator, Ellen Avril, lasted approximately 30 minutes 
and included questions about the design objectives as well as her impressions 
about the visitors’ experiences. Interviews with the security guards focused on 
the guards’ own impressions of the installation as well as their impressions 
and anecdotes regarding visitor reactions. These interviews were shorter,  
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generally 15 to 20 minutes, as they transpired during the guards’ breaks; six 
guards were interviewed in total. Finally, I both observed and interviewed 
museum visitors. Interviews with museum visitors were very short, from 5 to 
15 minutes long, as visitors were often on their way to another part of the 
museum or leaving the museum (one interview for example lasted the length 
of the elevator ride from the 5
th to the ground floor). In total, I conducted six 
interviews with single or groups of visitors, interviewing a total of 12 people. 
The interview consisted of asking if the visitor(s) had heard the bird sounds, 
what their impressions were, and the purpose of their visit to the museum. 
Results 
I will present the results from the installation in two groups: first the 
collected responses from the feedback cards and comment book, and then a 
summary of reactions from the interviews with the visitors, guards, and 
curator.  Because of the format of the feedback cards, i.e. specifically asking 
visitors about their impressions of the birds, this data source only reflects the 
attitudes of visitors who had noticed, or were directed to notice, the 
installation. As a quick description of the 37 responses gathered, almost half 
(51%) indicated the sounds made them ‘feel’ something, such as happiness, 
calm, surprised or natural. Of these responses, two people indicated feeling 
‘annoyed’ and although we hoped the experience would be open for 
interpretation, for this particular piece we would classify ‘annoyance’ as 
another type of failure. However, within this small sample, the annoyance 
factor appears small. A quarter of the 37 responses (24%) commented that the 
sounds made them ‘think’ of birds or nature. The rest of the responses were  
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either general comments about liking the Birdscape (5%) or about the museum 
gallery (19%)
26. 
Several responses indicated that the sounds caused visitors to blur the 
indoor/outdoor boundary: 
 
[The sounds made me…] “feel invited. I loved the bird 
chatter. It added to the serenity and felt like wonderful 
company”. 
 
[The sounds made me…] “feel surprised at first because I 
thought I was outside. But it was actually pretty peaceful. 
Props.” 
 
[The sounds made me…] “feel as if I could picture myself 
outdoors in one of the lovely scenes depicted in the hanging 
scrolls.” 
 
[The sounds made me…] “on a beautiful day like today, they 
made the indoors like the outdoors.” 
 
Two people indicated changing how they moved in response to the bird 
sounds: 
 
[The sounds made me…] “At first I didn’t hear the sounds [but 
because of the comment book]…I walked back toward the 
main quad until I was about to give up…then finally I heard 
them. Feel very high up. Go towards the sounds, feel more 
connected to the environment.” 
 
[The sounds made me…] “The bird sounds were great. They 
created a sense of playfulness and calm. They also drew my 
attention from room to room. Like walking in a forest. It was 
lovely.” 
 
                                                 
26 Because used for descriptive purposes only, percentages were rounded to the nearest 
whole number, therefore don’t add up to 100%.  
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As a self-selection method, the comment cards and book only provide insight 
from people who actively chose to comment on the birds. Therefore, to provide 
additional views onto the visitor experience, I will turn to the interviews and 
observations with the visitors, security guards, and curator.  
The security guards provided a broad summary view of visitor reactions 
in addition to specific anecdotes. The guards in a sense became a critical 
interface to the project as visitors would often stop and ask them where (or 
what) the bird noises were. All six of the security guards interviewed indicated 
that when asked by visitors about the Birdscape they would explain it as a 
‘project’ (as opposed to an installation or art) about visitor movement in the 
gallery or about measuring the most popular or least popular objects on 
display. One guard said he explained it to visitors as a zen-like version of hide 
and seek: you look for something only to discover it’s not there.  
When asked to summarize visitor reactions, the guards felt many 
people simply did not seem to notice the birds. This is the same impression 
the curator had of the visitor experience and was corroborated by our own 
observations and interviews. When visitors did notice the birds, however, the 
guards recounted watching people look around, first outside and then inside, 
for the source. When people explicitly asked about the sound and the guards 
explained it, the guards and our own interviews with visitors indicated that 
visitor reaction was positive. People commented that the sounds were 
soothing or made them feel like they were outdoors. The curator of the gallery 
also felt that response to the birds, when noticed, was positive. However, from 
the guards, the curators and our own interviews, it was evident that people did 
not connect the bird sounds to the absence or presence of visitors. When  
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reflection was triggered, it was about the connection between indoors and 
outdoors. 
Several people interpreted Birdscape as an ambient part of the Asia 
gallery. Some thought it was for atmosphere across the gallery. One woman I 
interviewed for instance had just recently visited a nature museum in California 
where soundscapes of nature featured prominently. She assumed the bird 
sounds in the Asia Galley were something similar. A couple of people thought 
the birds were connected with a particular piece in the gallery as opposed to a 
backdrop for the whole floor. In the results we collected, this impression 
happened only in the room with no windows. Three of the four sensors were 
placed on the perimeter of the gallery, but one sensor and speaker were 
placed in an alcove without a direct line of sight to windows. When people 
were asked about the birds while in this room, they tended to assume the 
sound was connected with either one of the Japanese nature prints, or 
interestingly enough, with the samuari warrior’s battle gear, the most 
prominent piece in the room. This suggests that perceptual salience played a 
large role in people’s interpretations – when they were on the perimeter, the 
windows were an obvious point of reference but in the internal room they 
either related the sounds to something associated with birds or to the largest 
piece in the room. Similar to the priming of the woman’s experience with the 
nature museum in California, one visitor indicated that he had connected the 
bird sounds to the nature prints because he had just seen a multi-media piece 
on the gallery floor below and assumed this was of a similar nature.  
We had little evidence of people simply interacting with sensors as a 
novel interface – i.e. tripping the sensors with no reflection on the overall 
experience. Although the sensors were placed in recesses on the floor, they  
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were still visible if a visitor directed his or her eyes toward them. In the three 
months of installation, however, we only witnessed or learned of two incidents 
of ‘gaming’ the system. I observed only one person literally laying on the floor 
and looking at the apparatus, and a security guard informed us that one 
person actually turned the play button of one of the speakers off and left a 
note: “Ha ha Bird Man. The gig is up.”  
In addition to asking for and observing visitor impressions, we were also 
interested in interviewing the guards and the curator for their own impressions 
of Birdscape. Five of the six guards we interviewed felt the Birdscape added to 
the museum experience because it was something different, it made people 
stop and think, or it added an element of life to an otherwise quiet space. 
Some of the guards even played with and extended the Birdscape 
functionality. One guard, for example, would augment the sounds with his own 
bird calls. Another guard revealed that he could use the sound of the birds to 
track people as they moved through the gallery – a kind of remote monitoring 
tool. A third guard described extending the reach of the Birdscape by using his 
push to talk radio to broadcast the birds throughout the museum. His fellow 
guards thus became mobile speakers, something that they quickly stopped out 
of annoyance. When asked if they felt the Birdscape was more art than tool, all 
of the guards described it as art for themselves, even though they described it 
to visitors as a project about visitor movement and monitoring popular areas in 
the gallery.   
Our discussion with the curator was enlightening about the art and tool 
distinction as well. She worked with us during the earliest discussions of this 
project, prior to the bird metaphor even developing. Her original interest was in 
the data that could be collected about visitors’ patterns and preferences. In  
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other words, she saw the project as a potentially useful source of information 
for curators and museum staff. At first, she was not sure how this same 
information might be valuable or interesting to visitors. In other words, she only 
saw the tool potential of the project, but not as a tool for visitors. As the project 
progressed, however, she also felt visitors approached the sounds as a type of 
art experience or perhaps as subtle background music for their regular 
museum visit.  
Discussion 
Based on the results from the visitors’ written comments and the 
interviews with various museum stakeholders, I can now return to our original 
design objectives and our criteria for success or failure. In terms of the criteria 
for failure, we listed gaming the system or never noticing the system. We only 
had two recorded instances of people simply playing with the system at a 
technical level, i.e. trying to start and stop the sounds purely at the level of 
interacting with the sensors. However, we had more evidence of people not 
noticing the system. On the one hand, this would register as a failure for these 
visitors. On the other hand, some people did notice the sounds either at an 
ambient level or consciously trying to find the source. I can not conclude as a 
whole then that the project failed. Furthermore, we had also agreed that if the 
system required multiple encounters in order to understand (like Chen’s 
fish/footprints), then this would be a successful design. During the time of our 
installation though, we did not record repeat visitors so could not assess how 
people responded to the installation over time.  
One of the limitations of this evaluation is in the lack of information 
regarding visitors who did not notice the system. We did not collect enough 
information from such visitors to conclusively say what encouraged or  
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prevented people noticing the bird sounds. One speculation we have is that 
the low number of sensor/speaker points, basically the four corners of the 
gallery, meant that if people made a single loop through the gallery, they only 
had four points of contact with the bird movement. This low exposure 
combined with the relatively low sensitivity of the motion sensors (the PIR 
detectors often missed people who were close to the sensor but not within its 
range of sight) could effectively prevent people from hearing and registering 
the sounds. Therefore, in practice, the sense of visitor control or influence over 
the sensors may not have been high enough for encouraging greater levels of 
visitor awareness. For a future implementation we have planned to section the 
gallery into eight zones, as opposed to four corners, and we will be using more 
powerful sensors. These are speculations based on the technical limitations of 
the system. I will turn now to examining each of our design objectives in turn in 
order to discuss if the limited awareness of the Birdscape was due solely to 
poor implementation or to poor design. 
Site specific 
We set out to design specifically for the Johnson museum’s Asia 
gallery. Based on the positive reaction from the curator, the guards and 
visitors who noticed the system, we felt the Birdscape fit well within the space. 
The birdscape metaphor worked because of both the content of the art in the 
gallery and the architecture of the windowed space. In fact, one possible 
interpretation of why the Birdscape was not noticed was because it fit too well 
within the space and therefore became too ambient. 
Avoid creating a separate art installation.  
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For this objective, the intention was that we would not just create an art 
piece that was simply dispersed throughout the gallery. We wanted the 
installation to serve both as a point of reflection, either on presence or on the 
indoor/outdoor boundary, but also that the sounds would draw people to 
different parts of the museum, i.e. that the installation would have a functional 
component to it as well. In this regard we were less successful. Although the 
guards and the curator recognized that the system could have information 
potential, the visitors did not experience the system in this way. Only two 
visitors indicated that the system influenced their movement into other parts of 
the gallery. 
Be technically simple yet evocative. 
For this objective, we believe we were successful. The PIR system was 
a very simple set-up and even the planned enhancements to the system will 
not make the technology the focus of the system. Furthermore, the fact that 
visitors did not show an interest in gaming the system suggests the focus was 
on the experience of the sounds and not on the mechanics that triggered the 
sounds.  
Design for openness to interpretation. 
There was a small range of interpretation amongst the visitors who did 
notice the sounds. Some thought they were background music for the gallery 
or individual pieces and some, most likely with the help of the guards, the 
comment book and/or the placard, used the sounds for reflecting on nature. 
We did not have any unexpected interpretations from the visitors but we did 
have unexpected adoption of the system by the security guards. The one 
security guard who realized he could use the system for remote monitoring  
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varied our objective slightly – we had thought if visitors connected the sounds 
with their own movement it would draw them into different places of the 
gallery. The guard figured out since the sounds were connected to visitor 
movements, he could stand in one place. The guard who used his push to talk 
radio provided the most extreme adaptation in our sample by reflecting the 
presence and movement of one floor to other floors.  
Two design principles we have played with in other projects for 
supporting an openness to interpretation are ambiguity and the avoidance of 
one to one mappings between a representation and a set meaning. We felt 
that the use of a metaphor, such as birds flying away at the approach of 
people, was an example of ambiguity in the design. We did not want, for 
example, a visual display over a floor map that showed the most popular and 
least popular areas of the gallery. However, the metaphor we used may have 
been too well situated in the context. Several visitors took the sound of birds 
as actual birds and therefore were not open to any kind of interpretation or 
reflection other than wondering where they were roosting and looking for their 
source on the ledge or in the trees outside. This suggests that in the spectrum 
of the familiar to the strange, we had erred perhaps too far toward the familiar 
and needed to push more toward the strange end of the spectrum in order to 
encourage both the moment of reflection and the range of meaning that could 
be constructed.  
In terms of the one to one mapping, we also fell short on this design 
principle. This is not just because the birds were mapped to actual birds, but 
because of our technical limitations we only had two states for the birds: on 
and off. Therefore, the bird sounds would be on, but the moment they were 
triggered, they turned off. The one to one mapping then was: presence, off;  
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absence, on. Although a simple one to one mapping should help people 
recognize their influence on the system, we believe it may have had an 
opposite effect. For the future installation, we plan to play with the complexity 
of the sound adding variables such as tempo of the call or increasing the 
volume based on triggers such as time since last trigger or number of people 
in the gallery. This would not be done in order for people to read and decode 
the sounds but to give them a greater degree of richness and variety that could 
have one meaning but could also generate alternate interpretations. 
Encourage reflection on other aspects of museum experience. 
This last objective was the original starting point of the project – to 
design technology so that it did not just stand as art but also did not just 
function as a guide for information transfer about the art on display. Toward 
this end, Chen and I had slightly different but compatible ideas of the kinds of 
experiences we wanted to support. Chen wanted to support reflection on the 
indoor/outdoor boundary and draw people through the gallery as they followed 
the birds. I wanted the bird sounds to stand as a reflection of presence but to 
also draw people throughout the gallery. From our results, the majority of 
people who did use the system for reflection reflected on the art/nature divide. 
A very small subset (2 out of the 49 comments from the book and interviews) 
indicated that the sounds made them move differently through the gallery. No 
one except for the one security guard indicated using the system for reflection 
on presence. 
By creating a design that in theory could support at least two different 
reflection points, we felt we were supporting the previous design objective of 
being open to interpretation. However, in the implementation, the design  
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favored one interpretation over the other. In our subsequent design sessions, 
the ideas we have for improving the chances of people reflecting on presence 
would likely demote the reflection on nature. For instance, one suggestion was 
to replace the bird sounds with the sounds of whispers or murmurs from past 
visitors, i.e. to block the interpretation that the sound is disconnected from 
people. Another idea was to use different lighting in the gallery based on 
presence and absence, lots of light in popular areas for example, or even bars 
of light projected on the floor as a type of luminary footprint. A third idea 
involved creating a visual display projected somewhere in the gallery that 
would depict the popular and less popular areas. All of these suggestions 
however start to turn against the other objectives – for instance, the visual 
display would not permeate the museum experience, i.e. it would become 
another stop or object on a visitor’s tour. In addition, a visual display could 
potentially encourage a rational processing of the information, and an attempt 
to read the right message, as opposed to appealing to a gut feeling or 
peripheral sensation that would encourage reflection.   
In processing these alternate design ideas with Chen, we decided to do 
one of two things, either the muffled voices (which would block the reflection 
on indoors/outdoors) or make the bird sounds more complex, for instance 
playing the sound of wings flapping as the birds fly away and adding this 
particular bird song to a new area in the gallery. This could potentially allow a 
visitor to chase a specific bird around the gallery. These redesign sessions 
with Chen were illuminating to me because they highlighted some of the 
divides in our practices. I will turn now to discussing an examination of 
designing and evaluating a system across disciplinary backgrounds. 
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Designing and Evaluating across Art and HCI. 
At the beginning of the project, I had anticipated that we would have a 
number of cross-discipline challenges. I anticipated that the idea of evaluation 
would go against ‘art’ and I had thought that the HCI practice bound by project 
deadlines would contrast with the artist practice bound by inspiration. I was 
also curious as to whether Chen would find the collaboration useful or 
distracting, assuming that most artists operate as the solitary creator able to 
make choices due to personal tastes and intuition. I was worried that our 
approaching Chen would be viewed as an ‘art goes here’ approach to making 
our project more aesthetically appealing. At the same time, I was wary that the 
HCI lab could become a ‘engineers code this’ shop for implementing an 
existing artistic vision.  
To some degree, however, I was disabused of these notions throughout 
our experience. First, Chen was quite amenable to project deadlines and 
indicated that these are often the source of inspiration even for artists. Second, 
he had a number of experiences working collaboratively. This was partly due 
to his work in China where collaboration was expected and the individual artist 
not encouraged. Yet this was also due, more recently, to his work with new 
technology and the need for collaborators with different skill sets. Finally, Chen 
was also amenable to the idea of evaluation as mentioned in the section on 
disclosing what a successful and unsuccessful design would be. I had thought 
an artist typically puts a piece of work out to the world because it is what he or 
she wishes to express and whether people ‘get it’ or not is less of a concern. 
The larger concern is that the curator or commissioner of the piece ‘gets it’.  
Despite the fact that my impressions of an artist’s practices turned out 
to be somewhat naïve and stereotypical, there were nuances to our  
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approaches that roughly followed these initial impressions. Regarding the 
design process for instance, we had brainstormed for a long time about the 
possible forms the design would take but Chen eventually came up with the 
idea of the bird metaphor. And it was evident immediately that this just worked 
– it was ‘better’ than the visual representations I had proposed such as climate 
maps. It was also ‘better’ suited for the kind of reflection Chen wanted and less 
so for mine. I could justify that people might reflect on visitor presence, but I 
also recognized that his proposed design and even the objective of the space 
between indoors and outdoors was more elegant. This is troubling for an HCI 
practice, though, as I cannot point to how the idea came about or why exactly 
it was more elegant than a climate map.  
Secondly, in terms of the collaboration, I do believe that this worked 
well but I often felt it was more of a coordination than a collaboration. Much of 
Chen’s involvement happened during the initial brainstorming phase and then 
the task of implementing toward this design specification became an issue for 
the HCI team. As one of the engineer’s on the HCI team commented: 
 
“The challenges came from bridging the definition of the 
project between the designers, the engineers, and the artist. 
The engineers worked with a technical definition of "working" 
-- something that produced an output in a specified range 
when given a fixed input (e.g. the people counters, or motion 
sensor), that didn't necessarily mesh with the designers' 
definition of working in the "real life" context. The artist, on the 
other hand, seemed to find that coming up with and thinking 
about the idea was the most important part, and everything 
else was just "filling in details" -- not really worth worrying too 
much about.” 
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These differences in focus became apparent throughout the project phases, 
from the design to the implementation to the final evaluation and redesign 
discussion. 
For the evaluation, I had been surprised that this was not an anathema 
to the artist but in practice, the evaluation was still not a priority. For an HCI 
practice, evaluation is a critical component but for the artist, evaluation is a 
‘nice to have.’ Chen was definitely interested in the visitor’s reactions to 
Birdscape but by the time the piece was installed in the museum, it was time 
to move on; whereas for us, the work was only half completed. This is not in 
any way a criticism of Chen as a collaborator but just an indication of the 
difficulty in interdisciplinary work. Although we both value each other’s 
practices, the fact that the practices value different aspects of work means that 
it will be difficult to move beyond coordination to true collaboration. This insight 
was corroborated during a presentation of these findings to an interdisciplinary 
audience at the 2005 Digital Arts and Culture conference. The audience 
consisted of game designers, digital artists, interactive fiction writers, dancers, 
cultural theorists, and a small representation of HCI practitioners. On the one 
hand, we had a writer respond to the Birdscape presentation by asking why 
evaluation should matter for the artist, how the artist in the end will just choose 
what he or she wants to say and use their artistic judgment to decide what way 
is best. On the other hand, we had artists indicate that the movement toward 
more and more interactive art that blurs the boundary between artist and ‘user’ 
means that the issue of evaluation is becoming more critical for artists as well. 
In our redesign sessions with Chen, I could see both sentiments at 
work. On the one hand, he was very amenable to starting a completely new 
design. He had said what he wanted to say about the indoor/outdoor boundary  
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so he was willing to start a new design that would reflect on visitor presence – 
suggesting that the evaluation was irrelevant for the initial design. On the other 
hand, he was also willing to operate within the practice of iterative design: 
taking the initial Birdscape and continuing to tweak it in order to meet different 
design objectives. From my work with Chen, I also started to question what 
exactly I wanted to get out of an evaluation. Were we trying to create designs 
where the ‘majority’ of people would ‘get it’? Because only 2 people used 
Birdscape to influence their movements, I suggested that to some degree we 
had failed to meet this design objective since it was a minority experience. 
This impression is a legacy of HCI evaluation practices that tend to focus on 
majority experiences and significant difference, smoothing out the uniqueness 
of individual experiences and marginal outliers. In contrast, in the art 
community, evaluation is a less uniform discipline and often relegated to the 
realm of subjective opinion and personal experience.  
As tool designers become more interested in designing for unique 
experiences and as artists become more interested in the medium of 
technology as a tool for their own and for audience expression, the interplay 
between forms of evaluation seems a fruitful tension to explore further. In other 
words, interactive artists appear to be moving from the belief that no one 
needs to ‘get it’ for the art to be successful while HCI practice may be moving 
toward a belief that not everyone has to get it for success to be declared. 
These different approaches to evaluation suggest that part of what 
interdisciplinary work requires is time – time to not only put different practices 
side by side but time for these practices to mutually inform each other. 
One final issue we are struggling with in our redesign sessions that 
illuminates the divide between HCI and the arts is the issue of privacy. As  
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mentioned, for our redesigns, we are experimenting with more sophisticated 
sensor technology being developed and tested in Stephen Wicker’s Wireless 
Intelligent Systems Laboratory at Cornell University. An area of great concern 
for this group as they work with embedded sensor networks is the issue of 
privacy. As tool designers, we are also sensitive to the need for full disclosure 
and safeguards for how personal information is collected and ultimately used. 
However, privacy concerns may be a relatively new topic in the art community. 
When something is an art work, do the same privacy regulations apply? Do 
visitors who become part of a participatory art installation require the same 
informed consent and control over their image? Or, does visiting the art 
museum and participating with a piece give implied consent? For participatory 
art installations rooted in one location, visitors can choose to interact or not, 
but in a soundscape installation such as ours, visitors participate in the piece 
by virtue of visiting the fifth floor gallery. We attempted to address this concern 
with signage that indicated how the Birdscape worked and indicating that the 
sensors could be turned off should anyone desire. However, as we develop 
more projects to bridge the space of art and tool, we anticipate privacy issues 
becoming something requiring further consideration. 
Overall, the design and evaluation methods we used for this project 
proved to be useful for iteratively exploring a conceptual space we identified – 
namely the space between art and tool for visitor experiences. Through our 
evaluation, we generated a number of ideas for redesign: such as the 
complexity of the sound and the increase in encounters with the trigger points. 
Therefore, in terms of the iterative design cycle, our evaluation was very 
helpful in providing suggestions of where to move forward. However, the 
evaluation was less helpful in providing direction in terms of re-examining our  
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initial objectives. To this end, the design and evaluation methods produced as 
many questions as answers.  
Furthermore, our experience is causing us to question the 
conceptualization of art versus tool. The more we leaned on this dichotomy, 
the more instable it appeared in practice. Although it makes intuitive sense to 
talk about bridging art and tool, in reality the space we are designing for is 
blurry. I believe though that the ideas discussed here have underscored this 
tension and although the dichotomy may not exist cleanly, this does not 
negate the need for a greater understanding of how arts practices and HCI 
practices may inform and influence each other. What would an arts based HCI 
practice, or an HCI based art practice, look like? What would its problem 
space or objective encompass? What methods would it employ?
27 Our 
experience has outlined how the form of art and tool in and of themselves is 
not as interesting but the cultural practices that develop around these 
constructs. In other words, Birdscape may be seen as a project on visitor 
traffic or it may be seen as an installation on the boundaries of the museum 
space. How Birdscape is framed influences who becomes involved, the 
language for discussing it, the goals and methods for advancing its 
development. By trying to hybridize art and tool, we hope to pull critically-
informed design, art practice, and user-centered design together in a way that 
affords new roles to visitors, museum staff, designers and artists in the co-
construction of new museum experiences. 
                                                 
27 These questions follow from the experience presented here yet they also echo the questions 
being asked by other researchers attempting to bridge the arts and sciences in HCI (e.g. 
Gaver and Dunne, 1999; Mitchell, W., Inouye, A., and Blumenthal, M., 2001; Wilson, 2002).   
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Conclusion 
The case study above presents an example of a reflective design for 
exploring the experience of the ineffable in the art museum context. I began 
with a description of how the ineffable is associated with the experience of art: 
as something transcendent or sublime that defies explanation. I reviewed how 
this idea of the ineffable experience of art has been contested and debated 
through different changes in the art museum and through the practice of art 
itself. The introduction of technology as a tool for mediating or understanding 
an experience of art, however, tends to take a dominant form of explaining 
rather than experiencing the ineffable. As a reflective design practice, I then 
looked at what existing practices the dominant experience marginalizes in the 
art museum. In particular, I chose to use an approach directed toward 
augmenting these existing experiences in a way that people could draw their 
own conclusions and make their own meaning about the value and use of this 
information. In this way, I designed for an interpretation approach as opposed 
to an explanatory or reduction approach described in the first chapter. The 
case study proceeded with a prototype brainstorming session to explore 
designing for these marginal experiences, such as the fact that the museum is 
a social place where people can be both private and public at the same time.   
The pilot study identified initial objectives for guiding the development of 
designs for this alternate design space and these objectives were further 
refined for the specific nature of both the Imprints and the Birdscape projects.  
From these implementations, I noted a relationship or tension between 
providing familiar footholds or clues in the digital scaffolding objective and 
using ambiguity for increasing engagement. In the Imprints example, I 
suggested that by using visitor’s existing movement, we had provided an  
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effective scaffold to draw them into a new experience of reflection on other 
visitors. However, in the collective mosaic of all of the imprints, we found the 
ambiguity of meaning left the visitors with no way or guide into interpreting the 
mosaic’s significance or their role in it. With the Birdscape example, we also 
used visitor’s existing movement as a kind of digital scaffolding with the 
metaphor of birds that fly away at the approach of humans. Yet we discovered 
that this design was not open or ambiguous enough – people tended to 
literally interpret the sounds and the movement as that from actual birds. 
Therefore, we need to explore further designs and conditions that support this 
sweet spot of ambiguity while maintaining the digital scaffolding. In fact, this 
holds true to the original idea of scaffolding inspired by Lev Vygotsky’s 
philosophy that learning happens when something is just out of one’s reach. 
Too big of a gap to negotiate between the known and unknown means the 
learner will not, and perhaps cannot, engage.  
The projects also revealed different insights regarding the objective of 
supporting the self in the collective. In the Birdscape implementation, the 
binary condition of the sounds being on or off partly played a role in preventing 
visitors from connecting the sounds not only with themselves but with the 
movement of other people. When the connection between self and sound did 
occur, it happened at the level of the individual. The Imprints implementation 
was more successful in displaying the individual in the space of a collective 
and we had evidence from people using their signatures or their unique 
emblems as a way to call out to friends in a publicly private way. The 
interviews from this stage further highlighted the uniqueness of the museum in 
this regard. People often go to this public place as a way to disappear 
amongst the masses, as a way to be with people while at the same time be  
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alone. This suggests an interesting twist to the type of visitor reflection we 
have been attempting to highlight.  
All three stages of the case study suggested not only ways forward and 
issues for design but ways forward in the evaluation. The use of dynamic 
feedback suggested from the initial pilot studies, i.e. taking feedback on 
surveys and presenting it immediately as a stimulus for discussion, was not 
picked up in the later stages of the museum project but was picked up in the 
case study in the next chapter. However, the pilot study did inspire us to 
design our evaluation methods in a way that provoked discussion. This was a 
challenging endeavor however with the museum visitors. It was important to 
us to reach visitors who came to the museum for their own reasons, rather 
than depending on soliciting focus groups, and therefore we approached 
visitors during their visit with the invitation to join us for a discussion. Although 
we were eager to have a provoking dialogue, visitors may not wish to have this 
kind of dialogue with us or during that particular time. This is of course an 
issue all researchers face but our objectives for designing the evaluation as a 
form of engagement conflicted with our desire to get people as they were 
going about the course of their predetermined day. One area for further 
exploration is designing exchanges with individual visitors that support thought 
provoking exchanges but don’t require a fifteen to twenty minute dialogue. 
We also experienced a number of technical difficulties in our evaluation 
that can be addressed in future iterations. Just as the designs themselves 
ultimately became a compromise between serving different stakeholders’ 
needs, time, logistics of the space, and budget, so too the evaluation methods 
had to be modified to fit the environment and the resulting design. Many of our 
design features however reflected our desire to build evaluation opportunities  
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into the system itself – for instance measuring whether people follow the 
Imprint of another person on the handheld tour or whether people continue to 
ask the question of who visited the objects before them. The evaluation issues 
we are tacking with the sensor side of the Birdscape implementation raise a 
new level of concerns about privacy. As a project that is at once art, design, 
tool, and research study, the requirements for how data is used and what is 
disclosed across all these different categories are different. We obviously must 
start with protecting visitors’ information to the degree required by human 
subjects but we want to do so in a way that doesn’t unduly scare visitors (e.g. 
signs that say: ‘warning: you are being tracked!!’) or take away from the 
experience of discovery (e.g. signs that say: “There are sensors around the 
gallery and you are triggering them. This is meant to cause reflection on visitor 
presence in the gallery”).  
All stages of this study presented designs that augmented visitor 
movement in the gallery and attempted to present this information in a way 
that would be considered at once art and tool. In Stage one, the different 
designs generated different opinions in terms of who they would be useful for 
and if they would simply be fun to look at or if they would be informative. Stage 
two with the handheld guide and the Imprints was ultimately perceived as 
more tool-like whereas the results from stage three suggested that the 
Birdscape was experienced more as art than tool. These different experiences 
suggest that more implementations will continue to find nuances in this space 
between art and tool. The collaboration with Xiaowen Chen has further 
troubled this dichotomy that has guided our thinking. The distinction between 
technology that enters the art museum as art and technology that enters the 
art museum for learning about art is an easy enough distinction to make. But  
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the distinction between the categories and functions of art and tool on their 
own becomes more difficult to sustain. For instance, with the Imprints 
program, we felt people used this more as a form of social navigation, as a 
way of telling the more popular pieces from the less popular pieces. Yet, why 
isn’t reflection on social navigation given art status? My criteria seems to be if 
the information can be ‘read’ to mean one thing and it can be used to inform 
some part of the visit, then it is tool. But, in the Birdscape example, which I 
considered more art-like, people were ‘reading’ the birds as a point of contact 
with the outdoors. When does reflection become a tool? As mentioned in the 
Birdscape discussion, this distinction between art and tool is perhaps more 
interesting when we consider the different discourses and surrounding 
practices. 
I believe there is also another way to frame this dichotomy that will be 
more useful for our future work. Instead of presenting a spectrum between art 
and tool, I believe what is underlying this is a spectrum of being open or 
closed to interpretation.  On this spectrum, we are aiming to push from the 
closed to the open, not aiming for the middle although designs all along the 
spectrum will be interesting to explore in particular how they could be moved 
from one spot to another. This is what we were ultimately addressing when 
reacting against the one-way information transfer of technology as tool in the 
museum. We were reacting against how this predominant design tended to 
shut down the possibility for alternate types of engagement with the art on 
display, or indeed reflection and awareness of alternate experiences in the 
gallery. 
Throughout the history of art and art museums, the ineffable 
communion that is to take place has alternatively focused on the relation  
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between the artist and the visitor, between the artist and his or her art to which 
the visitor is simply a bystander, or between the visitor and the art to which the 
artist is the mediator or facilitator. Furthermore, there exists an ongoing debate 
about how to support this type of ineffable communion, whether experiences 
should be unmediated or if induction is required. The rise of dialogical art 
suggests a greater need for understanding how this type of communion can 
occur without shutting down the possibility of multiplicity of meaning. This 
history of art and the ineffable has shown how art troubles the boundaries, the 
purpose, and the role of the art museum. It has also shown how technology as 
art troubles the nature and process of what art is. However, when technology 
enters the art museum as a tool, it does not trouble the dominant practices 
and instead reinforces them. This study and its conclusions argues for an 
alternate way to approaching technology design for art museums, one where 
different levels of openness in the designs are explored and the potential for 
transforming the standard practices of the museum is supported.  
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Chapter 3. Affect and the Ineffable 
Emotions are qualities of a complex experience 
that moves and changes. 
– John Dewey 
 
Affect, like art in the previous chapter, is a term that is both imminently 
knowable but difficult to capture in descriptive terms. As with art, one could 
argue that one knows it when one sees it, or perhaps more to the point, one 
knows affect through experience. The ability to recognize, express, and 
respond to affect seems to be an unlearned and often unconscious process, 
but one that is essential for meaningful experience. As a phenomenon of 
study, however, affect morphs and changes mainly in response to the 
discipline or perspective from which it is approached and the objective of the 
study. From a sociological point of view for example, affect may be 
approached in order to increase understanding about group norms, social 
trends, or social stratification. From a cognitive science perspective, studies of 
affect offer insights into mental processes such as decision-making, language 
choice, attitude formation and creativity. From a computer science perspective, 
studies in affect seek to build applications that respond to or recognize affect 
in their users or can improve processing through the addition of something 
akin to affective judgment. In other words, affect becomes a component for 
exploring the predominant questions of the discipline from which it is studied.  
  In this case study, I return to the paradox of interfaces with the ineffable 
but this time through designing technology for affect. I begin with an overview 
of how affect has historically been conceptualized for study and how this has 
influenced the dominant approach of designing technological interfaces with  
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affect in a way that tries to control or pin down the ineffable. In response to the 
challenges of this approach, I use reflective design to explore how interfaces 
with affect may be created to support affect as a phenomenon that is open to 
interpretation and changing.    
Contextualizing Affect  
As affect has been explored and debated from a range of disciplines 
and therefore developed into a range of competing and complementary 
perspectives, I must first contextualize what is meant by affect and in particular 
how affect relates to the idea of the ineffable. I will use ‘affect’ in a broad 
sense and synonymously with ‘emotions’ as a phenomenon encompassing a 
range of constructs including feelings and moods. By starting with a broad 
view of affect, I will move into more precise definitions of the term when 
addressing specific theories and specific designs. Detailing how affect is re-
conceptualized through definitions, experiments, or the design of technological 
interfaces is one of the main thrusts of inquiry for this chapter.  
Affect has been explored and debated since the time of ancient Greek 
philosophers who first began questioning the nature of affect and its role on 
the essence of mind, the soul, and figuring one’s place in the world. Even 
during the early beginnings of its contemplation, affect was approached 
diametrically, for instance in Plato’s rhetoric as something to be controlled or in 
Aristotle’s view something to be celebrated in the sense that our imperfect 
(uncertain) world requires emotion as a guide (de Sousa, 2003; Oatley, 2004). 
As the nature of affect became a focus of study in the sciences, approaches 
became not just dichotomous but multifarious.  
The connotations and denotations of affect have since exploded to the 
point where Klaus Scherer refers to over one hundred different scientific  
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constructions for the phenomenon (Scherer, 2005). Many of these definitions 
focus on what emotions are for, a teleological or functional approach to 
understanding affect, but the majority of these definitions construct a point of 
view regarding what emotions are. In particular, many of these perspectives 
attempt to identify the unique signature of affect or emotion in general – i.e. 
what differentiates affect from any other cognitive or behavioral construct – 
and what differentiates individual emotions from one another – e.g. how is 
angry different from happy.  For instance, in the late 1800s, William James 
presented one of the earliest attempts to classify emotions by identifying 
people’s physiological states of arousal as the defining moment
28. According to 
James, we don’t see a bear, feel afraid and then run but we see a bear, run, 
and this movement or heightened state of arousal is what we recognize as 
fear. This perspective was later refuted by Walter Cannon who argued that 
physiology by itself was not enough to distinguish arousal states into different 
emotions as fear and anger would have similar physical profiles
29. These two 
counter points illustrate what continues as an ongoing search for defining 
emotions.  
Some of the current perspectives for uniquely identifying affect focus on 
the output or results of emotions, such as the expressions, the subsequent 
behaviors, or the significance attributed to the emotion by an individual or a 
larger group. Other perspectives focus on the input that causes an emotion 
                                                 
28 Georg Lang, a Danish researcher, published a similar perspective to James a year later in 
1885 therefore this perspective is often referred to as James-Lange theory of emotion. An 
Italian researcher, Guiseppe Sergie, came to a similar conclusion in 1894 but is less 
referenced (Griffiths, 2001) 
29 This perspective was famously illustrated by Stanly Schacter and Jerome Singer (1962). 
Schacter and Singer injected subjects with adrenaline in two different conditions, one set in a 
room designed to make people feel happy and the other to make people feel anxious. 
Although arguably induced to have similar physiological states, people reported different 
feelings based on the room condition they were in (de Sousa, 2003).  
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such as the inciting events, and still other perspectives attempt to identify the 
psychological and physiological processes between input and output. As an 
example of this last approach, Scherer’s component process definition of 
emotion identifies five components to emotion including cognitive appraisal, 
bodily arousal, motivation or action preparation, expression, and subjective 
feeling (Scherer, 2005). He argues that much of the debate in emotion 
research is due to researchers not clearly articulating what aspect of the broad 
phenomenon they are studying and he calls for further consensus building on 
what is meant by emotions. Scherer notes that due to the complexity of 
emotion, a variety of approaches will most likely be required for measuring 
emotions, although he would argue against a variety of conceptions for 
modeling emotion. Other researchers however suggest that a pluralistic view 
is required to both model and measure the phenomenon of affect (Rorty, 
2003). Although the research presented here agrees with the pluralistic 
stance, the subsequent question is how these pluralistic views inform each 
other, if at all. 
The Contours of Affect 
Comparing and synthesizing research into affect is an overwhelming 
task as each broad discipline, such as psychology or anthropology, takes a 
different stance and within each discipline a further division of approaches 
exists. One goal of synthesis would be to try and identify the essential aspects 
of affect that are agreed upon, but this results in a rather vague description of 
affect as an evaluation that can influence current or future behaviors. More 
useful for the purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly some of the 
important contours of affect in terms of its borders and proponents of different  
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sides before taking a more historical look at the link between affect and the 
ineffable. 
Boundaries 
Much of the social science literature
30 around contextualizing affect 
begins by attempting to delimit boundaries around emotion (as a construct) 
and between emotions (as individual constructs).  In terms of delimiting 
emotions, this is best characterized by debates regarding whether emotions 
are discrete or dimensional. Discrete emotions are identified as a core set of 
‘basic’ emotions, including emotions such as anger, joy, surprise, sadness, 
fear, and disgust. Discrete emotions are seen as the building blocks of more 
complicated emotions such as love, grief, or schadenfreude. Some 
researchers suggest that this is due to a distinction between primary and 
secondary emotions (Damasio, 1995), also referred to as lower or higher level 
emotions (Le Doux, 1996; Oatley, 2004), or utilitarian and aesthetic emotions 
(Scherer, 2005) where the first term in these pairs is posited as more universal 
across cultures, more automatic or ‘subconscious’, and processed by the 
lower parts of the limbic system. This point of view on how to contain emotions 
differs from the dimensional approach that focuses not on discrete states or 
labels but on movement across a set of defining dimensions. In most cases, 
the dimensions pertinent to defining affect have been boiled down to a 
valence, from positive to negative, and level of arousal, from low to high 
(Russell, 1980). In this two-dimensional space then, happiness would be 
located at high arousal, positive valence and sadness would be at low arousal, 
                                                 
30 Although there is a rich history and current literature on emotions from the humanities as 
well, for the most part this review will focus on the range of approaches in the social sciences 
and in particular in psychology as this is the field most traditionally drawn on for design of 
affective technology. Later in the chapter I will discuss how the humanities are becoming a 
more popular source of inspiration and guidance.  
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negative valence
31. The reported advantage of the dimensional approach to 
classifying affect is its ability to account for a wider range of emotions and 
although a location on the grid still exists as a single point, the form of the 
dimensions suggests loose rather than defined borders between emotions. 
Approaching emotions as having more or less defined boundaries has 
methodological implications and this can be readily seen in how or for what 
end these different approaches tend to measure emotions. The discrete 
approach, for example, seeks to pattern feedback such as physiological or 
gestural responses into a set number of emotions (e.g. Ekman, Friesen, and 
Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman, 1992). The dimensional approach attempts to match 
different physiological signals to valence and arousal, or if using self-report 
measures, the subject is asked to place his or her feelings within the 
dimensional model, in other words the model in this case literally becomes the 
method.  Scherer (2005) argues however that the methods should not only 
match the conception or models of affect but must take into account what kind 
of comparisons one is after. He advocates using dimensional methods for 
comparing different emotions held by a single individual as opposed to across 
individuals since the dimensions are more meaningful in terms of points in 
relation to each other on the grid. For comparing emotions across individuals, 
Scherer favors the label approach, whether using discrete emotions or a more 
nuanced set. Even though Person A and Person B may mean slightly different 
things by the word ‘fear’, Scherer argues it likely shares more qualities than if 
Person A and Person B marked themselves on the exact same coordinates in 
a dimensional grid where one might mean fear and the other might mean 
                                                 
31 Some researchers suggest a third dimension of power or tension is required in order to 
differentiate between experiences of anger and terror (Scherer, 2005; Lively, 2004).  
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anger. Overall, however, the different models of affect, whether basic or 
dimensional, tend to employ different methods with the shortcomings of one 
addressed by the strengths of the other. Whereas discrete methods narrow 
the focus of study, dimensional methods allow for more variety and 
interpretation.  
How hard and identifiable the boundaries are between emotions is also 
at issue regarding the boundaries between emotion and other processes such 
as cognition.  Affect has historically, in terms of philosophical and 
psychological accounts, been held as a separate process to thinking with the 
latter playing a more desirable leading role. In other words, the optimal state 
has been portrayed as one where cognition leads or tames affect. New 
research by neuropsychologists, however, has called into question the line 
between, and the causal roles of, cognition and affect.  At a material or 
biological level, it was once believed that perceptual processes, such as 
awareness and attention, occurred in the neocortex, the part of the brain 
assumed to differentiate humans most from mammals and reptiles. However, 
recent research suggests that the limbic system, the seat of emotional 
responses, plays a much larger role than realized in directing or preparing the 
neocortex (Oatley, 2004; Picard, 1997). This is reminiscent of the early debate 
between James and Cannon whether cognitive processes prime feelings or 
vice versa; current research suggests that it goes both ways. Research by 
neurologist Antonio Damasio (1994) further blurs the line between thinking and 
feeling. In his studies of patients with severed or damaged connections 
between the cortex and limbic systems, Damasio demonstrated how rational 
behavior and rational decision-making requires emotion. In other words, 
whereas emotion had often been portrayed as operating separately from, and  
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at times at cross purposes with, rational thought, Damasio’s research shows 
how emotions and value judgments are intertwined with decision making and 
other thought processes.  
Control 
Implicated in the above discussion regarding the relationship and 
borders between affect and cognition is the issue of control. From a physio-
cognitive perspective, the issue is how different parts of the brain and the 
senses of the body coordinate the phenomenon of affect, i.e. what is the 
cause and what is the effect. The range of different emotion theories could be 
categorized according to whether led by cognitive appraisal or by bodily 
perception and movement. Computer scientist Rosalind Picard (1997) nicely 
contrasts these views along the lines of the acting methods of Stanislavksy 
versus Chekhov. Stanislavsky taught students to think about and imagine their 
character’s motivation and the appropriate bodily responses would follow; 
whereas, Checkov taught students to adopt the posture and gestures of their 
characters which would lead to the appropriate mind set.  
Another issue of control, beyond what process leads or controls what, is 
the question of what parts of our body and our minds are controllable and what 
parts respond automatically or subconsciously to stimuli. For example, in 
Darwin’s original account of emotions, many expressions of emotions, such as 
the hairs standing up on the back of one’s neck, were seen as unconscious 
and automatic signs that have ceased to perform their same adaptive and 
communicative potential (Oatley, 2004). In this sense, emotional expression 
need not require intention. A slightly different point of view suggests that we 
have more control over some emotional expressions than we do over ‘the 
emotion’ itself. For example, we may layer a false sense or expression of how  
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we are feeling over a true one. A Freudian view for instance suggests that our 
unconscious dictates our desires and emotions and it is the therapist’s job to 
excavate through the explanations and reasoning that obstructs this true self 
from emerging (Oatley, 2004). Ekman (1973) explores both control and non-
control over our emotions and expressions. He suggests that true emotions 
may linger hidden beneath a false expression of emotion or, in other 
instances, that our facial expressions may betray an emotion we are not even 
aware of having. In these examples, a boundary is drawn between having an 
emotion and expressing an emotion, with control being variably allocated to 
the person experiencing these different aspects. This is a discussion of 
controlling emotion internally or individually, but a different boundary for 
emotion is also debated between individuals and the social or cultural 
environment. 
Locus 
The final contour I will discuss is whether affect is constructed as an 
internal or a relational phenomenon. The discussion thus far has focused on 
defining affect’s borders with regards to an individual and has drawn primarily 
from literature of cognitive psychology and physiology. I began with this 
emphasis as it has arguably had the most influence on the design of affective 
technologies to which I will turn in the subsequent section. However, a 
substantial amount of work also exists that challenges the boundary of 
emotion as being neatly contained within an individual. Keith Oatley (2004) for 
instance points to Aristotle’s view of emotions as an interface between inner 
concerns and the outer world, a view that Oatley translates into today’s terms 
to suggest that an emotion derives jointly from “genes, individual experience, 
and society” (p. 43). The field of anthropology has also stressed the  
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importance of external forces, such as culture, on the experience and 
expression of emotion (e.g. Lutz, 1988). One could argue that cognitive 
accounts, such as appraisal theories, address the role of the environment on 
affect yet in doing so the locus of the emotion still remains individual. The 
environment becomes a stimulus to which the individual responds. A more 
radical point of view is one where the locus of the emotion is in the relation 
between self and world, self and other, self and society as opposed to 
contained within the self.  
Larissa Tiedens and Colin Leach (2004) express this relational view in 
their discussion of the social life of emotion. They identify three links between 
emotion and the social: emotional responses to social situations, social norms 
influencing the expression of emotions, and emotions as socially constituted. 
For this last link, they draw on Sartre’s perspective that we don’t just respond 
affectively to the world, but that our affective projections shape the world in 
which we live. “According to Sartre, ours is a world of emotion because our 
emotion makes us and the world a unified whole. In this way, emotion is what 
is between us and the world. This suggests that emotion is always, at the 
same time, inside us and outside us.” (Tiedens and Leach, 2004, p.6).  
Empirical evidence for a relational view of affect has been presented through 
studies of emotional contagion (e.g. Hatfield and Rapson, 2004) and emotional 
convergence (e.g. Anderson and Keltner, 2004) where the line blurs between 
individual and social responses to stimuli as they become sympathetic with 
each other. This relational view is also behind symbolic interactionists’ (e.g. 
Staske, 1996) and paralinguists’ (e.g. Fridlund, 1994) approaches to emotion 
where a discrete emotion is not matched with the right label but an emotion is 
experienced or called into being through emotion talk and expression. This  
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idea of the locus of emotions, whether internal or at some interface between 
the internal and external will be addressed again in the following section 
tracing a historical account of affect and the ineffable. 
All of the above shadings are important contours in the current 
discussions of affect. Whether emotions are modeled as discrete or 
dimensional, how integrated emotional processes are with other processes, 
and the locus of emotions from internal to relational all sketch out the nature of 
affect and in particular whether it is a phenomenon that is found versus 
created. It is interesting to note how a found versus created perspective could 
be applied to the same study and end with alternate conclusions in terms of 
the contours of affect. For example, in an Ekman study of facial expressions, 
Japanese and American subjects were shown to display the same facial 
expressions to a film when the subjects were alone in the room, yet the 
subjects differed in their expressions along cultural lines when a researcher 
was present (Ekman, 1973). From the ‘found’ perspective of affect, the 
interpretation of these results is that in the case with the researcher present, 
social display rules were invoked that therefore caused the subjects to mask 
the emotions elicited by the film. From a ‘created’ perspective, subjects in the 
condition with the researcher were in an entirely different condition than when 
alone and therefore experiencing an entirely different emotion.  
As an example from another school of thought, in a symbolic 
interactionist study of language, if partner A says “I’m angry” and then through 
the course of conversation with partner B downgrades this to “I’m kind of 
upset”, a ‘found’ perspective of affect would suggest that A first felt angry and 
then over time upset. The ‘created’ perspective of affect would look at this 
same conversation and suggest that partner A wasn’t sure how he was feeling  
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until working it out collaboratively with partner B. The point of these different 
examples is to demonstrate how the contours of affect appear differently and 
how this difference is apparent in the models and methods of studying affect. 
For the purpose of this research, I lean toward defining affect along the 
dimensional, relational, and creative contours and this will be described in 
more detail in the discussion of two contrasting approaching to designing 
technology interfaces for the experience of affect. Before turning to the 
interfaces however, I want to first take a step back from the current contours of 
affect and trace in a little more detail how we came to this point. In particular, I 
will focus on how affect and the idea of the ineffable relate to each other. 
From Mystery to Mathematics 
As described above, from some of the earliest periods of writing we 
know that affect was originally conceived of as something separate from 
reason and even separate from the will. Emotions early on tended to be 
identified more with the “magic and mysteries of human life” and into the 
Middle Ages emotions were viewed as expressions of animal spirits (Mandler, 
2001).  As part of the spiritual realm, affect was a force outside the self that 
could descend upon the self, or that the self could aspire to join as a type of 
transcendent experience of the sublime. Affect was an ineffable force that 
people could recognize but not explain as it defied reason and prediction. In 
popular beliefs, people thought affect could spread like a disease or a virus, 
such as the view during the 16
th and 17
th century that an old man could feast 
on a young man’s energy simply by being in the same room together or that a 
woman could become depleted of energy or mad through coming in contact 
with the ‘vapors’ (Brennan, 2004). Although part of the spirit world, there was 
also a belief that humans’ ability to express and feel emotions was a mark of  
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humanity, something that separated them from beasts. For instance, in 1884, 
in one of the first anatomical studies of facial expressions, Sir Charles Bell 
remarked that God made the muscles in the human face so that we could 
express emotions (Griffiths, 2001). Thus the concept of affect was shaped by 
Victorian values of human uniqueness and Romantic values of intuition and 
mystery.  
In the late 1800s, the connection between affect and the ineffable 
begins to change. Darwin’s 1872 study of emotion in animals is marked as one 
of the first attempts by science to understand emotions. Up until this time, 
affect was largely viewed as the province of philosophers
32, rhetoricians and 
artists (Oatley, 2004). Darwin’s study of emotional expression in animals 
began the process of removing affect from the realm of spirit and grounding it, 
or as Otniel Dror (2001) states ‘embodying’ it in nature. Darwin demonstrated 
emotions in animals as functional and mechanical and the implication was that 
the phenomenon could be the same in humans. Some emotions and 
expressions continue to have adaptive value and some take on the biological 
equivalence of our appendix, expressions we retain but no longer need 
(Oatley, 2004). Therefore, this unknown quality of affect began to erode and 
the romantic notion of emotion as a force larger than or outside oneself began 
to give way.  
However, emotion was still considered something messy, a 
disturbance. Although the connection with our animal ancestors emphasizes 
                                                 
32 As a brief recounting of an expansive period of history, these broad brush strokes risk 
leaving some of the important details unaccounted for – specifically in this case, the work of 
Rene Descartes on emotion. Descartes defied categorization as a scientist or a philospher 
since he was both. His work on emotion predates Darwin’s as his work Les Passions de 
L’âme (The Passions of the Soul) was written in 1649. In this work, he prefigures the debate 
on discrete versus dimensional emotions identifying 6 building blocks of wonder, love, hate, 
desire, joy and sadness (Mandler, 2001).   
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the naturalness of emotions, at the same time the predominant biological 
analogy beginning in the late 19
th and early 20
th century was with machines. A 
well-run machine was predictable and emotions disturbed this precise 
functioning (Dror, 2001). In the popular culture, therefore, the free expression 
of emotions in Western society began to be looked down upon (Oatley, 2004; 
Dror, 2001). But perhaps the more decisive move away from the ineffable 
came through the rise of the scientific method, classification, and practices 
during the 19
th century.  
During the late 19
th century, the science of emotions began to re-
conceptualize emotion from something uncertain, unexplainable and 
unpredictable into something accountable. One mark of this move can be 
found in the growing interest in taxonomies and classifications that continues 
today as described above in the discussion of affect’s contours. Dror (2001) 
notes that during this time, laboratories were considered ‘emotion free spaces’ 
(p. 364); just as emotion would disrupt the body’s running as a machine so too 
would emotion disturb the accurate production of knowledge. However, with 
the growing interest in emotion work and the rise of classifications of emotion 
came the need for and the development of tools to measure emotions in the 
form of technologies to measure blood circulation or temperature, measures 
that could then be mapped to different emotional states.  
The transcription of these measurements into numbers and graphs 
began what Dror calls the “numerization of emotions” (p. 360), thereby 
legitimizing or releasing emotions into the laboratory. In this same work, Dror 
argues that “emotion-as-number provided an alternative medium for the 
circulation and expression of emotions. It sanctioned an economy of emotional 
exchange and authorized affective communicability in a culture that, at least  
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overtly, emphasized restraint and management of the affective self.” (p. 359).  
In the laboratory then, affect ceased to be ineffable, or indescribable and 
uncontrollable. The more subjective expressions or discourses of affect, those 
still considered ineffable, were relegated to the arts. This contributed to the 
growing divide between the sciences and the arts, as well as to the gender 
attributions of non-numerical expressions of emotion as feminine.  Raw, 
savage, or feminine emotion was intractable, but emotion as number was 
accountable. Therefore although emotion could still be acknowledged as 
messy and uncontrollable in one context, emotion as a science could be 
tentatively embraced when represented and authenticated through the 
abstraction of numbers. 
The first technological interfaces to affect, according to Dror (2001), 
occurred through these measuring devices and through the numerical 
representations they produced. He identifies a number of devices designed for 
the laboratory prior the second World War including the Stomach Balloon, the 
Tremograph, and Electroencephalography (EEG) machines. From the 
laboratory, this type of technology and the numerization of numbers began to 
seep out into the popular environment as well. Dror gives representative 
examples of such devices as the Emotograph from the late 1920s which 
provided a “complete emotional diagnosis” or the 1930 Darrow Reflexohmeter 
for carrying in one’s pocket when in an automobile to “measure galvanic 
reactions as a study of perturbations of daily life” (p. 367). Also in the 1930s, 
Dror reports stories of people measuring their emotional reactions during their 
wedding vows as a sign of compatability and filing their blood pressure charts 
with their marriage certificates as “a record of affective authentication” (p. 
368). In the 1940s, Paramount used a device called the Emotion Meter to  
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record spectators’ affective responses to movies by monitoring their 
heartbeats and breathing and General Electric produced a Mechanical Freud 
(date unknown) that counted heartbeats as an index of repressed emotions. 
All of these examples prefigure the ‘origin’ of affective computing several 
decades later. 
Although emotion could be transcribed into numbers, it did not figure 
into early computer design during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead computer 
science drew largely from the current focus of the cognitive sciences, the 
production of rational and procedural intelligence. As this new computer 
technology developed, we can also start to trace a shift from designing 
computers to mimic the mind toward understanding the mind in terms of 
computer processes. In 1967, Herbert Simon published a seminal paper, 
linking affect to information processing models of cognition. He argued that 
although computers run without interruptions, people rarely operate in such a 
fashion and more often than not we are faced with a number of tasks at once 
and need to switch between urgent processes. He argued that the search 
space of possibilities is too large for a human to canvas with simple mental 
models and that something else must be at play in order to direct our thinking. 
Simon hypothesized that emotions acted as a heuristic for prioritizing multiple, 
competing, and uncertain processes (Simon, 1967; Oatley, 2001), a point of 
view that was later corroborated in the studies of Damasio and Le Doux 
described in the previous section. For Simon and other researchers at the 
time, affect presented a point of difference between humans and computers. 
Computers may be optimized for sequential or parallel processing, but 
judgments of value between matters of priority or making ‘gut’ decisions was  
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still the domain of people. How this affective decision-making happened in 
humans still eluded the code of computers.  
As discussed in the first chapter, however, the line between what 
humans can do and what computers can’t do, i.e. the essential qualities that 
make us human, often sets the agenda for computing design. With artificial 
intelligence’s failure to deliver on its promised potential during the 1970s and 
80s, and with the growing popularity of personal computers and graphical 
interfaces, an interest in affect and computers began to develop again in the 
early 1990s. New research into creating performance-like expressions with 
software and interactive environments explored how people became 
emotionally invested in computer applications and how different designs could 
appeal to or portray emotion through the computer (e.g. Bates, 1994; Laurel, 
1991; Nass, Steuer, and Tauber, 1994; Turkle, 1984).  
These early researchers exploring computers and affect argued that the 
dominant focus in computer science on problem solving and reasoning was 
missing an essential aspect of how we actually make sense of the world as 
emotional beings. If people were already responding to new technology 
emotionally and attributing emotion to new technology, in the form of the 
hardware or the software such as the agents on the screen (e.g. Reeves and 
Nass, 1996), then shouldn’t designers be facilitating this emotional 
communication? Therefore a new breed of researcher, coming from the field of 
computer science and human computer interaction, began looking for 
guidance in designing interfaces for affective experiences. As described 
above, inspiration could be found in roughly two broad camps: the sciences on 
the one hand where a view toward emotion-as-number had gained the most 
ground, and the arts and cultural studies on the other hand where affect  
160 
retained more of its ineffable qualities not easily reduced to abstract 
representation. In the following section, I will explore the predominant path 
taken by computer scientists and human computer interaction designers, 
explore the implications of this dominant view, and propose an alterative 
approach. 
Designing Interfaces with Affect 
The movement to build affective interfaces is part a growing discourse 
around broadening computer design to move beyond usability toward user 
experience (Dourish, 2001; McCarthy and Wright, 2004). A usability approach 
focused on tasks and valued certainty, standardization, and efficiency in the 
interface. The critique of such applications is that they designed only for a very 
narrow slice of human life ignoring non-task based activities such as the 
pursuit of fun or emotional communion. Furthermore, the task focus tends to 
design from a portrayal of a generic user, removed from particular 
circumstances and interactions. Several strategies have been proposed to 
redress this narrow focus, including a turn toward the social, toward situated 
actions and bodies, and finally a turn toward emotion (Dourish, 2001; 
Suchman, 2004). As discussed above, this last turn has much earlier roots but 
it became popularized in human computer interaction a bit later than the social 
and embodied turns. During the late 1990s, Rosalind Picard at the MIT 
research laboratory coined the term Affective Computing (Picard, 1997). 
Affective Computing was positioned as a new research agenda for exploring 
how computers could recognize, respond to, and express emotions. In the 
following sections, I will explore how the affective computing approach 
addresses the ineffable experience of emotion as something to be conquered,  
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whereas an alternative approach to affect as interaction tries to support the 
ineffability of lived experiences of affect.  
Affective Computing: Affect as Information 
Although the field of affective computing is expanding, in introducing it I 
will draw primarily from Picard’s research because her work is regarded as 
one of the preeminent examples of technology. In her book Affective 
Computing, Picard begins by outlining the motivation for addressing affect in 
computers. Technology based on models of rational intelligence divorced from 
emotion, she argues, neglects the evidence of the pivotal and integral role of 
emotion in cognitive processes. If computers are to be intelligent, they must 
include a form of affective intelligence as well.  Citing fellow MIT researcher 
and futurist Nicholas Negroponte (1995), Picard posits a Darwinian-type claim 
that even dogs understand the emotional valence of a message, such as ‘Get 
off the couch’. If animals can understand emotion, and computers are to mimic 
life not just machines, then they must also understand emotion. Including an 
emotional model in computer design, according to Picard’s examples, should 
result in more efficient, more pleasurable, and more effective interactions with 
technology. Furthermore, although people readily anthropomorphize and 
ascribe emotions to their computers, and although people use computer 
mediated communication such as email to communicate emotion, Picard 
suggests that the ‘affective bandwidth’ of computers could be improved. In 
discussing email, for example, she remarks on the limited palette of emotional 
expression available through emoticons and the difficulty in communicating 
emotion through text without the richness of voice. The majority of Picard’s 
examples, however, focus not on computers as a medium through which 
people express emotions but on computers as another actor in emotional  
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communication. The goal of affective computing is to build computer systems 
that recognize, respond to, express, and ultimately ‘have’ emotions. 
Picard’s book draws on a wide number of sources, from philosophers to 
scientists to artists, for grounding affective computing in an initial discussion of 
affect. She paints a rich picture of the pivotal, yet difficult to capture, role 
emotions play in people’s everyday meaning making activities. Emotions are 
not laws, Picard states, but “songs of the heart” (Picard, 1997, p. 4). She uses 
‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ as synonyms, as I have also done, preferring the term 
affect for three reasons. First, she believes that affective could usefully be 
mistaken for the meaning of effective, a link she wishes to make. Secondly, 
she believes that the term ‘emotional computing’ might conjure up 
connotations of machines acting irrationally or out of control as portrayed by 
HAL in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey. Finally, apart from popular 
misconceptions of emotion as separate from reason, she wants to use a 
perhaps less familiar term due to the overabundance of competing definitions 
in science as well. Despite this broad beginning, however, the space for affect 
narrows when Picard moves to describing the designs of affective computing. 
Picard does not claim to create a new theory of emotion but draws from 
existing theories where relevant for the design of affective computers. In 
discussing technology that can recognize emotion, for example, she draws on 
new advances in the measurement of emotion particularly in physiology and 
neurophysiology. The technologies are similar to those described earlier by 
Dror and use indices such as heart rate, body temperature, sweat, pupil 
dilation, and other bodily reactions to infer different emotional states. In order 
for computers to respond to emotions, they must first work through this 
measurement and identification stage. Most of the work here is on refining the  
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ability of technology to sense different bodily signals and on the mappings of 
these stimuli to emotional categories. In both the recognition and the response 
stages of affective computing design, Picard draws heavily from the emotion-
as-number approach favored in the sciences. For the goal of computers that 
express emotion, Picard draws on communication theories of Claude Shannon 
and Warren Weaver and an information theory framework. She uses the 
analogy of sending bits of information through a channel and how typically 
computers would throw away the affective bits of the signal, for example by 
converting the spoken word to text. The objective for affective computing is to 
increase the ability to carry affective signals. Based on the theories of support 
that Picard references, the implicit theory of affect she is building is a theory of 
affect as information. 
A theory of affect as information presents affect in a very specific way 
from within the many possible contours of affect described earlier in this 
chapter. Affect is discrete and because it is bounded can be transferred from 
one person to another or from one person to a computer and vice versa. The 
transfer of affect does not change, or should not change, the initial state of 
affect to be decoded by the receiver.  This transfer idea draws from the 
conduit metaphors of information processing (Reddy, 1993; Boehner, 
DePaula, Dourish, and Sengers, 2005) which has become a guiding force in 
HCI. Affect as information tends to present affect as something internal, 
something that occurs within the individual (DePaula and Dourish, 2005; 
Boehner, DePaula, Dourish, and Sengers, 2005). In this sense, affect is 
modeled in the same way that cognition in HCI had been modeled prior to the 
field’s turn to the social and the situated. As discussed in the previous section 
about the links between emotion, cognition, and context, a substantial amount  
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of research and design has shown the pitfalls in modeling cognition as 
something isolated from its particular context. Yet in attempting to add emotion 
to the computing equation the effect has been less of an enrichment of 
information processing and more of a reduction of affect. 
Design 
Although Picard does not explicitly articulate a theory of affect as 
information, the work of this implied theory is apparent in the types of designs 
that have resulted in the affective computing agenda. Although there are 
several examples in affective computing of people using computers to express 
emotion in new ways, the main emphasis in the designs is on augmenting the 
computer system’s understanding or modeling of affect. In other words, 
whether the goal is to support human-computer interaction or human-human 
interaction through computers, the computer mediates this experience as a 
kind of emotional agent with its own understanding and model of emotion. To 
illustrate this, I will briefly describe four prototypical systems within the field of 
affective computing before turning to a description of how these systems are 
evaluated and the implications of a theory of affect as information. 
 
•  Facial Affect in Instant Messaging, FAIM (see Figure 9): The FAIM 
system is designed by researchers at the University of Cambridge for 
improving the ‘affective bandwidth’ of text-based instant messaging (El 
Kaliouby and Robinson, 2004). In this system, a video camera captures 
a person’s facial expression as she is composing an instant message. 
This image is then analyzed according to indices such as the shape of 
one’s mouth and head gestures and one of seven affective states is 
determined (happy, surprised, agreeing, disagreeing, confused,  
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indecisive, and neutral). This state is subsequently displayed by 
modifying a cartoon animation of a person that now accompanies the 
instant text message. Therefore, on the receiving end of the instant 
message, the receiver sees not only a text box but a character box 
where a cartoon figure’s facial expression changes to match the 
sender’s analyzed facial expressions. In presenting this work, the 
researchers identify the challenges as being determining when to 
deduce an emotional expression as it may change throughout the 
course of writing a message, but they argue that the video capture 
allows for more natural and richer communication of emotion than using 
emoticons. 
 
•  EMFi Chair: Developed through a collaboration between the University 
of Tampere and the Tampere University Hospital in Finland, the 
Electromechanical Film (EMFi) Chair measures the sitter’s heart rate as 
an indicator of pleasant or unpleasant emotions (Anttonen and Surakka, 
2005). Heart rate was selected because people have less control over 
this signal than, for example, their facial expressions, and heart rate 
has been correlated with positive and negative emotions. The 
researchers propose to embed the electromechanical film in an office 
chair and then communicate this information wirelessly to other 
computer applications that could adapt and respond to the user’s 
inferred emotions. Although the researchers recognize the ethical 
issues of hidden sensors, they suggest that by putting a logo on the 
chair the user would be aware that his or her emotions were being 
tracked and recorded. This type of measurement is considered  
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desirable because it allows for continuous and non-instrusive 
measurement of an office worker’s emotion.  
 
•  Automatic Call-In Systems: This example draws on the work of emotion 
detection in vocal patterns discussed by Batliner, Fischer, Huber, 
Spilker, and Nöth (2003) from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
and the University of Bremen. The researchers examine methods for 
detecting the point of frustration in callers to automatic directory 
systems. The goal is to detect frustration at an early enough stage that 
callers may be patched through to a human operator before the caller 
hangs up. A majority of systems on the market at the time of this 
research depended upon prosodic signals of frustration in the 
intonation, stress, and rhythm of the caller’s voice. Furthermore, these 
systems tended to be tested in the laboratory with actors portraying 
emotions. Batliner and colleagues have suggested expanding the 
models of frustration to include linguistic cues as well such as cursing 
or repetition to improve the ability of a system to detect frustration 
before it reaches the point of no return. 
 
•  Kismet: Kismet is a socially expressive robot designed by Cynthia 
Breazeal (2000) at the MIT Media Lab as part of the Sociable Machines 
Project. Breazeal began Kismet with the objective of creating a semi-
autonomous agent, in other words, an agent that did not operate 
independently but worked in interaction with others: including 
communicating and responding to emotion in human interlocutors. 
Kismet is designed to have facial expressions including eye gaze,  
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eyebrow movement, ear placement (e.g. like an animal), and lip 
movement. In addition Kismet can alter the emotional qualities of it’s 
synthesized voice. The robot is programmed to respond to emotional 
cues from others and engage in social activities such as drawing people 
into conversations, taking turns in conversation, establishing personal 
space, and withdrawing from an interaction. Through her work with 
Kismet, Breazeal demonstrates the value in focusing on semi-
autonomous as opposed to autonomous displays of emotion. 
 
Figure 9. Facial analyzer for the FAIM system. Copyright Rana El Kaliouby 
and Peter Robinson 
 
The example designs described above were selected because of the 
diversity in their approach and application but also because they are 
emblematic of the affect as information approach. In all of these examples, 
affect is positioned as something discrete, something that can be captured 
(largely without the explicit awareness or control of the user), labeled, and 
then transferred. These systems seek to improve the affective bandwidth and 
the emotional expression of computers without requiring much additional work 
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on the part of the user. In order to meet this goal, the systems base their 
design on the natural expression, recognition and communication of emotion 
in their human counterparts.  
Evaluation 
In evaluating the above systems, the objectives and the methods are 
also informed by the view of affect as information. In this case, the evaluation 
of the systems is about getting the emotion ‘right’ whether this is accurately 
recognizing the right emotion, responding appropriately to the detected 
emotion, or expressing emotion in a convincing fashion. As Picard states, 
computers need not be right 100% of the time in order to be considered 
successful since humans are not 100% accurate in detecting, responding to or 
communicating affect – that emotional states can not be observed but only 
inferred (Picard 1997, p.24).  Since the objective is for computers to perform 
as humans emotionally, Picard proposes variations on the Turing test as 
appropriate ways of evaluating the success of affective computing systems. 
For example, if a human actor portrays an emotion, a computer should be able 
to detect the emotions portrayed at the same rate of success as a person. The 
use of actors and controlled sets of emotions is a popular approach, as 
discussed in the automatic call-in system, and most of the evaluation studies 
of affective computing systems begin in the laboratory as part of the iterative 
design of the system. The success of FAIM depends upon two stages: first 
modeling an expression that the sender of the message believes accurately 
represents how he or she feels at that moment, and second on the success of 
the animation to portray this emotion to the receiver. For the automatic call-in 
centers, success is measured in the laboratory in terms of whether or not the 
system picks up the point in the script where the actor is becoming frustrated.  
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Outside the lab, the measure of success for such an automated system is a 
low volume of callers hanging up. The success of Kismet would be rated 
against whether Kismet responded appropriately and believably, i.e. as 
another human might, to Breazeal.  
Although many of the measurements of emotion in the system design 
are based on physiological measures due to their relatively unobtrusive and 
involuntary nature, the evaluation of these systems depends upon correlating 
the results of these measurements with self-reports. For instance, the 
algorithms for the EMFi chair correlated the detection of negative mood with 
the subjects’ report of negative or positive mood. Furthermore, many of these 
studies begin with a standardized tool that has been developed from self-
report methods. In the EMFi study, subjects responded to a selection of 
images and sounds from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, 
Bradley, and Cuthbert, 2005) and the International Affective Digital Sounds 
(Bradley and Lang, 1999) – two databases of images and sounds given 
statistically significant scores of valence and arousal based on responses of 
hundreds of subjects. The example designs described here use physiological 
measurement as part of the system design, but physiological measurement is 
also proposed in affective computing as a method of evaluation as well. For 
instance, researchers at Simon Fraser and at Dalhousie Universities have 
proposed using heart rate, similar to the EMFi chair, to evaluate players’ 
engagement with video games (Mandryk, Atkins, and Inkpen, 2006).  
The researchers propose using physiological measures as an 
evaluation method for the same reason the examples above proposed to use 
them as design input: because the measures could be continuous and 
unobtrusive. However Mandryk, Atkins and Inkpen explicitly remark on the  
170 
objective nature of such methods as another added benefit. Yet although 
physiological data is presented as a very different metric than self-report data, 
the validation of this method is marked against players’ self report. In this 
particular study, the authors felt the physiological data not only performed as 
well as self-report but it also provided more statistically significant differences 
for further exploration. Although this is an example of using physiological 
methods to evaluate systems not explicitly designed for affect, one could 
imagine for instance the EMFi chair or a similar detection device could become 
a part of the game as the system begins to respond to the users detected 
emotional state.  
All of these evaluation studies of the designs described above suggest 
that the gold standard by which affective computing systems are judged is the 
performance of humans. A right response or a right emotion to detect is 
modeled a priori to the experiment and success is determined by performance 
which matches these models. The evaluation methods follow from the design 
methods and the overriding model of information as affect. If affect is discrete, 
then a particular emotion can be detected. If affect is transferable intact, then 
the emotion one sets out to communicate should be able to be decoded by the 
receiver. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the preference for 
physiological data as an objective measure – one that must be validated by 
self report but then eventually comes to replace self report as a more objective 
method.  
Implications 
The designs and evaluation methods of affective computing neatly 
follow from a conceptualization of affect as information. However, there are a 
number of design and evaluation issues that result from this perspective. First  
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of all, regarding the designs, although one of the motivations for affective 
computing is to improve on things such as the short list of emoticons for 
emotional expression, the designs still end up supporting a very limited palette 
of expression. With the FAIM system for instance, the palette is limited not 
only in how emotion is expressed but in terms of what emotions can be 
expressed with a short list of seven states. This reductionism is not only 
apparent in the palette of expressions but in the indices used to detect 
emotion. Although the development of new technology with ever more refined 
capabilities for visualizing the invisible and sensing new modalities offer 
exciting ways for measuring emotion, what often happens is the measurement 
comes to stand for the emotion itself. Just as a label of ‘happy’ is a weak 
signification of what it feels or means to be happy and leaves much about the 
individual experience undescribed and unaccounted for, a number on a heart 
rate chart also only represents one aspect of emotion. The danger in affective 
computing is that the dependency on discrete labels and on emotion-as-
number reduces rich experience to abstract, but easily tractable and tradable, 
representations. In other words, the ineffable is erased from the experience of 
affect. 
Secondly, as the designs focus on creating and refining an emotional 
model for the computer system, the priority established is one of improving the 
system’s knowledge of the user’s emotional states. This begs the question of 
who has control over this information once it has been collected. Although the 
EMFi chair acknowledges this issue and plans to address this with a logo on 
the chair, the stated goal of most of these systems is to fade into the 
background so that users are unaware of the system working. This leads to 
serious implications for accuracy. Systems that have this much control without  
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our awareness require a high degree of accuracy, yet the systems have been 
shown to only operate at a level on par with or below human ability. This 
human fallibility would be acceptable only if users are aware of the potential 
for error and if there are built in feedback mechanisms for users to detect and 
correct the errors. With the emphasis on invisibility, this information and its use 
is often hidden from the user. 
There are also several limitations embedded in the evaluation of 
affective computing systems. In reviewing the phone call-in centers for 
example, Batliner et al. note a marked decline in performance from systems in 
the laboratory and systems in the actual world. The reason for this is that 
people are rarely ever expressing one emotion and rarely do they express it in 
the exaggerated kinds of caricatures an actor might employ. Batliner cites 
Scherer’s (2000) study of people arguing with baggage claim attendants after 
losing their luggage. If ever there is a time when people might be experiencing 
a ‘pure’ emotion of frustration, it would be in the process of trying to retrieve a 
lost bag. Yet both from observers of these interactions and from the people 
themselves, the emotions identified were much more nuanced. The legacy of 
affective computing evaluations that depend on experimental exaggeration 
comes from earlier studies on measuring emotion such as those explored by 
Dror (1999) in his accounts of the numerization of emotion. In these early 
studies, Dror notes that subjects who could not produce unambiguous 
emotions were dropped from the protocol.  
Lucy Suchman (2004) also provides an interesting critique of evaluating 
affect as information through her comments on the Kismet studies. Although 
Kismet successfully demonstrated human like emotional expressions and 
reactions, Suchman notes that this only happens when Kismet is responding  
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to Breazeal – when responding to other people, the experience is much more 
unconvincing. In commenting on this result, Suchman suggests that Breazeal 
has been trained in the same way that Kismet has been trained – that she 
knows which of her behaviors will command a suitable response from Kismet. 
This is not to suggest that the Kismet design is a failure instead of a success 
but to claim it is a success because of its choreographed evaluation. The 
evaluation actually speaks to a different type of affect, one that emerges 
through the interaction of Breazeal with Kismet rather than one that is found by 
Kismet or found by Breazeal.    
Finally, many of the designs and evaluation methods discussed above 
either implicitly or explicitly rely on the objective account of physiological 
measures of affect. Even though these methods are either induced or 
validated through comparisons with self-report methods, self-report is 
positioned as subjective and therefore difficult to depend on for accuracy. 
Picard, for instance, discussed the limitations of self report at a recent 
workshop on Innovating Evaluation Methods for Affective Systems at CHI 
2005. She noted that self-report was difficult to rely upon for three reasons: 
people often forget what they are feeling or can’t articulate it, people may 
misrepresent what they are feeling to either please the researcher or in the 
interest of self-presentation, or people often express their feelings along the 
middle of a spectrum as opposed to pushing it toward extremes (which makes 
for less variance).  For all of these reasons, self-report is considered a less 
desirable evaluation method or at least one that must be supplemented with 
more ‘objective’ measures. However, these limitations all follow from a model 
of affect that is found, internal, and discrete. It assumes for instance that 
nuanced emotions are less valid (or valuable for the researcher) than extreme  
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emotions.  Due to all of these implications, I will now turn to a different model 
of affect and the subsequent designs, evaluations, and implications. 
Affective Presence: Affect as Interaction 
The implications of affective computing discussed in the previous 
section can be summarized into the following three issues: emotions are 
reduced to abstract representations that miss the lived experience of emotion, 
there is an illicit shift of control from people interpreting emotion to computers 
interpreting the emotions, and the emphasis is on the accuracy of detecting 
‘found’ emotions as opposed to the authenticity of emerging emotions. These 
issues arise from a perspective on affect as information and are based on a 
fundamental disjunction between the subjective, situated, cultural, and social 
ways in which people think about and experience emotions and the objective, 
formalized ways in which computers model them. This disjunction presents a 
gap between the experience of emotion and how it is defined (and by 
whom/what); a gap between what is experienced and what can be measured; 
and a gap between the richness of experience and the relative simplicity of its 
formalization (Sengers and Mateas, 2005).   A growing number of researchers 
are beginning to look at ways of addressing this gap including a collective of 
researchers focusing on what we have termed affective presence as an 
alternative approach to affective computing. The founding members
33 of this 
                                                 
33 For the purposes of space only I have not listed the many graduate students at all of these 
institutions who have also been active in advancing the Affective Presence ideas including 
(but not limited to): Joseph ‘Jofish’ Kaye, Petra Sundström, Jarmo Laaksolahti, Anna Ståhl, 
Michael Golembowski, Mario Romero, and Zach Pousman. The Affective Presence 
consortium began with the original schools/institutes in January of 2004 with a presentation for 
the Intel People and Practices Group on alternate models to affective computing. Since this 
time, we have begun working with several other researchers pursuing similar ideas including 
(but not limited to): Paul Dourish at University of Irvine, Peter Wright and Mark Blythe at the 
University of York, John McCarthy at University of Limerick, Katherine Isbister at RPI, and 
Rogerio DePaula at Intel.   
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group include: from Cornell University, Geri Gay and Phoebe Sengers; from 
the Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kristina Höök; from Goldsmiths 
College University of London, Bill Gaver; from Georgia Technology Institute, 
Michael Mateas; and from Intel’s People and Practices Group, Ken Anderson. 
The issues defining the affective presence agenda boil down to one central 
question: how is it possible, despite the relative inability of computational 
systems to understand the full meaning and context of human experience, to 
build systems that address people’s experiences at a humanly meaningful and 
appropriate level? To rephrase this question in terms of this work: how can we 
design interfaces for affect without losing the ineffable qualities that make 
affect meaningful? 
The answer being proposed by current affective computing research is 
to close the gap between lived experience and its representations by 
improving computers’ understanding of human emotions, in the hopes that 
formalized models will eventually capture the full complexity of human 
emotional experience.   We propose, instead, to close the gap by rebalancing 
the roles of humans and machines in affective computing.  In our model, affect 
is co-constructed through a process of collaboration rather than focusing on 
the computer’s ability to acquire and reason about a user’s emotion states. 
Instead, in this model, computing provides new opportunities for users to 
experience, interpret, and reflect on their emotions.    By designing for this 
collaboration between computers and users, we solve the three central 
problems introduced earlier: we address emotions that computational systems 
alone cannot truly understand, keep users in charge of emotional meaning-
making, and focus our design efforts not on formalizations but on complex, 
idiosyncratic, and enigmatic emotional experiences. In the next section, I will  
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illustrate the difference in this approach to the affective computing approach 
through specific design examples. 
Therefore, we propose a theory of affect not as information but affect as 
interaction. In returning to the contours of affect described earlier in this 
chapter, a position of affect as interaction views affect as non-discrete, 
integrally related and intertwined with a number of other processes, and 
relational. In developing the theory of affect as interaction, we were inspired by 
previous moves to expanding cognitive models in HCI for understanding any 
information as socially and culturally produced. In my collaboration with 
Phoebe Sengers, Paul Dourish and Rogerio DePaula, we explained the 
entwining of emotion and culture as follows: “To experience a feeling as, say, 
anger, love, happiness, lust, or frustration, one must be grounded in a cultural 
context that makes anger, love, happiness, lust, or frustration meaningful (and 
in turn determines a response to that emotion – whether it is something to be 
proud of, ashamed of, etc.)” (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish, and Sengers, 2005, 
p. 63). Emotions are culturally situated and culturally defined. This is not to 
suggest that different cultures just have different names for different emotions 
and it is not enough to just say that emotions play a role in defining our 
cultures (e.g. Western societies tend to express emotions in this way versus 
Eastern societies). The strong point of view here is that “the experience of 
emotion is mediated by cultural and social situations, but it is also used to 
enact and sustain those settings” (Boehner, DePaula, Dourish, and Sengers, 
2005, p. 64). In other words, through culture, emotion is experienced, and 
through emotion, culture is produced. More broadly, a view of affect as 
interaction maintains that emotion cannot be seen as bounded and complete 
within the individual.  
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By positioning individual emotion and the social/cultural field in which 
this is experienced as a mutually constitutive relationship, the interactional 
approach reframes the dichotomous divide discussed in the section on the 
contours of affect. The divides between the individual and the social, the 
cognitive and the physical, the objective and the subjective are seen in relation 
to each other, in interaction and informing each other. For instance, “the 
binding of the social and the cultural to emotion does not negate the agency 
and subjective feelings of the individual. As productive phenomena, culture 
and social contexts are also realized, reconstituted, experienced, and over 
time re-imagined, through the interaction of individuals. In this relationship, 
emotions are constructed and experienced as individuals act in and through 
their culture and social interactions. From the interactional perspective, affect 
is not a representational state to be transferred from one place to another, but 
rather is an aspect of collectively enacted social settings. Emotion is a 
witnessable property of social action, and a way in which actions are rendered 
interpretable and meaningful” (Boehner, DePaola, Dourish, and Sengers, 2005 
p. 64). In summary, affect is created through interactions and not found as a 
static or reductive bit of information. This divergence between these 
approaches to affect is perhaps best illustrated through a discussion of 
designs, evaluations and their implications.  
Design 
Rebalancing the affective gap through an affective presence approach 
does not attempt to make computers the mirror image of humans but instead 
draws on what computers do best as computers and what humans do best as 
humans. Computers are used for alternate forms of representation and for 
visualizing and processing information in new ways whereas humans make  
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sense of and attribute meaning to this information. We position computers as 
actors in this meaning making process but actors who are decidedly ‘other.’ In 
this way, we position the design as one of supporting ‘co-interpretation’ of 
affect as opposed to the detection, response, and possession of affect.  
 
•  Influencing Machine (see Figure 10): Created at the MARS Exploratory 
Research Lab, Fraunhofer Institute für Medienkommunkation, the 
Influencing Machine (IM) is designed to encourage reflection on the 
intersection between emotion and technology (Sengers et al., 2002). To 
use the IM, participants enter a room, and see projected on the wall a 
display of childlike scribbling: jagged lines, circles, spirals in simple 
colors, each building up and fading away.  A large wooden mailbox sits 
on a table surrounded by a variety of postcards of emotionally evocative 
art.  Feeding postcards into the mailbox triggers unusual sounds and 
changes the speed, color, and form of the drawings on the wall.  These 
sounds and drawings are tied to the cards chosen by the participants 
which were read electronically when entered into the mailbox. 
Importantly, the changes are not designed to directly communicate the 
computer’s emotions, but are deliberately multi-valenced and enigmatic, 
and intended to encourage reflection about emotion and the role 
computing may play in it.  The Influencing Machine is not transparently 
readable; it demands reflective interpretation. 
 
•  Home Health Horoscope: Created in collaboration between Goldsmiths 
College, Cornell University, and Intel, the Home Health Horoscope is a 
reaction in part to the development of “Smart Homes” and “Proactive  
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Homes.” These smart homes are laced with sensors for tracking 
inhabitants’ activities and establishing patterns that allow for emergency 
notifications should something be amiss, such as grandma falling in the 
shower, an intruder in the home, or perhaps something less disastrous 
like the milk going sour in the refrigerator. In response to this type of 
surveillance technology and the overdependence on models that 
accurately reproduce one’s world, the Home Health Horoscope 
proposes to use deliberately “shy” and idiosyncratic sensors such as 
force sensors in one’s slippers as a measure of how often comfort is 
needed and reports the health of the home not as a call for help to 
emergency services but as a fortune-like horoscope printed out for the 
inhabitants of the home to read. The sensors are designed specifically 
according to what the target family believes is important information for 
their specific patterns. By having a role in designing the sensors and by 
presenting the information in the playful manner of a horoscope that 
people are used to finding meaning in and discounting, the Home 
Health Horoscope supports discussion and reflection on emotional well-
being. 
 
•  eMoto (see Figure 10):  Developed at the Swedish Institute of Computer 
Science, eMoto is a system designed for Multimedia Messaging System 
(MMS) capabilities of mobile phones (Sundström, Ståhl, and Höök, 
2005). A user can compose a text message as per normal but then can 
add an emotionally valenced background which changes based on the 
user’s gestures with a sensor embedded and Bluetooth enabled stylus. 
Different movements, such as abrupt jabbing movements or slow  
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circular movements, are given different positions along a spectrum of 
colors and shapes. The matching between movements and outputs is 
based on movement, color, and shape theory although the user can 
simply continue to move the stylus around until he or she creates a 
suitable background pattern for expressing their message. Receivers of 
the message learn over time how to interpret the combination of the 
content of the text, with the color and shapes of the background pattern 
all judged in relation to the particular sender and his or her patterns of 
communication.  
 
•  Office Plant #1 (see Figure 10): Created at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, the Office Plant is a desktop robot that responds to light 
and sound levels in the environment as well as the social and emotional 
tone of email received by its user (Böhlen and Mateas, 1998). Based on 
this information, the plant acts as a living sculpture responding with its 
own sounds and physical movements occurring over long periods of 
time. The user might not notice the movement as it is happening but 
over time, the plant is recognizably in different states from a closed 
frond to an open bloom and various other states in between. The Office 
Plant is made of metallic materials but is reminiscent of an actual plant 
that one might find seeking life in a rather artificial climate of an office 
cubicle. The timing of the plant’s movements do not draw immediate 
attention but present snapshots of changes in emotional climate over 
time. In addition, the plant itself possesses what Mateas refers to as 
alien presence (Mateas, 2001), based on artificial intelligence, the plant 
develops its own ability to infer alternate, or alien, interpretations of  
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what is happening in the email and light/sound levels of the office. In 
terming this ‘alien presence’, Mateas signals that the role of the plant is 
as an ‘other’ not as an authority on the exact or right emotional state of 
the office inhabitants. 
 
   
Figure 10. eMoto, and the Office Plant (left to right) 
 
These designs may not differ drastically in form from the ones 
described in the affective computing section, but in principle and spirit they 
differ markedly. The Office Plant for example has a series of state diagrams 
that could look very similar to the Kismet diagram above of different emotional 
states represented by different positions. However, the difference is that the 
states in the Office Plant are positioned as an approximation – the 
strangeness of an office plant reflecting the emotional climate or the 
playfulness of a Home Health Horoscope for predicting the fortune of a home 
all indicate that this information is part of the interaction not the conclusion of 
it. Furthermore, the designs all suggest very different contours of affect than 
the designs from affective computing. In an affective presence approach, the 
designs work with affect that is conceived of as dimensional, difficult to isolate 
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from other practices, and relational. eMoto, for example, specifically plays with 
the dynamic nature of emotion with what the researchers call the Affective 
Loop. The Affective Loop pertains to the phenomenon that through expressing 
one’s emotion, one’s emotion changes. As with the emergent expression of 
affect in the other designs, this is based on a conception of affect as 
something created through interaction and not found or transferred intact as 
information. 
Evaluation 
As the affective presence designs above demonstrate, they all start 
from a very different point of view regarding affect, specifically a point of view 
where affect is a form of interaction. Therefore, what constitutes a ‘successful’ 
design also changes dramatically from the affect as information approach. 
Instead, in an approach to affect as interaction, the focus in evaluation is on 
whether or not the designs encourage reflection and whether or not the 
designs provide evidence and cues for engaging in the collaborative 
interpretation of affect. Shifting to a constructed, interpretive notion of emotion 
leads to new research questions around emotions and moods in social 
relationships, rather than focusing on individuals communicating with 
machines. A system designed for affect as information leads to questions 
about transfer of information: Did the system recognize the ‘right’ emotion and 
respond appropriately? Did the system transfer user A’s emotion to user B so 
that user B could decode it accurately? A system designed for affect as 
interaction, in contrast, will be evaluated through questions about co-
interpretation, such as: How do users experience and shape one another's 
moods or a collective mood?  What role can interactive systems play in 
helping multiple users in coordinating senses of each other's emotions? What  
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system attributes encourage or impair how users make meaning? How do 
users appropriate a system to evoke novel and personally meaningful 
practices of affect? How does the system stimulate reflection on or awareness 
of affect?  
Answering such questions requires open-ended but systematic 
evaluation methods accounting for the richness of co-interpretation. Since our 
design methods are inspired by theoretical approaches to meaning-making, 
our evaluation goals and methods also draw from forms of interpretive inquiry 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  For instance, the Home Health Horoscope project 
plans to use documentary methods to provide alternate accounts of how the 
household adopts and adapts the horoscope system. In eMoto, participants 
used the system during the course of their daily lives while they also 
documented their own use and their partner’s use through video footage and 
participant observation. For the Influencing Machine, participants were 
observed as they used the machine in groups (in order to promote discussion) 
and interviewed afterwards about their experience. The evaluation of the 
Influencing Machine attempted to combine practices for evaluating system 
design and evaluating interactive art in order to draw out not only what users 
did with the system but their interpretations of what the system was for (Höök, 
Sengers, and Andersson, 2003), for example by looking for the metaphors 
users employed to guide their interactions.  
In contrast to the affective computing approach, all of these studies 
favor evaluation in the intended setting (although pre-testing in the laboratory 
does occur) such as the home or the office. Another critical difference is the 
level of involvement of participants in the analysis of the evaluation results as 
they are collected. Participants play an active role in responding to and  
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interpreting their patterns of use. Whereas self-report is looked upon in 
affective computing as something that requires more objective methods to 
round out its use, in the affective presence approach methods are developed 
to encourage self-report as a way to round out the use of seemingly objective 
measures of behaviors or sensor data. This does not mean that physiological 
data and other usage type reports are not used as evaluation metrics, but it 
means that the information is positioned as a stimulus for reflection and 
interpretation by the participants as opposed to having a predetermined 
meaning. 
Implications 
The shift in designs within the affective presence approach suggests 
that we are not simply creating different designs focused more on the social 
and cultural experience of affect, but we are designing for a very different 
understanding of what affect is and the role of technology in supporting this. 
Whereas in the affect as information approach, the ineffable is explained 
away, in the affect as interaction, the ineffable complexity of affect is left open 
for interpretation. Affect as information and affect as interaction are like two 
adjacent points on a circle yet facing in opposite directions. It would not take 
much to shift Kismet or the EMFi for example to the affect as interaction 
approach. For instance, the EMFi chair could become part of the Office Plant 
experience where lack of sitting in one’s chair or different heartbeat rhythms 
cause changes in the plant’s morphology. The difference however is in a 
perspective on what authority is placed on the information collected and how 
transparent this is. In the affect as information perspective, the information is 
the affect, in other words, the affect is complete if the tools are considered 
sophisticated enough to get the right information and the information is  
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considered accountable. In the affect as interaction perspective, the 
information is considered a starting point, a part of a much larger whole.  
Designing for affect as interaction shifts the design from one of 
attempting to design affect ‘into’ the system to design ‘for’ affect where affect 
is experienced through the design and is not simply a component of the 
design. This requires rethinking many of the traditional design and evaluation 
strategies of HCI as the standard approaches do not fit well with an attempt to 
design for this kind of emergent, unfolding, open experience. Whereas a 
traditional HCI evaluation for example starts with established criteria for 
success and judges the design based on meeting these criteria, the designs 
described above and the evaluation methods for exploring their use are more 
open ended. What exactly this means – to design for open-ended experience 
– is currently an issue of debate within HCI. If experiences are open-ended, 
then does it really matter what we design? Couldn’t a screen saver or a lava 
lamp serve as an emotionally evocative display if the user chooses to make it 
so?  
Furthermore, if our objective is for causing reflection and new 
experiences of affect, what allows us to have a point of view on whether one 
design causes ‘better’ reflection than another or one design is a ‘better’ 
experience than another? We must answer critiques of phenomenological 
evaluations being relative accounts with little to offer for more general 
practices and understandings. As we search for criteria to guide and judge our 
designs we need new criteria for guiding and judging our evaluation methods. 
Standard HCI practices and the work of affective computing largely draw from 
the evaluation criteria established through the sciences, criteria for evaluation  
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methods with high degrees of accuracy, validity, and generalizability. These 
criteria may or may not be the right ones for systems designed for openness.  
Reflective Design: An Interpretation Approach for Affect 
In introducing this case study on affect, I have again followed a practice 
of reflective design. The first step of this process consists of examining the 
historical developments and the socio-cultural influences and implications of a 
particular area of design. In this case, my starting point was the development 
of affective computing. The motivating observation for initiating a reflective 
design practice was in how affective computing approached the ineffable 
experience of affect as something to be found, codified and transferred. In 
order to unpack this development, I had to take a step back and look at how 
affect as a concept is conceptualized in a number of different fields but 
primarily from cognitive psychology as this exerts the most influence on 
affective computing research and design. Although proponents of affective 
computing do not claim to propose a theory of affect, I could trace the theory 
or the perspective influencing their designs and evaluations as a perspective 
of affect as information. 
The second step then in reflective design is to imagine alternate 
possibilities and in turn to uncover the grounding available for an alternate 
approach, the assumptions that would support such an approach, and the 
resulting implications. For this step, I described the emerging perspective from 
the Affective Presence consortium. This group is developing a contrasting 
perspective or theory of affect as interaction where affect is created and the 
ineffable or lived experience of affect is not explained away. Contrasting the 
affect as information and the affect as interaction perspectives produces the 
following comparisons (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Affect as information vs. affect as interaction  
  Affect as Information  Affect as Interaction 
Nature of Affect  Inside the Individual 
Reified or Static 
Abstract 
Individual + Social 
Dynamic 
Felt 
Design 
Objectives 
Transference of Meaning  Co-Interpretation of 
Meaning 
System 
Evaluation 
Accuracy of 
Representation 
Evocativeness of 
Reflection 
 
  The table summarizes how each perspective will result not only in 
different designs but also in different methods and metrics for evaluating these 
designs. The third step in a reflective design practice is to engage in the 
design process itself with a continual orientation toward critically examining 
design choices. In the next section, I will discuss in detail the design and 
evaluation of one Affective Presence system. This case study will serve as an 
in depth exploration of the affect as interaction perspective and its 
implications. 
Affector: A Case Study of Affective Presence 
The case study for this chapter revolves around the design and initial 
evaluation of a system called Affector, a video window for communicating the 
affective climate of neighboring offices. Comments such as “a chill came over 
the room” or “you could cut the tension with a knife” suggest that people 
believe in their ability to read the climate of a space based on cues such as 
the number of people, their apparent moods, levels activity, and amount of 
clutter or crowding. We wanted to play with this perceived ability by creating 
displays of mood in an office space. I will begin this case study by first  
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examining background work on mood in the office space and lessons learned 
from this experience. I will then move to describing the Affector design and 
evaluation before ending with a discussion of implications for the affect as 
interaction perspective and the practice of reflective design. 
Background Work 
I will first describe an initial design for displaying collective mood called 
Miro, a system that ultimately played a large role in the ultimate shape of 
Affector.  Miro was a collaboration between myself, Mo Chen and Zheng Liu 
created in the fall of 2002 (Boehner, K., Chen, M., & Z. Liu, 2003). We were 
designing for a public space in the Information Science Building of Cornell 
University, where approximately 20-30 people work at any given time. As we 
were designing to augment people’s perceived abilities of sensing the 
emotional climate, we first set out to understand how they currently deduced 
information about affect in the office. We then brainstormed how sensors and 
ambient displays that foreground peripheral information could enhance and 
supplement the senses for detecting collective mood.  
Figure 11. The Miro display (left) and users’ attempting to interpret it (right) 
 
Our criteria of success were whether our system would 1) correctly 
model the affective climate (assuming that ‘a climate’ actually exists), and 2)  
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clearly communicate this climate in an informative display. In this way, our 
starting point was very similar to affective computing projects. 
However, we felt most affective computing and ambient systems 
communicated their underlying model of emotion too literally, e.g. using a bar 
chart to indicate the amount of ‘happiness’ or ‘sadness’ in a room. We felt this 
literal and didactic representation would quickly lose the interest of people in 
the office. Therefore, we chose to portray the emotional climate more 
abstractly as an animation of the painting Blue by Joan Miro. The display, 
henceforth dubbed Miro, was projected onto the walls of the shared office 
space (see Figure 11). The composition of Miro, such as its color, number of 
dots, and movement, changed according to indices of emotion gathered 
through sound monitors and surveys of how people in the office were feeling.  
It is important to note that, although we chose not to make the external display 
an easily decoded mapping of input to output, there was a  direct internal 
mapping driving the display. For example, a number of online responses of 
happy versus sad changed the background color of the display toward the 
yellow end of the color spectrum. 
During our evaluation of the installation, we began to confront the 
challenges described earlier in the affective computing approach. For one 
thing, people interpreted the display ‘incorrectly’, i.e. they rarely deduced the 
correct internal mapping between the display effect and their input. However, 
people did develop an interpretation of the display by standing in front of it in 
groups, talking about what it might mean, and sharing their impressions of why 
it changed. The “whys” that people discussed were not the system indices 
(e.g. the survey input or the amount of noise), but the surrounding context (e.g. 
the absence of people, the weather conditions, or the presence of impending  
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grant deadlines). In other words, rather than the display representing a pre-
existing climate, the collective interpretation people generated around the 
display worked to create an emotional climate. Because of how Miro was 
actually used, we realized our metrics for success, as well as our design 
approach, were misleading. The affective climate was less a state to measure 
and more an emergent expression. The readability of our display, therefore, 
was less important than its ability to provoke converation.  The engagement 
we needed to focus on was how people collaboratively interacted around the 
display, in addition to how they interacted with the display. 
Our experience with Miro developed as we were collaborating with the 
Affective Presence coalition to articulate the principles and strategies for affect 
as interaction.  In this context, we highlighted two important insights from Miro. 
First, the internal emotional model of the system trapped us into presenting 
affect as information rather than interaction. Even though we had tried to 
reduce the visibility of this emotional model in the display by using ambiguous 
graphics, we were still using an information model for the collection of input. 
We wondered what would happen if we removed, or at least drastically 
reduced, this internal mapping. Second, in thinking about affect as a process 
of co-interpretation, we realized that with Miro the interpretation occurred in 
distinct phases. In the first phase, the designers anticipated how the users 
might interpret the different display effects (e.g. choosing color changes to 
indicate happiness). The second phase of interpretation occurred in use, as 
the users collaborated with each other to create meaning around the display. 
As a result, the coordination of interpretation was asynchronous between 
designers and users.  We decided it would be interesting to collapse these 
phases by tightly coupling design and use. Finally, the Affector system also  
191 
differs from Miro in that it would originally be designed for use by two people 
as opposed to a larger group. We chose to start with a dyad for a more 
focused study that may then be tested against differences of use for larger 
groups. In the following section, I will present an overview of the Affector 
design process as enacted by its main designers Phoebe Sengers and 
Simeon Warner beginning in the autumn of 2004. The purpose of this case 
study is to both demonstrate the viability of designing for the ineffable 
experience of affect that is open to interpretation, rather than scripting and 
flattening affect, and to explore the design and evaluation implications of 
taking such a fundamentally different approach to affect and technology 
design.  
Designing Affector 
Although Miro provides a backdrop for Affector, and many of the 
Affector design decisions were made in response to the Miro experience, 
Affector has an origin story of its own. The story as told by its developers 
begins late one evening at the Information Science Building. Phoebe Sengers 
is steeped in concentration as she works in the quiet solitude. Suddenly her 
focus is interrupted when she hears a colleague enter her neighbor Simeon’s 
office and exclaim: “Working so late all by yourself?” Up this point, Phoebe 
had been unaware that anyone else was still in the building, but she 
spontaneously shouts: “He’s not by himself – I’m right next to him!” 
From this exchange, the seed for the Affector program was planted. 
Phoebe and Simeon realized that although they do sit next to each other, in 
fact physically only a meter or two apart, the intervening wall effectively 
prevents any knowledge of the other. They therefore decided to build a virtual  
192 
window powered by a video camera and distorted video display between their 
offices to promote awareness of each other’s emotional presence.  
Design Objectives 
In the first document produced regarding Affector (then called Tinge-
atron), the goal of the system is described as an installation supporting 
ambient emotional awareness. Like a magic window (or a tear in the fabric) it 
shares something of mood/ambience rather than a direct window into ‘physical 
reality.’ It is intended to reduce the ‘cubicality’ of the office and perhaps, as 
Phoebe and Simeon suggested, even increase the degree to which one could 
ascertain if the other wants to go for a cup of coffee. The original goals of the 
system are to increase the affective sense of each other and to increase the 
number of their physical interactions.  
The designers also indicated three objectives for the design itself. First, 
the design would be ambient, in that it would operate at a peripheral level and 
require minimal action. In other words, it would not demand a high degree of 
attention or intervention in order to communicate this sense of emotional 
presence. Secondly, the design would protect privacy and minimize the feeling 
of surveillance. Finally, the system would operate without an internal model of 
emotion. In other words, rather than developing a symbolic system like Miro 
where the dots represented sociability and the background color represented 
happiness for example, Affector would operate, initially, at a more sub-
symbolic or demonstrative level. In the words of the system designers: “The 
system should not directly model user emotions, understood as discrete and 
well-defined units, but rather give continuous, rich, and potentially ambiguous 
background sense of emotion” (Sengers, Boehner, Warner, and Jenkins, 
2005).  
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In articulating the system objectives, the designers were also clear 
about what the system would not be. In particular, they did not want to create 
a straight video window or a presence system. They were not interested in 
simply knowing if the other was in or out of the office, they wanted a sense of 
the affective presence or the emotional aura in the office over time. Secondly, 
they were not interested in a system for increasing productivity. Many 
presence awareness systems for the office are developed with the explicit 
purpose of improving work practices (e.g. Cadiz, Venolia, Jancke and Gupta, 
2002; de Guzman, Yau, Gagliano, Park and Dey, 2004), but Affector was 
designed to create a sense of connection among friends who happen to work 
in the same building.  
Design Strategies 
In order to meet the above objectives, the designers identified four 
design strategies to guide their eventual implementation. First, one of the 
objectives is also a design strategy on its own: the decision to not include an 
internal emotional model in the system code. For this strategy, the designers 
looked to the work of Rodney Brooks who “argues that systems can appear 
intelligent and  exhibit complex behavior without complex representation and 
manipulation of abstract information. Instead, Brooks’s work is based on 
defining effective connections between sensors and effectors so that when the 
system is placed in a complex environment, a complex sequence of actions is 
triggered which can be narrated as intelligent behavior” (Sengers, Boehner, 
Warner, and Jenkins, 2005, p.2). For the Affector system, this would translate 
into systematically distorting video feed information based on dynamic 
environmental cues as opposed to based on a previously coded internal map 
of cues, their meaning, and the resulting display.   
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Secondly, the designers would use the strategy of autobiographical 
design (Sengers, 2006) for creating systems that are personally meaningful 
and draw on rich details of subjective experience. Autobiographical design 
should not be confused with the maligned “I-methodology” approach in HCI 
where designers use their own experience as a resource for designing 
systems meant for others (Akrich, 1995). The I-methodology approach falters 
because the user and designer are not the same person; the designer 
assumes that by designing for him or herself, this will automatically translate to 
the target group. In autobiographical design, the designer explicitly designs for 
him or herself and recognizes that through the richness of designing for his or 
her own peculiarities this offers the system a depth for reinterpretation by 
others. The benefit of autobiographical design is more in line with persona 
design or in particular extreme user design, where designing for very specific 
and even extreme personalities (Djajadiningrat, Gaver, and Frens, 2000), 
produces more effective designs than does designing for abstract, general, 
and non-existent caricatures. 
Related to the idea of autobiographical design is the strategy of 
designing for situated use. This strategy is somewhat redundant to articulate 
as it follows from the previous strategy but I highlight it here because of its 
importance. The designers specifically talked about the Miro experience and 
how it ‘worked’ because the people who were interpreting the displays offered 
their own assessments of the shared context. The design leveraged the 
familiarity of users with each other and with the office space. Phoebe and 
Simeon, as the Affector designers, felt it important to bear this in mind as they 
developed Affector.   
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Finally, in order to address their objectives of protecting privacy, 
encouraging open interpretation and acting at the periphery, the designers 
used the strategies of ambiguity and defamiliarization in the display. Gaver, 
Beaver, and Benford (2003) argue that explicitly designing for ambiguity allows 
users to develop their own meanings of systems. Similarly, Aoki and Woodruff 
(2005) show how incorporating ambiguity into personal communication 
systems makes them a more flexible resource for users' personal 
relationships. Ambiguity and defamiliariation would therefore guide their 
choices as they developed the distortions to the video window. However, the 
designers recognize that ambiguity can also be alienating if there are no 
footholds into interpretation. To this end, they would rely primarily on the 
shared context described above. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Affector set-up. 
Implementation sketch 
The eventual set-up of Affector consisted of a video camera in each 
office and a framed window for the distorted video feed from the neighboring 
office (see Figure 12). The windows were positioned to be roughly in the same 
position on the wall thereby simulating an actual window or portal. In its initial 
implementation, Affector v1.0 consisted of a series of rules that mapped  
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sensors to effectors. Both Phoebe and Simeon could alter and edit these rule 
sets through a web editor.  
For example, Phoebe may develop a rule called “Green” that measures 
how much green is detected in each pixel of a video frame or “ColorDifference” 
that measures the covariance in color (red, green, blue) for pixels in the video 
that is captured. Simeon might come up with a rule called “Inversion” and give 
it the property of taking the color property of one pixel and inverting it to its 
opposite value. The final step then is combining the rules in if-then statements. 
For example, “If Average Green > 5”, then “Inversion”. This means that if the 
average level of green in the pixels of the video feed of Phoebe’s office have 
green levels greater than 5, then the color of all the pixel will be inverted when 
displayed in the Affector frame in Simeon’s office. A rule that stated “If 
Minimum Green < 5”, then “Inversion”, the inversion distortion would operate 
when the minimum level of green value detected across the pixels was less 
than 5. It is important to note how there is not an intermediate step where 
“Green” is coded to mean happy and therefore should launch the happy 
distortion. Instead, the sensors and distortions would be matched based more 
on trial and error of the resulting output displays. In the original 
implementation, the rules consisted of being able to detect light levels (e.g. 
greyscale) and color of pixels (e.g. red, green, blue). A skin-tone sensing 
algorithm was added early on yet did not work well technically in testing and 
was eventually rewritten for version 2.0. The effectors or distortions included: 
inverting color, stripping color out (e.g. to black and white), slowing movement 
of the video feed, and adding various types of noise.   
The designers anticipated in the initial implementation that the range of 
rules would grow over time and that they could combine the sensors in  
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interesting ways to create new sensors (e.g. If Green > 5 and Light Level < 5) 
and likewise combinations of distortions. They also recognized that the initial 
sensor capabilities they coded were less than optimal and instead were the 
easiest to detect
34. In addition, the designers discussed wanting sensors that 
could detect edges and movement. These were also added in version 2.0 and 
will be explored in the results and discussion sections.  
Evaluation Methods 
As an evaluation of an Affective Presence system where affect is 
conceptualized as interaction and not information transfer, the evaluation 
objectives have shifted from one of deducing if the ‘right’ emotion is detected 
and communicated to understanding how the system is appropriated for the 
expression and reflection on affect. Specifically, in talking about what would be 
the appropriate evaluation methods for this project, the designers and myself 
determined that what we were trying to capture through the evaluation is how 
as designers and users they narrate what a “working” system is and how they 
adjust the system accordingly. In other words, the objective is not to determine 
if the system works but to determine how it is that the designers/users 
conceive of a working system and how they adjust Affector accordingly. 
Therefore, the methods would have to serve as prompts for illustrating specific 
design decisions, surfacing the assumptions and directives behind these 
decisions, and capturing the implications of these decisions in use.  
In the design strategies section, I described the use of autobiographical 
design as a design strategy, but the evaluation is also a combination of 
autobiography and biography. My role in the Affector project has been 
                                                 
34 A number of graduate students worked on different aspects of the Affector v1.0 code 
including Rev Guron, Yevgeniy “Eugene” Medynskiy, and Eunyoung “Elie” Shin. For Affector 
v2.0, David Klein joined the technical team.  
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primarily one of a facilitator searching for prompts to help the designers/users 
narrate Affector. However, just as one of the design principles for affective 
presence systems is to support co-interpretation of affect, the evaluation of 
such systems must also be a collaborative process. Therefore, in the 
recounting of the evaluation, I will draw heavily from the interpretations of 
Phoebe and Simeon as well. Along with playing the role of designers and 
users, they also stepped into the role of evaluators and the methods discussed 
below were specifically designed to facilitate the sharing of this role. 
Questions 
The evaluation questions guiding our selection and use of evaluation 
methods throughout the design and use process include: 
1.  How do Phoebe and Simeon define a ‘working’ system? Does this 
definition change over time? 
2.  How do Phoebe and Simeon use Affector to develop a sense of each 
other’s affective presence? Do these practices change over time? 
3.  How does the system influence Phoebe and Simeon’s day to day 
interactions? Do these change over time? 
4.  What system attributes encourage or impair how Phoebe and Simeon 
collaborate and reflect on their affective presence in particular and 
affect in general? 
5.  How can we evoke rich, detailed narratives of experience? 
6.  How can we account for and make sense of multiple interpretations in 
evaluation? 
The first four questions are about the design and use of Affector, whereas the 
last two questions are about evaluating the evaluation itself.  
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These questions were present throughout the two-year period of this 
study. Affector did not have clearly time bound periods of design versus use. 
As a readily configurable system, Affector is meant to be always in a state of 
both design and use where Simeon and Phoebe can constantly tinker with the 
types of sensors and effectors at play in the system. Therefore, there was not 
a set period where we stopped using Affector and began the evaluation (in 
fact, the design, use and evaluation continues today). Instead, the questions 
above have been asked from the beginning. 
Methods 
We used several different methods in order to investigate the questions 
outlined above. These methods included usage data, interviews and 
observations, formal and informal documentation (e.g. published papers and 
emails), and facilitated design/evaluation sessions. The evaluation team was 
led by myself and included two undergraduate researchers, Liz Goulding and 
David Klein. Liz and David assisted with the interviews and observations 
throughout the study. I will describe each method in more detail when 
introducing the results for each method in the results section. 
Conditions  
From the period of November 2004 to January 2006, we had several 
different conditions. Due to Phoebe and/or Simeon being out of town 
intermittently for long periods of time, the data collected is not continuous 
across this time period but is focused on certain weeks. This is generally 
focused on twenty-one weeks when they are both in the office although we do 
have data from days where one or the other is out of the office. The first 
condition was the ‘Pre’ condition or the baseline condition where Phoebe,  
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Simeon and students were coding and designing Affector but there was no 
system set up between their offices. The second condition occurred from the 
end of February 2005 to early May 2005 and consisted of a straight video 
conferencing condition, i.e. a video feed of each with no distortions or filters. 
During the ‘Between’ condition, we removed the video conferencing set up. In 
July 2005, the  ‘Affector’ condition began with the Affector v1.0 system running 
in both offices. The last condition, the ‘Post’ condition, began in November 
2005 when we took the Affector system down. This period lasted through 
January of 2006. The chart below (see Table 2) illustrates the different 
conditions and sources of data collected during each condition.  
 
Table 2. Data sources across timeline of conditions
35. 
Conditions 
  Pre  Video  Btwn  Affector  Post 
wk:  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  4  1  2  3  1  2  3  4  5  6  1  2  3  4 
 
Nov04 - 
Feb05 
Feb05 -- 
Apr05 
Apr05 - 
Jun05 
Jul05 - 
Nov 05 
Dec05 - 
Jan06 
system 
looks 
                                         
system 
edits 
                                         
f2f 
clicks 
                                         
Inform. 
docs 
A                        B    C  D           
Formal 
docs 
  E              F  G                  H  I   
Inter-
view 
      *
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*  *  *
* 
    *
* 
      *
* 
         
Focus 
Group  
       
 
                    *          *
* 
 
                                                 
35 The letters for the informal and formal documents correspond with a list of the documents 
presented in the results section.  
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In addition to adding the straight video comparison condition, we had 
also anticipated having two additional modified conditions to test but these 
were not included during the v1.0 testing phase. These will be important 
additions in the next steps. The first condition would be a ‘Random’ condition 
where without Phoebe and Simeon knowing, the rule sets would be replaced 
with a random rule set generator. We felt this would be an important condition 
to judge against in terms of whether it makes a difference in the design to 
have control over the rule sets. The second condition we had hoped to test 
was an ‘Information’ condition – one created in the spirit of the affect as 
information approach where emotional presence levels would be given some 
type of internal emotional model that is then displayed (e.g. Happiness in 
Simeon’s office = 5). These additional conditions would have been useful for 
challenging the assumptions behind the affective presence approach, 
however, the current project is still able to address some of these through the 
conditions available. 
Results 
In this section, I will describe each method and present the main results 
in two forms: the ‘raw’ form and the ‘user interpreted’ form. The ‘raw’ results 
includes things such as look counts or comments from interviews. This same 
raw data was presented to Simeon and Phoebe and used as prompts for their 
interpretation, therefore producing more results of the ‘user interpreted’ form. 
Although interpretation of data is usually held for the discussion section, it is 
included here in the results because Phoebe and Simeon’s interpretations are 
the results I was interested in surfacing. From the beginning, we had decided 
the evaluation of Affector would involve detailing how Phoebe and Simeon  
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narrated what a “working” system would be. My interpretations of the results in 
this section will be primarily offered in the subsequent discussion section, 
although my selection of results here involves a degree of interpretation. To 
guide this selection, I include the points that Phoebe and Simeon mentioned 
multiple times, highlighted as important, or explicitly flagged them to me for 
inclusion.  
Usage Data: 
There were two types of usage data: 1) information from the web log of 
changes to and comments on the rule sets, and 2) the system look data 
recorded by Phoebe and Simeon for the Video condition and the Affector 
condition. As for the first type of usage data, the recorded changes and 
comments on the system, there was minimal use of the web log edit diaries. 
From the launch of the web interface to the close of this part of the study (Jun 
2005 – Jan 2006), there were 20 entries, all added by Phoebe. Her comments 
indicate that the rule set edits were primarily for testing functionality, for 
instance checking to see if the changes saved properly. The rest of the 
comments describe changing rule sets to monitor display effects. Most 
changes were not saved. One rule set was favored: Chunky Black and White 
(see Figure 13) which Phoebe and Simeon felt gave the display an artistic feel. 
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Figure 13. Chunky Black and White Distortion for Affector v1.0 
 
In the interviews and in the joint sessions, Phoebe and Simeon 
discussed whether the lack of rule set editing was due to it being a bad idea or 
if it was a bad design of the interface (or bad instructions since Simeon 
maintained he was not aware he was supposed to edit the rule sets). They 
concluded that it was a combination of bad instructions and bad design plus 
the need for more time with a working system. Because much of the design 
work was on stabilizing the system, they had yet to get to the point of playing 
with and reconfiguring the system in the way they had imagined. For version 
2.0, they have a new web interface that makes editing rule sets easier, 
Simeon is aware of his participation in changing the rules, and the program is 
becoming more stable.  
The second type of usage data attempted to measure how often 
Phoebe and Simeon used the Video display or the Affector window in terms of  
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how often they looked at it. To measure this, they each had a clicker on their 
desk near the display and were instructed for each look to up the count by one 
on the clicker. Phoebe and Simeon agreed this would be most meaningful for 
them if they only counted looks where they actually registered the window, i.e. 
they would not count it if their eyes simply passed over the display. We 
recognized from the beginning that this was a difficult metric to capture and an 
awkward measurement method. First and foremost, one of the defining criteria 
for the Affector system was for it to be ambient and therefore a click system to 
determine usage required non-ambient interaction. Secondly, both users felt 
they clicked inconsistently, either forgetting during the day to log counts or 
forgetting for whole days at a time. In reflecting on these limitations, both 
Phoebe and Simeon felt the usage numbers were a low estimate of use. The 
numbers were therefore low for each day they counted but there were also 
entire days when they would forget to count
36.  
As Phoebe and Simeon recorded and reported their counts, they often 
included comments on their raw score such as whether they believed it high or 
low and why, so to some degree they were aware of the raw data counts 
throughout the project. For low daily counts, they would primarily attribute this 
to the other person not being in the office. When they were busy themselves, 
this usually resulted in the system not being used at all, or at least not 
recorded. For the high counts, these were attributed to something interesting 
happening in the other person’s office: e.g. a funky new haircut, an interesting 
outfit, or a lot of visitors. High counts for Affector were also attributed to the 
                                                 
36 Simeon confessed to forgetting often. One factor influencing the disparity between Phoebe’s 
relative consistency and Simeon’s relative inconsistency is that, due to hardware malfunctions 
during both the Video or the Affector condition, for several days Phoebe could see Simeon but 
not vice versa. Although at one point, Phoebe switched machines because she felt guilty 
about being able to see Simeon and not the other way around.  
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system ‘looking so cool.’ In fact, one of the highest counts for Phoebe (28 
counts, her highest was 34) occurred on a day when Simeon was not even in 
the office but she commented that she was just so excited it was working and 
it looked so cool
37.  
Once this usage data and their comments were collected over a period 
of time, the evaluation team would periodically present the results to Phoebe 
and Simeon during the interviews or during the focus group sessions. The 
system data was presented not as conclusive results but as a stimulus or 
prompt to encourage interpretation, for instance to compare their usage across 
different conditions and to interpret any patterns or differences they saw. I 
asked during one of the design/evaluation sessions if they felt they used the 
Video system or the Affector system more. Both felt that the Video was more 
attention demanding and therefore would probably have a higher count. To 
check this hypothesis, I pulled data on the weeks from these different 
conditions when they were both in town (although both weren’t recording 
which is why Phoebe’s is higher). This resulted in 11 days averaged for 
Phoebe’s Video looks and 8 days averaged for Simeon’s; for the Affector 
looks, Phoebe had 17 days recorded and Simeon had 10 days
38.  
                                                 
37 During the interview and the design/evaluation sessions, Phoebe commented that she felt 
like this happened a lot – that they used the system even when the other was not around. 
Their clicker data however did not support this. The only day reported during the Affector 
condition of this happening was on July 5 from Phoebe when she logged 28 counts. During 
the video condition, Simeon logged numbers on 3 days when Phoebe was absent and they 
were his lowest counts and Phoebe only logged one day during the video condition when 
Simeon was out. However, they still had the impression that they used it when the other 
wasn’t around probably because they looked at the system at times during the day when the 
other was absent. 
38 In order to control for the variety in their recording and for the large difference in the days 
recorded (6 days), between the Video condition and the Affector condition for Phoebe, I also 
looked at a subset of the data where I only averaged the counts on days where both Simeon 
and Phoebe had logged counts. This meant I had 8 days for the Video condition and 6 days 
for the Affector condition. The highs, lows, and averages were all comparable with the results 
shown above, with Video being used more and Phoebe using Affector more than Simeon.  
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Figure 14. A bar chart comparing Phoebe and Simeon’s look data (clicker 
counts) for the Video and the Affector systems. 
 
The system data collected from these weeks generally supports their 
hypothesis that the Video system would produce more average daily looks 
(see Figure 14).  
More importantly than the actual numbers themselves however was the 
sense that Phoebe and Simeon made of them. From the interview discussions 
and the design/evaluation sessions, their impression of the system look data 
was that it perhaps served as a rough indicator but they had low confidence in 
their accuracy. Perhaps more than the accuracy however was the feeling that 
                                                                                                                                           
With this data for Phoebe, the average Video looks per day was 18 and average Affector looks 
was 15. For Simeon, the average Video was 23 and the average Affector looks was 8. 
(numbers rounded to nearest whole number).  
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the process of using the clickers took away from the original design goal of 
ambience, as anticipated. Their preference moving forward would be to 
configure the system so that it could take an indiscrete measure of gaze for 
Affector v2.0 (launch TBD). Until this capability could be implemented, they 
would continue with the clickers but instead of assessing the information 
periodically, they would assess the information on a more regular basis. This 
would serve both as a reminder to use the clicker and also would help them 
remember what might be happening at the time to influence the numbers. The 
issues Phoebe and Simeon experienced with the system data, in terms of 
accuracy, were largely the same with the face-to-face interaction data, the next 
data source described. 
Face-to-Face Interaction Data: 
The face-to-face interaction data was collected for a much longer time 
period as they began charting their interactions from the start of the project in 
November 2004 and carried through to January 2006. We used the same kind 
of clicker system that we used for the system usage. For the face-to-face 
interactions, Phoebe and Simeon chose to track four areas: the kitchen 
(chosen as a common/social space), the area directly outside of their offices, 
inside Phoebe’s office, and inside Simeon’s office. In each area, there was a 
clicker suspended from the ceiling to record interactions. For their individual 
offices, we had two clickers suspended. One clicker was labeled P for Phoebe 
and the other S for Simeon. When they found themselves in a face-to-face 
interaction, they would click the clicker based on who initiated the interaction. 
For instance, if Phoebe went into Simeon’s office, she would click the P clicker 
but if Simeon called her into his office, he would click the S clicker.   
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The idea behind collecting this information was to present it to Phoebe 
and Simeon during the interviews and the design/evaluation sessions 
(described in the following section). We did not anticipate that the usage data 
would become a pivotal part of the analysis where we would make statistical 
assessments of the variations in their patterns and attribute it to the conditions 
with or without the Affector display. Instead, we were interested in what sense 
Phoebe and Simeon would make of the data – would they believe it had 
significance? How would they narrate changes in the data? Would they cite 
Affector as a contributing factor or would they explain the data through other 
factors? 
The face-to-face clicker data collected for this study ranged from 
November 2004 until January 2006. The clicker data was collected, recorded, 
and then the clickers were reset to zero weekly by students working for the 
Information Science program. Again, there were large periods of time when 
either Phoebe or Simeon was out of town, or occasionally one of the students 
would forget to log the data for that week, so the information presented here is 
for the weeks where information was recorded: 4 weeks for the Pre condition, 
4 weeks for the Video condition, 3 weeks for the Between condition, 6 weeks 
for the Affector condition, and 4 weeks for the Post condition. Coincidentally, 
the Pre condition weeks and the Post condition weeks ended up occurring at 
roughly the same time periods but a year apart (2 weeks at the end of the 
winter semester and 2 weeks at the very beginning of the spring semester). 
This became important for comparison as both Phoebe and Simeon, but 
primarily Phoebe because of teaching duties, commented that they would 
expect interaction to be higher at the start of the semester.   
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According to the graphs shared with Phoebe and Simeon during the 
interviews and design/evaluation sessions, there were no strong discernible 
patterns in their face-to-face interaction levels, although interactions seemed 
to be lower during the Video and the Between conditions and interactions were 
highest during the Post condition. From the numbers, Phoebe and Simeon 
concluded that they don’t interact enough in the kitchen at all to make counting 
in that space useful and most of their face-to-face interactions occur in their 
offices. One point from the data that caused some distress during the 
design/evaluation sessions was a perceived pattern that Simeon initiated more 
face-to-face interactions than Phoebe
39. Phoebe wanted the results to show 
more parity in their initiations, although she countered this difference by 
pointing out that she used Affector more. Simeon suggested this might mean 
that she was happy enough with Affector, and therefore her need to interact 
with the real Simeon declined – an opposite effect of what they were trying to 
design for. But according to the numbers collected, during the time period 
when Affector was running, their average face-to-face interactions stayed 
roughly the same with the Pre condition yet interactions during the Post 
condition increased. All three of these conditions were higher than the Video 
or the Between condition. 
At the very beginning of the project, both Phoebe and Simeon 
hypothesized that their interactions would go up during the use of the Video 
and Affector, but more so with Affector. During one of the design/evaluation 
sessions, they discussed one possible reason for an increase in interaction 
                                                 
39 According to the numbers, there were two (out of 5) periods where there was a relative 
disparity in initiations – in the Between condition, Simeon initiated on average 6 interactions to 
Phoebe’s 1, and in the Post condition, Simeon initiated on average 8 times to Phoebe’s 5. 
During the other three conditions, they were about equal.  
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during the Affector condition would be due to talking about Affector and they 
discussed whether they needed to control for this kind of interaction (i.e. 
whether it was a confound). They decided that this was a feature and not a 
fault. As Simeon stated, “It’s fun [to talk about Affector].” Yet, they also 
speculated that they would interact more because Affector would encourage a 
greater ‘sense’ of the other person. The example they gave in the beginning 
was whether they would know if the other wanted to go for a cup of coffee 
because they could tell the if person was feeling social or not. Although 
Phoebe indicated that giving up caffeine in the middle of the project negated 
this as a possible outcome, the data did not support a narrative of increased 
interactions. Instead, interactions seemed to decrease from the Pre condition 
to the Video condition to the Between condition but then increase slightly in the 
Affector condition and jump in the Post condition. Furthermore, they believed 
that the numbers for their interactions would spike prior to a launch of the 
system as they worked out the kinks, whether Affector or the Video. Again, the 
numbers did not confirm this hypothesis. These are the ‘raw’ results collected 
– but what is interesting is how Phoebe and Simeon chose to interpret these 
results. One possibility would be to explain why they didn’t interact the way 
they anticipated, but instead, they felt the more resonant explanation was to 
doubt the numbers’ accuracy (see Figure 15).  
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Figure 15. The average face-to-face (f2f) interactions across conditions. Total 
interactions are combined scores of the In Offices (Phoebe’s and Simeon’s) 
plus the Common area interactions. Total interactions also equal Phoebe (P) 
initated plus Simeon (S) initiated. 
 
During one of the design/evaluation sessions, we discussed if the face-
to-face interaction counts suffered the same limitations as the system counts. 
There were a couple important distinctions according to Phoebe and Simeon. 
First, Phoebe had predicted that the system clicker data would be easy to use 
since one wouldn’t even have to get out of the chair to click it, but that the 
face-to-face clickers were more troublesome. If she forgot to click after 
returning from Simeon’s office, she’d have to yell over to him to get him to click 
it for her. Throughout the course of the project, though, the reverse started to 
happen. Clicking the face-to-face clickers became second nature to them, and  
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the system clicks became more annoying. They both described how they 
would enter the other’s office with their hand raised as they walked toward the 
clicker – it became an automatic movement for them. In contrast, with the 
system usage method, the clicker took away from its intended ambient nature. 
One distinction in these scenarios could be that the face-to-face interactions in 
each others’ offices tended to be intentional and a conscious break from 
another activity whereas looking at the displays tended to be unintentional at 
first – something that would draw their attention away from an existing activity. 
The other important distinction discussed was that during their intense periods 
of interaction leading up to a system launch, a long intense interaction 
registered the same as a quick hello. If they worked together in Simeon’s office 
for 5 hours, that would only register as one click. Therefore, although the 
number of interactions did not spike according to the data we collected, the 
duration of these interactions most likely did but was not captured in the data
40.  
Overall, the face-to-face interaction data proved an interesting point for 
discussion but inconclusive. At the end of the project, the question remains 
whether or not they believe that Affector v2.0 will increase or decrease their 
face-to-face interactions. An increase could suggest they have a better sense 
of when the other is ready for a break, needs a break, or is feeling social. But 
a decrease could suggest that the kind of companionship and friendship they 
get from spending face to face time with each other is replaced somewhat 
through the Affector window. From the interviews and design/evaluation 
sessions, however, the importance of the effect on face-to-face encounters 
seemed to become less of an objective. Although in the original 
                                                 
40 Simeon also suggested that if they were going to and from each other’s offices rapidly 
during the design periods, it was likely that they only logged their interactions once as well.  
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documentation, increased interactions had been hypothesized as a measure 
of success, in later discussions they focused more on the interactions through 
the system: the sense of each other from the presence of the window. 
Interviews/Observations: 
The next set of results presented focus on data collected through 
interviews and observations. A portion of the time during the interviews was 
spent reflecting on the usage and face-to-face data, and those results have 
been reported above. For this section, I will report on additional impressions 
that were shared through the interviews and observation. For the 
observations, the evaluation team would observe Phoebe and Simeon and 
their use of the system. Through the observations, we were primarily 
interested in capturing spontaneously any interactions witnessed as well as 
how Phoebe and Simeon manipulated the set up of the system. Did they, for 
example, move the frames or move the camera? How did the system become 
part of their office environment? For the interviews, a single interviewer would 
enter one of the offices and ask a series of questions. The same questions 
would be repeated in the other office. The order of which office was 
approached first would be alternated.  
Fourteen individual interviews were conducted, seven with Phoebe and 
seven with Simeon across the different conditions. The interviews were 
generally short, lasting from 10 to 15 minutes and were videotaped to allow for 
future review. The interviews included the following set questions: 
•  How would you describe what is going on with Phoebe/Simeon today? 
•  What evidence were you using to come to this conclusion? 
•  How would you describe the goals of the Affector project? 
•  How have your experiences so far with Affector influenced its design?  
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Additional questions would be added based on their responses and based on 
what had been happening in the design and use process. These results from 
our interviews and observations will be presented in rough chronological order 
starting with discussions from the Pre condition through to Video and onto 
Affector. 
The goals cited for Affector remained relatively consistent throughout 
the project – both consistent between Phoebe and Simeon and consistent 
across the conditions. During one of the Pre condition interviews with Simeon, 
he stated the goal as: 
 
“to produce something that affects our awareness of each 
other and perhaps changes our interactions as a result… I 
think our most important metric then is going to be whether 
we look at the system or ignore it, however using it could be 
a real subliminal thing so hard to measure. ” (Pre condition) 
 
According to Phoebe, she noted two goals, one for their own use but the other 
a broader impact goal. In terms of their own use, she said: 
 
“What I hope the system does is give me a sense of the 
presence of Simeon in the other office, so I can glance up 
and get a sense that someone is sort of sharing the space 
with me and maybe I can tell a little bit about how he’s 
feeling, in the same sense of working in the same room with 
someone and you aren’t interacting but you have a sense of 
their mood. At the same time, I’m hoping I don’t feel like I’m 
on Big Brother.” (Pre condition) 
As for the broader goal, she went on: 
 
“I’m hoping that one of the things we can learn from Affector 
is the lesson from AI that you don’t have to represent 
everything and you can just have things directly connected to 
the world and pass information around about the world  
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without representing it. I’m hoping to show that these ideas 
should be taken up in ubicomp too – it would be more 
privacy preserving [than the current model of sticking a 
sensor everywhere to build a model of the whole world]”  
(Pre condition) 
 
Therefore from these very first interviews, Phoebe and Simeon establish that 
the system will be about gaining a sense of the other, in particular a sense of 
their mood or affect, in an unobtrusive (ambient) manner that preserves 
privacy.  
One of the objectives of the interviews was to determine how Phoebe 
and Simeon used the different systems – the Video or Affector (or nothing) – to 
develop a sense of the other. Therefore, the first question we always asked in 
the interviews was “What is going on with X today?” (where X is the other 
person). In answering this question during the Video condition, both Phoebe 
and Simeon would talk about events they noticed happening in the other’s 
office, primarily the presence of other people as an indicator of something 
different happening. “Normal” mode would be working at their computers but 
the mark of something else happening appeared as interruptions to this 
normal mode. They both commented early on how facial expressions were of 
little use for determining mood even though they could easily see each other’s 
expressions through the camera. As Phoebe commented: 
 
“Normally, he’s just looking at his screen and he has his 
regular usual expression, so that’s just kind of the default. If I 
see that, I presume nothing’s going on. But otherwise 
sometimes you see there are people in there with him so I 
assume a social interaction of some sort, whether it’s work 
related or not.” (Video condition) 
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Later, in one of our design/evaluation sessions, Phoebe and Simeon picked up 
this thread again about facial expressions for determining emotion. They 
commented that when you are alone, and in both the Affector and the Video 
condition they still considered themselves alone, you don’t think of using facial 
expressions to convey emotion – in fact you aren’t thinking about explicitly 
trying to communicate or express emotion at all. Therefore on the flip side of 
this, it would not make sense to try to interpret the facial expression as a 
conclusive sign of emotion.  
Throughout our interviews with the Video condition, both Phoebe and 
Simeon refrained from making any pronouncements about the person’s mood 
based solely on the video footage. If they hazarded a guess on what the other 
person was feeling, it was backed up with other corroborating information. 
Most often, they indicated simply asking each other how they were feeling. But 
the Video and the Affector condition did often serve as a prompt for this 
conversation (e.g. “I saw there were a lot of people in your office today, are 
you super busy?”). For the Video condition, Phoebe and Simeon declared that 
it was not a system about mood. Simeon felt it was more a proof of concept 
that the mechanics worked. Phoebe also wondered during the Video condition 
if we were still boxing ourselves into thinking that an image on the screen 
could correlate with an identification of mood. The image might become one 
piece of evidence in the collaboration of establishing a sense of mood, but the 
image by itself could not be mapped like that. I will return to this result below 
when discussing their impressions of the Affector condition and its ability to 
invoke a sense of mood or affect. 
Overall, the biggest complaint or critique offered about the video 
condition was that it was not ambient enough. Because all movements were  
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broadcast, even the slightest movement of the other person would cause a 
flicker in the display and this flicker would be enough to draw one’s attention to 
it. Both Phoebe and Simeon mentioned that they hoped Affector would be less 
of a distraction – that the distortions would be “faded” or as Simeon said: 
 
“I don’t want to be aware of things in real clear detail exactly 
as they happen. I want it to be more ambient. I think that is 
what we always had in mind.” (Video condition) 
 
The distraction of the movements on the screen would often cause 
Phoebe and Simeon to interact with each other through the video window (e.g. 
“I see him start moving so I wave to him and he waves back”), and this may 
have led to their assumption that they were interacting more in the Video 
condition. According to the physical face-to-face counter data, they interacted 
the least during this condition and the Between condition. 
There were four aspects of the Video system that they identified as 
particularly liking: its physical form, the heightened sense of context, the 
privacy/presence balance, and the anticipation of the other. For the physical 
form, it took them some experimentation to get the camera angles as they 
wanted and moving the video conferencing software from their desktops to 
separate machines, but eventually they were happy with the physical 
configuration. They noted liking the position of the laptops so that they would 
be approximately back-to-back on other sides of the wall – therefore creating a 
sense of a virtual window. They felt this would be augmenting even more when 
they had the physical wooden frames of Affector. Second, they both 
mentioned that the window gave them an expanded view of their shared 
surrounding context. They liked hearing something outside of their office, in  
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the common space, and then checking the window to see if the other had 
heard it or responded to it as well. Or, as Simeon stated, wondering if he saw 
Phoebe leave her office if she would perhaps come toward his.  
As for the privacy concern, they were both surprised that the Video 
condition did not feel invasive. They found it much more pleasant than they’d 
anticipated and worried more about being the watcher than the watchee. 
Simeon speculated that their unconcern with surveillance was due to their pre-
existing friendship and the fact that it was typically just one person on the 
other side who could see him. This is related to the last point of anticipating 
presence: the Video window gave them a sense of the other and this came to 
be something they looked forward to having. Phoebe remarked how much she 
enjoyed looking at the window when Simeon cut his hair for Alaska – how it 
was fun to look over and see his bald head. Both mentioned that without the 
window, they wondered where the other was and they had not done this prior 
to experiencing the Video connection. Both also described a sense of 
disappointment when this potential of seeing the other was taken away at the 
close of this condition. 
All four of the aspects that were liked during the Video condition 
improved during the Affector condition according to Phoebe and Simeon. They 
both commented during the interviews on liking the form of the Affector frames 
– that this physical form gave it the feeling of a special object and by 
positioning them in relation to each other it further emphasized the ‘tear in the 
wall’ idea. They also continued to enjoy the expanded sense of context (i.e. 
seeing how each other responded to their shared context) and the privacy 
factor improved because the details were more obscured. Finally, they 
continued to look forward to having this sense of the other because they could  
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still tell when the other was in the field of view even if things like facial 
expressions were obscured.  
In terms of what they liked better than the video condition, they 
commented on the aesthetic and intriguing feel of the display: that it looked 
like an “art work”,  “comic book”, “pen and ink drawing”, “a movie”, and “poetic, 
even if you can’t read shit in it”. As Phoebe commented: 
 
“I feel like I’m looking at a picture of him as opposed to 
looking at him. It feels very unreal in some sense and 
unobtrusive…” (Affector condition) 
 
The distortions further helped in the objective of making the display 
more ambient. When they were drawn to look at the Affector display, it was 
because something interesting was happening either aesthetically, because it 
was fun to look at, or because the distortion would augment larger 
movements. The Video condition, in contrast, augmented all movements no 
matter how small and would therefore draw their attention even if nothing 
interesting was happening. 
Despite Affector improving on the Video condition, they also discussed 
in the interviews that Affector v1.0 was a far way away from Affector v2.0. 
Simeon suggested that it was still too pictorial – that he wanted more 
distortions to the image to take away even more detail. Both Phoebe and 
Simeon also expressed concern that it was still about presence and not about 
affective presence. Simeon felt one important fix would be adding a sense of 
history in the display – for instance, creating ghosts of movement that would 
linger in proportion to how big the movement was. He stated: 
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“I’m interested in this idea of having something that you look 
at in an instant, but it tells you something across a longer 
ranges of time.” (Affector condition) 
 
He reasoned that a still image or snapshot can only tell him so much about 
what is happening in the picture, but a series of snapshots laid on top of each 
other would be more evocative of the scene. Phoebe also discussed how the 
distortions and the sensors would need to be improved, how they had only 
recently implemented sensors to detect motion and skin tone.  
 
During one of my observation sessions, I was fortunate to witness an 
ah-ha moment transpire in Phoebe’s office after asking her what was going on 
with Simeon. She started interpreting the Affector display in much the same 
way that she had narrated the Video condition. She could tell the body outline 
of Simeon and could therefore talk about what was happening in his office in 
terms of body position, other people entering the office, etc. Her assessment 
of this display to me was that it looked cool but it still wasn’t communicating 
emotion. At that moment, Simeon leaned back in his chair and put his arms 
behind his head and the distortions changed dramatically. Phoebe bolted 
upright and exclaimed,  
 
“Wait!! There was emotion! Right there!! You can tell exactly 
how he’s feeling.” (Affector condition) 
 
This experience combined with a number of other events and their 
frustration with the ‘too pictorial’ nature of the display culminated in the design 
decision to focus on augmenting large or fast/abrupt movements. Around this 
same time, Phoebe had visited with Simon Penny who she had worked with  
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on the Traces program at Carnegie Mellon University. Part of Traces is about 
augmenting an individual’s movement through creating semi-autonomous 
ghosts or agents that fly off of the person’s arms and legs. She also reflected 
on her work with Joe Bates at Carnegie Mellon on creating believable agents 
where movement played a critical role in defining the emotion of a character. 
Seeing Simeon’s movement and recognizing it as a proxy of emotion caused 
these other known experiences of motion as a rich communicative medium to 
surface again. I will further explore this theme of motion as a proxy for emotion 
in the results below from the Documents and the Design/Evaluation Session. 
Documents: 
As Phoebe and Simeon are not only designers and users but also 
researchers, this project could also draw from research papers written about 
the experience. At various stages of the project, different publications were 
written that reflected what was considered to be the most interesting and 
important parts of the project. In addition to formal documentation through 
papers and grants, I also used as a source email correspondence between 
Phoebe, Simeon and myself. The designers often used email to signal to each 
other when they had a new thought about the design or if they’d encountered a 
problem. They also used email to alert me of something they felt was 
important to capture for the evaluation.  
The list of formal and informal documentation of note includes (see 
Table 2): 
A.  Tinge-a-tron initial project inception email. November, 2004  
B.  Big Ideas Affector email, August 1, 2005 
C.  Genius Affector Insight email, September 29, 2005 
D.  Sensors = Effectors sketch, October, 2005  
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E.  Evaluating Affector: Co-Interpreting What Works. Phoebe Sengers, 
Kirsten Boehner, Simeon Warner, and Tom Jenkins. Submitted in 
December 2004 to the CHI 2005 workshop on Innovative Approaches 
to Evaluating Affective Systems. (accepted) 
F.  Affect: From Information to Interaction. Submitted in May 2005 as a full 
paper to the 2005 Critical Computing conference. (accepted) 
G. Closing the Affective Gap. Phoebe Sengers and Michael Mateas. 
Submitted in May 2005 to the National Science Foundation. (accepted) 
H.  Autobiographical Design. Submitted in November 2005 to the 
Experience Design Workshop at the 2005 Critical Computing 
conference. Later revised for the Experience Design Workshop at CHI 
2006. (both accepted) 
I.  The Disenchantment of Affect. Phoebe Sengers, Kirsten Boehner, 
Michael Mateas, and Geri Gay. Journal of Personal and Ubiquitous 
Computing. (in press) 
 
I will discuss the formal documents first. The formal documents started with 
a paper (E in the list above) on how to evaluate Affector. This is interesting as 
it suggests that along with the initial design concept, the evaluation was being 
considered from day one. The second and third formal documents (F and G in 
the list above) focus on the theory of affect as interaction and how this 
translates into design and evaluation implications. The fourth published paper 
(H in the list above) detailed the design strategy of autobiographical design. 
Finally, the last paper (in the above list) was a refinement of the earlier 
theoretical papers and presented the idea of affect as a lived experience. 
Reviewing the papers along a time continuum did not suggest any major  
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changes in the design, evaluation or theoretical ideas. What is important in 
terms of results from these papers however is the fact that they were reviewed 
and accepted by an outside community of peers. As Phoebe had stated at the 
beginning of the project, one of the goals was to explore an alternative design 
space to the traditional model of Affective Computing. The fact that the ideas 
were accepted as worth consideration and further exploration by conference 
review boards and in particular by the National Science Foundation suggests a 
receptiveness to and interest in advancing this alternate approach. 
In terms of results from the informal documents, they corroborate most of 
the results discussed already – such as Phoebe and Simeon’s surprise about 
liking the video condition, feelings of disappointment when the video was 
removed, and feelings of disappointment when Affector was broken and 
eventually taken down. Phoebe often commented to me through email about 
enjoying Simeon’s company in the manner that she’d hoped for when the 
project idea first came about: 
 
“I’m in my office with the door shut. And Simeon is in HIS 
office with the door shut. And he’s still keeping me company. 
That’s cool!” (Affector condition) 
 
In addition to these general informal emails, there were two emails sent 
detailing key project changes. One email sent on August 1, 2005 from Phoebe 
to myself and Simeon was called “Big Ideas about Affector” and the other 
email sent on September 29, 2005 from Phoebe to myself and Simeon called 
“Genius Affector Insight”. I will summarize their message here. 
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In the “Big Ideas about Affector” email, Phoebe realized that in order to 
augment movement in the manner that they wanted to, they needed to rebuild 
the sensor to effector mapping. In the current system, the video sensor would 
measure some condition and return a value about the whole image. If this 
value reached a certain threshold, then it would trigger an appropriate 
distortion. Phoebe realized however that the sensors needed more direct 
impact on the distortions: 
 
“For example, we want to display ripples from areas in the 
image that have movement, rather than using movement to 
trigger a generic ripple distortion…Distortions represent the 
data from sensors directly rather than just being triggered by 
them.” 
 
In this way, the sensors and the distortions would have to be deeply 
intertwined. In the “Genius Affector Insight” email, Phoebe concluded (and 
claims that Simeon already knew this) that making the sensors and the 
effectors or distortions intertwined pushed to its extreme meant that these 
were actually the same thing. For instance, in the previous design, to trigger a 
distortion based on skin movement, the rule set would require mapping a 
sensor rule (e.g. If color = skin) to a distortion rule (e.g. change to black). What 
would happen now is that you would layer distortion rules (e.g. skin distortion 
combined with pixilation distortion). This idea was further corroborated as she 
worked with David Klein, a student on the project, to make new sensors. In 
order to see if the new machine vision sensors were working, David made 
each sensor also have a visual component – so rather than returning a 
number or value for the entire image, it changed the value of each pixel in the 
image and displayed a new image. In this way, he wasn’t just designing  
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sensors but sensors with a visual component or display, i.e. he was creating 
sensor/distortions (see Figure 16). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Screen shots of Affector distortions. The top line are first round 
distortions when sensors and effectors were separate, the bottom line are 
distortions when sensors and effectors were intertwined..  
 
In reflecting on the importance of these insights, Phoebe suggested that 
it veers from but is compatible with the Brooks model that had been their 
original inspiration. She suggests the difference is due to the degree of human 
interpretation required of the output (rather than wanting the output to ‘do’ 
something) and the potential complexity of the output available. In a Brooks 
model, he has fewer outputs to control – e.g. a limited set of motors – and he 
is designing for some level of functionality – e.g. robots vacuuming your 
house. In the Affector system, there are hundreds of pixels to control – a far 
greater complexity field. Therefore, the complexity of the input should be 
matched by the complexity of the output (as opposed to reducing the  
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complexity of the input into a smaller degree of variation allowed by the 
output). Furthermore, the ‘doing’ is more rooted in the realm of the human 
interpretation. A Brooksian robot for example can vacuum the house and 
humans can interpret the robot as having some intentionality or even some 
emotion because the actions seem purposeful. However, the primary focus is 
on getting the robot to vacuum the house, the side result is that people will 
interpret the actions as meaningful. In the Affector case, the primary focus is 
on Phoebe and Simeon interpreting the displays. 
Design/Evaluation Sessions: 
Finally, in addition to the short interviews with Phoebe and Simeon 
individually, we also coordinated design/evaluation sessions with both of them 
present. Whereas in the individual interviews we wanted to get a sense of their 
personal opinions (and to see if they matched each other), in the group 
sessions, we wanted the designers/users to engage in dialogue about the 
project. Since the key thrust of evaluating affective presence systems, in 
general, and Affector in particular is elucidating how users make sense of the 
system, our strategies involve creating points of reflection for users to 
articulate this process. The design and evaluation sessions were designed 
specifically to help Phoebe and Simeon create a rich narrative about their 
experiences. Whereas in traditional HCI evaluation methods, self-report is 
regarded with a degree of suspicion, the Affector, the users self-report is 
exactly what we wanted to draw out.  
The evaluation team’s role then was to provide interesting topics for 
discussion in order to try and surface points of agreement, disagreement, 
change and confirmation. We held three joint sessions – one in the middle of 
the Affector v1.0 project and two toward the end of the project in January of  
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2006. As the final set of data presented, I will focus only on new results or new 
articulations of results already presented.  
The first design/evaluation session took place after Affector had been 
running for approximately two weeks. During this session, Phoebe called for a 
return to first principles and they discussed the original metaphor of a tear in 
the wall and the influence of Brooks’s idea of limited internal representations. 
They agreed that both the metaphor and the goal of limited internal models 
were still accurate. They wanted to create displays that didn’t necessarily 
represent emotions but were open ended enough and based off of meaningful 
changes so that they would stimulate reflection on emotion. They reiterated 
that the Video condition did not work because: 
 
“you can’t tell how someone is feeling by staring at them” 
and “we don’t want to stare at the window. One thing we’ve 
talked about over and over is giving a view of the window 
over time.” (Affector condition) 
 
  In reviewing the current Affector state, they agreed that what worked 
was that it did not intrude on privacy, it had more aesthetic quality than the 
Video, and it was a step in the right direction to augment motion. In terms of 
what didn’t work, they listed that the sensor functionality was not meaningful 
enough, the sensor to effector mapping was slow (note this was addressed 
later by cleaning up the code), there was no ‘at a glance’ sense or no history, 
and the rule set editing interface was too difficult. For the wish list, they talked 
about wanting distortions that were perhaps modeled after A-life algorithms 
and distortions that left traces or ripples. Simeon also suggested that in 
addition to augmenting big or quick movements, it might be interesting to 
augment the other extreme as well of no movement over a long period of time.  
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Overall, however, the meeting summary was that Affector was better than the 
Video condition but still a somewhat low-resolution video itself. To improve it 
required better sensors/distortions that focused on movement and history. 
The second joint design/evaluation session happened at the close of 
this phase of the project in January 2006. I organized this session to have 
more structure than the first session and in particular I developed a “Pivots 
and Divots” exercise for producing a milestone chart of the project detailing the 
high points, the low points, and the surprises along the way. The session 
started with Phoebe and Simeon entering a conference room where the table 
was covered with artifacts from the project to date. The white board had a 
timeline with 5 stages of the project outlining the bottom axis. I explained the 
exercise to them and asked them to take 10 minutes to write individually on 
single post-it notes all of the highs, lows, and surprises they could remember 
from the project. After 10 minutes, I asked them to put their post-it notes along 
the timeline and to discuss them with each other as they did so. Next, they 
were instructed to return to the table and read through the artifacts available 
for fleshing out more of the milestone story. The artifacts included quotes from 
emails, the clicker data charts, the documents itemized above, and images of 
Affector screen shots. 
As this exercise was designed to review the history of the project, the 
discussions primarily confirmed the results that have been discussed above, 
but it did provide a reconstruction of the whole project for Phoebe and Simeon. 
For example, by using different color coded post it notes and placing them 
along the timeline, they could readily see that Simeon had more investment 
and interaction in the system during the hardware building stages and Phoebe 
was more involved during the software phase as this was how they divided  
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responsibilities. As they walked through filling in the outline and reviewing the 
project notes and artifacts, they also reenacted the ups and downs of the 
project. They became animated about the highlights: such as the physical form 
of Affector and when Affector two-way first worked. They also became 
despondent about the low points: such as their initial realization at the 
beginning that they would have to abandon Linux and building the system 
became more difficult. Phoebe became especially depressed from the 
realization of how long Affector had been down and the code rot that had 
ensued. The meeting ended though with a return to higher spirits because 
Affector v2.0 was ‘vanishingly close to completion’ and it would be ‘so cool.’ 
At one point during this session, Phoebe compared the presence 
information from Affector with other office presence systems such as Instant 
Messaging. She differentiated a buddy icon in her buddy list as similar to the 
sense of Simeon in the other office. The buddy icon she said was an 
“information token”, something that she wouldn’t necessarily reflect on. But 
seeing Simeon’s presence through Affector had more meaning because of 
their physical proximity and the shared context that they had. As Simeon 
commented:  
 
“It’s part of me being ‘there’…not just that I’m online or 
something.” (Post condition) 
 
In discussing how they used Affector I asked for clarification in terms of 
whether, as the designers, they were conscious of reverse engineering it when 
they looked at the displays. Did they, I asked, think about the mechanics when 
a certain display fired or did they just think about what it meant? Phoebe’s 
response was that the rule sets were not sophisticated enough yet, so they  
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really had only been using one distortion the whole time. She speculated that 
she might think about the mechanics more with version 2.0. Simeon had also 
not been playing with the distortions so this was not something he thought 
about either. As a follow up, I asked if they thought about what was happening 
in their own offices and how this might be triggering something in the other’s 
display. Both Phoebe and Simeon commented that when they looked at the 
Affector display, they generally only thought about what the other person was 
doing and not necessarily about what they looked like or how they were 
influencing their own display on the other side. They only thought about their 
own appearance if they did something goofy (e.g. changing out of one’s bike 
shorts late at night) and then suddenly remembering that the Affector window 
was running. 
As a final point from the second design/evaluation session, Phoebe and 
Simeon returned again to the issue of removing a representational model. 
Their dialogue went as follows: 
 
P:  I think even in Rod Brooks’ approach, even though he is 
trying to get away from as much representation as possible, 
there is still representation in there. There is no doubt about 
that. When this sensor is triggered, then this motor is going 
to start turning because the designer knows that it will make 
the robot turn in the direction it is supposed to. So to some 
degree it’s specious. But on the other hand, in [Simon 
Penny’s] Fugitive, there is still an explicit emotional model 
and I still wouldn’t want that. 
S:  I think…ok…so, we are detecting movement in the 
image but we know that this is movement of the person. So 
we’re designing that system for the sensing of a person. 
Which is in a sense modeling the movement of the person, 
it’s just a very imprecise handle on that.  
P:  And it’s extremely situated. But that would agree with 
Brooks too. That because we know the system is in a 
particular situation…and in fact we’re not really sensing  
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movement, we’re really sensing the sudden changing of a 
pixel color.  
S:  Right so we’ve got one thing that is a proxy for one thing 
which is a proxy for another thing. 
P:  Right so we’re not really sensing movement, we’re 
sensing a sudden change in the image and from that we’re 
presuming movement and presuming from that that this is 
something that we want to see. 
S:  So switching the light off would produce a ghost. 
P: Yeah, but that’s ok. 
S: That’s fine.  
P: Yeah, it tells you a change in state. 
S: You would probably learn over time what that meant. 
P: Yep.  
(Post condition) 
 
I highlight the above exchange because it digs deeper into their first principle 
of removing any representation and also speaks to their insight into using 
movement as the proxy for emotion. This doesn’t change the original design 
goals of Affector in terms of what they want to do but it demonstrates refined 
thinking in terms of how they will get there.  
Overall, the Pivots and Divots exercise was useful and confirmed the 
storyline that had been developing throughout the Affector interviews and 
previous design session, however I did not feel that the exercise pushed us to 
new insights or new discussions. Therefore for the final design/evaluation 
session, held a week later, I tried three different techniques to generate new 
discussions and perhaps looking at the same data in new ways.  As the 
previous session had been an exhausting review with Simeon and Phoebe 
experiencing emotions such as guilt, because of the non-parity in their 
initiation of interactions, and frustration, because of the realization of how long 
the project had taken and its current code rot, I started with a fun exercise. 
Since they had often commented on wanting to decorate the wooden frames, I  
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brought wallpaper books and found online decorating sites for them to peruse. 
This started the session with a different level of excitement than going over 
data that they’d been reflecting on for some time. In terms of results from this 
exercise, there is not much to report other than they approached decorating 
the frames in order to say something about themselves (e.g. Phoebe wanted 
her frame to say “this is a woman with no taste”) or to make the frames 
aesthetically pleasing (e.g. Simeon chose the jungle leaf print because it 
simply appealed to him). Their top choices then were as follows (Figure 17): 
 
 
Figure 17. Mocked up Affector frames. Phoebe’s top choice (left): black and 
white flocked, Simeon’s top choice (right): urban safari. 
 
For the second part of this session, I asked pointed questions based on 
the previous session but meant to provoke new directions in the discussion.  
Due to the challenges with the clicker data for example, I proposed an extreme 
design change that required them to ‘invoke’ Affector, for example by pushing 
a button that would then display all the distorted changes from the other office 
since the last time the button was pushed. There were two objections to this 
idea. First, it would remove the peripheral nature of the display and this was 
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one of the non-negotiable design principles. Second, it meant that you would 
witness ‘all’ of the changes that happened in the speeded up display. Part of 
what they liked about Affector was its ephemeral nature. In other words, 
something really interesting could be happening on the display – such as in 
Simeon’s ghost analogy, his ghost could be floating across the screen with 
flames shooting off his arms – and Phoebe could miss it because she was 
reading her email. They both liked the fact that they could miss something 
really cool since the ephemeral nature of the display made it more like the 
ephemeral nature of the everyday. However, they did think that there could be 
something interesting in a display that not only responded to what it saw in 
one office but what was recorded in both offices. They marked this as a 
suggestion for further discussion. 
One other point that was raised based off the earlier design session 
and in the interviews was the question of whether they felt Affector in its 
current version was for inducing emotion or reflecting emotion. Simeon took 
the question to mean whether he thought about his own emotions or Phoebe’s 
and he replied that he thought more about the latter. But Phoebe took the 
question to mean whether the displays were more about reflecting Simeon’s 
emotion (in her case) or inducing certain emotions in her. I shared that the 
impetus behind my question was from reviewing their interviews and emails for 
descriptions of emotional impressions or reactions to Affector (and the Video 
condition). It appeared that they often described how the system made them 
feel – for instance, feeling disappointed if the other person wasn’t showing up 
in the window, feeling excited about the possibility of seeing the other, feeling 
content when the other person was in the window. This led to the following 
exchange:  
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P:  I think it’s a little mood inducing in that when you look at 
it, you have the sense that there is someone else there. And 
that you have company and in that sense it’s mood 
inducing. But it’s also mood reflecting because you are 
reflecting on the other person’s mood or it reflects the other 
person’s mood as well. 
S:  I think of it as allowing me to reflect on Phoebe’s mood 
and that may induce my mood. I didn’t notice any 
component of my reflection on my own mood. 
P:  If you think about what Affector does well in v1.0, it was 
the sense that Simeon was sitting in the other office and 
you could get a vague sense of what was going on…so 
maybe the mood inducing worked better than the mood 
reflecting right now.” (Post condition) 
 
The final exercise in the final design/evaluation session will close this 
section on results. For this exercise, I developed a variation on the repertory 
grid technique (Fallman, 2005, based on Kelly, 1955 and Bannister and 
Fransella, 1985) that involved five steps toward generating discussion on the 
salient dimensions of Affector. For the first step, Phoebe and Simeon 
brainstormed a list of defining dimensions – the qualities they felt essential for 
differentiating Affector from having no system at all, having a physical window, 
and having a video window. In step two, they would choose the three 
dimensions they considered most important. For step three, they would refine 
these dimensions further in terms of defining the polar ends of the dimension 
(e.g. non-ambient to ambient). In step four, they would take the three most 
important dimensions and rank where the following systems would fall: No 
System (i.e. just the wall), Hole in the Wall (i.e. a physical transparent 
window), Video (a video conferencing window), Affector, and Dream Affector 
(i.e. the system that they aspire to build). This step would allow them to  
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discuss the relative differences between these systems and sets up the final 
step: discussing how to close the gap between Affector and Dream Affector. 
 
 
Figure 18. Dimensions listed in order from the first one thought of to the last. 
The stars mark the most important, the arrows represent related dimensions. 
 
In the generating and prioritizing steps 1 and 2 (see Figure 18), Phoebe 
and Simeon produced a list of important qualities for Affector and immediately 
identified presence/awareness was the most important. The reasoned that  
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presence/awareness was the definition of what they were doing and all the 
other qualities were about doing presence/awareness in a different way. 
Simeon chose ambient for number 2 and Phoebe agreed but also voted for the 
Intriguing, Aesthetically pleasing one. She noted that this was not necessarily 
one that they were originally thinking about but that now she felt Affector 
embodied the Open-ended idea. Simeon agreed that something open-ended 
had less to do with having a well-defined function, an important distinction for 
Affector. I asked where ‘affect’ was – why wasn’t this a dimension on their list? 
They felt that affect came through presence and awareness, and through 
being intriguing and aesthetically pleasing. I then asked about ‘motion’ since 
this had figured so prominently in their new thinking. Phoebe replied that 
motion was the means to the end –the way things done but not the goal.  
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Figure 19. Rating the 5 different ‘systems’ according to chosen dimensions. 
 
In steps 3 and 4, they now created the polar ends for these dimensions 
and placed all of the systems along the axis (see Figure 19). Phoebe and 
Simeon realized that for the dimensions they chose, they didn’t actually want 
Dream Affector to be all the way to one extreme – for both the ambient and the 
presence/awareness dimension, they wanted Dream Affector to be a little bit 
to the right. The profile they were working the most against was simply having 
nothing. They remarked that the hole in the wall could potentially be enigmatic 
if it was shaped oddly like a key-hole or a heart, but even then that would be 
more awareness than they wanted. In comparing what they accomplished with 
Affector v1.0, there was less difference between Affector v1.0 and Dream  
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Affector than between Affector v1.0 and the Video, meaning they had moved 
closer to their goal.  
Phoebe and Simeon were aligned on where they would put almost all of 
the systems except for two points of negotiation. They disagreed at first 
whether the Video condition was more or less enigmatic/intriguing than the 
Hole in the Wall. Since the Hole in the Wall would let sound through they 
wondered if it would be more straight-forward. However, they decided that a 
hole in the wall, especially a little one, would be weird so that raised its 
enigmatic score. Next, they disagreed  whether Affector v1.0 had more 
presence/awareness than the video. Phoebe felt that the video seemed to tell 
you more than it did – that its ‘photorealism’ increased her expectations of 
being able to tell what was going on and she was then disappointed. Simeon 
felt that Affector didn’t improve upon the presence/awareness of video but 
Phoebe argued that Affector got rid of some of the distraction (the noise or the 
clutter) and focused your attention only when something potentially meaningful 
had changed. Ultimately, they put Affector v1.0 and the Video at the same 
spot.  
In order to close the gap between Affector v1.0 and Dream Affector, 
they felt on the presence/awareness dimension they would need to address 
the need for history in the distortions and for the enigmatics dimension, they 
would need more interesting sensor/distortion rules to play with. Simeon 
suggested that they also needed time in order to play with the rules and to 
learn to interpret them. He said: 
 
“[Dream Affector] is not going to be immediately obvious and 
pictorial. We need to nurture our relationship with Affector. I  
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don’t mean that entirely facetiously. It’s going to be a partly 
learned thing.” 
 
We ended the discussion by considering whether the axes were related – for 
instance if they improved the enigmatics if that could possibly change how 
ambient the system was. Although they felt this could be possible, they also 
agreed that Dream Affector was within their grasp. 
Discussion 
The presentation of the results thus far further demonstrates how 
design and evaluation in an affective presence approach differs from the affect 
as information approach. Whereas in affective computing the success or 
failure of Affector might be judged in terms of whether Phoebe could discern 
Simeon’s actual emotions at any given time and vice versa, in this study we 
were interested in how they reconfigured the Affector goals and design in 
order to produce what they considered as a working system. This does not 
mean we precluded the possibility that they would try to use the system to 
deduce each other’s exact emotions – in fact, during the interviews, we 
pushed to see if this was something they felt they could do. Instead, however, 
Affector was approached for giving an opportunity to reflect on a general 
sense of (an approximation of) mood or affect, not a one to one correlation 
between an internal state and an external display. 
Because of our shift in focus, our challenge is to allow Affector to fail. If 
everything constitutes a success, then there is no need for evaluation. The 
preceding results however did speak to parts of the design that failed and in 
the end, they recognized the shortcomings of Affector v1.0 as a low resolution 
video system. What this type of evaluation allowed for however was a more  
240 
nuanced look at the failures and successes of Affector. I will return now to the 
original questions and use the results for proposing answers. 
1. How do Phoebe and Simeon define a ‘working’ system? Does this definition 
change over time? 
For the most part, the goals of the Affector system remained relatively 
consistant throughout the project for both Phoebe and Simeon with some 
interesting caveats. When returning to the final repertory grid that they 
developed, affect, mood and emotion are absent from the defining 
characteristics. They suggested this was because affect followed from 
enigmatically presenting presence awareness. I believe it was also not 
articulated because of this idea that they were not matching affect to a defined 
state reflected in an information display. Sometimes they may get a sense of 
affect, sometimes they may not. Sometimes the sense of affect may only 
appear every once in a while such as the ah-ha moment in Phoebe’s office. 
The potential for Affect is constant but the sense of it is not.  
The non-articulation of affect as a defining dimension may also be due to 
the way Phoebe and Simeon began to conceptualize the reading of affect. 
Their first move was toward using the proxy of movement as an index for 
affect. But their second move was toward using change in general as a proxy 
of movement which would then be a signal of potential emotional meaning.   
Also from the grid and throughout their interview discussions, the 
importance of privacy diminished and was replaced by enigmatics as a 
criterion. Although Phoebe and Simeon had always planned to use enigmatics 
as a design method since they had always planned to distort the video feed, 
enigmatics became a goal of the system and not just a means to an end. As 
for privacy, there were three reasons why this was not cited as a central  
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concern by the end of the project. First, the system was being used between 
two friends and although this was always the design specification it became 
more apparent in use. In other words, a camera in their office in the abstract 
was more scary than the actual thing in the office of someone they know. 
Secondly, the rise of enigmatics as a defining goal meant that privacy would to 
some degree be taken care of at least if the enigmatics are implemented in a 
way to obscure details. Finally, and this last point will be discussed later as 
well, both Simeon and Phoebe felt more like a watcher and less like a 
watchee. Whereas they had initially expressed concern about feeling like they 
were being watched, the reverse happened and they only occasionally 
reflected on what their partner was seeing.  
In addition, one of their early stated goals was not only what they would 
gain from the system when each was in his or her office but that the system 
would potentially increase their face to face interactions. Throughout the 
project, this became less of a stated goal. One possible reason for this is that 
the system didn’t seem to be functioning in that way or at least the evidence 
was inconclusive in terms of whether it was increasing their interactions or not. 
But, what the system did do was act as another stimulus for informing 
interactions. The system may have caused some interactions to occur but its 
causal capacity seemed to diminish in the way that Phoebe and Simeon talked 
about it, but its ability to provide a resource to draw upon during interactions 
remained.  
Finally, at the start of the project, Phoebe had articulated a broader goal of 
appealing to the Ubicomp and HCI community with a viable alternative to 
abstract world building through models and sensors. The acceptance of these 
ideas for consideration through published articles and an accepted grant  
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proposal indicates that this project and the ideas inspiring it have made 
progress toward this goal. However, the experience with Affector also caused 
Phoebe and Simeon to rethink what they meant by stripping out 
representations of the world. In their design discussions, they often referred to 
what they could sense and what this could potentially mean, such as skin tone 
to represent a person being in the space and large movements like leaning 
back in one’s chair with arms behind their head to suggest relaxation. They 
often spoke of representations – for instance movement being a proxy for 
emotion. The difference in this project however is the conclusiveness of the 
representations. As a proxy of emotion, movement does not, at least in this 
current project, replace emotion. It specifically stands as a proxy – meaning an 
approximation. Its proxy status signals a more open form to interpretation. 
What will be interesting to chart in Affector v2.0 is whether movement 
maintains its proxy and open ended status or if Phoebe and Simeon quickly 
create a symbolic representation chain of distortions to moods to movements. 
2. How do Phoebe and Simeon use Affector to develop a sense of each 
other’s affective presence? Do these practices change over time? 
Through the priming of the Video condition, Phoebe and Simeon 
immediately began to discount facial expressions as a means of 
communicating Affect. In some of the initial interviews, Phoebe would often 
describe Simeon’s facial expression but then she quickly began to rely on 
other information such as the amount of activity in his office as more valuable 
indicators of mood. This low stock in facial expressions, because they were 
‘alone’, translated into Affector as well. The need for details in the image, in 
order to see nuances such as a smile versus a frown, became even less 
important.   
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Phoebe and Simeon used Affector to catch glimpses of affect, hints at what 
one’s affect might be. This hinting quality of Affector is partly due to its 
unfinished state (e.g. waiting for the history distortions) but also because 
hinting is what Affector will ultimately be about. The combination of supporting 
ephemeral experiences with ambient displays further dictates that Affector will 
not be used as a numerical barometer, like Dror’s Emotographs, or a snapshot 
measure of mood. However, despite how they managed to use Affector 
occasionally for a sense of affect, overall they were both unsatisfied with the 
final results in version 1.0. In our discussion about whether Affector was about 
inducing or reflecting emotion, both clearly wanted to move toward reflection. 
The fact that Affector invoked feelings in themselves, for instance anticipation 
of the other and comfort when the other was around, was not enough for the 
system to be working. 
This desire to push toward being able to reflect on the other’s emotion, and 
perhaps then on one’s own, contrasts in an interesting way with how they were 
using the system. Both Simeon and Phoebe spoke about ‘reading’ the system 
or watching the system but they did not talk about using the system to express 
emotion. In fact, one reason they said facial expressions were uninteresting to 
them was because they specifically knew the other was not trying to express 
emotion to them. Yet, they were trying to be a receiver of potential emotional 
messages even if they did not consciously use the system as a sender. They 
rarely thought about what they were doing on their end to express emotion. 
This may be because of the desire to remain ambient, to not want to require 
any specific actions to engage with the system. Yet the desire for 
unobtrusiveness seems very close to the affective computing agenda to 
unobtrusively measure someone’s ‘real’ emotions without their awareness or  
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participation. At issue here is whether both sides, expressing and sensing, 
need to be possible in the system simultaneously. It may be that when the 
distortion editor becomes more readily usable that this is when we see Simeon 
and Phoebe attempting to express emotion. Another suggestion that was on 
the table was including aspects of both offices in driving a distortion, so that 
Simeon’s display is dictated not only by Phoebe’s office conditions but his 
own.  
3. How does the system influence Phoebe and Simeon’s day-to-day 
interactions? Do these change over time? 
During the interviews, when we asked Phoebe and Simeon to interpret 
what was going on with the other, they only used the information from the 
system (whether Video or Affector) as one piece of the puzzle for sensing 
affect. They never conclusively made an assessment of affect based on what 
they could see in the window, this was always supplemented with other 
experiences and factors, such as a previous conversation or knowledge of 
extenuating circumstances such as being in a coding frenzy or the time in the 
semester. Rather than assuming this is a fault or weakness of the system, I 
believe it speaks to its integration in their day-to-day interactions. They did not 
look to the system to tell them what was going on, they used the system as a 
new resource for their interactions. 
It is tempting to want to make grander proclamations about Affector’s 
influence on their face-to-face interactions. The face-to-face interaction data, 
for example, could tell the story that the Video condition caused their physical 
interactions to go down since they simply interacted through the video window 
(e.g. waving to each other more) or Simeon’s interpretation that because 
Phoebe looked at Affector more she felt less of a need to interact with the ‘real’  
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Simeon. One could carry on to suggest that the reason the Post condition 
face-to-face interactions were the highest of all interactions was due to an 
increased need for more interaction. However, Phoebe and Simeon did not 
offer such strong interpretations of the data, partly because of the suspect 
nature of the data, although I believe this was more due to the previous point 
of integration. Furthermore, they ceased to cite as a goal for Affector the 
desire for increasing face-to-face interactions. Instead, they are focusing more 
on the sense of each other when they are ‘apart’ but still together. 
This is related to an idea Phoebe started to explore when she mentioned 
the difference between the sense of the other through Affector and the sense 
of an other in an instant messaging Buddy list. She likened the Buddy list icon 
as an ‘information token’. It definitely stands for something. It says ‘here I am, 
you can interact with me if you want.’ But Affector is not as didactic in what it 
communicates. In one instant, Affector may be saying nothing but in another 
instant something interesting might be happening. Affector is not an 
Information Token but a Meaning Opportunity. It does not dictate when 
something meaningful has happened and what this means but it leaves open 
the possibility that something meaningful could transpire.   
4. What system attributes encourage or impair how Phoebe and Simeon 
collaborate and reflect on their affective presence in particular and affect in 
general? 
The Affector system design created a system that crossed several 
established dichotomies of distance vs. co-located and synchronous vs. 
asynchronous. It inhabited a different space of co-located but physically 
separated. This allowed them to play with the idea of an expanded shared 
context, a result that ended up surprising them in terms of how much they  
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enjoyed this augmented sense. Phoebe no longer just turned around to see 
what was happening in the common space outside her office but she also 
considered what Simeon’s reaction were to these events. Simeon suggested 
that this was another reason why Affector’s sense of presence was different 
than a Buddy icon as a Buddy icon travels with you wherever you happen to 
be online. A Buddy icon represents you across distance, but Affector is 
decidedly rooted in a particular place. In addition to occupying a new type of 
physical space, Affector transcends the dichotomy of synchronous and 
asynchronous communication. It is synchronous because the distortions are 
happening as close to real time as possible and it is designed to be 
ephemeral. However, the desire to include history, to have an at a glance 
sense of a much longer time period, suggests a degree of asynchronous 
communication as well.  
The use of distortions as a prime design feature of Affector demonstrated 
how technology can support enigmatic expressions. Whereas in the Affective 
Computing, and traditional HCI approach, technology is harnessed to support 
clarity, accuracy of information, and reduction of noise, in this case, the ability 
to distort the video in systematic but interesting ways obscured clarity and 
added noise into the picture. Yet, the noise was not random. In fact, Phoebe 
described the Video condition as having more noise since she didn’t know 
where or when to look at it. By using Affector to augment certain thresholds 
and indices, noise was added purposefully as a directing device.  
It is difficult however to discuss the system attributes in greater detail in 
terms of hindering or encouraging interpretations of Affect as a large part of 
the system remained unfinished. One of the goals for the next version of 
Affector and the next round of evaluation is to gauge how different distortions  
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are manipulated and the effects of these distortions on Phoebe and Simeon’s 
sense of Affector.  
The questions above addressed evaluating the experience of Affector v1.0 
and how Simeon and Phoebe constructed a “working” system. The last two 
questions guiding this case study revolved around the evaluation. 
5. How can we evoke rich, detailed narratives of experience? 
This was a fundamentally different type of evaluation than traditional 
Affective Computing approach of evaluating systems for accuracy. In such 
studies the methods for the evaluation are more well defined. In this study, the 
focus of the evaluation was on how evocative and configurable the system 
was for causing engagement and reflection on affect. Methods for this type of 
evaluation are less common in HCI although I drew from histories of 
ethnographic and other phenomenological approaches.  
Whereas in affective computing the trend in evaluation is away from self-
report methods, in the study here the methods focused on evoking rich 
accounts of self-report. One strategy to aide in this self-report was to 
reposition usage data as a source for the evaluator’s analysis to input for the 
user’s reflection. My data for analysis then shifted from the usage reports to 
Phoebe and Simeon’s assessment of these reports. In order to provide 
effective prompts however the data had to mean something to Phoebe and 
Simeon. In the results section, I discussed many of the limitations that they 
pointed out regarding the usage and the face-to-face interaction data, for 
instance the credibility of their own recording and the negative effects using 
the clickers had on the experience of Affector. Phoebe and Simeon offered two 
solutions: one to remove the clickers in favor of the system measuring its own 
use (i.e. through gaze tracking), and, in lieu of this technological fix, presenting  
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the data to them on a more frequent basis. In fact, as strongly as I argued for 
removing this as one of the prompts because of its inaccuracy, Phoebe and 
Simeon continued to want to try it (to the point where the face-to-face clickers 
started becoming second nature).  
One further limitation on the usage data in this particular study, however, 
was its presentation. I wanted to present the data to Phoebe and Simeon in as 
close to raw form as possible in order to allow their own interpretations of how 
to manipulate it in ways that would be meaningful to them. I did not want to 
present the data in ways that would be meaningful to a statistician or a social 
science researcher who understands the implications of p-values (even though 
this data would not have lent itself to such presentations and even though 
Phoebe and Simeon are scientists as well). However, presenting the data in 
raw form, such as clicks per week or even at the level of clicks per day, makes 
the search for patterns difficult. Therefore, I presented averages and graphs 
for them but as soon as I took this step, I felt I was glossing over the 
imprecision of the numbers into bar charts that by their nature of highs and 
lows suggest narrative inflections. Although Phoebe and Simeon took the 
usage data in the spirit in which it was offered, I believe this is an area for 
future advancement: taking data we are accustomed to analyzing with 
statistician’s tools and software and presenting it to a lay audience for their 
own analysis. 
In the interviews, we followed a set format but also allowed for following 
Phoebe and Simeon’s lead. I found a combination of open-ended and 
provocative questions to be useful. In terms of open-ended questions for 
example, asking Simeon how Phoebe was feeling was less effective than 
asking Simeon what was going on with Phoebe today. This is because the  
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former phrasing suggests too much that the image simply needs to be 
decoded and the feeling level will appear as opposed to the idea of feelings 
being hinted at and constructed throughout a range of interactions and 
impressions. In terms of provocative questions, generally leading questions 
are considered undesirable, but asking devils’ advocate type questions about 
the design parameters proved to be a useful way for digging deeper into their 
first principles.  
All of the different sources of data in this project supported each other and 
were often intertwined. The usage data for instance was used during the 
interviews and the design/evaluation sessions and the design/evaluation 
sessions built on all of the data collected. The final design/evaluation session 
with the modified repertory grid could not have occurred without the other 
sources but I would like to highlight this as an example of a method that I wish 
to explore further in future work. Of all of the different sessions, this one 
engaged their attention the most, evident by the amount of discussion it 
generated and the number of new discussions it generated as opposed to 
summaries of past perspectives. I believe the success of this was due in part 
to concerning myself ahead of time with what the evaluation experience feels 
like which is why I purposefully started with a fun oblique exercise on 
designing their frames, then moved to the provocative questions, then ended 
with the structured but creative exercise with the repertory grid. The grid 
exercise proved to be a useful way of asking the same question about the 
goals of the system but in a different way. This opens up the issue of whether 
or not the goals of the system had actually changed or if it was a function of 
the way I asked the question that changed the goals of the system. However, 
Phoebe and Simeon debated on all of the points from the original goal  
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statement but chose to define Affector along presence/awareness, ambient, 
and enigmatic. This leads me to conclude that the form of the questioning did 
not prevent Phoebe and Simeon from choosing the same goals but facilitated 
articulating and discussing their refinement.   
In the final design/evaluation session, I also played with a slightly different 
role for the evaluator – one that was informed by the roles I adopted in the 
earlier sessions. During the first design/evaluation session, Liz Goulding and I 
played a fairly traditional role as evaluators, determining our interview guide 
ahead of time and although we followed the lead of Simeon and Phoebe, we 
interjected our questions when appropriate. For the second design/evaluation 
session, I wanted to take more of a backseat in terms of my evaluator role. I 
saw my role in this session as a reporter. I wanted to present the data in as 
raw a form as possible to Simeon and Phoebe. In doing so, I felt this would 
mark two levels of significance. First, they would have to wade through the 
data and pull out the pieces they thought were most meaningful to them. 
Secondly, once they had done this, they would then have to explain what the 
significance was. My role then as reporter was first to draw up all the facts and 
lay them out in a way that would allow them to do this (and I discuss the 
challenges of this above). Then I played a reporter again as I collected their 
interpretations as the primary data for the results section. This was a useful 
exercise for creating a summary of Affector but as I mentioned above the third 
session was designed to try and open up new discussions. Therefore, in this 
session, I saw my role shifting to facilitator or provocateur. I wanted to create 
exercises that would focus their attention on producing an artifact (e.g. the 
dimension chart) but that would provoke discussions in order to complete the  
251 
task.  I believe future work would help identify when these different roles are 
most useful for a project and how they can be supported. 
6. How can we account for and make sense of multiple interpretations in 
evaluation? 
This final question addresses the shift in roles implied in the move from 
traditional Affective Computing evaluation methods to Affective Presence 
methods. In Affective Presence, designs are positioned as a process of co-
interpretation between the user, the designer, and the system. Therefore, the 
evaluation also becomes a process of co-interpretation between the evaluator, 
the users, and the designers. This stance informs the strategy of sharing data 
with users throughout the design and evaluation process.  
The strategy of mixing roles has a number of implications. For instance, not 
only does the role of the evaluator, user and designer become muddled but 
the phases and artifacts of evaluation, use, and design become less distinct as 
well. The clickers became part of our designed system for instance – in a 
negative way on the one hand, by detracting from the ambient feel of the 
system, but in a potentially positive way on the other hand by providing a form 
of dynamic feedback (similar to a gamer’s score while game playing) to 
Phoebe and Simeon about their use patterns. The periodic interviews and 
design/evaluation sessions also to some degree became part of the usage 
patterns. For instance, after our second design/evaluation session, I imagine 
Phoebe’s guilt induced state about not initiating contact with Simeon may have 
had a greater potential to impact her interactions with him than did Affector. 
The desire to allow for multiple interpretations from the data may also be 
seen in the manner of the results presentation. I have attempted to present the 
results in as descriptive and comprehensive a manner as possible. Whereas in  
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a statistical study, the significant results are highlighted and focused into an 
end result, in this study, there are many results which may be more or less 
significant to different readers. Furthermore, whereas in an experimental 
study, the goal is to continue refining the study so that the results will lead to 
only one interpretation, in this study, I would argue that a successful 
presentation of the results should support the interpretations I make in the 
discussion but need not preclude other interpretations. This raises a critical 
issue, however, and one that this study does not help answer definitively. 
Such claims for supporting multiple interpretations can lead to criticisms of 
relativism and the inability to make any general statements from this very 
particular study. We do still want our evaluations to inform our designs and our 
theories, and both design and theory are a practice of choice, and choice 
implies value of something over another.  
Therefore, although not a direct response to the charge of relativism, I 
believe one thing this evaluation does do is highlight the need for criteria that 
inform our evaluation practices.  Much of what I’ve outlined so far turns several 
standard approaches to evaluation around – such as strict demarcation 
between users, designers, and evaluators. This does not suggest that in all 
cases users should be designers and evaluators or that there is no role for 
external evaluators or separate designers. Instead, these ideas are offered as 
alternatives for understanding aspects of affect in system use that may have 
been left behind in other methods. However, in doing so, this means that many 
of the criteria we depend upon for judging the evaluation itself become 
contested – criteria such as whether or not the same results would occur if the 
same evaluation methods were repeated.   
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There are many discussions of how criteria for quantitative evaluation do 
not work for qualitative evaluation and discussions as well regarding whether 
criteria for qualitative evaluation even make sense. I will outline here some 
possible criteria for evaluations of the type presented here. One criterion for 
evaluating experience could be to make the evaluation itself an experience -- 
i.e. attending to the engagement and provocation of the methods for drawing 
users in emotionally, physically, and intellectually. Second, valuing methods 
that surface idiosyncrasies as opposed to generalities: methods that surface, 
highlight and explore outliers or unique expressions. Third is the idea of 
methods that produce divergence or are irreproducible – in other words, they 
are designed so that if a different evaluator used the same methods, they 
would more than likely get different results. This criterion suggests that 
methods that allow for and elicit multiple interpretations about what is 
happening are more appropriate for experience designs than those that seek 
to converge upon a single story. Finally, continuing to ask what the users will 
take away from the methods – as researchers, we are well accustomed to 
making sure we do no harm to our subjects but we are perhaps less 
accustomed to thinking about what good might result from experiencing the 
evaluation. This is related to the idea of catalytic validity (Lather, 1991) that 
often guides participatory action research – the notion that through evaluation 
the users are empowered to some kind of action or change in either their 
thinking or behavior.  These criteria are only a starting point. Further work is 
needed for refining how to use these criteria and their role in supporting and 
negotiating multiple interpretations.   
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Conclusion  
This chapter began with an overview of how affect has been variably 
defined and how these definitions have in turn influenced the design and 
evaluation of technology for affect. One of the central points in detailing the 
story of affective computing in contrast to affective presence is that even 
without an explicit theory of affect identified or articulated, through the design 
and evaluation approaches, a driving theory may be deduced. In a sense, the 
designs and their conceptual models become the espoused theory.  
The historical review of affect connected affect with the ineffable 
through its original conception of mysterious and irreducible. This perspective 
gave way to a bifurcated view, on the one end there is the scientific 
numerization of affect and on the other end the artistic indeterminacy of affect. 
I have shown how the approach in computing has favored the scientific 
approach of objectifying, codifying and containing affect into a unique 
signature within the individual. The scientific approach to numerizing emotion 
allowed for it to enter the laboratory to be measured, normalized, and traded. 
However, despite the goal of affective computing to enhance the anemic 
cognitive models of information processing, I have argued that the 
dependence on the scientific approach to affect has instead reduced affect 
into an anemic model.  
This is not a complete indictment of the approach, as the affective 
computing agenda has advanced the profile of affect as an important area for 
research in computing and has advanced our understanding through 
discussion and exploration of affect. Furthermore, the approach in affective 
computing makes sense for a number of reasons: computers excel at 
processing complicated and abstract information, new technology can provide  
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views and measures into ever more sources of information such as 
physiological patterns, and one approach toward understanding (and 
designing for) complex phenomenon is to break them down into identifiable 
parts. My argument is not against these reasons but against what happens 
when the identifiable parts start to stand for the whole or when what we can 
measure stands for what we don’t yet have measurements for. 
In contrast to the predominant affective computing approach, I have 
presented the alternative of affective presence to conceptualize affect not as a 
reducible, internal bit of information but as a socio-cultural process of 
interaction and subjective meaning-making. Affect as interaction differs from 
affect as information in three important ways: how the nature of affect is 
conceptualized and subsequently how technology is both designed and 
evaluated. In particular, affect as interaction is about affect as the interface 
between the individual and the social, it is dynamic, and it is ‘felt’ or subjective. 
This view requires then design objectives that are about the co-interpretation 
as opposed to the transference of meaning and evaluations that are about 
understanding how meaning is evoked as opposed to measuring the accuracy 
of representation. To examine the potential and limitations of this alternate 
approach, I presented a case study of Affector, a system designed for 
reflection between two people on the affective presence of their neighbor in a 
separate office.  
The case study detailed the objectives of the Affector design as two-
fold: one set of objectives about the experience the designers wanted to create 
and one set of objectives relating to the larger questions they were addressing 
in demonstrating the viability of an alternate approach to affective computing. 
Regarding this last objective, the acceptance of the project through various  
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peer reviewed processes as well as the demonstration of a working, valued 
system speak to the validity of this alternate space. Furthermore, through their 
design, they have refined how Brooks’ model of artificial intelligence for 
robotics applies to a non-robotic system, where digital information does not 
need to be reduced to analogue forms. As for their specific design objectives, 
the designers began with a desire to support their awareness of each other’s 
affective presence without sacrificing their privacy and a desire to increase 
their face to face interactions. The goal for the evaluation of this system was to 
both chart how these objectives changed and to illustrate how the designers 
conceptualized and worked toward a working system.  One of the main 
changes in the design objectives was the elevating of enigmatics and 
ambiguity as a design goal and not just a design method. This positioning 
replaced both affect and privacy as specific design goals. The increased 
emphasis on enigmatics highlights the need for further work into 
understanding how to design for and evaluate systems designed for openness 
to interpretation. 
The importance of enigmatics is also implicated in the realization that 
Affector ‘hints at’ instead of represents affective states. Affector does not 
present information tokens of presence, as a system such as instant 
messaging does, but it creates meaning opportunities. At times, Affector will 
provoke a sense of affect but at times it will not. The sense of affect will be 
generated over time, and always in concert with other resources from their 
shared surroundings. The hinting quality of Affector is similar to the shy 
sensing of the Home Health Horoscope, another project in the affective 
presence consortium. In Affector, the hinting is underscored by the designer’s 
constant recognition that they are only ever approximating affect. Although it is  
257 
often tempting to fall into the desire to build mappings (e.g. if we detect a 
coffee cup, then what would it mean?), they always returned to the idea that 
what they would sense was change, and from this they would infer motion, 
and from that they would interpret affect. This chaining of meaning suggests 
the approximation and the building of affect. 
The designers also recognize the hinting of affect is at play when the 
expression of affect is ambient. During their experimentation with an open 
video channel, they both quickly discounted facial expressions as a sign of 
affect. They argued that facial expressions are less meaningful for 
constructing affect when not meant as a form of communication. This has 
implications for affective computing studies that rely on more unobtrusive 
measures of affect, but it also has implications for the design of Affector. In 
future versions, as designers begin to play with the distortion rule sets, it will 
interesting to see how the designers as users reconceptualize Affector again. 
Will they try to express themselves through the distortions? Will the distortions 
become mapped to how they are feeling? In other words, will the hinting of 
affect overtime be replaced by a language of Affector? 
The design of Affector not only demonstrated a viable space to the 
affective computing approach but it also suggested a new space for design 
that crosses several other dichotomies in HCI. It designs for a space that is at 
once both distant and co-located and suggests new features for such a space 
such as supporting the awareness of an extended shared context. It also 
designs for a tempo that is at once asynchronous and synchronous – with 
historical information presented ephemerally. Playing with the implications of 
this new space and tempo will be part of Affector version 2.0.   
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In addition to some of the suggestions for the next version of Affector 
already mentioned, one of the larger questions is how to take lessons from this 
very specific design, one created by the designers for themselves as users, to 
a more general context. On the one hand, we anticipate Affector being part of 
a larger group of case studies from the affective presence consortium where 
the question of generalizablity is answered through looking at a range of 
studies across a range of contexts to look for more general lessons. But this 
question also speaks to the limitations and challenges of Affector and the 
current study. Although this case has identified a number of evaluation 
methods and a start at thinking about new criteria, more work is needed for 
understanding how to evaluate systems designed for reflection and openness 
to interpretation. 
Ultimately, although this case study of this chapter is about the design 
and evaluation of technology, it is a case study about affect. The design and 
evaluation of the technology becomes an attempt to articulate a particular 
theory of affect, one where affect is created and not found. Both a theory of 
affect as found and a theory of affect as created can take an approximation 
view to affect as ineffable. In the found approach, we will never fully know the 
ineffable aspect of affect but we can continue to approximate it through 
identifying and measuring component parts. The danger with the found 
approach is that the parts begin to replace the absent whole. In the approach 
to affect as created, the ineffable is also approximated because we recognize 
that it will continue to change as we continue to study it 
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Chapter 4. Interpretation and Communication 
Language communicates less than one 
desires and more than one intends. 
-- Arthur Bochner and Carolyn Ellis 
 
The previous case studies demonstrate the practice of reflective design 
as a method for understanding how interfaces with the ineffable are designed. 
I began by first examining the dominant approach for designing interfaces with 
the ineffable where an ineffable experience is first reduced into a codifiable 
and discrete representation. In the museum case study, the dominant 
approach to technology as tool transforms the ineffable aesthetic experience 
into a discursive explanation transferred from the enlightened to the 
uninitiated.  In the affect case study, the experience of emotion is objectified 
into observable information indices capable of intact transference from one to 
another, and the scientist (or the designer’s algorithm of affect) is the authority 
over the experience of affect. The second step in reflective design is to 
propose and demonstrate the potential for an alternate design space, one 
originally defined as an approach for augmentation, where the richness and 
complexity of ineffable experience need not be formalized into a static 
expression. Although both the reduction and augmentation approaches 
depend on some level of abstraction and representation, in the reduction 
approach the representations became static and difficult to both recognize and 
change. In the most extreme examples, the representation begins to stand for 
the experience itself. In the augmentation approach, the challenge becomes 
one of making the representations both visible and open to transformation. 
This objective led to re-articulating the augmentation approach as one of 
designing for openness to interpretation.  
260 
In exploring the interpretation approach to designing interfaces with the 
ineffable, the case studies revealed a number of challenges in terms of 
existing practices of design and evaluation in HCI. Both case studies grappled 
with how traditional HCI methods run into limitations in this alternate approach, 
for instance questioning where the line between design and evaluation lies 
and the respective roles of the designers and users. Both case studies also 
struggled with the balance of how to use ambiguity, or openness to 
interpretation, effectively as a resource without spiraling into a lack of uptake, 
alienation, or the irrelevance of design and evaluation. Some of the key 
challenges in designing for interpretation require more exploration into what 
designing for interpretation means and what the subsequent issues are for 
evaluation.  
The questions and challenges provoked in the case studies motivates a 
need for more grounding and explanation into the process of interpretation. In 
the following sections, I will begin with an overview of new thinking in the field 
of HCI regarding interpretation, some identified strategies for design and 
evaluation and the directions of future research.  I will then turn to examining 
how the field of communication can add to this examination of interpretation. 
The link between communication and interpretation seems like an obvious fit 
as the process of communication could be conceived of as the process of 
interpretation. Furthermore, if the movement in design is toward understanding 
how users actively reinterpret designs, in other words how users adopt the role 
of designers when using systems, then communication research provides a 
valuable resource for understanding everyday acts of interpretation. In 
particular, I look to research in language use where people act as both the 
designers and users of the everyday technology of language. Drawing from  
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the relevant insights in communication theory and methods, I will then return to 
the case studies and suggest how this lens would influence future directions. 
Finally, in the last section of this chapter I will reverse the examination of what 
communication can bring to the field of HCI regarding the role of interpretation 
and explore what an HCI design practice for interpretation can bring to the field 
of communication. 
Re-thinking Interpretation in HCI  
Interpretation has always been a topic for consideration in HCI. 
Researchers and practitioners of HCI consider how designers interpret user 
needs and requirements, how users interpret a system interface, how a 
system interprets a user’s input, and how evaluators interpret the user 
experience with a system. In recent years, however, the role of interpretation 
has been elevated as well as redefined. This elevation and redefinition has led 
to a number of different slants and perspectives, including calls of designing 
for appropriation (e.g. Chalmers and Galani, 2004), designing for hackability 
(e.g. Galloway, 2004), designing for openness (e.g. Sengers and Gaver, 
2006), and under-designing (e.g. Brand, 1994).  What all these different 
names have in common is the desire to recognize the gap between design 
and use as an interesting space to explore, an opportunity as opposed to a 
problem. In this section, I will draw primarily on new work from Sengers and 
Gaver (2006) on designing for multiple interpretations. 
Motivations 
In support of the focus on interpretation, designers and researchers 
generally cite at least one of four interrelated arguments that I will refer to as 
ubiquity, complexity, awareness and control, and/or inevitability. The most  
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common lead-in argument suggests that the increasing ubiquity and 
embedded nature of technology calls for more concern about interpretation. 
Digital technology is no longer an isolated interaction but something that we 
encounter everyday and therefore the issue of interpretation becomes more 
prominent and prevalent simply because we are called upon to do it more. 
Second, the everydayness of these encounters suggests a widening of the 
technology agenda as design moves from circumscribed work tasks to 
addressing more complex human experiences including those of an ineffable 
nature. In this move, technology becomes more connected with intimate and 
rich experiences.  
Following from the first two arguments about the ubiquity of technology 
and the complexity of experiences designed for, one common design 
response is to increase the complexity of the technology. This ubiquity and 
complexity of technology tends to contrast with existing usability goals such as 
ease of use and user friendliness. This mismatch then often leads to a desire 
to bury or hide the complexity and range of technology systems from the user. 
The user need not trouble with how a device works, only that it works. This 
movement toward making technology invisible leads to what I will call the 
awareness and control argument. The desire to hide the role of technology 
raises concern for designers aiming to support rather than direct interpretation. 
It has also raised privacy concerns as technology becomes more proactive 
and the users’ awareness and control over a system’s impact on their lives 
decreases. Finally, the inevitability argument for focusing on interpretation 
points to the growing recognition of how users reinterpret and shape designed 
systems (Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003) in unanticipated, and potentially more 
valuable, ways. Historical reviews of new technology argue that to some  
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degree, the designer’s intentions do not matter as it is impossible for a 
designer to predict or direct use, yet some designs may have a greater degree 
of interpretive flexibility (Bijker, 1995) allowing for a wider range of adoption.  
Supporting Multiple Interpretations 
The motivations behind the current focus on interpretation are 
reshaping how interpretation is conceptualized for HCI.  Sengers and Gaver 
(2006) argue that in the past the gap between the interpretations of users and 
designers was presented as a problem to solve. One solution to this problem 
was to lead users to the right interpretation of the system (e.g. what button to 
click) and its use (e.g. what it is for) through clues in the system design. An 
alternate solution, explored through user-centered design and participatory 
design, suggested reframing the problem from one of shaping users’ 
interpretations of the designed system to shaping the designers’ approach.  
Both solutions however take as the goal closing the gap between an original 
intention for the design and the ultimate use. Alignment of interpretations is the 
objective, i.e. there is a ‘correct’ interpretation and everything else is 
‘incorrect’.  
Sengers and Gaver (2006) suggest an alternate way of thinking about 
interpretation where multiple interpretations are desired and supported by the 
design rather than in spite of it. Gaver, Beaver, and Benford (2003) provide a 
foundation for the value of this perspective by demonstrating how a system 
that invites multiple interpretations can be fun, engaging, mysterious, and 
delightful. In the case studies of designing for the ineffable, I have also tried to 
demonstrate how ambiguity, or the space for multiple interpretations, became 
an important objective. In this view, the goal is not to narrow interpretation into  
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a single matching point of view or consensus but to allow for multiple 
interpretations.  
Sengers and Gaver clarify the charge to design for multiple 
interpretations by articulating where and when multiple interpretations are 
desirable. User interpretation, they explain, happens at a number of levels. 
The lowest level, one that could be called usability, involves identifying how to 
use inputs and output effects of the system interface. This is the level primarily 
of asking ‘how’, such as “how does this button work?”, or “how do I submit this 
form?” Generally, at this level matching interpretations between the designer 
and the user are desired. For example, in the Key Table system designed by 
Gaver and colleagues, the designers wanted users to clearly understand that 
the force and direction by which their keys (or whatever object) landed on the 
table would tilt the picture frame situated above the table. Although the 
mechanics of the system were simple and clearly described, how to interpret 
this – the higher levels of interpretation – were left open.  At the second level, 
what I will call the impact or effect level, users interpret how a system may be 
used. The question here is “what for”, either what was it designed for or for 
what is it actually most appropriate. With the Key Table for example, the users 
focused not on the relationship between their keys and the tilt of the frame as 
the designers anticipated but on the image of the dog that was chosen to 
occupy the frame. Finally, the third level identified by Sengers and Gaver is 
where the user interprets how the system relates outside of its specific use 
and speaks to the values embedded in or reflected by the system. This is the 
level of significance, the why or to what effect question, i.e. what the system 
means about or for the individual, his or her social group, and the surrounding 
culture. Returning to the Key Table, the designers were interested in learning if  
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the use of the system would cause reflection perhaps on other forms of 
technology in the home, technology in general, or other patterns in the home 
such as table clutter or comings and goings in the entryway.  
Sengers and Gaver explain that multiple interpretations may be 
desirable at different levels of the system, although they qualify that even that 
simple suggestion is complicated by the nature of system design. 
Conceptually the three layers may be pulled apart, but in actuality, they are 
interrelated. For instance, although multiple ideas of what button to click to 
send a form does not sound like a desirable outcome at the usability level, 
there may be times when playing with the system level usability is a tactic for 
encouraging a greater range of higher level interpretation. However, in 
general, the interpretation that Sengers and Gaver and others in this field 
speak of occurs at the top two levels. The above discussion introduces a new 
perspective developing in HCI where multiple interpretations are desirable and 
designed for as opposed to considered problems to be overcome. In the 
following section, I will outline a number of the design and evaluation 
strategies offered for this new approach.  
Design Strategies 
Several researchers and designers working to develop systems that 
allow and facilitate multiple interpretations to emerge have been experimenting 
with different design strategies. These are presented as a list below with brief 
explanations but references to more comprehensive discussions.  
Access to System Innards 
The first design strategy is perhaps the easiest to imagine but one of 
the more difficult ones to actuate. It suggests that appropriating a system is  
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simply a matter of users opening it up and recoding or rewiring it. This is 
largely the push behind the design for hackability agenda (e.g. Galloway, 
2004). Although advances continue in the form of open system platforms, 
easier programming and scripting languages, and earlier education for this 
type of literacy, access to the systems innards is a limited approach. For 
starters, advances in easing access must keep pace with ever changing 
systems and their increasing complexity. In addition, not all designers want to 
relinquish this amount of control
41.   
Exposing the Seams  
In this second strategy, instead of giving the user explicit access to alter 
the code level, the user is given access to knowledge of how the system 
works. This approach is described well by Dourish (2004) regarding systems 
that display their context and by Chalmers (Chalmers et al., 2003; Chalmers et 
al., 2004) as ‘seamful design’. For example, Dourish suggests that users may 
want to know that they have switched network coverage on their wireless 
devices as opposed to this happening behind the scenes. Chalmers also 
challenges the idea that coverage should be something seamless and invisible 
to users. He suggests exposing the gaps in coverage provides impromptu 
design opportunities for users to appropriate these gaps as ‘safe zones’ where 
they are hidden from any form of connectivity or more formal design 
opportunities, such as building distributed games that leverage these dark 
spots as part of the game functionality.  The strategy of exposing seams calls 
for computing to be more translucent than transparent or invisible. 
                                                 
41 Tarleton Gillespie (2006, 2007 forthcoming) is examining the reverse of this design strategy 
and its implications: namely how technology developers are preventing, both legally and 
technically, the capability to ‘peek under the hood’ and alter (or simply learn about) how the 
system works.  
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Under-designing 
The strategy of under-designing has gained favor partly in response to 
feature creep and bloat of system design. Many designers draw from the 
lessons of architect Stewart Brand who advocated a ‘less is more’ approach to 
buildings. “An important aspect of design,” he writes, “is the degree to which 
an object involves you in its own completion…This is what makes old buildings 
interesting to me. I think that humans have a taste for things that not only 
show that they have been through a process of evolution, but which also show 
they are still part of one. They are not dead yet” (Brand, 1994, p. 11). Under-
designing is the approach followed by Strong and Gaver (1996) and Joseph 
‘Jofish’ Kaye (2005) in designing systems for communicating intimacy at a 
distance with minimal bandwidth as opposed to the tendency to assume that 
something as rich as intimacy needs rich representations. In these systems, 
the richness is gained through the user’s interpretations of simple or minimal 
representations. 
Surfaces for Personalization 
Höök
42 identifies surfaces of personalization that allow users to leave 
their mark on a system as an important strategy in the design for 
interpretation. She makes the analogy with traces of physical erosion in the 
environment suggesting how and how often a site has been used. The idea of 
users leaving their marks through system usage became popular through the 
work of Chalmers, Gay, Höök, and others with regards to social navigation 
(e.g. Burrell, Gay, Kubo, and Farina, 2002; Chalmers, et al., 2004; Höök and 
                                                 
42 Personal communication and from an unpublished draft of Kia Hook tentatively titled 
“Enabling appropriation and sense-making through building upon familiarity.”  
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Svensson, 1999): how current users may take the experience of past users as 
a guide to inform and perhaps enrich their own use.  
Framing 
In many systems, the most narrowing feature of the system has nothing 
to do with the system itself per se (e.g. its form and features) but with how the 
system is introduced and framed. A frame may direct or give hints for 
prompting interpretation in unexpected ways. For instance, Mateas describes 
how his Terminal Time system was received differently when introduced as a 
system about the future of documentaries versus when introduced as a 
performance (Domike, Mateas, Vanouse, 2001). Gaver and Sengers (2006) 
explore the use of minimal framing by providing users with a ‘topic’ but not an 
exposition. For instance, with the History Tablecloth, Gaver and colleagues 
provide the topic of the piece through its name. The tablecloth functions by 
glowing in areas where objects have remained for long periods of time, 
suggesting that the history of objects on the table might be interesting to think 
about. What this means, however, is left unarticulated.  
Characters and Extreme Characters 
A popular source for design strategies to design for interpretation is the 
arts and humanities as these practices intentionally (or not) produce works 
considered open to a range of meanings. Wright and McCarthy (2005), for 
example, explore film and literary theories, in particular the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, for insights into using character design as opposed to generic 
personas. Blythe (2004) suggests literally drawing from literature or other 
sources of deep complex characters, for example, designing for Anna, the 
distraught Russian, or Romeo and Juliet, the star-crossed lovers. This is  
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related to the idea of extreme characters, advocated by Djajadiningrat, Gaver 
and Frens (2000). Whereas minimal framing and under-designing leave room 
for interpretation by getting out of the way, extreme and well fleshed out 
characters leave room for interpretation by providing a range of details for 
users to identify as significant and resonant. It is the very particularity of the 
characters that allows for their generalizability. 
Layering complexity 
The approach of layering complexity entails designing for multiple 
audiences and multiple experiences at once, but the complexity as a whole 
need not be appreciated at any given moment. For instance, the charm and 
success of many cartoons is that they address both a children audience and 
an adult audience at the same time, but neither group needs to fully appreciate 
the others’ interpretation in order to enjoy the show. As an alternate form of 
this approach, Sengers and Gaver use the example of Simon Penny’s 
autopedagogic interfaces where a system changes its complexity through use. 
This means that a user’s initial interpretations of a system will become 
challenged in further uses with a system drawing out more complicated 
interactions and assessments of meaning.  
Blocking dominant interpretations 
The design strategy of blocking dominant interpretations is related to 
the strategy of defamiliarization discussed below because its intention is to 
remove the most common or familiar interpretation from the range of 
possibility therefore forcing the construction of new unexpected interpretations. 
As an example of this approach, Sengers and Gaver describe the Drift Table 
(Gaver et al., 2004), a type of coffee table with a small portal on top through  
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which one can see a moving video of a landscape seen by air. The most 
common interpretation of the table anticipated by the designers is that the 
table would be about ‘traveling somewhere specific’. In order to foil this 
interpretation, and make the user develop alternatives, there was no way to 
speed the video up or enter exact coordinates for the location over which one 
wanted to hover. Instead, users could only place weights on the table to 
gradually drift over the scene.  
Defamiliarization 
Many of the design strategies above highlight the system experience as 
something ‘different’, this is what is meant by the design strategy of 
defamiliarization where the users’ expectations are confronted. There are 
several ways for doing this. First, is the process of augmenting the ‘otherness’ 
of the system as described earlier with Mateas’s (2001) articulation of ‘alien 
presence’. Sengers and Gaver argue that what this does is downplay the 
system’s authority and leave more space for user interpretations. This requires 
the user to engage more with the system to understand his or her influence, 
and allows more freedom in interpreting the output since it is not tied to a 
definable cause. Another approach, related to alien presence, is to add 
randomness to the system, similar as well to the idea of layering complexity 
and challenging consistency described above. When the system changes 
often, this denies stagnant interpretations and forces not only multiple 
interpretations among users, but also multiple interpretations for one user.  
In their article on designing for emergent ambiguity, Gaver, Beaver, and 
Benford (2003) outline a number of strategies for defamiliarization that shock 
or puzzle the user, for example by introducing disturbing side effects of the 
system, juxtaposing incongruities, or by providing drastic over-interpretations  
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of the system that the user will challenge. These techniques were inspired by 
examples from art practices, such as Duchamp’s Fountain (described in 
chapter 2).  In contrast to over-interpreting information, the opposite may also 
be effective by under-representing information. For instance, Sengers et. al’s 
(2002) use of enigmatic drawings in the Influencing Machine (described in 
Chapter 3) encouraged a range of interpretations because the drawings were 
more iconic than symbolic. Chalmers and Galanti (2004) also describes the 
role of imprecision and uncertainty as assets in designs where interpretation 
and heightened engagement is desired: for instance, they explore how the 
imprecision of location aware systems in associating content with a pinpoint 
location can trigger more awareness of place.  
The list of above strategies is not exhaustive or exclusive but a short list 
of techniques current developers are experimenting with in order to design for 
openness to interpretation. In the museum case studies, I drew from the 
strategies for personalization and defamiliarization. For the Affector case 
study, the designers drew from primarily from the strategies for 
defamiliarization for the goal of designing for ambiguity. Both case studies 
involved a degree of framing. In reviewing the strategies as a list, they appear 
as a palette for mixing and matching. However, as this type of design research 
continues, understanding the interaction of the different strategies would help 
designers anticipate their effects. Furthermore, many of the strategies fly in the 
face of traditional usability studies and the designers experimenting with these 
approaches are careful to point out that the move beyond usability does not 
mean that usability no longer matters. In fact, just the opposite holds: without a 
baseline of usability, users will not have the opportunity to reach the higher 
levels of interpretation regarding how to use the system and what it means.   
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Evaluation Strategies 
Because the design methods enumerated here are directed toward 
supporting multiple interpretations, the traditional HCI evaluation methods of 
assessing the convergence of interpretations will not suffice. Instead, the 
evaluation methods draw from interpretive forms of inquiry (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000) asking how it is that interpretations form and what range of 
interpretations result. The list of evaluation methods is somewhat shorter than 
the design methods suggesting an area needing more attention. The methods 
will be described according to two objectives outlined by Sengers and Gaver 
(2006): drawing the user into the evaluation process and supporting multiple 
interpretations. 
Drawing Out User Interpretations 
As the emphasis for evaluation is on interpretation, the methods must 
help surface how it is that users are engaging with the system at the higher 
levels of interpretation. Example methods for doing this include using guided 
journals with provocative prompts encouraging users to reflect on their use of 
the system such as employed for the VIO system (Kaye et al., 2005). The 
Affective Presence consortium has also been experimenting with the design of 
different provocative prompts or stimuli that encourage user reflection. The 
repertory grid dimensions exercise, described in chapter 3, for building an 
architecture of Affector is an example of this type of prompt. One of the tactics 
described during the case studies for further drawing out user interpretations is 
the use of dynamic feedback. This was described in detail during the Affector 
case study where system usage and face-to-face interaction information was 
presented to the users for their own interpretations. This tactic enlists users in 
the analysis stage of data collection and transforms results into input or stimuli  
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for the user’s assessment and articulation of how the system is working (or not 
working). Petra Sundström (2006) and colleagues use another approach to 
draw users in and draw out their interpretations by training them to act as 
evaluators during their use of the eMoto system. A user is paired with another 
user and each acts as the ‘participant evaluator’ of the other’s experience – 
documenting the other’s use with a video camera and field notes. This 
encourages the user to step outside of her own experience to assess that of 
another, in the process encouraging further examination of her own use.  
Finally, Sengers and Gaver (2006) discuss the importance of 
longitudinal studies for interpretive analysis. Longitudinal studies account for 
how a single individual’s interpretations may change over time – an important 
method when design strategies such as layering complexity are used. Both the 
museum case study and the Affector case study require longer periods of use. 
In Birdscape, for instance, we tried to design for an experience that might not 
be apparent on an initial visit but return visitors would notice over time. This 
requires being able to access and track return visitors. The Affector case study 
occurred over a long period of use and its assessment involved articulating 
how the design goals and objectives for the system evolved. Future 
evaluations of Affector will examine how the use of the distortions influences 
these objectives and how the pattern of distortion use changes over time. 
Supporting Multiple Interpretation.  
If a system involves multiple users, then the methods described above 
partly address the goal of evoking multiple interpretations as users will likely 
focus on different aspects of an experience and their personal impression of 
the system use. In addition to drawing out multiple user interpretations, 
Sengers and Gaver (2006) also indicate the need to draw out the designer’s  
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interpretation, not just of the system prior-to-use but also of the system-in-use 
and the perspective of different evaluators. They suggest for instance drawing 
on the concept of the “crit” used in the arts and architecture fields where on a 
regular basis other commentators are called upon to evaluate a piece of work. 
This could be likened to heuristic evaluation techniques popular in HCI where 
experts analyze systems along predefined criteria. However, art crits tend to 
be less formal and standardized in terms of following a predefined checklist.  
Senger and Gaver also suggest looking outside the design field to fields 
such as psychoanalysis, forensic anthropology, or documentary film-making. 
Each of these fields may yield new interpretations of how users are interacting 
with systems. For instance, with the Drift Table and the Key Table, the 
designers hired a documentary filmmaker to interact with the users and create 
a narrative about what the filmmaker believed was happening. In drawing out 
the users, the designers, and the filmmaker’s perspectives, the evaluation of 
theses systems subverted a single authoritarian point of view on what the 
system was about, whether or not it worked, and why. 
As a match to the design strategies of designing for openness, the 
evaluation strategies also result in openness. In fact, the evaluation strategies, 
as illustrated in the case studies, become part of the design strategies. In 
other words, the line between evaluation and system design is difficult to tease 
apart. Making these distinctions seems to make less sense than in traditional 
HCI design and evaluation studies. Yet the challenge with the evaluation 
methods here is that even though they have changed their objective, from 
matching interpretations to eliciting and examining the construction of multiple 
interpretations, the evaluations still should address typical HCI functions of  
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guiding current and future design choices for a particular system and providing 
a rich resource from which to assess applicability in other design scenarios.  
Open Issues 
There are several open issues to highlight regarding the design and 
evaluation methods illustrated here and the new directions in HCI regarding 
interpretation. First, there is not a clear point of view on the interactions 
between multiple interpretations. Is simply a range of multiple interpretations 
desired? Should the interaction between these different interpretations be 
facilitated? Designers of this point of view have articulated the desire for ‘co-
interpretation’ or the ‘negotiation’ of meaning in system design where 
interpretation occurs between the designer, the system, the user, and the 
evaluators. Does ‘co-interpretation’ mean co-present, coordinated, or 
collaborative? Furthermore, do more interpretations and greater range of 
interpretation signal more success, in the same way that creativity studies 
measure creativity through the number and qualitative difference of ideas 
generated?  
Second, the design and evaluation methods described here underscore 
the importance of the particular and the idiosyncratic. The argument is that 
rather than abstract generalities, it is the particularities that become the basis 
for generalizing lessons. The open question then is what exactly is 
generalized? Designers from this point of view are reluctant to suggest they 
are building taxonomies of the design space and some suggest that the word 
design principles too strong a term and in practice could result in the very 
codification they want to avoid. Kia Höök and her group at SICS attempt to 
develop what they call ‘mid-range’ theories inspired by the idea of memes, that 
identify practices and their relevant situations but shy away from grand unified  
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theories
43. The tool kit of design and evaluation strategies listed here could 
suggest a list of memes but it fails to address how these strategies play off 
each other. There is little guidance for a designer now to choose which 
strategy to use. I have noted a number of times for instance how 
defamiliarization is a difficult balance to strike – are there certain situations 
where this is more alienating than others and an alternate design strategy 
should be employed? 
Finally, designing for openness requires striking a balance between 
providing constraints, a traditional designer role, and anticipating emergent 
interactions. In discussing ambiguity, or the space for multiple interpretations, 
Gaver, Beaver, and Benford (2003) emphasize how ambiguity is not a design 
strategy or a design attribute but an emergent phenomenon of the situation. In 
other words, ambiguity results or emerges based on the interaction of the 
designed system, the context, and the people involved. The difficulty, 
however, in studying ambiguity is that most studies tend to take on one of 
these components. For example, designers tend to focus on strategies since 
this is what they can control. This makes intuitive sense but the danger is 
when ambiguity slips from being an emergent phenomenon to becoming 
conceptualized as an attribute, or something that is designed into the system. 
In the following sections, I will take up the idea of ambiguity from another 
perspective, from the field of communication and language use. I will look at 
how perspectives from communication may provide additional resources for 
responding to the open issues in the re-thinking of interpretation in HCI. 
                                                 
43 http://www.sics.se/~kia/ideas/computing.html  
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Re-Thinking Interpretation in Communication 
The potential of communication theory as a resource for designing for 
interpretation seems obvious. Communication, according to some theorists, is 
itself a process of interpretation. In the following sections, I will examine the 
perspectives of communication that address the process of interpretation and 
in particular the parallel development of perspectives supportive of multiple as 
opposed to convergent interpretations. I begin with an overview of 
communication theories, broadly at first outlining some of the major issues 
with regards to interpretation and narrowing to a focus on ambiguity in 
language use. I will then examine the issue of moving from theories of 
interpretation to methods of studying interpretation and review obstacles in the 
translation from theory into designed system.  
Communication as Individual and Mechanical 
The development of communication as a field parallels the narrative 
paths of both art and affect discussed in the case studies. This is not 
surprising. As a history these fields are responding to similar events in time 
and their developments influence each other.  The museum chapter started 
with a reference to the Greek temples of the gods, the affect chapter started 
with reference to Greek philosophers’ conceptions of emotion, and 
communication also traces its roots to the period of Greek rhetoricians. I will 
briefly outline the history of communication as a field, however, starting from 
the Enlightenment: a pivotal period also in the history of museums and affect. 
Several contemporary communication theorists (e.g. Peters, 1989; Shepherd, 
1999; Baxter, 2004) point to the Enlightenment period as providing the two 
core principles underlying the modern day discipline of communication: the 
completeness of the individual and the predictability of mechanical transfer.   
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The focus on the individual during the Enlightenment led to a 
prioritization of internal mental states. The individual was held as “the source 
of significance, the arbiter of meaning, and the locus of reality” (Shepherd, 
1999, p.156). Significance was not only ‘in’ the individual, but ‘bound’ in the 
individual as self-contained and discrete from others. Bakhtin referred to this 
as a view of the monadic self: “a hermetic and self-sufficient whole” (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 273, as cited in Baxter, 2004, p.2). Since internal states such as 
thought, emotion, goals, and motivations were seen to direct the act of 
communication, the implication of this view was to consider communication as 
merely a vehicle within existing disciplines such as psychology, anthropology 
or economics.   
As a vehicle, communication was further perceived of as mechanical 
and ideas simply transferred intact between minds. This mechanistic transfer 
view gained popularity through the development of new communication 
technologies such as the telegraph, telephone and radio during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s. With the rise of distance communication, Peters (1999) 
argued that this new form of mediated communication appeared easier and 
more romantic than the difficulty of face-to-face language work
44. According to 
Peters (1999), the mechanical process of communication technologies, 
whether by analogue or digital signal, began to redescribe interpersonal 
relations: “communication in this sense makes problems of relationships into 
problems of proper tuning or noise reduction” (p. 5).  Overall, the empiricist 
focus on the individual combined with this mechanical vehicle view meant 
                                                 
44 This sentiment about the superiority of mediated versus unmediated communication is later 
echoed with the introduction of computers, prompting Licklider and Taylor (1968) to speculate 
that people would soon “be able to communicate more effectively through a machine than 
face-to-face.” (p.21).  
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communication was seen as a process of transference and success was 
measured in terms of accuracy, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
From these early philosophical beginnings and technical 
advancements, Peters (1999) marks spikes of interest in communication 
around the world wars. After the First World War, there was a renewed interest 
in communication technology as a tool for war, but also in communication itself 
as a means for peace through attempts to promote forums for dialogue. The 
effects of war also spurred a new breed of philosophers and artists, such as 
the Dadaists and Surrealists, to critically challenge the view of communication 
as a neutral vehicle. However, the mechanical view of communication 
continued to gain steam and legitimacy with the development of information 
theory and the introduction of computer technology during the 1940s and 50s. 
Shannon’s Mathematical theory of Communication, for example, served to 
further intertwine communication with information. Whereas Shannon 
proposed to discuss communication of information at the syntactic level with 
information sources, signals, channels, and noise, his collaborator Weaver 
began applying the theory to human communication as well with information 
sources replaced by minds (Radford, 1994).  
The view of mathematics and engineering as esteemed sciences led to 
an institutionalizing of information theory for communication as a field (Peters, 
1986, 1999). Architects of this institutionalization, such as Harold Lasswell, for 
instance, defined communication as ‘who says what to whom in which channel 
with what effect’ and Wilbur Schramm divided the study of communication into 
messages, channels, audiences, and effects (Slack, 2006). Peters (1986) 
goes on to argue that the fledgling field of communication was desperately 
grasping at such theories even if not properly understanding them or  
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marginally using them because of the perceived scientific credibility (see also 
Craig, 1999). Shepherd (1999) argues that this legitimization move suggests 
what is needed to improve communication processes is not theory but 
engineering. Interpretation in this engineering view of communication was a 
‘decoding’ process. There was one right interpretation and it involved matching 
the sender’s original message with what appeared on the receiving end. In this 
way, the history of communication regarding interpretation echoes closely the 
traditional view of interpretation in HCI. 
Communication as a Process of Construction 
The view of communication as a product of a mechanical process 
directed by an autonomous individual is largely out of favor in contemporary 
theories of communication although as I will discuss later, the legacy of this 
earlier development remains. Part of the revision of this foundational approach 
was due to another legitimizing move, reframing communication from an effect 
to a cause of internal states. In other words, rather than conceptualizing 
identity as influencing the practice and form of communication, in the new 
approach, communication influences identity. As a primary process, it warrants 
a discipline of its own. As Deetz (1994) rallied his fellow communication 
scholars: “If we are to make our full social contribution, we have to move from 
studying ‘communication’ phenomena as formed and explained 
psychologically, sociologically, and economically, and produce studies that 
study psychological, sociological, and economic phenomena as formed and 
explained communicationally” (p.568). This shift entails framing 
communication as a process, some say a constitutive one, rather than a 
product. The role of interpretation also shifts in this view, from one of an  
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individual decoding a message to collaborators jointly constructing a message 
in action.  
This move to a view of communication as a primary process requires 
shifting momentum away from the foundational views of individualism and 
mechanics. This counter movement can be found brewing toward the end of 
the 19
th century. At this time, Hegel and Kierkegaard and other philosophers 
began to challenge the primacy of the individual. Philosophers such as Dewey, 
Bakhtin, Heidegger, Habermas, and Marx continued different aspects of this 
movement away from the primacy of the complete individual into the beginning 
of the 20
th century. Hegel’s philosophical project, for instance, was about 
contradictions between opposing terms such as subject and object and his 
response was to see them as intertwined, to create a third space, and to 
consider “meaning as public rather than psychological” (Peters, 1999, p.118). 
Dewey referred to this type of third space between people as the potential for 
new worlds. Identity then becomes constructed from the outside in, or from 
this space in between, through interaction and communication.  
This expanded view of the individual defined through interaction 
corresponds with the complicating of the simple mechanical view of 
communication. Hegel, for example, described communication as a dangerous 
and tragic effort far more difficult than simple mechanistic transport (Peters, 
1999, p.118). Kierkegaard continued this thread, describing communication as 
a process of “revealing and concealing, not of information transfer” as people 
continue to unfold themselves in “an allusive enterprise of hints and evasions” 
(Peters, 1999, p.129). Heidegger took the revision of the mechanical view a 
step further. It was not just that communication consisted of more than 
syntactical exchanges of information or even semantical constructions of  
282 
meaning. For Heidegger, communication was about disclosing new worlds and 
opening up otherness (Peters, 1999). Communication in this sense is 
constitutive of identity, reality, and experience. 
The emergence of the constituting role of communication continues into 
contemporary perspectives, such as a view of communication as ‘relating’ 
(Condit, 2006) or ‘transcendence’’ (Shepherd, 2006).  In describing 
communication as relating, for instance, Condit is careful to point out that she 
does not mean a relationship between discrete entities but between entities 
continuously in the process of formation. She uses the metaphors of stars, 
where the gravity and energy of one constantly pulls on and influences the 
other, thereby changing each mass as well as their relation. In more earthly 
terms, Condit states, “[relationality] does not privilege the isolated things 
created by words over the processes of creation and disassembly which 
makes for the constant changes in beings.” (Condit, 2006, p.6). Similarly, 
Shepherd advocates a view of communication as a “simultaneous experience 
of self and other…overcoming one’s (current) self to become more than what 
one was through connection with the other” (Shepherd, 2006, p.22). He 
clarifies that this ‘self’ is not found as a pre-given entity that we must work to 
uncover but as something that continuously evolves through our experiences 
and connections.  
Since one’s identity is forged through communication, the process of 
communicating intention and meaning cannot be a simple mechanical transfer. 
Shepherd (2006) argues that a definition of communication based on accuracy 
and transmission is a ‘hopeless’ one. If accurate transmission could occur, 
then further conversation would be unnecessary. “After all, once I ‘get’ your 
message, or meaning, the task of communication has been accomplished and  
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we have no further need to talk” (Shepherd, 2006, p.26). Yet if accurate 
transmission cannot occur, why bother attempting to talk at all? The fact that a 
middle ground exists between these options can be seen perhaps most 
usefully through an examination of everyday language use. Therefore, in the 
next two sub-sections, I will look first at theories of language use as 
constitutive communication and then in particular at theories of ambiguity and 
interpretation in language. 
The Linguistic Turn 
The discussions above outline a philosophical and conceptual shift in 
defining communication as a process of construction. More specifically, this 
construction can be seen to happen through language use. In Heidegger’s 
philosophy, for example, he argued that all ‘seeing’ was actually a ‘seeing as’ 
and that all ‘seeing as’ was a form of language use (Heidegger, 1934; Deetz, 
2003). We cannot approach the environment or the other without an act of 
interpretation, influenced by culture, and consequently actively reconstituting 
the outside world. The roots of interest in language use and in particular its 
structure for constituting how we talk about and therefore experience the world 
can be seen in the development of semiotics and structuralism.  
Pierce, one of the founders of semiotics, proposed in the late 1800s a 
theory of signs (e.g. icons, indexes, and symbols) that stood for objects and 
were addressed to interpretants. The relationship between the sign, the object, 
and the interpretant was one of possibility, not set meaning. In this sense, 
Pierce’s conception of meaning is similar to the emergent phenomenon of 
ambiguity discussed by Gaver and colleagues. Whereas Gaver focuses on the 
designer’s manipulation of system attributes, Pierce focused on the language 
producer’s manipulation of signs. In Pierce’s view, communication between  
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people can never be entirely definite, there is always room for interpretation. 
“There are no sure signs in communication, only hints and guesses” (Peters, 
1999, p.268). Similarly, in his study of language, Saussure
45 identified the 
arbitrary relationship between the signifier (the linguistic sign) and the signified 
as the structure of language. He stressed a focus on how language functioned 
as a social activity and he depicted language and thought as two sides of the 
same coin, one influencing the other. These ideas spread and morphed 
through the arts, philosophy, and critical theory. For example, the importance 
of structure for meaning-making inspired an examination of its political 
implications as a determinant force. Ultimately, these views bled into post-
structuralist approaches where signs are not only arbitrary but fluid and at 
times even non-referential.  
In analyzing the structure of language, its functionality, and the 
constructive act of language use, several theorists have outlined maxims, 
principles and constructs guiding language in action and aiding interpretation. 
H. Paul Grice (1975), for example, developed four maxims directed at 
speakers to help facilitate the coordination process of meaning. These 
maxims, which could be considered as design principles for language 
producers, included things such as quantity (i.e. make a statement as 
informative as possible but not more than it needs to be), quality (i.e. be 
truthful and backup evidence), relation (i.e. be relevant), and manner (i.e. 
avoid obscurity, ambiguity, redundancy, and disorderliness). Around this same 
period, John Austin (1962) was developing the idea of speech acts, also a 
structural theory that identified meaning in the speaker’s intention or what the 
                                                 
45 Saussure died in 1913 and his most famous work Cours de linguistique générale was 
written posthumously from the notes of his students and published three years later – an 
interesting exercise in interpretation between signifiers and signs.   
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speaker was trying to do through the act of speech (such as telling, asserting, 
requesting, asking, etc). Examples such as Grice’s maxims, Austin’s structural 
theory, and later Searle’s speech acts (Searle, 1969) provide explicit 
articulation of implicit rules by which language use is coordinated.  
Yet, as Clark (1996) cautioned, these rules and maxims are rules of 
thumb, conventional practices but not beyond challenging. For example, 
Grice’s maxim of avoiding ambiguity to support coordination of meaning is 
violated with common expressions of metaphor, deception, irony, and other 
forms of ambiguous language. Because of the relevance of ambiguity for the 
design spaces I have been exploring, I will look at several instances of 
ambiguous language use including irony, equivocal expressions, deception, 
metaphor and idioms in more detail below.  
Interpretation and Ambiguity 
Despite its apparent contradiction to conventional language use, 
ambiguous language is prominent in everyday discourse, suggesting 
something that we have developed an ability to negotiate. Insights into how 
this happens therefore should help designers understand and anticipate how 
ambiguity emerges. The potential for ambiguity is ever present, as argued 
above regarding the fluid relationship between signs and meaning. Almost 
every expression, according to Clark (1996), has more than one conventional 
meaning. The process of co-interpretation between a speaker and a 
respondent depends upon Clark’s related principles of common ground and 
joint salience.  
Common ground is “the sum of mutual, common, or joint knowledge, 
beliefs and suppositions”  between communicators (Clark, 1996, p.93) and it is 
around this shared base that people coordinate their actions, in this case their  
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use of language.  If two people enter a face to face conversation, they build off 
of their initial common ground of a shared symbol system (e.g. English or 
French), shared perceptions (e.g. common physical fields of view), shared 
conventions (e.g. turn-taking in conversation), and so on. This process of 
drawing from and building new common ground occurs through successive 
presentations of evidence and inference.  The selection of evidence to present 
and its interpretation is guided by the property of joint salience: the most 
salient, prominent, or conspicuous solution with respect to the participants’ 
current common ground. In order to coordinate meaning when every utterance 
could have multiple interpretations, Clark explains:  “We select the lexical entry 
that ‘best fits’ the utterances in context. But what ‘best fits’ comes down to 
really is joint salience – which sense is the most salient solution given our 
current common ground” (Clark, 1996, p.78).  
The example above of choosing one’s words in terms of their perceived 
salience for a specific other suggests one type of ambiguity arises when the 
salience is mistaken or what is salient for one person is not for another. For 
instance, someone assumes a shared reference point or conventions, such as 
an American speaker in Britain asking for the bathroom and a British person in 
America asking for the toilet
46. In such situations, Clark claims that ambiguity is 
resolved and joint action accomplished through repair work. Evidence from the 
respondent suggests he or she misunderstood the request and the requester 
can then frame the question differently. In this eample, ambiguity is a 
coordination problem, or a suboptimal state for joint action, where ambiguity 
                                                 
46 In Britain, a bathroom is literally a room with a bath tub whereas this term is more generic in 
America. In America, if you asked for the ‘toilet’, this would appear crass but this is acceptable 
in Britain. This is somewhat of an exaggerated example however as many Brits and 
Americans can figure out what is needed and recognize it as an example of two countries 
divided by a shared language.   
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must be diminished on the way to common ground and mutual understanding. 
However, in the following examples I will look at specific types of figurative or 
ambiguous language where ambiguity or openness to interpretation is an 
intended state and yet still largely abides by principles for coordination.  
Irony 
Irony (e.g. Clark, 1996; Hancock, 2004) is an example where language 
use appears to violate maxims for coordination yet is readily understood in 
everyday discourse. Clark introduces the idea of ‘layers’ to explain how this 
happens. At layer one, conversants talk about what really is.  They enter into 
alternate layers when an imagined reality is required.  Suppose two people 
walk into a third friend’s house and they are confronted with lava lamps, black 
lighting and velvet posters of Elvis.  Person A turns to person B, raises his 
eyebrows and says “Nice décor.”   Person B, knowing Person A’s impeccable 
tastes nods and says, “Yeah. Long live the King.”  In this exchange, A & B are 
operating at two layers of communication.  In layer one, they agree to jointly 
pretend that the actions in layer two are true.  In layer two, they act out an 
alternate reality, namely that the characters they are playing both like the 
décor.  Ambiguity in this sense does not necessarily exist in the exchange 
between A and B as the evidence of B’s uptake indicates he understood A’s 
intention and agreed to join the pretense.  Instead, ambiguity here exists 
between the layers for someone on the outside.   Irony works through the 
same type of collaborative action Clark describes with less figurative talk but 
by adding an additional device of ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’.  
Deception  
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Clark argued against viewing deception as a type of coordinated action 
since the participants in the conversation have different goals and are not 
working toward a shared reality. However, White and Burgoon (2001) argue 
that deception also requires coordination and follows a discernible pattern of 
interaction. This issue of requiring mutual goals and intention will be taken up 
in a later section, but it appears that deception could easily still occur within 
Clark’s frameworks of language use. In fact, it is possibly the speaker’s 
awareness of conventional maxims that allows for developing a layer of 
imagined reality that the speaker and respondent construct together. One 
difference is that the speaker realizes two layers are operating whereas the 
respondent does not. Ambiguity here exists in the sense of multiple 
interpretations between the in and out group, just as with irony.  
Equivocation 
The development of coordination through ambiguity may also be seen 
in explanations for use of equivocal language. “Equivocation is 
nonstraightforward communication; it appears ambiguous, contradictory, 
tangential, obscure, or even evasive” (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett, 
1990, p.28). Bavelas is careful to distinguish equivocal language from 
deception because something subtle is happening with the layers of 
interpretation. In Bavelas’s construction, equivocal language is more precisely 
defined by explaining what it is for, namely as a response to an ‘avoidance-
avoidance’ situation. When caught between two poor alternatives in a 
communication exchange, Bavelas predicts that equivocation will occur. For 
instance, imagine Person A received a terrible haircut and asks his friend 
Person B what she thinks about it. Person B doesn’t want to tell the truth and  
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hurt her friend’s feelings, but she doesn’t want to lie. Therefore, she chooses 
something that does not do either, for example responding, “I love it when your 
hair gets blonde like this in the summer.” She deflects the real question and 
provides a true compliment instead. Note however that equivocal 
communication is often a way of saving face, and also operates on the 
principles of common ground, where both parties could agree at the reality 
level that their act of communication reaffirms their friendship whereas at the 
imagination level, they take B’s comments as a non-response. In another 
scenario, however, A could choose to interpret B’s response as an affirmative 
– that maybe she thinks the cut brings out the highlights in his hair. Equivocal 
communication then can lead to disparate interpretations or mutual ones.   
Metaphor 
A fourth type of ambiguous language use involves the use of metaphor. 
The richness of metaphor employed in poetic language suggests its openness 
to interpretation as well as our capacity as readers of poetry to understand 
metaphor. For instance, in the poem “Because I Could Not Stop for Death” by 
Emily Dickinson, she uses the metaphor of a coachman and carriage for the 
end of one’s journey in life. Poetic metaphor leaves room for interpretation 
because in the comparison of two unlike or normally separate things, many 
different features may be common or uncommon. Here, too, we can look to 
Clark’s principle of joint salience to suggest what aspects of the comparison 
will direct interpretations. Yet metaphor in poetry also sparks discussions of 
what the poem ‘really’ means, what did the author ‘really’ intend. In other 
words, metaphor may be for encouraging open readings or about making the 
discovery of the intended meaning more engaging.   
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The nature of metaphor and interpretation is not only at issue in poetic 
uses but also in everyday ones. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), for example, 
examine how metaphors such as ‘he shot down my arguments’ or ‘stop 
wasting my time’ promote views of argument as war and time as money 
respectively (p. 4-7). The argument from Lakoff and Johnson and others is that 
we don’t often realize we are using metaphor and take its figurative meaning 
as a given. Reddy (1993), for example, provides insights into why the 
transference model of communication has had such a lasting impact in 
communication theory. In examining everyday discourse, Reddy points to the 
prominence of the conduit metaphor for describing successful and 
unsuccessful communication acts. For example, statements such as “Try to 
get your thoughts across better” (p.166) or “Your words are hollow – you don’t 
mean them” (168) suggest not only do we use language to transfer meaning 
from sender to receiver, but that words have an ‘inside’ to them where 
meaning can be inserted. Reddy comments that most of the metaphors about 
breakdown blame the speaker, “after all receiving and unwrapping a package 
is so passive and so simple – what can go wrong?” (p. 170). This may help 
explain why linguistic studies focused for so long on the speaker as opposed 
to considering language a collaborative act. For my review, however, the 
interesting thing about this example is how easily metaphor ceases to stand as 
metaphor. With the conduit metaphor, for example, rather than one way of 
thinking about or explaining communication, it starts to stand for the essence 
of communication. Rather than opening up interpretation, metaphor can just as 
easily limit it. 
Idioms  
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The final example of figurative language I will address is the use of 
idioms. Idiomatic expressions, such as “you’re pulling my leg”, are a type of 
metaphor but generally function not as a comparison so much as a 
conventional expression. In this example, “you’re pulling my leg” generally 
means “you’re kidding me” or perhaps “you’re trying to fool me.” As an 
example of language use, idiomatic expressions don’t seem to be any different 
than any other word that might have multiple or subtle shades of meaning 
depending on use. However, the perception of an idiomatic expression is that 
its utility is derived from a shared, idiosyncratic, meaning among a group of 
people. This is interesting in light of the work of linguist Geoffrey Nunberg 
(2003, cited in Striphas, 2006). Nunberg examined common expressions 
whose meaning had been taken for granted and the discovery that often 
people who assume they are using an expression the same way hold different, 
and even opposite intentions. He used the example of the phrase “on the up 
and up” and how one person in a married couple meant it as “on the level” and 
the other partner meant it as “on the increase”. This fascinated the couple to 
discover that despite their years together and similar backgrounds they could 
talk past each other and not realize it. Clark’s model would explain this 
misperception was based on lack evidence that understanding had not 
occurred, therefore there was no need for repair work. The couple believed 
they had common ground yet each had a different interpretation. Through the 
ambiguity of the expression, two alternate interpretations emerged, but without 
awareness of the discrepancy. At a trivial level, this example seems simply like 
a misunderstanding – one that was eventually repaired at the couple’s 
discovery of their differences. The next time one of them uses ‘on the up and 
up’, they might realize they need further clarification. However, at a deeper  
292 
level, the example highlights what we might assume to be a rare occasion that 
actually happens quite a lot. As Nunberg concluded: “We can never be sure 
we’re understanding each other…But maybe the wonder of it all is that we 
manage to muddle through even so.”  
In all of the above examples, what is striking is the similarity between 
how ambiguity and interpretation is defined in communication studies and the 
trajectory and approach in HCI. On the one hand, ambiguity is a mark of a 
failure to communicate, e.g. the coordination did not follow existing maxims. 
On the other hand, if ambiguous language deliberately violated these maxims 
the ultimate goal is still a type of convergence. In irony, convergence occurs 
among the in-group; in deception, the convergence is around the ‘false’ story; 
in equivocal language, the convergence is around an alternate exchange; in 
metaphor convergence often happens whether intended or not; in idioms we 
often assume convergence even if it does not exist. Although the constitutive 
approach to communication challenged the primacy and completeness of an 
individual and the language use approach challenges the reification of 
conventions, there is still a sense in which the process is one of matching 
meanings. In the following section, I will examine whether there is space within 
communication for the approach to interpretation in HCI being advocated by 
Sengers and Gaver (2006), namely interpretation that allows and works for 
multiple instead of single interpretations.  
Interpretation: Matching versus Approximating 
Roberts and Bavelas (1996) characterize the construction or action 
approach to studying communication, and in particular language use, as a shift 
regarding where meaning resides “from in words, to in words and their context, 
to in the speaker’s intention, and finally, to in between interlocutors” (cited in  
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Kelshaw, 2006, p.156). This still leads to the question of “what” is being 
constructed. If meaning resides in between interlocutors is it a single shared 
meaning? Is the goal of communication still a matching of minds, only the 
direction has shifted from inside out to outside in? The discussion above 
regarding ambiguity and interpretation suggests that even though we use 
language designed for leaving room for interpretation, the goal still seems to 
orient toward a shared meaning. At this point, I could conclude that based on 
communication theory and studies of language use, designing for openness is 
doomed from the start. Whereas science and technology studies suggests 
designing for openness is somewhat irrelevant since people appropriate 
designs regardless of whether openness is intended, this reading of 
communication theory suggests that regardless of how open a design is, 
people will work their way into a shared interpretation that eventually becomes 
dominant and part of common ground. Yet, I believe this conclusion might be 
premature. In this section, I will re-examine common ground as 
accommodating multiple interpretations and summarize new movements in 
communication theory suggesting yet another parallel development with HCI. 
In an early reading of Clark (1996), I found two aspects of his theory 
that called for further examination. The first was the (deflected) discussion on 
‘uncommon ground’. Common ground in Clark’s formulation is built on 
common ground, but this begs the question of how common ground begins. 
Clark dismisses this conundrum as a more apparent than real problem. He 
suggests that without common ground to start with people likely build up 
perceived common ground based on misunderstanding, which may later 
become worked out, as in the idiom example above from Nunberg. The 
second weakness in Clark’s theory is the focus on mutual goals and a narrow  
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definition of collaborative acts. Based on personal experience working in the 
field of conflict management, I witnessed collaborative exchanges between 
people holding opposite views – where each utterance anticipated each 
counter utterance. In other words, they were mutually working to hold opposite 
views. Similarly, Pearce (1989) discusses intractable communication patterns 
as exhibiting this type of collaborative behavior where participants, often 
despite their best efforts to end a pattern, maintain a type of downward spiral. 
His patients would say things like: “I knew if I said X, it would escalate the 
argument, but I just couldn’t help myself.” As mentioned earlier, new thinking 
on deception has also challenged the view that communication requires a joint 
goal. These two questions of uncommon ground and non-commensurate 
goals, suggests either a re-interpretation of Clark’s theory or new theory to 
account for these phenomena.  
Nunberg’s analysis of the idiom example helps begin to reformulate 
ideas around uncommon ground. Nunberg shifted the focus from the moment 
when the repair work happens to the time period up to this point – the time 
during which the couple holds different interpretations yet still manages to 
‘muddle through.’ This example is part of a larger argument by Striphas (2006) 
in his conception of communication as translation. In Striphas’s view, there is 
always a gap of interpretation, i.e. there always exist multiple interpretations of 
varying degrees of resonance. He uses the practice of translation because the 
traditional view of translation studies (e.g. from one sign system to another, 
such as from English to French) is that it is a downgrading of the original 
message. We accept translation as a necessary evil and we consider it 
something that happens relatively infrequently, such as when traveling to a 
foreign country. Whereas a dominant view of communication, according to  
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Striphas, privileges shared understanding and is biased toward mutuality, 
translation does not.  Striphas’s conclusion however is not that translation 
exists on the margin of the dominant practice of communication, but that 
translation is the dominant form of communication, therefore requiring a new 
definition of communication. Translation is “always an approximation…always 
a ‘good enough’ and never exact” (p. 234). The focus of translation, and 
communication in general in this view, is on making do, misunderstanding, 
contingency, and difference. This suggests that rather than repair work 
marking a failure to communicate, we are always in the process of repair, 
always improvising approximations and managing multiple interpretations.  
The shift in considering common ground and mutual understanding as 
the dominant state of affairs is also taken up by Shepherd (2006) and Baxter 
(2006) in their respective presentations of communication as transcendence 
and communication as dialogue. Shepherd’s definition of transcendence, and 
by his extension communication, is “the simultaneous experience of self and 
other” (Shepherd, 2006, p. 22). He emphasizes a non-foundational view of self 
or other but recognizing each as in the process of ‘always becoming’ – not a 
‘better sense of self’ which implies uncovering something that was always 
there, but – an expanded sense of self (p.24). Since the ‘other’ is the flip of the 
self, we can never truly understand each other as both selves are in the 
process of change. Shepherd concludes that what we aim for is not “accurate 
interpretations” of each other, but understanding in the sense of “sympathetic 
awareness” (p. 24). He unpacks this idea of sympathetic awareness as the 
sharing of significance rather than meaning: “It is, in other words, the 
significance of the experience of one another that we share – each of us  
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becoming more, not by our actions alone, but because of our interactions” (p. 
24-25, emphasis in original).  
Baxter also addresses the idea of otherness in her approach to 
communication as dialogue developed through the work of Bakhtin (Baxter, 
2006). She argues, “Diversity is the ubiquitous condition of humanity, yet 
communication scholars partition it off, view it negatively, or ignore it 
completely” (p. 102). The philosophy of Bakhtin, in contrast, focuses on both 
difference and cohesion or what he called the centripetal (unity) and 
centrifugal (difference) forces always at work in dialogue. Dialogue does not 
require commonality in its objectives according to Baxter (2004). She 
differentiates it from a Hegelian dialectic that moves from thesis to antithesis 
and ultimately to synthesis. In dialogue, synthesis need not be the outcome. 
All dialogue retains elements of the dialectical in terms of a to and fro of 
difference, but not all dialectics are about dialogue (Baxter, 2004). Baxter’s 
reading of Bakhtin’s formulation of aesthetic dialogue resonates with the view 
of communication as characterized by messiness with only fleeting moments 
of order or wholeness. She highlights Bakhtin’s work against monologic 
wholeness as possible or even ideal as this leads to hegemony and 
dominance of the powerful. In contrast, Bakhtin worked for aesthetic 
wholeness to accomplish “a momentary sense of unity through a profound 
respect for the disparate voices in dialogue” (Baxter, 2004, p.12).  
Peters (1999) also advocates a view of dialogue that does not require 
mutuality. Yet, he argues against using the term ‘dialogue’ to describe 
communication because of its connotations of unity and harmony, what he 
sees as utopian baggage, and because of the equally likely possibility that 
dialogue, just as totalitarian discourse, can become a vehicle of hegemony.  
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Regardless of his choice of term, Peters’ view of communication is very similar 
to Baxter’s (and Bhaktin’s) and Shepherd’s described above. Peters furthers 
their argument by challenging the assumption that co-located human-to-
human communication is the most ideal form of communication, the gold 
standard against which distance communication or communication between 
human and animal or human and machine are compared and modeled. If the 
momentary connection with others is the hallmark of dialogue, then this opens 
up what is considered communication to include conversing with computers, 
aliens, and the dead (Peters, 1999). Furthermore, in countering the ideal of co-
location, Peters uses as an analogy of an experiment by James Clerk Maxwell 
in 1873 that demonstrated the irreducible quality of distance. In Maxwell’s 
experiment, he pressed two plates of glass together with the help of pulleys, 
levers and weights and used a light source’s reflected patterns to determine if 
the plates acted as two lenses or one. Despite eventually welding the plates 
together because of the force, the pattern always showed that some distance 
was retained. Likewise, Peters argues that as humans, there are always gaps 
to navigate even in face-to-face communication regardless of the appearance 
that distance does not exist. 
Yet, Peters takes his argument a step further when he proposes that an 
‘other’ need not even exist for communication to occur. This is what he intends 
by the title of his 1999 book, Speaking Into the Air, and his conceptualization 
of communication as dissemination rather than dialogue (Peters, 2006). For 
instance, he suggests that if someone raises his hand as a gesture, this signal 
does not need to be noticed by anyone for communication to occur. In a more 
detailed example to justify his position, he proposes a thought experiment with 
Da Vinci’s painting of the Mona Lisa. He imagines a scenario where all the  
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humans on the planet have disappeared yet this particular artifact is left 
behind for the contemplation of the beasts. The beasts would not understand 
its cultural significance or even that it represented a human likeness 
(apparently these beasts were not around when humans were). Instead, the 
beasts would only consider it a perceptual novelty. Despite this lack of uptake, 
Peters argues that the painting would still be saying something, even if no one 
were around to hear it. Both of Peters’ examples, however, still suggest the 
presence of an other. In the former example of the gesture, the gesture was 
intended for a recipient who simply didn’t see it. In the example of the Mona 
Lisa, the painting was also created for an other, yet this other could change 
from the past, present, to the future. Peters himself confirms this view later in 
his book when he suggests, “All talk is an act of faith predicated on the future’s 
ability to bring forth the worlds called for. Meaning is an incomplete project, 
open-ended and subject to radical revision by later events” (Peters, 1999, 
p.267). In other words, the Geist
47 or irreducible meaning that Peters tries to 
locate within the Mona Lisa represents the potential for communication not the 
act itself.   
Pushed to its extreme, Peters’ conception of dissemination as a 
contrast to dialogue has dangerous consequences. First, it could lead to the 
same un-hopefulness Shepherd predicted in situations that required perfect 
symmetry. A view that requires no attempt toward symmetry, however, also 
suggests communication is unnecessary and futile. Peters’ overall argument 
                                                 
47 Peters borrows the term Geist from Hegel to mean both the material and the spiritual, a third 
space. He argues that the Geist in the Mona Lisa is “entirely autonomous from any viewer’s 
perception of that painting. The painting holds more than the sum of what it is in the eyes of its 
beholders, and it holds an objective intelligence that can never be reduced to the aggregated 
individual mental experiences of its viewers.” (Peters, 1999, p.116). Peters use of the term 
‘autonomous’ is curious. Although the Geist may be non-reducible to one view or to a simple 
aggregation of views, surely it is dependent on this disparity of views existing?  
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does not support this, but parts of his argument, such as the depiction of 
speaking into the air, deny that the potential for brief moments of connection 
exists. Peters’ dissemination resembles the sentiment of modern and 
minimalist art from the middle of the twentieth century: the artist speaks and 
there the art stops. Whether a viewer engages or not is irrelevant.  Speaking 
into the air in its extreme is sound that carries forever, without boundaries of 
receptors. Furthermore, his arguments for perpetual distance, although on the 
one hand providing a much needed balance against the valorization of face-to-
face communication, on the other hand risk throwing the balance too far 
toward distance at the expense of ever momentarily transcending the gap. In 
other words, as the constructive move to language argued against the 
impermeability and completeness of the individual, Peters’ argument could be 
easily drawn on to support re-closing the individual. If we can never reach 
across the void, we either must be complete in and of ourselves or we must 
live our lives as incomplete beings never to find fulfillment. Finally, by denying 
the role of reciprocity, Peters’ argument suggests that it does not matter what 
someone does. Yet this position does not square with his emphasis on 
pragmatics: “whatever ‘communication’ might mean, it is more fundamentally a 
political and ethical problem than a semantic one.” (Peters, 1999, p.30). In this 
view, the outcome of communication is highlighted as equally important as the 
process. 
A more interesting question that Peters is posing is whether or not the 
intention to communicate must exist for communication to occur. Returning to 
the gesture example, in his scenario, a person raises his hand in gesture but it 
is not seen or perhaps interpreted as merely a reflex. One person intended it 
as a communicative act, an invitation to join in communication and the other,  
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while not actively denying it, did not perceive it as such. The flip side of this 
scenario would be if someone raises his hand in a reflex and a bystander 
interprets it as a gesture. In this scenario the observer intends to engage in a 
communicative exchange but the other does not. In Peters’ view, the intention 
to communicate, as well as the intention of the communication, can be 
isomorphic. This contrasts with the view of most constructive approaches to 
communication and language use that require reciprocity of intentions but not 
necessarily mutuality. Shepherd’s view of communication, for instance, 
suggests that communication is ‘voluntary’ – it requires volition to speak and to 
accept, what he argues is an empowering view. As Shepherd states: 
“communication is not something that happens in spite of you but because of 
you” (Shepherd, 2006, p. 27).  
One way of aligning these two different views is to consider Peters’ 
formulation as having communicative potential. The vision of communication 
put forth by Peters is at base more hopeful than his metaphors of speaking 
into the air and irreducible gaps. As he states: “The task is to find an account 
of communication that erases neither the curious fact of otherness at its core 
nor the possibility of doing things with words. Language is resistant to our 
intent and often, in Heidegger’s phrase, speaks us; but it is also the most 
reliable means of persuasion we know. Though language is a dark vessel that 
does not quite carry what I, as a speaking self, might think it does, it still 
manages to coordinate action more often than not” (Peters, 1999, p.21-22). 
The conclusion, one made by Peters, Baxter, Shepherd and several other 
theorists, is that the coordination of action does not require meaning between 
two people to be isomorphic.  
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Based on the above discussion I believe an alternate, or compatible, 
reading of Clark’s formulation of common ground is possible. Joint common 
ground need not be exact – in fact, the perception of common ground may be 
enough for coordination or ‘muddling through.’ Common could be thought of 
more as ‘sympathetic’ in the Shepherd sense. After all, we can never 
completely have a shared reality or as Wittgenstein is often quoted, if we 
taught a lion to speak we still couldn’t understand him (Wittgenstein, 1958). 
The commonality of our symbol system is not enough to produce symmetrical 
meanings but is enough to work toward sympathetic ones. Because of this 
reformulation of common ground, the space for ‘uncommon ground’ exists as 
well. Common ground and uncommon ground, understanding and 
misunderstanding, are not binary choices. In other words, if we agree that the 
common will never be exact, then we are never exactly uncommon either. This 
space in between is where communication happens. Arendt commented that 
this dynamic character of equality and distinction establishes the basic 
condition for human plurality. She observed, “If men were not equal, they could 
neither understand each other and see those who came before them nor plan 
for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men 
were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, 
or ever will be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves 
understood. Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs 
and wants would be enough” (Arendt, 1959, p. 155-156). 
In rethinking Clark’s framework, his model of interpretation remains 
unchanged and highlighted in significance. Interpretation is always an 
approximate link between available evidence (which includes perceived 
common ground) and intention (see Figure 20). Although a simple formulation,  
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this has important implications for design, as will be discussed in a later 
section.  The available evidence may be considered of higher or lower quality, 
but neither the quality nor the quantity of evidence available can guarantee 
that the link between evidence and intention is complete (Boehner and 
Hancock, 2006). This reformulation of Clark also spurred me to rethink the 
inverse relationship I had originally formulated between ambiguity, defined as 
openness to multiple interpretations, and common ground (see Figure 21). In 
an earlier paper (Boehner, 2004), I had considered that more common ground 
would lead to less openness to interpretation, that people would work through 
openness until they had settled on an agreement or convention. I saw the 
funnel as operating both ways, but generally in a more narrowing function. To 
some degree, I believe this is what often happens, that through experience, 
conventions develop and that conventions tend to limit openness. But, I’ve 
reformulated my model in subtle but important ways.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Inferring intention is 
always a matter of interpreting 
produced evidence 
Figure 21. An earlier model of 
common ground and ambiguity as an 
opposite relationship 
 
 
increasing ambiguity
openness to interpretation
building common ground 
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In Figure 22, the horizontal divide in the funnel represents the non-
isomorphic nature of shared meaning between people (in this model I’m 
depicting a dyadic exchange). The shape of the funnel represents the potential 
space for interpretation, which may be narrower or wider depending on a 
number of factors. Common ground may also be more or less within this 
funnel, but it does not map linearly. In other words, more common ground may 
be associated with a narrower space for interpretation but this is not always 
the case. Movement happens both horizontally and vertically. Vertically, if the 
dots are far apart, it suggests a wider gap between interpretations. The 
horizontal movement represents changes in the space available for 
interpretation, the dots moving right and left according to a number of factors 
that define this available space. If the dots exist at different points along the 
spectrum, it suggests differences in their perception of the interpretation 
space. For instance if one is at the far right side, she might work harder to 
make herself understood because of her perceived potential for the variety in 
interpretations whereas her partner might be more toward the left side thinking 
alignment (not perfect) is easier. The model does not suggest that mutual 
alignment is required (the gap depicts its possibility only through momentary 
transcendence) or even desired by the participants as a goal.  
 
     
Figure 22. from left to right, two people with a) close interpretations in a wide 
field of possibility, b) more divergent interpretations in a narrower space, c) 
extremely close interpretations yet different perceptions of the range.  
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I do not offer the above as a predictive model but merely as a thinking 
framework for emphasizing that ambiguity and common ground are not 
opposing concepts, yet they are interrelated. In developing other work with 
Hancock (Boehner and Hancock, 2006), we played with the idea of ambiguity 
as an amoeba, that the shape of potential ambiguity in a conversation or 
communicative exchange never changes but instead it just changes shape. If 
one piece of information is pinned down, something else might open up.  We 
found this to be a more radical argument, however, to support. In common 
experience, there are situations we recognize as having more or less 
openness to interpretation. If I return to the idea of levels of interpretation 
introduced by Sengers and Gaver (2006), at the physical level, for example 
pointing to an oak table and saying to a friend, “I like that table,” the 
interpretation linking my words to my pointing to the physical reality in front of 
us is fairly straight forward. At higher levels of interpretation, things may open 
up more. For instance, why do I like this table and why did I choose to point it 
out to my friend? Was it a suggestion for a present? Was I merely making 
conversation? Was it an indication that I liked this table but not that table? The 
argument that all communication is ambiguous is one advocated by many 
theorists, including those discussed in this and the previous sections. 
However, the argument that the level of ambiguity stays the same is more 
difficult to support. In contrast, the funnel or wedge model depicted above 
suggests movement (horizontally and vertically) but it also illustrates that 
situations may vary in the amount of openness. 
This section on the movement from transmission approaches to 
constructive approaches in communication theory has paralleled a similar 
trajectory as the field of HCI. For instance, both moved from a view of  
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transmission of meaning or use in the abstract to an emphasis on meaning in 
interaction and in context. The observation that both fields are also 
reconsidering the symmetry requirement of this interaction suggests a further 
confluence of interests. In the next section, I will turn from the overriding model 
of communication as one of construction to a discussion of how this model 
translates into both methods for studying interpretation and implications or 
connections with designs for interpretation. This discussion will set the stage 
for proposing specific suggestions for reviewing the theory, design, and 
evaluation of the case studies presented in the earlier chapters.  
Communication Method and Theory for HCI Design 
In this section, I will begin with a discussion of how a conceptualization 
of communication as construction translates into approaches to studying 
communication. I will not examine specific methods per se, such as discourse 
analysis, but instead I will examine the orientation toward methods. This is in 
the same spirit as Craig (1989) and his interpretation of Kaplan (1964) who 
focuses on the description, explanation, and justification of methods and not 
the particular methodological techniques. In this sense then, I am moving from 
a general theory of communication (communication as construction) to a 
theory of how to study communication as construction. In the final section, I 
will make a similar move in considering how a theory of communication as 
construction influences the orientation and practice of design. 
Communication Methods for Studying Interpretation 
Although the above section on re-thinking interpretation identifies 
communication as a field moving from a focus on transmission of meaning to 
the construction of meaning and a focus on messages to interaction, the field  
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is far from homogeneous. Several scholars remark that the field is still split 
rather than a definitive movement from transmission to construction (e.g. 
Shepherd, 1999; Baxter, 2006). Where this split may still exist is not in the 
general acceptance of the interaction view of language use in particular and 
communication in general but in the move from theory toward methods. For 
example, in a review of communication studies literature from 2000 to 2005, 
Poole
48 concluded that only ten percent of the publications reported on 
studying communication as a process, as opposed to the variable view. In 
addition, if he removed discourse analysis studies from his sample, the 
number of process oriented studies reduced to less than five percent. Poole 
presented this as a puzzle and a challenge – if as scholars we define 
communication as a process, then why do our methodologies and studies not 
reflect this as well? If interaction and construction has indeed become the 
dominant view in communication theory, perhaps where the divide still lies is in 
how interaction is studied as opposed to conceptualized. 
In the following sub-sections, I will discuss common approaches to 
studying the construction view of communication and how these approaches 
still orient around the construction of a single meaning or interpretation. In 
pursuit of theories amenable to the construction of multiple meanings or 
interpretations, new methods of study must be developed. In particular, 
because support for multiple meanings and the emergent construction of 
meaning, rather than the location of pre-existing meaning, challenges the goal 
of prediction, I will explore the alternate criterion of ‘usefulness’ as developed 
in the grounded practical theory approach. I will end this section with 
                                                 
48 Poole, M.S. 2005. “The Study of Process in Communication Research: Old Wine in new 
Bottles and New Wine in Old Bottles”, seminar at Cornell University’s Communication 
Department, Oct.21, 2005, Ithaca, NY.  
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reflections on how new criteria for methods in theory building and method 
selection would influence the study of the case examples from chapter two 
and three. 
Legacy of Transmission 
The tension between theory and the practice of ‘doing theory’ or 
studying a theory in practice, is discussed by several of the theorists 
introduced above who write about the challenges of a constructive or relational 
view of communication. Baxter (2004), for example, comments on the difficulty 
of escaping the legacy of the individualistic and mechanistic pillars discussed 
in the introduction of this chapter. She observes that most studies in her field 
of interpersonal communication still frame relationships as a coordination of 
individual parties where success is measured by the efficacy and efficiency of 
the coordination as opposed to the quality of construction. Likewise, Deetz 
(2003) argues for the need to reclaim the spirit of the linguistic turn. He claims 
that current studies in his field of organizational communication oriented 
around language and discourse use ultimately recreate the same subject and 
object dualism that the original phenomenological and constructivist turns 
sought to overcome. Furthermore, in Shepherd’s review of advances in 
communication theory, he underscores how often terms such as ‘breakdown’ 
and ‘message production’ reflect a continued mechanistic view of 
communication (Shepherd, 1999). The individual and mechanistic legacies 
that gave rise to the transmission view of communication continue in the study 
of construction.  
Perhaps the greatest legacy reflected in contemporary research of the 
individualistic and mechanistic traditions is an emphasis on identifying 
component parts and predicting causal relations between components. This is  
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related to the argument Myers (2001) makes regarding the dominant techno-
determinism in early computer mediated communication studies. Both Myers 
and Craig (2001) argue that when a new medium is developed, studies often 
use socio-psychological approaches of isolating causal variables and 
predictive models around how certain attributes of the new medium may 
predict behaviors. For example, during the early years of the Internet, theorists 
predicted that the loss of social context information would lead to ‘de-
individuation’ (Myers cites Kiesler, Siegal, & McGuire, 1984 as a prime 
example). The attributes of the medium then would cause or determine certain 
behaviors reflective of a different view of self. The current interest in online 
communities and self-expression challenges this techno-deterministic view 
that the medium’s attributes can routinely dictate and restrain behavior in only 
one direction. As an example of an opposite approach, coming from the 
determining qualities of the person, in White and Burgoon’s (2001) deception 
work, they explore how a person’s interaction position (defined as his or her 
requirements, expectations, and desires for behavior) can predict their initial 
pattern of interaction (such as approach, avoidance, reciprocity and 
compensation). Finally, in Bavelas’s studies of equivocal communication, also 
discussed earlier, the causal element is the context, for instance in an 
avoidance-avoidance situation, equivocal communication is likely to occur. In 
these three studies, the causal locus varies from the attributes of the 
technology to the attributes of the person to the attributes of the situation, yet 
the relationship remains as a type of linear cause-effect. The question remains 
of how to study issues of emergence, such as discussed in the very beginning 
of this chapter regarding ambiguity as a property that emerges from the 
interplay of people, context, and material artifacts.   
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Shepherd, Striphas, and St. John (2006) argue that this emphasis on 
prediction, control, and cause and effect models in studies of communication 
reflect the scientific empiricism that has guided a large portion of academic 
research in many of the social sciences. Furthermore, they argue this has led 
to an increasing interest in the ‘methods’ of research, at times at the expense 
of new insights. They write, “the powerfully humanist belief that the inherent 
sense of an idea – its place in a community, its emergence within an 
identifiable tradition, or its reflection of a way of life – is the strongest measure 
of an idea’s worth was overwhelmed by method. In an astonishingly brief time, 
the new empirical paradigm began to declare that what made a theory ‘good’ 
was whether it could be proven, where proof was confined to normative and 
potentially limiting rules of measure and referral” (p.xv). Slack (2006) also 
comments on an overriding emphasis on methods, not only as predictive of 
some phenomenon of study, but predictive in and of themselves as refined 
and replicable techniques. She comments, “when I read studies in 
communication that find comfort – indeed, mastery – in a restricted ‘scientistic’ 
version of method, I am astonished that so many competent scholars seem 
content with the neatness of their work, the conformity of their method and 
approach, to the detriment of reaching critical insights about the world they are 
studying. When Stuart Hall (1992, p. 280) states that ‘the only theory worth 
having is that which you have to fight off, not that which you speak with 
profound fluency,’ he warns us away from taking any theory and reifying it into 
a paper cutout with which to withdraw from the unexpected richness and 
complexity of the real world as well as to the political realities of oppression” 
(p. 230). A particular emphasis on methods, and methods that serve to predict 
results and verify existing theories, presents a challenge to theories of  
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communication where meaning emerges as opposed to being found or 
dictated. 
Beyond Prediction and Control 
A starting point for matching methods to the view of communication as 
supporting multiple interpretations or ‘hints and guesses’, as opposed to 
coordinated meanings, is to search for new criteria. Criteria such as predictive 
power and verifiability that dictate both the evaluation of theories and the 
methods these theories tend to employ are more appropriate for a view of 
matching meanings in construction as opposed to being open to multiple or 
missed constructions. As Shepherd notes typical measures of accuracy and 
correspondence, for example, do not apply in his formulation of 
communication as transcendence. If transcendence is an ‘experience’, then as 
an experience “they can not be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, or true 
and false” instead experiences can be thought of as good or bad, happy or 
sad, memorable or forgettable (Shepherd, 2006, p. 23). This interest in 
personal, lived experience is related to the view proposed by Bochner and 
Ellis (2006) who argue that a cause and effect approach narrows the focus of 
study to phenomenon that may be explained by instrumentality, the reduction 
of uncertainty, and the application of rational decision making. Yet, if the 
interest is in understanding more messy circumstances, such as what people 
do when their original intentions go awry, when their intentions are at cross 
purposes, or when they are attempting to ‘muddle through’ a communication 
event, then the interest is in eliciting stories of significance from people not in 
predictive results. 
Craig refers to these stories as people’s everyday discourse about 
discourse and he offers this as an example of practical theory making (Craig,  
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1999, 2006). The discipline of communication itself in Craig’s 
conceptualization is also a practical theory and I will use his framework for 
thinking about the study of communication in this way to explore alternate 
criteria beyond cause-effect predictive models.  Craig positions formal 
communication theories as a more abstract and specialized process than the 
process people use themselves in constructing their own theories about what 
works and what doesn’t in their everyday communicative encounters. Yet, 
formal communication theories, he argues, have the same objective as these 
everyday theories in that they guide reflection and choices. When people 
theorize about their own communicative acts, it is not merely to describe to 
themselves what they are doing but it is a practice for thinking about why 
something went awry or how they might go about engaging in a future 
conversation. Craig argues that this same type of theorizing is desirable in 
formal communication theory. Whereas scientific theorizing is concerned with 
what is and the goal is to discover general explanations of phenomena with 
predictive power, normative theorizing is concerned with what ought to be and 
seeks to “articulate normative ideals by which to guide the conduct and 
criticism of practice” (Craig and Tracy, 1995, p.249). 
Normative theories, however, have come under fire as much as 
scientific theories. In fact, scientific theories when under the most attack could 
be seen as parading as normative theories, dictating what ought to be, when 
only asserting what is. For example, in the quote above from Shepherd, 
Striphas and St. John regarding the need for new criteria, they rail against the 
‘normative’ restrictions of scientific method. In this sense, the normative rules 
of what ought to be when practicing scientific method directs the reality or 
‘what is’ discovered. The caution with normative theories is in avoiding  
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statements of what ought to be turning into a reification of existing norms. 
Craig suggests however that his ideal of normative theory is one that identifies 
norms that are useful for critically reflecting on practice, not rigidly determining 
practice (Craig and Tracy, 1995; Craig, 1999, Craig, 2006). Craig also points 
out the weakness of normative theories that are often disassociated from 
actual practice, that address universal issues of power for instance but have 
less to say about how to ground the theory in practice. Finally, Craig 
differentiates normative theories from rule-based theories that do not propose 
rules but instead describe human behavior through the rules that seem to 
optimize or govern certain practices. Like scientific theories, rules-based 
theories focus on what is in contrast to what ought to be. Craig’s concern with 
what ought to be stems from his belief that the goal of any communication 
study should be to advance the practical art, or praxis, of communication.  
In order to address the charge that normative theory is often divorced 
from the actual problems and practices of particular situations, Craig and 
Tracy propose a particular methodological model to developing normative 
theories, an approach they call grounded practical theory (1995, p. 250). The 
goal of grounded practical theory is to engage in the “theoretical reconstruction 
of a practice” (p.252), in this case the practice of communicating. Craig and 
Tracy’s application of grounded practical theory is very similar in spirit to the 
practice of reflective design in that it begins with existing practices and looks 
for the assumptions that have guided and continue to guide choices in this 
practice. In applying grounded practical theory, the practice is narrowed down 
even further to a particular situation, for instance, in Craig and Tracy’s case 
study they look at intellectual discourse in an internal university seminar series 
with faculty and graduate students. A theoretical reconstruction looks for ideals  
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of practice, but not in the sense of uncovering “some inherent unchanging 
‘essence’ but rather to construct a tentative, revisable, but still rationally 
warranted normative model…. The ultimate test of such a practical theory is 
not, then, like scientific theory, its capacity to explain an existing reality but 
rather its usefulness for practice and reflection. The underlying philosophy is 
not realism (theory describes the world) or idealism (theory constitutes the 
world) but rather a reflective pragmatism (theory informs praxis)” (1995, p. 
252, emphasis in the original). In this sense, Craig and Tracy’s goal for 
normative theory has shades of generative theory, in that it is not only about 
what ought to be, but through critical reflection it can also shape what could 
be. This discussion begins to identify a possible new criterion beyond 
prediction: usefulness for practice and reflection. Understanding how to apply 
a criterion of ‘usefulness’ requires unpacking grounded practical theory in 
more detail.  
Grounded Practical Theory: Evaluating ‘Usefulness’ 
The key for Craig and Tracy’s model is their identification of three 
interrelated levels where reconstruction of practice takes place: at the 
technical, problem, and philosophical level. Their starting point, the ‘grounding’ 
move, is at the problem level, thereby differentiating their view of normative 
theory from traditional philosophical views. The usefulness of any norm, 
according to Craig and Tracy, revolves around how it addresses actually 
experienced problems. Therefore, in their application of this approach to a 
specific case study of intellectual discourse in a university department, they 
begin with an analysis of the participants’ discourse and the way the 
participants talk about their discourse to identify the problems and tensions 
participants recognize. The table below (see Table 3) identifies the focus of  
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each of these levels and outlines the case example of examining intellectual 
discourse between faculty and graduate students during their seminar series.  
 
Table 3. Reconstituting practice at three levels and a case example of each 
Level  Main focus  Case Example: Academic discussion 
Technical:  
the specific 
communicative 
strategies and 
techniques routinely 
available and 
employed within the 
practice 
How we 
work 
Assess the general knowledge level of 
different speakers and questioners. Tailor 
question difficult to perceived skill level. 
For lower skill levels, frame questions as 
prodding suggestions, “have you thought 
about…” as opposed to “why didn’t you 
consider…”.  
Problem:  
the specific 
problems or 
dilemmas that bring 
forth normative 
(philosophical) 
reflection and drive 
the use of specific 
techniques (i.e. 
strategic action). 
What we 
focus on, 
what we 
deliberate 
over 
When asking questions in an academic 
seminar, there is a tension between 
supporting intellectual standards/rigor 
versus engaging in self-aggrandizing 
displays of one’s own intellect. For 
instance, asking a speaker hard 
questions may be seen as advancing 
debate and the quality of the idea or as 
showcasing one’s own superior intellect. 
Philosophical: 
abstract but 
elaborated 
normative ideals 
and principles that 
provide the rationale 
for resolving a 
problem in one way 
or another 
Why we 
choose or 
do what we 
do 
Two competing ‘situated ideals’ may be 
at play in academic discourse: the 
dialectical ideal and the constructive 
criticism ideal
49. These contrasting ideals 
are often held by different people to 
different degrees yet both are at play. 
Understanding the ideals allows for 
greater reflection on how the practice of 
this setting is informed.   
                                                 
49 In comparing these situated ideals, Craig and Tracy (1995) identify the following 
characteristics. The dialectical ideal prioritizes: the merit of an idea; recognizing that ideas will 
cause strong feelings in others that they have a ‘right to express’; and the stance that power 
differences between people exist but altering debate to fit this reifies the difference – all ideas 
should be treated equally. In contrast, the constructive criticism ideal: sees people and ideas 
as intertwined; cautions that expression of strong feelings about another’s ideas has the 
potential to wound and shut down dialogue; maintains that power differences (e.g. between 
faculty and graduate students) should inform how to frame questions and answers.  
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In proposing grounded practical theory as an alternative to scientific 
theory, Craig and Tracy must demonstrate how their approach does more than 
describe or explain a communication practice. Furthermore, if their goal is not 
prediction or accuracy, then they must articulate how a good application of 
their theory is differentiated from a bad one, and indeed how they determine 
the merits of the theory itself. They argue that the instantiation of their theory is 
judged, i.e. its criteria of success, by its usefulness to inform critical reflection 
on practice.  
Craig and Tracy describe three possible ways to test this usefulness. 
For the first approach, they propose sharing the theoretical reconstructions 
with participants and then assessing the subsequent role these 
reconstructions have in informing the participants’ subsequent critical 
reflection and practice of communication. For example, in their case study, 
they could share their resultant identification of normative models and situated 
ideals with the participants and then assess how the participants use or ignore 
these reconstructions in their further academic discussions. This process 
becomes reflexive then as participants engage in new constructions of their 
discourse affording new reconstructions at the theoretical level. Craig and 
Tracy describe this test of their method as a type of action research that 
combines intervention with case study methods. The approach to theory is 
judged at two levels in this suggestion: 1) whether the grounded framework 
helps guide the researchers’ investigation and articulation of the techniques, 
problems and situated ideals and 2) whether the articulated techniques, 
problems and ideals are then re-appropriated by participants. The judgment is 
in both the process of inquiry and in the final outcome’s uptake.  
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Second, Craig and Tracy suggest that the articulations that result from 
grounded practical theory could be tested empirically. They describe this test 
as a functional approach to examine whether practice is more effective (they 
note that this term would require careful definition) when it approximates the 
situated ideals versus when it does not. Finally, they suggest a third approach 
to testing usefulness, similar to a critical theory approach, by taking a broader 
view and looking beyond the closed session of the phenomenon in question. 
For instance, the identification of dialectical and constructive criticism ideals 
that emerged in their case study did not occur in a historical vacuum. Both the 
researchers and the participants engage in other discourses and are informed 
by ideals from broader cultures that influence their discourse in any particular 
setting. The usefulness of their approach in this example depends upon being 
able to use their framework and findings to look for “antecedents of these 
ideas and their evolution in the social and institutional context of the modern 
university” (p. 264). Interestingly, the three approaches to testing their 
application of grounded practical theory roughly correspond with the three 
levels they identify within the theory: the problem level (action research 
approach), the technical level (empirical approach), and the philosophical level 
(critical theory approach). 
Regardless of which approach is taken, Craig and Tracy stress that not 
only are the criteria different for judging normative theories from scientific 
theories, but the notion of criteria is also different. Criteria for scientific theory 
are for accepting or rejecting the theory or its application, but criteria for 
normative theory are for evaluating its usefulness and therefore not a binary 
choice between success and failure. “We must not forget that in principle, 
there is no logically determinate way to verify or falsify normative claims.  
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Arguments can be made pro or contra a particular normative theory on any 
number of grounds, some empirically based, some so embedded in the 
contingencies of a particular situated practice that they cannot be specified in 
advance by any methodological model” (p. 268). Any normative claim, Craig 
and Tracy argue, is a matter of “practical judgment, a decision that should 
always be informed, but can never be strictly determined, by the best available 
arguments” (p.268). As Shepherd argued, experiences are not right or wrong, 
but good or bad, more resonant or not resonant. This is related as well to the 
criteria Baxter identifies for what she calls sensitizing schemes or theories that 
orient researchers to certain critical practices (Baxter, 2004). Baxter proposes 
two criteria for sensitizing theories: their ability to be heuristic and allow 
researchers to see existing practices or phenomena in a new light, and their 
ability to render these practices intelligible. In Craig’s grounded practical 
theory, it is not only researchers who become sensitized to the critical 
practices but the participants as well.  
In summary, Craig and Tracy’s articulation of a grounded practical 
theory approach offers alternative goals, criteria, and practices for studying 
communication as interaction open to interpretation. The goal is in identifying 
the situated ideals or norms informing how choices are made and defined in 
communication practices, a goal similar to the objectives of reflective design in 
examining a particular design practice. The emphasis that different people 
may hold different conflicting ideals and even that the same person may hold 
contrasting ideals suggests that matching interpretations is not the goal of this 
approach. Instead, the goal is to understand actions, what transpires or what 
is, through an identification of what people identify as their own evaluative 
norms, what they consider ought to be. This is not an attempt to reify existing  
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norms and resultant practices, however, although this is a danger in normative 
theorizing. 
The criteria for judging the theory and its application involve assessing 
its usefulness for reflection and for informing practice. Usefulness as a 
criterion is not subject to verification type tests in terms of a priori and post test 
matching. Instead, verification may take place through an interventionist 
approach by assessing how the articulation of ideals influences practice, 
through an empirical approach by assessing how practices that support some 
ideals over others produce different results, or through a critical analysis 
approach to understand the larger historical influences and cultural 
implications of certain ideals. Although grounded practical theory provides a 
framework that incorporates the empirical, the practical, and the critical, it 
stresses starting with the practical in terms of existing problems and tensions 
of a very particular situation.  Like the sensitizing theories described by Baxter, 
the usefulness of the grounded practical theory approach for the researcher is 
in describing not only what is happening but in providing heuristics for thinking 
about why it is happening, what is influencing communication to happen, in 
certain ways. In addition to Baxter’s sensitizing theories, however, by linking 
the communication theory of researchers with the communication theory that 
happens in everyday discourse, grounded practical theory is also judged 
through its utility not only for researchers but also for informing people’s actual 
communicative practices.  
Lessons for Studying Interpretation in HCI 
The previous section on interpretation in communication demonstrated 
a parallel movement with HCI in re-thinking interpretation as supporting 
multiple, not necessarily synonymous, interpretations. In communication, this  
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move began first with re-thinking communication as the transmission of a 
message between sender and receiver to the construction of messages 
between sender and receiver, whether real or imaginary, past, present or 
future. Yet, most methods for studying communication as construction still 
focus on the construction of a single meaning or the coordination around a 
single interpretation of meaning. In doing so, these methods focus on 
predictive models of cause and effect. Alternate approaches within 
communication exist however that would allow for the generation of multiple 
interpretations, such as Craig and Tracy’s grounded practical theory described 
above. Based on this discussion, I will now draw out particular lessons from 
communication methods for the design case studies discussed in the previous 
chapters. There are three main lessons I will focus on: the role of empirical 
studies, the difference between prescription and prediction, and the criteria of 
reflection. 
Empirical work is most commonly associated with the scientific method 
approach although Craig and Tracy’s grounded practical theory provides one 
example of how empirical work need not be tied to methods for accuracy and 
prediction. The empirical work Craig and Tracy focus on is in articulating the 
techniques and skills practitioners use in response to or in anticipation of 
problems. In other words, they draw out the empirical work of their 
participants. Yet design work can also be considered empirical
50. The choices 
a designer makes in response to certain design problems are the techniques 
of the designer. The grounded practical theory framework then could present a 
                                                 
50 Ethnomethodology and ethnography, methods that informed the evaluations in the case 
studies, are also empirical in that they are driving from observations and aim to provide 
descriptions. The difference with this type of empirical work is its stance against the strong 
predictive ability of descriptions in one context for another.   
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frame for experimenting with and examining different design choices. For 
example, in the beginning of this chapter, a number of strategies for designing 
for ambiguity or openness to interpretation were articulated including 
defamiliarization, scaffolding, and personalization. Yet, one of the challenges 
is in anticipating and informing how these strategies might interact with each 
other and with various attributes of the individuals participating and the 
surrounding context. Using a systematic empirical approach may help build up 
a catalogue of anticipated responses to certain design choices and situations. 
In the museum example, both the Imprints and the Birdscape were 
designed to use technology for an alternate purpose than distributing 
information about the art on display. Instead, we tried to draw attention to the 
experience of being in a museum, in particular the social experience within a 
unique public/private space. The resulting designs were implemented and 
analyzed in terms of visitor response, yet although the Birdscape design was 
informed by the Imprint design, the projects could also be considered stand-
alone efforts. Subsequent designs will draw from these experiences but in 
order to better inform the design choices, looking more closely at how certain 
choices interact with the range and type of interpretations that emerge would 
be beneficial. For instance, I have identified ‘framing’ as an important strategy 
in how open or closed an installation is for interpretation. The museum itself 
provides a very powerful frame, as does the specific museum such as the 
Johnson’s fifth floor gallery with windows all around and Asian art inside. Both 
the Birdscape and the Imprints had framing for their installation as well. For 
the Birdscape, there was a placard describing what the installation was about 
and the security guards also had a set story they told about the piece when 
visitors asked them. For the Imprints, there was also a story about why to  
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make an imprint and how to use the imprint when the guides were handed out. 
One simple empirical study would be to systematically vary the framing and 
capture how visitors interact with the different frames.  
A slightly more complicated approach would be to combine two 
variables and look for interaction across these variables. For instance, another 
strategy for ambiguity we have outlined is the level of one to one mapping 
between visitor input and output. Both the Imprints and the Birdscape had high 
levels of one to one mapping, but altering this would allow for observing how 
visitor responses might qualitatively differ when the mappings are more 
difficult to determine. By combining these factors in a semi-controlled testing 
condition, we could explore how visitors draw on both framing and mapping in 
their interpretations. 
As with the museum case study, the Affector case study also uses 
empirical methods but could do so in a more systematic fashion in order to 
draw out broader lessons and influence future design. In chapter three, I 
indicated how Affector is part of a larger consortium of studies exploring 
design and evaluation for affective presence. In addition to modifying the 
design choices and articulating changes in participant responses within a 
system, a systematic empirical approach can help identify the larger design 
space across different systems. For instance, the various systems in the 
affective presence consortium differ in terms of the number of people designed 
for (dyads, small groups, or large groups), the degree of familiarity people 
have with each other (intimates, friends, or strangers), and the cultural space 
designed for (office, home, or public space). Each system is designed for a 
specific context and the system attributes, as with the museum studies, may 
vary in terms of the design strategies used. The goal of this systematic  
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approach within a common framework is to provide a range of specific 
scenarios and techniques that together create a richer picture of the affective 
presence space. The grounded practical theory framework could help guide 
this at two levels: at one level in terms of how the designers define the 
problem space, the techniques they employ to address this problem space, 
and the situated ideals that inform these choices; and at the second level 
performing the same analysis in terms of the participants’ interactions with the 
resulting designs.  
The above suggestions could be seen simply as an argument for a 
typical social science experimental design or a typical iterative design 
approach. The question then is whether the grounded practical theory adds 
anything new or different. In my assessment of how to apply this approach, I 
believe there are several important distinctions. First, the identification of 
different modifications for design choices is not in the spirit of ‘divide and 
conquer’ or the ‘brick laying’ approach to research. It is not a matter of 
isolating components, ascertaining their effects and causes, and then building 
from this set knowledge. Instead, it is a framework for articulating a variety of 
complex interactions, that will likely change across different circumstances. 
The point of identifying the components is to illustrate the variety of ways in 
which they alter and change the interpretation space as opposed to pinning 
them down in one context and assuming the effect will remain the same. The 
goal then is to provide a range of evidence for designers, and evidence for 
participants, but as the previous discussion of Clark’s model argued evidence 
is always a matter of interpretation. Craig and Tracy make a very important 
distinction between identifying ‘influences’ and creating a normative model of 
prescriptions versus identifying ‘dictates’ and creating a scientific model of  
323 
predictions. In continuing empirical work on the museum studies or on 
Affector, for instance, I do not propose to start with formal hypothesis to be 
confirmed or rejected. Instead, the empirical work consists in observing how 
participants and designers alike respond to and anticipate different choices.  
Anticipation is similar to but markedly different from prediction. 
Prediction has clear lines for success and failure whereas anticipation is 
informed but not restrictive. If we consider prediction a situated ideal of 
scientific problem spaces and anticipation a situated ideal of interpretive 
problem spaces, it is interesting to consider how the same techniques might 
be employed to serve both. For instance, statistical measures need not serve 
only for verifying truths or rejecting falsities, but could serve the ideal of 
anticipation and probabilities. Finally, Craig’s overall interest in people’s 
everyday theory making regarding their communication also reclaims some 
elements of empiricism for interpretive studies. Whereas empirical studies 
have become associated with ‘objective’ measures, grounded practical theory 
is keenly interested in subjective accounts. People’s own assessments of why 
they make certain choices and the way people talk about their choices are 
critical for identifying the situated ideals or norms driving these choices. This 
resonates with both the approaches in the museum studies and in Affector 
where the participant’s analysis of what was happening was a key source of 
data.  
The move away from verification studies where the desired result is a 
single interpretation called for the identification of new criteria. Based on the 
case studies, I proposed criteria such as the level of engagement in the 
evaluation, the irreproducibility of results, and the catalytic validity of studies 
that encourage participants to see things in new ways or seek out change. The  
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criteria explored within grounded practical theory and the related sensitizing 
theory approach suggest a related criterion: usefulness for reflection. I had 
previously considered reflection as the type of design strategy, but in this 
framing it stands as a valuable criterion as well. In Craig and Tracy’s 
interventionist style of testing, the results from Affector and from the museum 
case studies should be shared with participants in order to determine if the 
heuristics are taken up in how people reason about or make sense of their 
experiences. As with our case studies, this blurs the line between design and 
evaluation when results become input as opposed to output. As Craig and 
Tracy note, this shifts the emphasis from testing existing theories to constantly 
generating new theories, identifying emergent ideals and then challenging 
them in the next iteration. In order to take these lessons further in the case 
studies, a thorough examination of practices from action science and 
generative theory would yield valuable insights of this practice in continual 
theory generation. 
Finally, one of the challenges noted within the grounded practical theory 
approach is preventing the normative, or the prescriptive, from turning into the 
descriptive, predictive and restrictive. When results are presented as ‘what is’, 
these can then in turn perpetuate into what must be.  For instance, the starting 
point of grounded practical theory is with ‘problems’ or tensions that require 
choice. But, as critical theory practices have demonstrated, and as the case 
studies in the previous chapters illustrate, the framing of problem spaces is 
often guided by unseen choices. In other words, if we only focus on existing 
problems, such as how to provide more information about art to visitors in the 
museum, then we may ignore marginal or unexplored design spaces. This is 
related to the argument for enhancing critical technical practice: instead of only  
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engaging when there is a breakdown in the technical modeling, one should 
also question why certain breakdowns happen and not others or what 
interesting new breakdowns could lead to different practices. This suggests 
that instead of modeling the three levels of grounded practical theory as linear 
with the middle layer affecting the top and bottom, a circular model would allow 
for considering how the problem layer becomes defined.  
Communication Theory and HCI Design 
The parallels between movements in communication theory and in HCI 
indicate how both fields could benefit from comparing and contrasting 
practices. The question in this section is how crossing over from 
communication theory to HCI influences design. One argument is for keeping 
them separate, recognizing their similarities but keeping a conscious divide 
between the practice of communication theory and the practice of designing 
communication or other HCI systems. For example, Shepherd, Striphas, and 
St. John (2006) describe the unique role of communication theory as being 
one step between highly abstract theory such as philosophy and highly 
practical work such as media production. Communication theorizing that 
becomes design work, in this view, ceases to occupy this unique space. This 
view is similar to critical theory approaches to technology design. The goal of 
this discipline is to describe how technology design happens and the 
implications of design assumptions and choices as they play out across 
history and cultures. The role of the critical theorists is as observer, 
documenter, and commentator, not as designer. Likewise, many 
communication theorists have adopted design as a subject matter for study 
but not a practice of their own.  For example, in computer supported 
cooperative work (CSCW) studies, organizational and interpersonal  
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communication theorists examine how people use computing systems for 
collaboration. As another example, communication and social science 
researchers interested in computer mediated communication (CMC) explore 
how new media challenge or support existing theories of communication. In 
both of these examples, the line between researcher and designer remains 
distinct. 
Yet, cross-overs between communication theory and HCI design do 
occur. Sometimes, this influence is unintentional or indirect. Because the field 
of communication addresses everyday discourse, Craig (2006) argues that it 
can be  ‘picked up’ by people as it becomes part of popular culture. He 
suggests this happens through concepts such as ‘information overload
51’ 
gaining media currency or being taught on university campuses. By extension 
of this argument, some of these people and students who ‘pick up’ 
communication theory could be or become designers who then trade on these 
ideas in their designs. Secondly, and a related idea, communication theory 
that becomes part of everyday discourse and practices of communication 
creates expectations and needs for how communication will occur. This, in 
turn, can influence the needs analysis or requirements process designers go 
through when creating systems to support communication. Just as the 
popularization of communication theories may influence designers, the 
popularization of design ideas may ultimately influence communication 
theorists and the cycle continues. For instance, the rise and advancement of 
information theory was spurred largely from developments in computing and 
                                                 
51 Craig credits communication theorists with popularizing this term although according to 
wikipedia, it was coined by Alvin Toffler, an American writer and futurist.  
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communication systems. This theory in turn played a large role in the 
development of communication as a discipline 
Apart from these indirect links, this section will look at more direct, 
intentional examples of communication theory influencing or providing a 
resource for system design. I will examine three different examples referred to 
here as the blueprint approach, the measures into design approach, and the 
affordances approach. The first two examples will be discussed only briefly as 
they are less applicable for the design for interpretation or design for openness 
I wish to explore. I will examine the last approach in more detail through a 
case example of how the communication theories discussed above could 
augment resources for addressing a desired design space.  I will end this 
section with reflections on using communication theory as a resource for 
design for future iterations of the museum installations and Affector.  
Theory as Blueprint Approach 
In the blueprint approach, communication theory acts not as a resource 
for understanding a design space but as a predetermined script. It acts not in 
the normative fashion as described by Craig and Tracy above, where 
prescriptions of what ought to be are also subject to challenge, but instead 
results in normative rules becoming codified into the system. One ill fated 
example of designers drawing on communication theory as a blueprint for 
design is offered by Suchman (1993, 1997) in her critique of Winograd and 
Flores’ use of speech act theory for the design of a collaborative system called 
The Coordinator. In this system, the user is instructed to tag his or her 
communication with illocutionary force labels (e.g. “Informing”, “Requesting”, 
“Promising”, etc.). Interestingly, Winograd and Flores argued against giving 
this type of control to the computer system through natural language  
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processing (NLP) either because NLP at the time was not up to the task or 
because the situated nature of illocutionary acts would always require human 
intervention.  By creating a facility however that required people to make their 
implicit intentions explicit, Winograd and Flores believed this would ease the 
coordination process as well as educate people about their specific and the 
general practice of communication.  
However Suchman and others (e.g. McCarthy and Monk, 1994; 
Shapiro, 1994; Button and Dourish, 1996; McCarthy and Wright, 2005) point 
out the dangers of this approach. In Suchman’s analysis, Winograd and Flores 
were actually violating the theory they sought to uphold, namely Austin’s 
(1962) and Wittgenstein’s (1958) view that language happens in action and 
that it is impossible to theorize language apart from its use. When Winograd 
and Flores used Searle’s (1969) taxonomy of speech acts, they were 
positioning this ordered taxonomy as components of a ‘plan’ that a speaker 
follows implicitly. What the Coordinator would do is help the speaker articulate 
this plan. Yet in Suchman’s analysis, language use (and the identification of 
language acts) occurs in action – specifically in interaction, not prior to action. 
Therefore, rather than supporting language as a collaborative activity, the 
Coordinator resulted in a very controlled, hierarchical, and scripted form of 
communication.   
One assessment of this example could be that Winograd and Flores 
simply picked the wrong theory. Suchman notes, for instance, that speech act 
theory has been subsequently attacked by conversation analysts for 
overlooking the interactional structure of talk. Yet, McCarthy and Wright 
underscore the more challenging issue. Winograd and Flores espoused a view 
of language and action as self-regulating, as something that a structure could  
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not be imposed on. It was from this perspective that they challenged the 
rational foundation of computer science and argued instead for a 
phenomenological approach. Yet, when attempting to use a theory of 
language that resonated with this view in design, they contradicted of their 
own intentions. The question remains then of how to use theory of construction 
to guide design without reifing the theory as dictation. 
Measures into Design Approach 
A second example of how communication theory may directly influence 
designs is when measurement techniques developed through theory become 
incorporated into systems. This example is closely related to the physiological 
measures section discussed in the chapter on affect. Physiological measures, 
such as heart beat or galvanized skin response have a long history in 
detecting an individual’s emotional state. As these measures continue to gain 
popularity, they are becoming incorporated into affective computing designs, 
such as a video game that will respond to a player’s inferred increase in 
excitation or stress. Likewise, psycholinguistic theories also have a long 
history of detecting cognitive and emotional states through the word choices 
people make in their communication. Linguistic analysis involves strategies 
such as counting the number of words used as well as the word content (what 
people talk about) and the style of word choice (how they talk about it) to 
determine qualities of the individual and his or her intent (Pennebaker, 2002). 
In the past, this counting and sorting analysis happened by hand but 
eventually became a prospect for automation through the development of 
software and algorithms for classifying words based on either identified or 
emergent patterns of language use. An example of such a program is the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count  (LIWC) application developed by James W.  
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Pennebaker, Roger J. Booth, and Martha E. Francis
52. Pennebaker refers to 
some of the new methods employed within LIWC as ‘meaning extraction 
methods’ that use word choice, such as the frequency of “I” versus “we”, to 
detect personality traits as well as detecting behavior such as the act of 
deception. 
The conceptual leap from software used as an aide to help researchers 
analyze language patterns to software that designers employ to build systems 
that respond to language patterns is an easy one to make. I have already 
presented one example of such a system, the Batliner et al. (2003) study in 
the chapter on affect, with the automated call-in help center that used linguistic 
analysis to determine a caller’s level of frustration. In this study, the 
researchers described how system performance deteriorated when the call-in 
systems moved from the laboratory to the field. They concluded that the 
models measuring frustration needed refining to focus on odd linguistic 
behavior and repetition in addition to prosody. Yet the conclusion from a 
perspective of affect as interaction as opposed to information suggests that 
refinement of the model still proposes that affect is found as opposed to 
emergent or created in interaction. In other words, the poor performance may 
not be improved by making the model more complex. This same caution is 
warranted when thinking about how to apply LIWC software as the input 
mechanism for other applications.  It is one application for the LIWC software 
to extract meaning for a researcher’s analysis and interpretation, but it is 
another matter when this extracted meaning has implications beyond a user’s 
control. In this scenario, the criterion of accuracy is not simply a measure of 
success but an essential requirement. The call-in center example may not 
                                                 
52 See http://www.liwc.net/  
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raise red flags, but imagine a LIWC enabled system for sniffing out deceptive 
practices in a corporation through analysis of email. A small margin of error 
should not be tolerated. Yet, if meaning is constructed through language use 
and not extracted from language production, building a system around the 
assumption of exact meaning must be handled with caution. 
As an ad-hoc experiment, I tried two online LIWC demonstrations that 
proposed to analyze my writing style and extract information about my 
personality
53. In the first test, I was instructed to look at a picture of two female 
researchers in a chemical laboratory and write about the characters for ten 
minutes. According to what I wrote, my need for power, affiliation, and 
achievement are below average. I used zero self references and was below 
average in my use of social words. I was above average in references to both 
positive and negative emotions and in my use of big words. I found the low 
scores on power and affiliation interesting because I had been trying to write 
my story about the researchers as a power struggle drama – the women 
affiliated with each other against the male establishment. But something in my 
word choice or style did not register this through the LIWC.  
On the second test, I looked at a picture of a branded water bottle and 
was told to describe it in writing to someone who couldn’t see the bottle for 5 
minutes. The results of my sample suggested that I was a highly functional 
and tactile thinker and about average in verbal, visual and contextual thinking. 
What I found interesting in this test is that I had interpreted the instructions as 
meaning I was describing the bottle to someone who is blind – not that they 
can’t see the bottle but that they can’t see anything. Therefore, I was very 
                                                 
53 See the TAT test (http://www.utpsyc.org/TATintro/) and the bottle test 
(http://utpsycorg.liwc.net/Bottle/) from James Pennebaker’s research group at the University of 
Texas, Austin.  
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careful to describe things that I thought would be meaningful for a blind 
person, such as what would you do with it and how it might feel if you held it. 
These tests were not taken under experimental conditions and I am not 
presenting my experience with them as evidence for or against the strength of 
LIWC. Instead, I present them as a thought experiment. As an exercise, I 
enjoyed seeing what the system had to say about my writing and I enjoyed the 
chance for reflection on my personality and how I might demonstrate it in my 
writing. What I found troubling however was contemplating a scenario where 
this personality information is used as input to a system without my ability to 
intervene or negotiate with it the meaning it has extracted.   
An alternate example of using linguistic measures as input into design 
is demonstrated in Böhlen and Mateas’s Office Plant #1 installation, also 
described in chapter three. This robotic sculpture of a plant responds to a 
linguistic analysis of a user’s email traffic and assumes different shapes and 
emits various sounds based on this analysis. The movements between states 
for the office plant are quite slow, the user will likely not notice change as it is 
happening but will only occasionally note that the sculpture has changed form. 
When this recognition occurs, it is an impetus for reflection on what traffic may 
have caused such changes. In this system, the reflective potential of the 
linguistic analysis is shared rather than hidden. 
Both the blueprint and the measures approach for design run the risk of 
enabling the Platonic forehand introduced in chapter one. The Platonic 
backhand is the abstraction process of theory making, such as Searle’s 
identification of various speech acts, or model making, such as a textual 
classification of positive or negative words. The Platonic forehand then comes 
in when these abstractions begin to stand for and direct the emergent  
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meaning. The theory and measures no longer describe what is happening but 
they direct what happens next as they become codified in the design.  
Affordances Approach 
The final approach to how communication theory can influence design 
is intentional but more indirect than the blueprint or measures approach. In 
other words, its indirectness is not the same kind of osmosis or casual ‘picking 
up’ that Craig described earlier but instead involves purposeful reflection. This 
approach takes its name from the idea of affordances first put forth by 
environmental psychologist J.J. Gibson (e.g. Gibson, 1979) and popularized in 
design by Don Norman (e.g. Norman,1988).  Affordances are not one to one 
mappings between actions and material attributes, nor are they one to one 
mappings with specific qualities of a situation or traits of an individual. Instead, 
affordances describe a narrowed range of possibility through the interaction of 
material form, context, and individual traits including experiences and 
expectations. Gaver (1996) explores the idea of social affordances with the 
example comparing the desirable location of top floors (i.e. away from street 
level) for an office setting versus the desirable location of bottom floors for a 
retail setting. The affordance in this example is not ‘elevation’ but 
‘accessibility’. Elevation describes the material form or property of being higher 
or lower. But the affordance of accessibility begins to explain why the different 
settings would value one form over another, i.e. a retail store would prefer 
easy foot traffic whereas an office would not. It is important to note that 
affordances describe potential actions, they do not dictate actions. For 
instance, a retail store may desire a top floor to convey a level of 
inaccessibility and therefore exclusivity.   
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For communication theory and design, the affordance approach 
advocates a deeper understanding of why certain conventional practices 
develop – what affordances emerge through the combination of people’s 
needs and expectations, context, and constraints of material artifacts. For 
instance, in a previous section Myers (1999) critiqued the techno-determinism 
view that tends to ensue with the introduction of any new technology. With the 
introduction of the internet, scholars predicted and attempted to gain evidence 
for how the lack of social context and the isolation of connecting online would 
lead to loss of community and de-individuation. However, by taking a step 
back from this one way approach of form dictating action, communication 
theorists interested in the flexibility and tenacity of people’s ability to express 
themselves and form community could lead to anticipating how the constraints 
of the new medium will be re-appropriated for these ends. If for example, 
community or individuality is considered an affordance, then understanding the 
effect of new material constraints becomes a type of contingency theory 
building where one looks for what variation of material constraints, situations, 
and practices will enable this affordance to still emerge.  
As another example, Aoki and Woodruff (2005) recently looked at how 
the affordance of ambiguity is influenced by different constraints of personal 
communication systems (PCSs) such as mobile phones. Aoki and Woodruff 
referred to this ambiguity as ‘space for stories’ or multiple interpretations. In 
particular, they were interested in how space for stories in communication 
exchanges allows for face saving practices, such as when person A fails to 
call person B back and can later explain his oversight because of being out of 
town, or missing the message, or being sick, etc. Aoki and Woodruff’s central 
argument is that the goal for ‘perfect communication’ design in PCSs is  
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infringing upon the space for stories and subsequently the ability to be 
unresponsive while still maintaining harmony in a relationship (what they 
identify as ‘saving face’).  
Aoki and Woodruff argue that features of mobile phones such as being 
‘always on’ or transmitting more information about our communication partners 
will reduce the ability to be unresponsive and still save face. As a reversal to 
this trend, they suggest the need for designing space for stories, or designing 
for ambiguity and openness. As an example of such a design, they develop 
the construct of a lease service for mobile phones. Similar to the idea of 
buying a bank of minutes, a person can purchase a bank of leases for different 
communication partners that have varying conditions such as expiring out of 
lack of use or over time. The benefit of such leases, according to Aoki and 
Woodruff, is that if a person no longer wants to continue communicating with a 
partner, he can simply let the lease expire. This effectively would allow the 
person to avoid having to discontinue contact directly or if confronted about the 
lack contact, he has an array of stories handy: e.g., the lease expired and he 
forgot to renew it, or he doesn’t have enough funds to renew it, or he can only 
afford so many leases at a time.  However, what happened in the transition 
between wanting to design space for stories and in proposing the lease idea is 
that Aoki and Woodruff switched from designing space to designing stories. 
They switched from ambiguity emerging from the situation to trying to design 
ambiguity into the lease service as a feature. In examining this move, Hancock 
and I conducted an analysis of how communication theory, particularly 
theories of language use discussed in the previous section, could ameliorate 
this slippage (Boehner and Hancock, 2006).   
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Our first move in addressing the weakness of the lease design from 
Aoki and Woodruff was to demonstrate that in all communication, space for 
stories exists. The space for interpretation may be more or less open, but 
every communicative act is a presentation of evidence based on interpretation, 
followed by another act of interpretation. As Peters (1999) argued, even face-
to-face communication must navigate the gap of difference whereas in the 
Aoki and Woodruff argument face-to-face communication was positioned as 
less open to interpretation than mediated communication. This argument led 
Aoki and Woodruff to warn that by attempting to stop the gap with ever more 
present and pervasive communication devices, we could effectively close this 
distance, and remove the space for explaining away unresponsiveness and 
saving face. Yet current perspectives on communication theory suggest the 
gap is ever present. This move suggests that it doesn’t matter what Aoki and 
Woodruff or designed. However, our second move was to challenge the 
assumption that more information is mapped to less ambiguity.  As discussed 
in the previous section on ambiguity in communication, the relationship 
between amount of information and degree of openness to interpretation is not 
linear. More or less ambiguity may emerge in a situation but it does not map 
directly to the amount of information available.  This returns us to the 
rethinking of common ground: not as a binary relationship between common 
ground and uncommon ground or between understanding and 
misunderstanding, but something more nuanced like Shepherd’s idea of 
sympathetic awareness. If we think of interpretations  between people (or a 
person and a system model) as isomorphic, then we would design for exact 
communication or exact miscommunication (such as in the case of the  
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leases). But if we think of communication as a continual approximation then 
we design for space.  
By drawing on communication theory, we returned ambiguity from a 
design strategy or attribute to an emergent property or affordance of how the 
situation, people, and material artifacts interact. Furthermore, we speculated 
why this kind of slippage and the technodeterminist tendency described by 
Myers often happens. When new technologies are introduced, often the most 
salient aspects of the situation are the new constraints of the medium, in 
particular how it might limit or alter current forms of communication.  This 
difference makes these features stand out – their salience increases both for 
designers and for users. But over time, users either work around or with these 
constraints, developing new conventions and practices that begin to have 
more salience than the particular material form. Salience changes over time. 
For instance, Aoki and Woodruff examined how a group of college students 
interacted in an experiment with a push to talk radio, yet they failed to 
elaborate the context of the interactions, i.e. they failed to describe the 
baseline salience of the radio’s features. The context, such as the students’ 
familiarity with such radios or the framing of the experiment, is critical for 
understanding how ambiguity emerges with the constraints of the medium. 
The same experiment with a group of emergency relief workers or security 
guards familiar with such radios would likely tell a different story about how the 
attributes of the radio led to the affordance of ambiguity. 
This turning to communication theory not only provided a way in for 
understanding how the objective for designing for space quickly turned more 
into designing stories, but also led to the development of a number of design 
ideas or heuristics for keeping the story space more open. We proposed five  
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design ideas and examples (Boehner and Hancock, 2006) described briefly 
here.  
1.  Design for Opposites: in order to leave space for stories, the constraints 
of the system should enable opposite experience. In the case Aoki and 
Woodruff were designing for, the constraints should support both 
responsiveness and unresponsiveness. For instance, the lease idea 
only seems to support temporality, otherwise, why lease? Consider 
instead the effectiveness of Caller ID for both choosing to accept a call 
and choosing to decline a call. 
2.  Design for Salience: conventions form around information with joint 
salience – information or interpretations that people through experience 
and expectations agree are the most prominent. Designs that increase 
points of reference that can be shared and made meaningful in use 
increase the opportunity for making interpretations. For instance, we 
proposed building phones that provided even more information about 
the situation – such as the signal strength of the caller and the callee at 
the time of the call. In this example, both the caller and callee would 
know what the other knows in terms of the call. This increase in 
information can lead to new space for stories as opposed to less. 
Overtime, this information may become a critical part of the story space 
or it may not.  
3.  Design for Something Else: this is a call for oblique design. If the goal is 
to support the ability to be unresponsive then design for some other 
activity with an eye toward how this might be appropriated for 
unresponsiveness. For example, the eMoto system (described in 
chapter three), was designed for communicating emotional tones in  
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multimedia messages. A receiver of a message might draw on this 
emotional information as an explanation for why there had been a 
delayed response (e.g. ‘Oh, she seems sad’) thereby preempting the 
need for her partner to explain her delay. 
4.  Design for Extremes: this heuristic pushes on the idea of shared 
culpability (e.g. blaming the lease) suggested by the leases and pushes 
it to its extreme. Imagine a personality phone that has an agent with its 
own unique personality. It may randomly decide when to delete 
messages from your voice mail. Whereas the lease idea is designed for 
specific targets, the randomness of the personality phone appears less 
premeditated. (see Figure 23). 
 
 
 
Figure 23. A phone with a hang-over. 
 
5.  Design for Over-Interpretation: this heuristic for keeping the design 
space open suggests starting with the original intended interpretation 
and augmenting it. For instance, rather than explaining away 
unresponsiveness, why not draw attention to the unresponsiveness? 
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This led to a design idea for a pause embellisher in instant messaging. 
Some IM clients show ellipses when someone in typing, but nothing is 
happening when there is a pause in the conversation. A long delay 
could mean the other person is thinking, he got a phone call, he went to 
the bathroom, etc. The pause embellisher would create some kind of 
animation visible by each party allowing another explanation for 
unresponsiveness, “sorry, I was watching my pause.” (see Figure 24.) 
 
 
Figure 24. Cherry blossoms taking over the screen in the pause embellisher. 
 
These design ideas are offered as works in progress. I imagine not 
many people would sign up for a phone with a hang-over that could potentially 
lose important calls. The point of illustrating these ideas was to attempt to 
think about ways of designing for openness and in particular to demonstrate 
an alternate approach for using communication theory to influence design. In 
developing these, we drew from communication theory and the idea of 
ambiguity as an affordance, a property defining the range of potential 
interpretations based on material constraints, the situation, and the people 
involved.  
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Lessons for Communication Theory in HCI Design 
The descriptions of the various approaches for linking communication 
theory to design explore the benefits and obstacles of crossing between the 
parallel tracks. In terms of obstacles, both the blue print approach and the 
measures into design approach describe scenarios where the theory of what is 
becomes codified into what must be. Although with the measures approach, I 
also outlined how using measures such as linguistic analysis may draw 
attention to norms or patterns of communication, in the Craig and Tracy sense 
of grounded practical theory, and in doing so cause an opportunity for both 
reflection and change. The approach I explained in the most detail was the 
affordance approach. In this approach, communication theory is a resource 
not a plan of action for thinking about emergent affordances, in this case the 
affordance of openness to interpretation or ambiguity.  
Specifically, the critique of one approach toward using ambiguity to 
design for unresponsiveness led to the development of five design ideas or 
heuristics for thinking about affordances instead of attributes. These design 
ideas could spark suggestions for reconsidering the museum installations and 
the Affector program. For example, the design for opposites call suggests that 
in focusing only on the alternate experience of presence I limited the type of 
interpretations. Perhaps if I created displays that equally augmented the art on 
display and the presence in the gallery, this would allow for more openness in 
interpretation. The suggestion to design for salience points to the suggestion 
that arose in the Affector installation for depicting not only the partner, but 
what the partner sees. Providing this kind of mutual feedback is commonplace 
in video conferencing systems. It would be interesting to experiment with 
whether or not this kind of feedback is seen as useful or if Affector works only  
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through its indirect instead of intentional communication. The design for 
something else was also partly a conclusion through the design of Affector. 
The project began with a desire to display ‘affect’ but then progressed toward 
more and more oblique or indirect proxies of affect. To design for extremes, I 
could imagine using this in the museum installations to direct displays toward 
extreme presence situations – for instance designing for when a visitor is the 
only person in the gallery or designing for when a particular room is near 
capacity. The extremity of the situation and designs might catch people’s 
imaginations and resulting interpretations more vividly. Finally, the design for 
over-interpretation suggestion is similar to the previous one except instead of 
designing for an extreme situation, an ordinary situation is made more 
extreme. For example, in Affector, we moved toward augmenting change that 
reached a certain threshold so that large movements such as leaning back in 
one’s chair would fire lots of distortion effects. Yet, it might also be interesting 
to think about small indiscernible movements that we would not pick up or 
notice with the naked eye but could demand attention in the Affector window. 
For example, we could focus the Affector lens only on the computer keyboard 
to capture only the movement of their hands, or a shot of their left foot, or train 
it on the person’s eye. Augmenting invisible movements might cause different 
types of reflections and interpretations of activity and therefore mood. 
This list of heuristics then provides a useful set of prompts for both 
thinking about how the case studies evolved and why certain aspects of the 
designs may have worked as well as thinking about alternative 
implementations to try. At the same time, however, this list is not complete and 
it was originally developed in response to a different design scenario 
(ambiguity and unresponsiveness). Its usefulness is as a thinking tool, not as a  
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checklist. As a checklist, I would simply be substituting communication theory 
as a blueprint for another predetermined strategy. Instead, in the spirit of the 
mid-range theories explored by Kia Höök or the sensitizing schemes of Baxter 
(described earlier), design heuristics or ideas that result from considering the 
interplay between theory and design are useful guides.  Overall the biggest 
benefit from communication theory for the case study designs, has been in 
refining the concept of what it would mean to design for openness to 
interpretation.  
Design as Process for Communication Studies 
The previous sections of this chapter explored how existing and new 
developments in the study and theory of communication, in particular language 
use and ambiguity, could inform a practice of designing for openness to 
multiple interpretations. In this final section, I will look the other way, namely in 
terms of how insights from the practice of design influence the field of 
communication. Some of these ideas have been explored already in drawing 
parallels and identifying cross-overs between the respective fields. I will return 
to these themes in the following treatment of four important areas where HCI 
design offers insights and opportunities for the field of communication. These 
areas include: refining concepts and criteria, the expanded role of participants, 
the challenges of interdisciplinary work, and the increased interest in the arts. 
Before I introduce these areas, however, I will begin by first clarifying an 
orientation toward design as a process, and how it is this orientation I believe 
to be the most valuable for communication. 
At a recent seminar on constructing theory in communication, M. Scott 
Poole identified design theory as a promising new area for communication  
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studies
54. This relevance is partly due to Poole’s aforementioned observation 
that although many in the field define communication as a process, there exist 
few methods for studying communication as a process. Model building in 
computing design offers one process approach, but he suggests that system 
building (and subsequent study of use) presents a further addition to the toolkit 
for process studies of communication. Yet, in reviewing Poole’s summary of 
design theory and his selected articles as exemplars for system building, it 
appears that Poole is drawing from a very narrow view of design. Poole’s view 
of design does not benefit from many of the current developments this 
dissertation has sought to highlight, in particular the practice of reflective 
design.  
Poole presents an instrumentalist view of design – one of building 
systems as solutions to existing problems. His description of the practice of 
design is very aligned with an empirical and traditional HCI approach. With this 
model, the practice of design becomes a method for testing communication 
theories in the same manner that an experimental study design can test and 
refine a theory. This idea can be further illustrated by a figure from one of the 
exemplary articles on design identified by Poole (see Figure 25.) 
 
 
                                                 
54 Comments on Poole’s perspective for design theory are drawn from his handouts, including 
an outline of ‘Design Theory’ and his slide presentation during his presentation of “The Study 
of Process in Communication Research: Old Wine in new Bottles and New Wine in Old 
Bottles”, seminar at Cornell University’s Communication Department, Oct.21, 2005, Ithaca, 
NY.  
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Figure 25. Modified model linking design and behavioral science (Hevner, 
March, Park, 2004). 
 
In this model above, the design starts with an assessment of a problem 
in a particular environment and draws from both existing design science 
research and from the knowledge base of behavioral science research. Once 
relevant knowledge is consulted in response to user needs, an instantiation of 
the design is placed in the environment. Evaluations of the design in use and 
the process of the design generate new additions for the behavioral science 
knowledge base. The authors of this model state that this approach of 
explicitly linking behavioral science knowledge with design research 
knowledge and practice brings together the ‘truth value’ of science and the 
‘utility’ of design. As they state, “truth informs design and utility informs theory” 
(Hevner, March, Park, 2004, p.80). It is statements such as this that then leads 
Poole to identify the overriding criteria or standard of design theory as one of 
utility and effectiveness and to push for an objectiveness view in both the 
process of design and the process of evaluation.  
Although the instrumental view of design is feasible, if the caution 
against the blueprint method is observed, the narrowness of this definition of 
design limits the benefits for communication. Instead, I propose that a broader 
view of design will be more beneficial. This broader view has been identified 
as reflective design, a practice inspired by Agre’s critical technical practice of  
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moving computational science beyond its narrow focus on ‘what works’ to 
considering why problems are framed in a particular way in the first place. 
Agre’s practice is one of following breakdowns or outliers as an impetus for 
rethinking the boundaries of a design space, i.e. the centers (what is focused 
on) and the margins (what is excluded or taken for granted). What reflective 
design adds to this formulation is not just a focus on why certain problems 
occur or how problems are framed, but the impetus for asking these questions 
prior to any breakdown. If traditional design asks ‘how can we fix this problem’ 
and critical technical practice asks ‘why do we consider this a problem instead 
of that?’, reflective design asks ‘what new opportunities arise if we invert the 
margins and centers of our design space?’ This view of design is very different 
than the one Poole proposes to follow. Poole’s approach to design may be 
beneficial for periods that Shapiro (1994) identifies as having ‘theoretical 
confidence and coherence’ where the relationship between theory and 
application is a directional one with application subordinated to theory. Yet, in 
cases where theory is in a process of redefinition and exploration, such as the 
case in the movement in both design and communication for considering 
interpretation not as an isomorphic goal but a muddling through of multiple 
possibilities, then this instrumental view of design may be less appropriate.  
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Figure 27. An alternate view of designing as a process of theorizing 
 
In the model above (see Figure 27) depicting the relationship between 
design and social science theory, I have modified the previous model to 
communicate how design and social science theory are responding to the 
same environment but offer different lenses for framing and approaching the 
phenomenon in question. The phenomenon in question may be a problem or 
well functioning state. The difference with this model is it allows for both 
parallel developments and for one to ‘drive’ the other. But, most importantly, 
what I want to try and convey with this model is that designing is a way of 
theorizing
55. It is at this level, understanding how constructs are identified and 
modeled, understanding the criteria that directs the research, understanding 
the values that underlie these criteria, etc. that dialogue between design and 
communication theory are interesting.  With this new orientation of design, not 
as an instrumental method for solving problems in the world, but as a way of 
                                                 
55 This argument of design as a kind of theory-making is similar to the link between the social 
science theory of ethnomethodology and the practice of system design that Button and 
Dourish (1996) make in their development of technomethodology.   
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participating in and conceptualizing the world, I can now turn to specific areas 
where I believe HCI design can offer insights for the study communication. 
Concepts and Criteria for Evaluation and Design 
An alternate view of design than the one Poole proposes of an 
instrumental step from problem to solution is to consider design as a 
satisficing step (Shapiro, 1995), or making best possible choices, in uncertain 
environments with a range of possibility. In this sense, the process of design is 
not unlike the process of communication. Despite uncertainty, despite the 
range of options, despite the multiplicity of interpretations, design is about 
making choices. Design, as with communication, is a process of ‘making do’ 
with material, social, economic, and cultural constraints. I mention the 
pragmatics of design because the move in communication theory toward one 
that acknowledges multiple, instead of mutual or joint, interpretations could 
draw criticisms and charges of relativism. It could suggest a futility to any 
attempts to understand the process of communication. Yet, the discipline of 
design has a history of moving forward in the face of uncertainty and unending 
choice. Furthermore, a design approach that advocates a move toward 
anticipation as opposed to prediction does not deny that predictions happen or 
that a level of realism exists in our world. For example, the levels of 
interpretation proposed by Sengers and Gaver (2006) suggests that perhaps 
predictability may be more appropriate at the level of the physical or material 
environment whereas higher levels of interpretation are more open and less 
under the designer’s or communication theorist’s ability to control and predict. 
As HCI designers release themselves from solely evaluating systems in 
the model of empirical science, the practice of evaluation opens up. In the 
case studies I described a number of challenges for evaluation related to the  
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relativism critique. If all systems are open to interpretation, how do we 
determine whether more or less interpretation has been achieved, or in fact is 
desirable? One approach in moving forward within reflective design has been 
to draw from alternate criteria to scientific constructions of validity and 
reliability. A rich history of qualitative criteria exists proposing alternatives such 
as confirmability (e.g. through checking results with participants), dependability 
and confirmability (e.g. through peer auditing), and authenticity (e.g. 
demonstrating a range of views represented) (Lincoln, 1995; Seale, 1999). 
These studies emphasize that rigor is achieved through practices of deep 
inquiry and thick descriptions, not formulaic application of existing methods 
(Springgay and Irwin, 2005). Seale (1999) advocates, for example, that 
researchers considering methods as a form of craft apprenticeship, learning a 
range of methods but modifying them as the circumstances and their own 
personal style dictate, in much the same way that an apprentice learns and 
embellishes from a master artist the basics of painting, drawing, and sculpting. 
In this view, reproducibility is less valued as is personal accountability (i.e. 
identifying the researcher’s own fingerprints) and ecological relevance. The 
interest in approaches to qualitative inquiry also responds to the charge that 
designing for particularities implies that no grander lessons may be learned – 
that each design is a design from the beginning and for a unique situation. Yet, 
the qualitative criteria of transferability argues that sensibilities and themes 
can be found across contexts but it is not as simple as abstracting from one 
sample population to a similar representative population. An example of taking 
up this idea of transferability in design research will help unpack this further.   
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In a recent HUMAINE workshop
56 on evaluating affective systems, 
Daniel Fallman presented the repertory grid technique as a design/evaluation 
method. In a repertory grid, users are asked to generate polar constructs to 
describe something (e.g. a system, an object, an experience) in a way that is 
personally meaningful to them. For example, in Fallman’s lab they have asked 
users to generate polar constructs to describe shapes resulting in paired 
constructs such as roundish/squarish, organic/synthetic, clever/not clever. 
Once a user has generated a construct to describe a shape, the user then 
rates the shape, e.g. very round to very square and does the same for all the 
shapes to be reviewed. Fallman stressed that the strength of the repertory grid 
technique is in the user’s creation of the constructs rather than something like 
a semantic differential technique or a pre-made scale where the researcher 
makes the constructs. In the latter case, the researcher knows what he or she 
means by the construct and has to infer if it has the same meaning for the 
user. With repertory grids, the situation is reversed. The user knows what he 
means regarding a construct and the researcher has to guess what this is. 
What this suggests then is that the grids are a useful technique for surfacing 
constructs and features that are meaningful to users but what exactly they 
mean is left open.  
 
More pertinent for this discussion, however, is Fallman’s observation that 
when they used the grids to attempt a more systematic analysis across users, 
for example collapsing constructs by similarity and trying to measure dominant 
experiences, they ended up with what he considered ‘boring’ results. For 
instance, they might learn that the majority of users interpreted a square 
                                                 
56 http://emotion-research.net/publicnews/chi05ws/view  
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shape as being more ‘square like’ than the circle shape. What the grid ended 
up being more useful for was inspiration – finding perhaps an idiosyncratic 
construct that a user came up with and using this as a basis for future 
exploration. In other words, when trying to find general lessons about the 
shapes across users, or for a certain type of users (e.g. women versus men), 
the results tended to abstract away anything interesting and smooth over the 
inspiration found in the peculiarities. This is a shift then from analysis to 
inspiration, a shift from evaluation of results to evaluation as design. But, what 
the designers found was that these inspirations from a peculiar source often 
led to the implementation of designs with a broader appeal. This speaks to the 
idea of transferability, yet further work is needed in order to understand this 
move. 
The inspiration approach to design and evaluation must be balanced, if 
conducted as a form of research, with the other criteria mentioned such as 
authenticity. One danger in solely pursuing peculiarities is that single isolated 
cases could again serve to smooth out the range of differences across users 
and contexts. If a design researcher only chooses to display the results that 
speak to him, that make his point, that stand out from the array of more hum-
drum results, the danger is that instead of an over-reliance on methods what 
results is an over-reliance on the cleverness of the designer. Yet the 
combination of criteria, especially those for acknowledging any filters that a 
designer/researcher puts on results, offer helpful guides for both design and 
communication theory in addressing practices that are open to interpretation. 
Role of Participants 
The above discussion about criteria that engage participants alludes to 
the next area I will describe where HCI design can inform the study of  
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communication. HCI design has a long history in challenging the privilege of 
the designer as the authority on the shape and declared success of a given 
design.  Movements such as participatory design, user-centered design, and 
reflective design have developed strategies for bringing users into the design 
process as equal stakeholders. Each of these practices has a slightly different 
focus – participatory design for example brings target users into a design 
process once a design problem as been established, user-centered design 
advocates following users in the initial scoping of a problem or design space, 
and reflective design positions the designers as a provocateur encouraging 
reflection on existing and new design opportunities where they might not have 
existed before. But in all three of these traditions, participation from the ‘user’ 
is critical. 
Participation of ‘subjects’ in communication research is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, the new APA (2001) guidelines advocate replacing the 
use of the word ‘subjects’ with ‘participants’ to suggest this orientation exists 
even if the research does not reflect a view of participants as more than a 
source for data collection. Communication theorists who draw from practices 
of action science, citizen science, and interpretivist research display a 
sensitivity toward including participants in various stages of the research 
process. In interpretivist research for example, Lincoln (1995) encourages 
researchers to commit to a level of relationality between the researcher and 
participant and to adopt a criteria of reciprocity marked by openness and 
sharing as they collaborate in what she refers to as the reflexive practice of 
inquiry. A helpful way to examine the balance of reciprocity is to ask the simple 
question of every study ‘for whom’ and ‘for what purpose’ is the research being 
done (Lincoln, 1995).   
353 
Although participation is becoming a more popular idea within 
traditional empirical approaches to communication studies, much can still be 
learned from further advances in design. Reflective design for instance 
advocates bringing participants in to not only the data collection process or as 
a member check on the results the researcher produces but as a collaborator 
in the analysis process. In the museum and Affector case studies, for 
example, I described the principle of dynamic feedback where information 
normally collected for research purposes is shared with participants at an early 
stage and is presented in as raw a form as possible. Although the argument in 
a controlled study is that the display of results would influence subsequent 
responses and therefore make it difficult to tease apart what exactly is 
informing a participant’s response, this is an important aspect of reflective 
design. To return to Craig and Tracy’s study of grounded practical theory, if a 
reflective design stance were added to this approach the development of 
‘situated ideals’ would take place through co-construction of ideals by the 
researchers and participants. Once ideals or norms were identified, the next 
phase would be to identify how this increased awareness influences further 
practices (i.e. do they challenge or abide by the ideals) and perspectives (i.e. 
do they begin to identify or construct alternate ideals). It is this movement to 
co-interpretation and full participation that leads Sengers
57 to characterize 
reflective design as a form of engagement as opposed to a critical 
intervention. An intervention suggests an external researcher shaking things 
up, but engagement calls for a commitment to relationality. 
                                                 
57 From a presentation of Senger’s practice at the Values in Computer and Information 
Systems Design Workshop, August 11, 2005.  
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Interdisciplinary: Working ‘Without’ 
The case studies presented in the previous chapter illustrate the 
interdisciplinary nature of HCI design. The museum case study drew from 
museum studies, art history, art, design, critical theory, learning theory and 
communication. The Affector case study drew from psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, design, critical theory, computer science and communication. 
The field of HCI is marked by its interdisciplinarity just as the field of 
communication is. Whereas the challenges of working across boundaries tend 
to be accepted in HCI, the interdisciplinarity within communication is often 
portrayed as a crisis or lack of cohesiveness. The diversity has led to the field 
being described derogatively by its own as ‘actively ignoring each other’, ‘a 
mad hatter’s tea party’, and ‘drafty’ (Craig, 1999; Myers, 2001; St. John, 
Striphas, and Shepherd, 2006). St. John, Striphas, and Shepherd in their 2006 
book on perspectives of communication argue for not just greater 
cohesiveness in the field but more rigorous debate to fend off postmodern 
paralysis and ‘a thousand flowers bloom’ mentality that threatens to choke 
promising seedlings in an overcrowded plot. This climate suggests that an 
open arm reception might not be forthcoming to yet another perspective of 
communication (i.e. communication as design or design as communication).  
Yet, the synergies between the idea of centers and margins in reflective 
design (from Agre’s critical technical practice) resonates with the view of 
scholars in the field of communication, such as Craig (1999), who recognize 
that the differences within the field are largely an issue of foregrounding and 
backgrounding. For Craig, each different school of thought in communication 
takes some aspect of communication for granted while highlighting other 
aspects as requiring further examination. The practice of reflective design is  
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also about drawing attention to what aspects have been designed for and what 
aspects have been ignored or marginalized. The interdisciplinary work of 
reflective design forces researchers to make assumptions apparent and open 
to debate since they cannot take as a given that their collaborators share the 
same assumptions and background. The implication for communication is to 
consider both the differences within the field and crossing borders into other 
fields not as a threat to the identity of the field itself but as an opportunity for 
continually refining and re-imagining this identity. 
Finally, the perspective of researchers within the arts, a practice that 
could be described as transgressing boundaries, provides a compelling 
orientation on the nature of interdisciplinary work. From an outside 
perspective, interdisciplinary work seems to be an additive process – an 
accumulation of a greater range of methods and criteria from which to pick and 
choose. Yet Springgay and Irwin (2005) argue that from the inside, 
interdisciplinary work is not a patchwork of practices but to some degree about 
“a loss, a shift, or a rupture where in absence, new courses of action unfold” 
(p. 898). They use the concept of ‘without’ proposed by Irit Rogoff (Phelan and 
Rogoff, 2001) to describe a position and process that does not depend on an 
existing well defined problem or methodology. According to Rogoff, the idea of 
being ‘without’ is “not a form of negation of existing subjects and methods, or a 
form of lack. [It] isn’t turning your back on, or denying, what you had at your 
disposal previously. It assumes that you had a model, to begin with. You lived 
it out, so you got as much out of it as may have been interesting at that point. 
And you’ve now found yourself in a position where you’re actively doing 
without the certitudes [but] without as yet having produced a hard-and-fast 
subject or methodology to replace them” (Phelan and Rogoff, 2001, p.34). This  
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perspective speaks to a form of interdisciplinary work that is not simply 
practitioners from different disciplines stepping into the unknown with the 
certainty of their tried and true methods and frames for research. Instead it 
suggests spaces of possibilities that emerge in the gaps between disciplines 
that encourage a fruitful period of uncertainty and questioning.  
Movement toward the Arts 
The perspective of ‘without’ proposed by Rogoff is also an example of a 
growing trend in HCI design of looking toward the arts and humanities for 
inspiration, collaboration, and the creation of new hybrid practices. An interest 
in arts-based inquiry is growing in a number of areas of the social sciences as 
well, including communication. Yet communication theory has mainly 
approached the arts as an object of study – an artistic practice within the field 
of study, for example the art of rhetoric or the production of creative media 
such as film and photography.  There is some work in the field on the 
production of art as a form of social science research, for example the work of 
Bochner and Ellis (2003, 2006) and their production of autoethnographies for 
examining the practice of communication. The field lags behind the movement 
in other disciplines however actively experimenting with different forms of 
representation of research such as poetry, drama, dance, visual art, etc. 
(Mullen, 2003). These new forms of research seem particularly suited to the 
aim of designing for, and subsequently evaluating for, openness to multiple 
interpretations. As Finley (2003) notes, artist-researchers “deal with openness 
by creating open spaces and multiple entrances into their work” (p.288) and 
Barone (2001) consents that playful, provocative and expressive research has 
the ability to “endow features of our experience with more than a single 
meaning” (p.24). Yet there are two more important aspects of the influence of  
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the arts beyond a recognition of more open forms of representation. In addition 
to the product of art, art is concerned about the process and in at least one 
current trend this process is positioned as dialogic.  
In terms of thinking about art as a process, this again suggests parallels 
with communication which is also described as being simultaneously a product 
and a process. But the movement in art I find interesting for the field of 
communication is not a recognition that process leads to a product but a 
reorientation of the focus. Instead of the product being the ultimate artifact by 
which art is remembered, there is a growing interest in art that is ephemeral 
where the participation in the process of art is the experience and the product 
remains as the residue, an after-thought, or a memento. Applying this same 
idea to the field of communication would argue that it is not the final research 
publication, not the final research results which impart the significance of the 
pursuit, but the process of engaging in the research. This switching of 
emphasis seems to counter previous statements arguing against the primacy 
of methods since if we prioritize the process we prioritize the methods by 
which the research happens. However, I would argue that the previous 
critiques of methods were of the formulaic applications, methods as templates. 
This new orientation toward process calls for dynamic methods, what 
Springgay and Irwin (2005) call ‘living inquiry’ and Rogoff (Phelan and Rogoff, 
2001) refers to as participation that is ‘performative’. 
As the emphasis shifts to the process of art, or in communication to the 
process of doing research, the type of results may shift as well. The goal may 
become not as much conclusions or conclusive results as it is generating new 
conversations, new questions, new directions. In this sense, it is not unlike the 
heuristics Craig and Tracy seek in their grounded practical theory – heuristics  
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that inspire new ways of looking at an existing practice of communication. 
Furthermore, the role of communication studies becomes even more important 
in the move toward this type of art, and this type of research. As Kester (2004) 
has identified the movement in art toward the dialogic – art that is not a 
‘speaking into the air’ approach for generating multiple interpretations but a 
form where multiple interpretations are part of the give and take between artist 
and audience through the artistic process. In this way then, just as art can 
inspire research in communication as a process, the study of communication 
can inform the practice of dialogic art. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began where each of the case studies left off: with the goal 
of designing for openness to interpretation. I started this examination with a 
review of how interpretation has been approached historically in HCI and how 
a re-thinking of interpretation calls for multiple as opposed to matching 
interpretations as a valuable goal in design. This openness to multiple 
interpretations was argued for as the complex, integral, and intimate nature of 
technology continues to increase. The observation that users consistently 
interpret technology in new ways is an opportunity and resource for design as 
opposed to something that required preclusion. Although a number of 
strategies have been proposed to increase a design’s degree of openness to 
interpretation, more work is required for understanding how these strategies 
interact with each other and how the strategies interact with other attributes 
such as particular situations and people. Openness to interpretation, used 
interchangeably with the idea of ambiguity, is presented as an emergent 
phenomenon and this emergence challenges the role of the designer and 
evaluator.  
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In an effort to understand interpretation and its relationship with 
ambiguity, I turned to the field of communication. Communication shares 
several overlaps with the space of design and the practice of interpretation as 
well as the use of ambiguity in language suggested a rich area for exploration. 
Although this chapter seemingly left the concept of the ineffable behind, what 
transpired began to resemble a third experience of the ineffable. The history of 
communication shares a number of parallels with both the history of affect and 
the history of art, all three for example have been compared to mystical 
transcendent experiences. All three have also endured a period of where the 
transmission of discrete information dominated. The history of communication 
studies traces this legacy to the period of the Enlightenment and the pillars of 
individualism and mechanicalism. As with the case studies, however, the study 
of communication has also moved away from the transmission of ideas to the 
co-construction of experience. 
Construction in communication is about language use and for this 
reason I introduced the focus on the linguistic turn in communication and 
specifically examined ambiguity in language. In this case, ambiguity emerges 
not from a designed situation where a designer chooses certain strategies to 
influence the openness to interpretation, but ambiguity emerges through the 
selection of figurative language choices and reliance on conventions for 
meaning-making and interpretation. In exploring how figurative language 
works, it became apparent that what is considered intentional ambiguity in 
communication is actually less open to interpretation than one might assume. 
Intentional ambiguity follows many of the same conventions of more literal 
communication. This review also indicated how studies of communication,  
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both of figurative and literal uses, focused on the convergence of meaning as 
opposed to multiple interpretations.  
Yet just as this review described ambiguous language as less open 
than perceived, new perspectives on communication are presenting literal or 
everyday language as more ambiguous. This chapter introduced the work of 
theorists such as Shepherd, Striphas, Baxter and Peters to discuss language 
use and communication not as a melding of minds, nor as a convergence of 
meaning but a sympathetic awareness and momentary connections of 
otherness. Communication is not portrayed as the opposite of 
miscommunication, binary poles of right and wrong, correct and incorrect, but 
a nuanced process of hints, guesses, and muddling through. This perspective 
could veer too far in the direction of infinite possibilities for openness, but all of 
these theorists take a more pragmatic view of communication happening in a 
world of both possibility but also reality.  
The discussion of communication as one that is always open to multiple 
interpretations led to a rethinking of the Clarkian model of common ground and 
joint salience. In this new proposal, the emphasis on ‘joint’ and ‘common’ is in 
the sense of being shared or sympathetic not necessarily isomorphic. 
Furthermore, the idea of space for interpretation was modeled as a funnel from 
more open to more closed (though never completely closed), but it did not 
correspond linearly with the amount of information or the presence of 
conventions. Conventions do tend to narrow the range for interpretation but 
they do not reduce it completely and at the same time conventions may also 
provide the impetus for transformation and therefore new interpretations. In 
other words, conventions may be the impetus for pushing from the narrow end 
of the funnel toward the wider end. Ultimately, the part of Clark’s model that  
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did not require re-thinking was the formulation that all interpretations are 
inferences based on evidence. We can never completely equate meaning with 
intention as meaning is always negotiated. 
The next step in the chapter was to explore how this new perspective in 
communication could inform thinking about the case study chapters, in 
particular how to study and how to evaluate multiple interpretations. Yet, in 
beginning this review, I discovered a disconnect between the 
conceptualization of communication as a process of construction and the 
study of communication. Most studies of communication still bear the legacy of 
individualism and mechanicalism. This is most evident through studies 
emphasizing a componentization of causal and predictable parts in the 
communication process. The recognition of the power of this legacy, even in 
light of new thinking on communication, suggests yet another link with the 
example of dominant design in the case studies. In the case study, a dominant 
design approach codified what was considered an ineffable experience. In the 
review of communication theory, the dominant study approach also codifies 
what is considered ineffable and complex. The move from conceptualization to 
operationalization often ends in codification. 
In an effort to address this legacy, I looked for examples of alternate 
criteria and used Craig and Tracy’s (1995) discussion of grounded practical 
theory as an alternative approach to scientific examinations. Grounded 
practical theory works to identify how practice is constituted, in particular the 
practice of communication. It calls for not just articulating ‘what is’ in a 
descriptive manner like an empirical study but articulating ‘what ought to be’. 
These situated ideals or norms are not proposed as directing behavior but 
providing a resource or influencing behavior. The norms are as subject to  
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challenge as the practices. Although grounded practical theory is also 
descriptive, its aim is for examining how certain practices come about. It is 
prescriptive but not predictive. The criteria for grounded practical theory is its 
usefulness for reflection and practice – both for the researchers and for the 
participants.  The exploration of grounded practical theory, alternate criteria, 
the benefits of empirical observations, and the difference between prediction 
and anticipation set the ground for returning to the evaluation of the case 
studies. For both case studies, I proposed how the ideas for grounded 
practical theory might inform a more systematic approach toward building 
understanding and anticipating how various attributes in the emergence of 
ambiguity interact. Again, the important distinction to emphasize is the goal of 
looking at the particularities of interactions and using these particularities to 
inform future design decisions, not to predict design impacts.  
In addition to examining how theory became codified in the study of 
communication, I looked at how theories of communication influenced both 
directly and indirectly the practice of design. In particular I presented three 
alternatives when communication and design are directly linked: the blueprint, 
the measures into design and the affordances approach. Both the blueprint 
and the measures approach run the risk of reifying abstract practices into de-
contextualized static representations. Whereas with theory this is something to 
caution against, with design the results can be more problematic because of 
the impact it could have on people’s everyday lives. I described an alternative 
to the measures into design and the blueprint approach where the goal is 
awareness as opposed to invisible control. I also explored in more detail the 
idea of affordances, returning to the goal of emergent phenomenon discussed 
throughout the conceptualization of openness. The affordance approach  
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resists one to one mappings between design attributes and behaviors or 
design attributes and meaning. Instead, it requires thoughtful reflection on the 
range of interactions. Attributes of design provide constraints, but as with 
words they are only one form of evidence. I drew from the expanded ideas of 
common ground and ambiguity in order to critique a design that used as its 
base the idea that more information mapped to less ambiguity. Instead, I 
proposed how a more complex understanding of the emergence of ambiguity 
from a communication perspective would lead to different design heuristics. I 
then used these design heuristics to rethink the case studies to both inspire 
new directions and push on the usefulness of the heuristics themselves.  
Finally, I proposed to reverse my examination from the lessons design 
could learn from communication to the lessons communication could draw 
from design. I am not alone in calling for this type of research, yet I cautioned 
that a narrow view of design as an instrumental problem centered process will 
limit the benefits. Instead, I advocate drawing from new approaches such as 
reflective design such as followed by each of the case studies. In this review, I 
highlighted four promising areas for future influences from design: refining 
concepts and criteria for interpretation, increasing the role of participants, the 
idea of ‘without’ in interdisciplinary work, and the growing role of the arts in 
social sciences. This last area captures the spirit of synergies between 
communication and design perhaps the best. Whereas designers may 
embrace the arts as inspiration for their work process, communication 
theorists are ahead of artists in thinking about engagement through dialogue 
and participation. Despite the increasing recognition of otherness, despite the 
ever present space for multiple interpretations, communication still works 
toward connection. Communication is about otherness, but not isolation.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
It is our differences that make us the same. 
-- Roger Coleman 
 
This work began with a personal case study questioning the limiting 
application of computing technology for the open and standard breaking 
practice of innovation in a business context. Through further exploration, I 
discovered this personal experience to be part of a much larger trend in the 
design of computing technology. In particular, the design of computing 
technology for rich, complex and difficult to formalize experiences typically 
results in an approach calling for reduction and simplification. I referred to 
these experiences as the ‘ineffable’ and the systems that result as ‘interfaces 
with the ineffable.’ It is the interfaces and their design that concerns this work. 
Although the ineffable provides an area of study, this is not a theory of the 
ineffable. Instead it is an exploration of design for a particularly relevant 
experience in the current emphasis toward technology that is more intimate, 
pervasive, and contextually responsive.  
The ineffable by definition escapes formal description yet the 
boundaries of the ineffable are fluid. What was considered ineffable at one 
period of history ceases to be so in the next. As this dissertation details, the 
redrawing of boundaries of the ineffable is partly influenced by technology 
design. On the one hand, the identification of ineffable experience serves as a 
demarcation between humans and technology – humans being capable of 
functioning with and sensing the ineffable and technology failing at this. On the 
other hand, this boundary of the ineffable also serves as a rallying cry for new  
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technology agendas. In an effort to fashion computers in the image of humans, 
we seek to model this facility with the ineffable. Two approaches to modeling 
the ineffable and subsequently designing interfaces were introduced: the 
reductionist approach where the ineffable is turned into the effable, and the 
interpretation approach where the richness and complexity of the ineffable is 
augmented. The former approach has a longer history of development in HCI 
but the latter is gaining more momentum. The interpretation approach 
advocates an orientation of designing for openness to multiple interpretations, 
recognizing that the incompleteness of a design at the hands of a designer is 
not a weakness but an asset of the design process. Yet the charge to design 
for openness shifts the orientation of traditional HCI and in doing so requires 
re-thinking and developing new strategies for design and evaluation of such 
systems. 
Following a reflective design practice, I explore these challenges as 
well as the tension between the alternate approaches of designing interfaces 
with the ineffable through two detailed case studies. Each study began by 
historically situating a formulation of a different ineffable experience: the 
ineffable experience of art in the first study and the ineffable experience of 
affect in the second. Both studies then presented the dominant approach in 
designing technology for such experiences and used this as a foil for 
articulating an alternate approach. The first case narrowed the exploration of 
art to the experience of art in the museum and described the dominant 
technology design as one of didactic one-way information transfer from expert 
to novice. The alternate approach in this study sought to emphasize marginal 
but essential aspects of the museum experience as a way of participating in 
and therefore connecting with art. The second case described affective  
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computing as designing for affect as information before introducing alternative 
designs for affect as interaction. Both case studies therefore followed the 
interpretation approach to designing interfaces with the ineffable. The first 
case study focused more on issues of design whereas the second case 
focused more on issues of evaluation. The open questions identified at the 
close of each study pointed to the need for further exploration into the process 
of designing for interpretation and engagement in interpretive acts. 
The penultimate chapter picked up this charge by first examining new 
thinking in designing for interpretation in the field of HCI. This thinking 
underscores many of the same conclusions and lessons learned from the case 
studies, but it also extends them. One of the main conclusions in this work is 
the view that how open something is to interpretation can not be 
predetermined but it emerges in action. Yet, from a design perspective the 
focus is on attributes under the designer’s control that constrain or enhance 
the interpretation space. Designers manipulate the material aspects of a 
situation. They build things. Despite a directive to focus on the interplay 
between material form, socio-cultural circumstances and practices, and 
attributes of people, at the end of the day what the designer controls and is 
therefore concerned about is the design. Therefore, in an effort to broaden the 
lens of interpretation, I turned to the field of communication. In the everyday 
practice of communication, people themselves step into the simultaneous role 
of users and designers. They choose the (material) form of their 
communication and therefore design their expressive acts. At the same time, 
they engage in the active process of meaning making in terms of how their 
contributions interact with others and the environment. By examining 
communication, in particular the process of interpretation and ambiguity in  
367 
language use, I proposed new insights for the field of HCI. Subsequently, I 
returned to the process of conducting the case studies in particular and the 
practice of design in HCI in general to identify how design adds to the field of 
communication. 
The introduction of this chapter has provided a broad overview of how 
the work presented here has progressed. In the following sections, I will argue 
for the relevance or appropriateness of this approach in answering the 
questions motivating this research. I will then turn to the five research 
questions introduced in the first chapter and summarize results addressing 
these questions. From this specific vantage point, I will take a step back to 
look at broader themes that emerged across the case studies and the 
discussion of interpretation in chapter four. Finally, I will end with a discussion 
of future directions.  
Relevance of Approach  
This work is rooted in design and the interdisciplinary practice of HCI. 
As a study in reflective design it seeks to contribute new ways of thinking 
about, practicing, and ultimately evaluating designs for a particular context, 
namely for experiences of the ineffable. I present reflective design not as an 
instrumental problem driven approach but as a form of critical inquiry where 
the boundaries of existing design spaces are pushed on and the pursuit of 
resonant practices pursued. Reflective design is both a process of reflecting 
on the assumptions and values involved in design as well as a product 
resulting in designs that stimulate reflection on the design space and the role 
of technology in that formulation. Unlike critical technical practice which waits 
for a technical impasse to spark reflection, reflective design argues for 
continually examining existing design spaces to keep assumptions and values  
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from becoming invisible and taken for granted. Unlike participatory design and 
user-centered design that typically begin with known problem spaces and the 
articulation of user needs and requirements, reflective design also looks to 
provoke reflection on how the perception of needs and requirements first begin 
to formalize. Unlike critical design, where the audience for reflection is 
traditionally other designers and the idea of the design is more important than 
the actual implementation, reflective design works to engage designers and 
participants through reflection on the design process and use of an actual 
system. Finally, unlike conceptions of reflection that suggest a process that 
precedes or follows action, reflective design emphasizes reflection that 
happens in and through use.  
Because of its focus on both designers and participants in the design 
process, reflective design is characterized not as an intervention but as a 
practice of participative inquiry. Engagement in this inquiry is toward 
understanding how people make meaning in their everyday lives and how they 
incorporate, rely on, adapt, or ignore computer technology in these everyday 
meaning making acts. The goal of this type of research, a broader 
understanding of the human condition, situates the design as research not 
only in advancing approaches to design but in advancing social science 
theories also concerned with meaning making. In particular, the work 
presented here is offered as an exploration of a new perspective and 
approach to theorizing in the field of communication. 
The design approach followed in this study was ethnographically 
informed and ethnomethodologically inspired. From the practice of 
ethnography, I drew an orientation toward and relevant practices for observing 
designs and the process of design in action, then subsequently using these  
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observations as the basis for analysis. From ethnomethodology, I attempted to 
refrain from imposing initial categorizations on how the designs would be 
adopted and appropriated and instead work to elicit participants’ own accounts 
of how the designs were used and how they would define whether a system 
works or not. I do not claim this as an ethnomethodological study however. I 
played a large role in providing categorization that would influence uptake by 
virtue of being both the designer as well as the evaluator in the studies. This 
involvement was critical for the type of research I wanted to engage in: 
research that was a collaboration between myself and the participants 
throughout the stages of design and evaluation. Finally, because of the relative 
newness of this area of inquiry into designing for openness, the inductive 
approach of developing descriptive analysis of a variety of cases is the most 
appropriate approach at this stage. In chapter four I discuss how this inductive 
case study approach may draw from systematic studies for fleshing out the 
design space, but the goal of this work is not the development of theorems for 
prediction but design exemplars for anticipation. 
As a new approach to theorizing within the field of communication, this 
work provides a point for discussion among scholars in the field in terms of 
ways to structure and present research of this vein. It is rooted in design yet 
presented to the field of communication. I have argued for the parallels 
between the fields of HCI and the field of communication regarding the 
process of interpretation and the relevance of practices and perspectives in 
each respective field for the other.  However, as a new approach it will be 
unfamiliar to many scholars in the field of communication. Many theorists in 
communication are very familiar with the products of technology design and 
the study of technology design in use, but they are less familiar with engaging  
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in technology design. Much of the work for this dissertation is only alluded to in 
this presentation. This work entailed building and deploying several working 
systems. Whereas most studies of computer technology in communication 
begin with an already working deployed system, this study first had to engage 
in the process of building each system.  
Furthermore, because the systems were designed for environments 
outside the laboratory, I had less control as a researcher and had to make 
decisions due to the contingencies of the situation as opposed to always being 
driven only by the design and research questions. Although the lab also has 
contingencies to address, these tend to be well known ahead of time and 
controllable. This contingency-based work does not undermine the value of the 
results and I would argue that it grounds them in the contingencies of every 
day life. The larger point, however, is that because this is a new approach it 
will require further dialogue to understand how to position it most fruitfully 
within the field of communication. I have followed the strategy of scaffolding 
introduced as an important part of the designs in orienting the unfamiliar parts 
of this approach to research within familiar constructs but I believe more work 
is required. 
Research Questions and Results 
In this section, I will return to the original research questions outlined in 
the first chapter and detail how the case studies and discussion of 
interpretation offers evidence for answering these questions. These questions 
include: 
 
Q1: How have the boundaries of the ineffable been 
configured for the experience of art and for the experience of 
affect? What is the dominant approach of interfacing with  
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this configuration? What are the practical, political and 
personal implications? 
 
Q2: How do we design for co-interpretation? If systems are 
ultimately interpreted by users, what strategies enable the 
designer to play a role in anticipating or contributing to this 
conversation?  
 
Q3: How do we evaluate designs for co-interpretation? How 
do we use phenomenological approaches (and other 
methods) based on one particular system for more general 
lessons? 
 
Q4: What insights from communication theory, particularly 
studies of language use, can we draw from for insights into 
the design, use, and evaluation of systems designed for 
openness to interpretation? 
 
Q5: What insights from the process of designing and 
evaluating systems designed for openness can we draw on 
for the field of communication? 
 
In general, these questions were approached in order through the 
sequence of the chapters. Question one was addressed in the historical 
review for each case study. Questions two and three were addressed in the 
design, evaluation, results and discussion sections for each case study as well 
as drawing additional strategies for design from the discussion in chapter four 
on re-thinking interpretation in HCI. Questions four and five were tackled in 
chapter four’s examination of the parallels and cross-overs between HCI and 
communication. I will briefly summarize answers to these questions here.  
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Q1: Boundaries and Interfaces with the Ineffable  
The introduction briefly identified a number of areas considered 
ineffable but the case studies focused on two in particular. The first case study 
looked at how art has historically been described as an experience of the 
ineffable – a transcendent experience beyond descriptions. In terms of 
personhood implications of the ineffable, the ability to produce and appreciate 
art is what separated man from beast and in later times what has motivated 
debates around whether it also separates man from computers. Politically, this 
transcendent experience has also served to demarcate a select group of 
elitist, those typically with an abundance of wealth, power or exposure to the 
arts. Although the Enlightenment ideals maintained that universality existed 
beyond the material, the history of art reads largely as one of exclusion. This 
could be seen sharply in the institutionalization of the art experience in the art 
museum.   
In the art museum, the boundaries of the ineffable were contested and 
redrawn around who has access and license to participate in this experience 
and whether the ineffable nature of art is directed by the artist, the material 
form of the art itself, the critic or the viewer. Building interfaces with the 
ineffable in the art museum has produced ongoing debates of practice. The 
essentialist camp believed no amount of mediation could provide a bridge into 
the ineffable and encouraged the white cube mentality where the form of the 
art is supposed to speak for itself. Although the essentialist camp is typically 
associated with the powerful, artists and curators working against dominance 
such as the surrealists and avant-garde often show traces of essentialism 
where the art is still portrayed as speaking for itself and ends in dividing those 
who ‘get it’ from those who don’t. The contextualist camp argues that art is  
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part of a larger socio-cultural history requiring an introduction and footholds for 
aiding interpretation and connection with the art. According to the 
contextualists, even surrealist art, that challenges having a ‘set meaning’ to 
decode, has a larger social commentary that requires understanding what the 
art is a reaction against.  
The introduction of computer technology for interfacing with art into this 
debate tends to follow the contextualist line of argument although in doing so 
could be argued to continue the divide between those who get it and those 
who don’t. The dominant application of computer technology for understanding 
art in the museum is designed for providing information about the art on 
display to the viewer. In terms of political and practical implications, the 
information provided is determined by museum professionals responding to 
the debates described above. Even in advanced systems that allow visitors to 
select their own tours or their own path through the available information, this 
information is presented with authority of a curatorial point of view for guiding 
the visitor’s experience to a common interpretation. As was discussed with the 
artist who commented on his experience using the handheld tour guide at the 
Renwick Gallery, his concern with the amount of information provided and the 
rich descriptions offered by the creators of the art tended to close down the 
objects for him. Instead of letting the objects take on new meanings through 
interactions with visitors, the amount of information available tended to close 
this down. 
The second case study also reviewed the shifting boundaries of the 
ineffable but in this case for the experience of affect. Like art, affect was once 
positioned in the realm of the spiritual, something that separated man from 
mere beasts. It could not be described but could descend upon or, in reverse,  
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elevate people to heightened experiences. Its locus was outside the body. Yet 
despite its original conceptions as being unpredictable, there was always a 
strong urge to control it evident in the earliest of philosophical writings. This 
need for control over emotions continued into the period of the Enlightenment 
with the laying of foundations for empirical science. Darwin made an early 
critical move in de-spiritualizing affect by demonstrating its presence in 
animals. Affect as a concept steadily moved inside people or other biological 
beings as opposed to an outside force. Also during this time period, concerted 
efforts were made to classify emotions – to mark off its boundaries between 
other constructs, such as reasoning, and between different emotions, such as 
happy versus sad. Finally, Dror’s account of the numerization of emotions 
speaks to another legitimizing move in the study of affect. As science was 
perceived of as an ‘emotion free’ space, in order to study emotions they had to 
be de-emotionalized, contained, and abstracted away from messy 
uncontrollable experience. The development of technology and algorithms to 
track emotions numerically opened up affect for legitimate scientific pursuit.  At 
this point then, a split could be discerned in terms of the ineffable experience 
of the affect. From a scientific perspective, emotion ceased to be ineffable; yet, 
the ineffable conception of affect still held favor for many philosophers and 
artists. This split could also be seen lining up implications for personhood – 
although Darwin’s move showed emotions as a point of kinship between man 
and beast, unscientific emotions were regarded as savage or feminine. Today, 
the feminine association with emotions continues, reportedly backed by 
science.  
The rise of affective computing, the interesting in computing technology 
that took into account not just reason based processes but the integral  
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importance of emotion in our daily work and leisure, could approach emotion 
as the effable construct of science or the ineffable construct of the arts. Not 
surprisingly, with its roots in cognitive psychology and with an interest in 
disassociating itself from the feminization of emotions, affective computing 
followed the numerization approach. In this manner, emotions were 
constructed as internal, discrete, and codifiable bits of information that could 
be transmitted to or detected by a computer. In practical terms, this meant that 
the experience of emotion that escaped codification, such as the felt life 
described by McCarthy and Wright, was left out of the equation. In political 
terms, the implications of computers that detect the information of emotions 
revolved around issues of accuracy, control, and loss of complexity.  
Q2: Designing for openness to interpretation 
The case studies each began with a historical positioning of art and 
affect respectively as experiences of the ineffable. They then illustrated how 
the dominant approach to designing interfaces for these experiences is to 
reduce the ineffability through discrete and codifiable representation. The 
reduction and codification of the experience of art or affect is controlled by the 
expert (e.g. by the scientist or the curator). In both cases, the application of 
technology focused on the expert identification and transference of 
information. Yet, both case studies also explored alternatives to this approach. 
In the museum case study, I presented a series of designs attempting to 
create both an experience of art and a tool for navigating the space of the 
museum. The designs largely attempted to focus on other aspects of the 
museum experience that visitors are the authorities on, as opposed to the 
curators, such as their own reactions to and interactions with the objects, 
people, and space of the museum. For the affect chapter, I presented a shift in  
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perspective of affect as information transfer to affect as interaction. This shift 
called for designing technologies that augmented the rich, complex, and 
relational experience of affect. The alternate design approaches in both case 
studies pursue an interpretation approach to the ineffable. In other words, 
instead of first defining the ineffable and then coding for it, the designs 
maintain that an experience of the ineffable is an experience of interpretation. 
Meaning is not embedded in or transferred intact through the system but 
constructed in interaction with the system.  
In designing for interpretation, each case study experimented with 
different design strategies. In addition, chapter four provided a review of 
design strategies for openness to interpretation developed across a number of 
systems. These strategies are outlined quickly in Table 4.  
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Table 4. Summary of design strategies for designing for interpretation
58: 
Strategy  Description  Cases 
Defamiliarization  A collection of strategies for augmenting and 
drawing attention to difference: e.g. alien 
presence, abstract representations, 
incongruent juxtapositions 
I, B, A 
Digital scaffolding  Providing familiar footholds to present a way 
into a defamiliar experience 
I, B 
Dynamic feedback  Presenting any information collected for the 
system use to the user as well, e.g. 
visualizations of use patterns 
I, B, A 
Self in collective  Allowing users to easily identify their 
personal influence as separate from others 
I 
Site-specific / 
context dependent 
Leverage information outside the system 
itself; design for particularities 
I, B, A 
Autobiographical 
design 
Designers as users  A 
Remove internal 
meaning maps 
System acts without a pre-coded meaning 
for translating input to output; meaning 
construction occurs outside the system 
A 
Access to system 
innards 
Users can readily manipulate system code 
and behavior 
A 
Surfaces for 
personalization  
Users leave traces of their participation; 
these traces become an integral part of the 
system 
I 
Framing   Altering the positioning of the system, e.g. 
an origin story, a genre, etc. 
I, B, A 
Exposing the seams  Highlighting system functioning, e.g. how 
information is handled between processes, 
how the system integrates with other 
systems 
- 
Under-designing  Providing minimal features requiring 
maximum meaning overlays from the users 
- 
Characters and 
extreme characters 
Targeting rich, deep, identifiable people not 
generic stereotypes or non-existent 
amalgamations 
- 
Layering complexity  Altering system functionality over time; 
designing simultaneously for two different 
audiences (e.g. children + adults) 
- 
 
                                                 
58 [I]mprints, [B]irdscape, [A]ffector  
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In addition to the design strategies, one finding from the case study and 
review of other similar work in designing for openness to interpretation is the 
increased role evaluation strategies play in design. Typically, design occurs as 
an iterative process with a prototype or finished system introduced into a use 
case and an evaluation follows before returning to the design drawing board. 
Because the goal of these designs is to allow for openness to interpretation, 
the evaluation methods must document how interpretation happens in use. 
This resulted in a merging of design, evaluation, and use stages. For example, 
during the Affector case study, we used diaries to capture notes from the user 
and I conducted several interviews and focus group sessions throughout the 
design/use period. The diaries are configured into the system and as such 
they stand as part of the system design, no different than the access to 
configuring the sensors and distortions. This interweaving of evaluation 
methods into the system presents challenges as well as opportunities. In 
terms of challenges, we must consider the interaction of the evaluation 
methods, just as another design attribute or feature. As an opportunity 
however it further underscores the fluid nature of design without well defined 
periods of design versus evaluation versus use. In doing so, it supports the 
move to present the designs as a co-interpretation between designers, 
evaluators, and users, sometimes by the same person playing all three roles. 
Finally, the design strategies listed above are not an exhaustive list nor 
do they represent a checklist. The purpose of developing a list of strategies is 
to explore their effects in a range of contexts and to create a textured 
description of this new design space. As will be discussed in the next section, 
the goal of this design approach is not prediction but anticipation. By 
articulating different design experiences, it is hoped that these will provide  
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resources for anticipating how different design decisions interact with other 
circumstances such as the specific environment and the number and type of 
people involved. As the designs are intended to open the space for 
interpretation, prediction is less relevant. Prediction presumes a right or wrong 
response as opposed to a multiplicity. Furthermore, prediction in a design 
context is a step away from removing control or responsibility for meaning 
making away from users or away from a collaborative model to one that is 
determined by the system’s internal predictive model. 
Q3: Evaluating for openness to interpretation 
The challenge of evaluating systems designed for openness to 
interpretation materializes because if all systems are open to interpretation, 
then all systems could potentially be considered successful in this approach. 
The case studies explored how to move forward with evaluation in the face of 
this conundrum. One possible suggestion was to draw from metrics of 
creativity studies, where more ideas and the range of ideas indicate higher 
creativity. Yet, this quantitative approach focuses on only the product of 
experience and not the process. Furthermore, although the language used 
throughout the discussion of openness has been for multiplicity and for ‘more’ 
versus ‘less’ openness, the evaluation methods focused on qualitative 
descriptions of interpretation process. Therefore, I drew from 
phenomenological and qualitative inquiry studies to develop methods that 
were open-ended and designed to elicit reflection and rich descriptions of the 
systems in use. In both the museum case studies and with Affector, I avoided 
static tools such as surveys in favor of interviews and design sessions. The 
interviews during the Imprint program in the museum were designed to 
encourage visitors to think critically and descriptively not only about their use  
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of Imprints but about their visits to museums and their use of technology in 
general. The comment book designed for the Birdscape study was 
implemented as an evocative postcard attempting to look not like a research 
tool but something that belonged in the museum. Finally, the focus group 
sessions with Affector attempted to create exercises full of rich data prompts 
where the data was positioned as elements for crafting a story about how 
Affector did or did not work. Ultimately the focus for both case studies was on 
eliciting accounts of how the systems were appropriated – not, did the system 
work according to the designer’s point of view, but how was it that the systems 
were defined as working (or not) from the users. 
The chapter on interpretation in HCI and in communication also shed 
light on the question of evaluation. New thinking in HCI is positioning 
evaluation as one of eliciting multiple perspectives including the users, the 
designers, and a range of outside evaluators – in particular people from 
outside the field of HCI such as documentary film makers (Gaver, Boucher, 
Pennington, and Walker, 2005). Just as the designs are intended to evoke 
multiple interpretations, the evaluations will also likely evoke different 
interpretations. The exploration of studying interpretation in communication 
and in particular the strategy of grounded practical theory gave insights into 
structuring systematic studies of the different design strategies in a range of 
contexts. This systematic approach is for fleshing out details, in particular 
interactions of different attributes, but not an approach of divide and conquer. 
Instead, the systematic approach works toward the goal of anticipation 
described in the design section above. As the goal and therefore criterion of 
prediction is not relevant for this form of evaluation, new criteria were 
proposed to assess the quality of the evaluation itself. Criteria such as the  
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evaluation’s usefulness in generating new interpretations or perspectives on 
the design space, its ability to evoke reflection and deep engagement with 
participants, its transformative or catalytic effects from virtue of participating, 
and finally the level of enjoyment evident from participation. All of these criteria 
for the evaluation reflect the same criteria of the design itself, another 
indication of how the design and evaluation of systems are becoming more 
intertwined. 
Although the question of how to approach evaluation remains open, 
what is clear is that evaluation itself in a reflective design approach to research 
is a fundamentally different process than traditional notions of evaluation in 
HCI or in empirical communication studies. Many of the methods may be 
familiar but the criteria and the focus are different. 
Q4: Drawing from Communication for HCI 
Ultimately, the discussion of communication as a field and as a practice 
of study mirrored the earlier case studies of designing for the ineffable. In this 
case the ineffable experience is the momentary transcendence to a 
sympathetic awareness of the other that communication entails. The 
approaches explored to communication as an experience were less about 
specific technology designs and more about the formulation of theories and 
methods for approaching communication practice. The history of 
communication detailed a movement from communication as transmission of 
information and intact meaning, similar to the history of art and affect, to a 
process where meaning is constructed in collaboration. Although most studies 
of communication still focus on the construction of a single meaning, support 
also exists for conceptualizing interpretation not as a process of isomorphism 
but of multiplicity. As an exemplar of this conception, I looked in detail at  
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practices of ambiguity in language: language constructions designed 
ostensibly to be more open to multiple interpretations. In doing so, I 
discovered both that ambiguous language is often more clear and coordinated 
than we imagine it to be and that non-ambiguous language is more open to 
interpretations than we traditionally characterize it. This discovery led to re-
thinking ambiguity in language use not as a binary construct where something 
is ambiguous or not, where there is common ground or not, understanding or 
misunderstanding. Instead, ambiguity is more fluid, and like the discussions of 
ambiguity in design not simply an attribute of the language itself but an 
emergent phenomenon.  
In addition to using studies of ambiguity, I looked at how the process of 
interpretation and meaning making is typically conducted within 
communication. Despite an orientation toward construction and process, the 
studies tend to take more of a variable approach. Furthermore, the emphasis 
is more toward convergence around a single shared meaning. As an 
alternative methodology, I explored in detail Craig and Tracy’s grounded 
practical theory approach to studying the reconstruction of a communication 
practice. Grounded practical theory differs from scientific empirical studies that 
describe what is (and often what will be through predictions) by instead 
articulating what ought to be according to the participants in the phenomenon 
of study. Craig and Tracy refer to this as a normative theory, but their view of 
the normative is a questioning of ideals not a solidification of them. The 
grounded practical theory explanation served as an example for future 
development of the case studies of weaving together examination from 
empirical science, action science, and critical inquiry. Finally, the grounded 
practical theory discussion highlighted ‘usefulness’ as a criterion for theories  
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and methods: usefulness for reflection and for new thinking. I found the 
orientation of this approach resonant with reflective design where the goal is 
not to test the accuracy of existing theories but to continue developing new 
fields of inquiry based on close observation of practice. 
Finally, I reviewed how communication theory directly influences 
technology design practice and articulated three different approaches: the 
blueprint, measures into design, and the affordances. I discussed limitations of 
the first two approaches before elaborating the affordance approach which 
looks at potential and possibilities for interaction rather than a one to one 
mapping between a design attribute and an outcome. I described several 
examples of missteps in applying communication theory to design before 
describing a project where communication theories of ambiguity, applied in the 
affordance approach, served to identify problems in a design and propose 
several design heuristics. In particular, I underscored how Aoki & Woodruff’s 
attempt to design for unresponsiveness by leaving space for stories fell foul of 
their objective when they equated more information with less ambiguity. The 
refined position on ambiguity developed through this work suggests instead 
that ambiguity is a question of quality of evidence, not amount. The amount of 
evidence is only part of the overall affordance of the situation.  
The design ideas developed from this discussion (see Table 5) sit 
somewhere in between the objective of designing for openness and the design 
strategies listed above. In other words, these ideas or guidelines act as a 
bridge between objectives and strategies. I used these guidelines to reflect on 
and propose next steps for the case studies from chapter two and three. 
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Table 5. Design ideas inspired from communication theories of ambiguity 
•  Design for opposites 
•  Design for convention building 
•  Design for extremes 
•  Design for something else 
•  Design for over-interpretation. 
Q5: Drawing from HCI for Communication  
The last research question asked what lessons from the field of HCI 
could be drawn for the field of communication. To some extent, this 
dissertation as a whole is offered in that spirit, a study from the field of HCI of 
two specific design cases and reflections on how people construct meaning 
from open-ended experiences. In response to the charge from Poole to 
develop more process related approaches for a process view of 
communication, design theory and practice offers a strong candidate forward. 
However, I cautioned against using a narrow, instrumental approach to design 
and instead advocated the type of reflective design explored here.  The new 
developments in reflective design and related efforts to design for openness 
provide an exciting area of study for conceptions of communication such as 
those advocated by Striphas, Shepherd, Peters, and Baxter where meaning 
may be multifaceted and a process of recognizing otherness as opposed to 
desiring sameness. Therefore, I would argue that the parallel developments in 
design offer at the very least refinements in conceptualizing communication as 
well as alternate criteria for evaluation described in response to the above 
questions.  
I will end by summarizing three of the strongest contributions design 
has to offer for communication. The first is the role of participants in research.  
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Although communication and the social sciences in general are becoming 
more interested in expanding the role of participants in the research process, 
the field of design has a head start in experimenting with participants as 
designers and more recently as evaluators. Second, although both 
communication and HCI are interdisciplinary and to some degree overlapping 
fields, the former approaches interdisciplinarity more as an unfortunate legacy 
of its past. HCI, although not without its interdisciplinary challenges, seems 
more prone to embrace its multi-disciplined nature. Furthermore, the growing 
interest in the arts and humanities within HCI are developing very interesting 
advancements in terms of criteria and methods. I offered the term ‘without’ 
from Rogoff as a injunction to rely less on formalized methods, to draw on 
existing methods not for their reproducibility but for their ability to provide a 
resource or raw material for creating something new. Finally, this interest in 
the arts also led to the conclusion that the focus of this research is not on end 
results but on the process of getting to these conclusions.  
Reflection on Themes 
The above section roughly followed the order of the chapters looking at 
each research question in turn and summarizing how these questions were 
approached and explored. In this section, I will look across all of the chapters 
and identify five main themes that continued to arise throughout the 
discussions and mark the overall lessons learned.  
Representation and Codification 
This work opened with a personal case study and observation of how 
quickly a representation of innovation, in the form of a theory of innovation, 
became codified into a standard practice. The codification of this  
386 
representation became further solidified when new technology was introduced 
to further standardize these set routines. I quickly jumped to concern with this 
second order codification, from theory into design. What I overlooked in 
significance was the initial codification in the theorizing step.  
The case studies and discussion chapter on communication and 
interpretation highlight how similar theory and design are in regards to 
representation and codification. Both employ Hayles’ Platonic backhand in 
moving from “noisy multiplicity to reductive simplicity” (Hayles, 1999, p. 13). In 
design, the move is from a messy situation of innumerable choices to a 
narrowing of possibilities in terms of actions supported and restrained by the 
designed system. In theory, the move is from a complex phenomenon to a 
focusing on what is significant and related versus what can be ignored and 
considered less consequential. In both cases as well, this work demonstrates 
consequences of the Platonic forehand in perpetuating the representation and 
making change difficult. The more a design narrows possibilities of action, the 
more difficult it is to realize and argue for the relevance of other actions, such 
as in the museum space the difficulty in promoting technology that broadens 
the activities designed for in the experience of art. The more a theory focuses 
attention and amasses evidence for its perspective, the more difficult it is to 
look in an alternate direction. The observation of how both theory and design 
employ the backhand and forehand of abstraction and generation leads to two 
further points of reflection: the issue of control and the issue of reflection.  
Just as a historical representation or theory of the past often tells us 
more about the historian than the history itself, so too does academic theory 
(or design) tell us as much about the researchers (or the designer) as the 
researched phenomenon. It is the storyteller, a term I do not use in the  
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pejorative sense, who controls the storyline and its development. In the case 
studies on the art museum and affect, I demonstrated approaches that sought 
to increase participation in controlling what an eventual design addresses. In 
other words, the process of representation and even codification itself is not 
the limiting factor, it is the level of access to this process. It is a question of 
control. In fact, the representation and codification process itself need not be 
portrayed as something to guard against but something that potentially sparks 
reflection. The constraints of a design or a theory offer not only a way forward 
in a sea of possibility that gives rise to practical designs and illuminating 
perspectives on phenomenon, but they also provide guides for ultimately 
challenging the frame itself. In other words, the frame provides a way into a 
phenomenon and also a way out. Again, I had an initial experience of this as 
the designer of the innovation platform for my clients discussed in the first 
chapter. It was through the process of designing the innovation system that as 
designers we came to know and understand the standardized practices we 
were using inside and out. These practices then served as a marker for 
perhaps overturning and looking for new practices. The point here is that 
representations and codifications, in the sense of normative ideals, do not 
need to determine or constrain behavior and perspectives to the point where 
change is impossible. The representations themselves can serve as a stimulus 
for change when awareness and agency for participation and change exists. 
Awareness, Agency, and Ambiguity 
The importance of awareness surfaced throughout the case studies and 
discussion: awareness of conventions, awareness of assumptions and values, 
awareness of actions supported and marginalized. All of these points of 
awareness direct attention toward aspects more traditionally hidden, either by  
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design or by nature. For instance, in the affective computing systems, one of 
the goals is to augment physiological symptoms such as amount of sweat on 
one’s skin that we may not consciously attend to. As another example, in the 
museum automated context-aware guides, a visitor’s foot traffic is calculated 
according to complicated Bayesian formulas in order to develop a set pattern 
that may or may not be discernible to the individual visitor. Yet in these 
examples, the awareness that is heightened is that of the system, and by 
extension the designer or researcher. This invisible information is brought into 
being as input to a system or for analysis by the researcher. As the alternate 
designs in the case studies argued, however, this same invisible information 
can be of interest to participants or users of the designed systems as well. In 
this manner, awareness of the invisible is the first step in designing for 
openness to interpretation. In order for interpretation to be engaged in, one 
first must be aware of the opportunity to engage in a meaning-making process. 
Awareness on its own however is not enough for engagement. Another 
key issue arising through the case studies was the importance of agency, or 
as it was introduced in the studies, the license for participation. Agency 
suggests not only awareness of an opportunity but the wherewithal, including 
the desire, the skill, and the access to participate. Furthermore, agency, like 
the discussions of ambiguity, is an emergent property according to Suchman 
(2004). Agency is not located solely within the individual but is enacted 
relationally between people and the attributes of the environment. In the 
museum example, we learned that simply designing for marginal experiences 
in the museum, such as visitor commenting, is not enough to break out of 
conventional practices and expectations. Instead, strategies are needed that 
signal or grant this authority for appropriation.   
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The concept of ambiguity, or openness to interpretation, can increase 
both awareness (through design strategies such as defamiliarization) and 
agency (by signaling its openness to the active construction of meaning). Yet, 
designing for ambiguity can also lead to the exact opposite scenario: 
defamiliarization can reduce awareness and agency if it is either too strange, 
disorienting, or uninviting.  Part of the difficulty in approaching ambiguity for 
design is in this tension between considering it a strategy implemented under 
the designer’s control and a property that emerges from the interaction of 
design attributes, people, and the specific situation. For example, in language 
use, ambiguity can be considered a strategy of the communicator, such as 
using evasive, imprecise, or figurative language. But ambiguity can also be 
considered an inherent and emergent property in all language acts as both the 
speaker and responder actively work to coordinate meanings yet still retain a 
space of otherness. I have highlighted studies in everyday language use as a 
fertile area for further exploration as designers attempt to understand and 
anticipate ambiguity as an emergent phenomenon. In particular, I believe 
further work into the development of conventions in language use, the work 
required to build conventions and the use of conventions as a springboard for 
reopening the space of interpretation can provide a valuable resource for 
designers in HCI. 
Digital Scaffolding and Dynamic Feedback  
Two of the related concepts for awareness, agency and ambiguity that 
this dissertation explores include digital scaffolding and dynamic feedback. 
The former is a principle for design strategies and the latter outlines both a 
principle and a strategy. A number of design strategies for ambiguity were 
listed in the previous chapters but I highlight these as new contributions for  
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this objective of design. The concepts themselves are not new: the idea of 
scaffolding is borrowed from Vygotsky’s theories of learning and the idea of 
feedback comes from studies in second-order cybernetics where the observer 
of the feedback becomes part of the system itself.  
Digital scaffolding became an important principle in the museum case 
studies because we realized we had to build from people’s familiar 
experiences. We couldn’t simply introduce new experiences without 
accessible entry points or else we would run the risk of creating designs, like 
avant-garde art, where people either get it or they don’t. Digital scaffolding 
entails working to provide footholds from the conventional to the 
unconventional. As a principle, digital scaffolding does not tell us as designers 
what to do but serves as a reminder to include strategies such as framing or 
leveraging familiarity as a balance to defamiliarization strategies.  
Dynamic feedback on the other hand suggests both a principle and a 
strategy. First, it requires an orientation to research and design that values 
making information translucent as opposed to invisible. It is the emphasis on 
awareness and control described above that motivates the desire to make the 
information traditionally collected for a researcher’s analysis or for a system’s 
processing equally available to the people who generate this information. 
Second, dynamic feedback requires deliberation and experimentation with 
what information to track and collect. In the museum examples for instance we 
tracked density of people and their relative paths through the museum space. 
In the Affector example, we ultimately focused on changes in movement levels 
across time. However, in both case studies alternate indices could be 
experimented with and part of future explorations will try different sources. Part 
of what is needed to advance the use of dynamic feedback are guides for how  
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to choose from the variety of information sources available. The third part of 
dynamic feedback involves decisions over how this information is represented. 
As the first theme indicated, all presentations of information or indices of 
experience are a representation regardless of attempts to remove 
predetermined models of meaning. Yet, the range of possible representations 
will vary along dimensions such as who has access to influencing and 
modifying the representation and how open or closed the representation is for 
different situations.  
Foregrounding and Backgrounding 
The final theme throughout this work was initially introduced from 
Agre’s critical technical practice conception of centers and margins. In Agre’s 
development of an interaction approach to artificial intelligence, he swapped 
the traditionally dominant focus on abstract complete models in favor of the 
traditionally marginal aspect of context. This practice of inversion is also at the 
heart of reflective design and was demonstrated in both case studies as well 
as in the discussion of movement in the field of communication. In the histories 
presented for art, affect, and communication, the dominant methods for 
conceptualizing, studying, and designing for these concepts all shifted from an 
information transfer model to one of experience.  
The idea of centers, something that is foregrounded, and margins, 
something that is backgrounded, was also discussed with regards to fields that 
are interdisciplinary in nature such as HCI and communication. Craig (1999), 
for instance, attempts to provide a coherent framework for how different 
approaches to the study of communication fit together, with each focusing on 
different aspects of the complex phenomenon of communication. As another 
example, when writing this dissertation, I was conscious that different parts  
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would appeal to different members of my committee, and corresponding parts 
may seem less necessary, based on each individual’s own research 
perspective. Finally, in the museum case study, I explored how foregrounding 
and backgrounding played out in my interactions with artist Chen on the 
Birdscape implementation. Although we often understood each other’s 
perspectives, we valued different things and therefore were driven to make 
different choices. The question of value is one that I am returning to over and 
over: whether it is the value or valence of an emotional response, the value or 
salience of available information, the value of an evaluation method, or the 
values informing what is considered a worthy design space. Values mediate 
the boundaries between the foreground and background of focus.  
The question of values raises debates of positivist/essentialist positions 
versus relativist/postmodern positions. The former suggests there are right 
and wrong values and the latter suggests values are constructed and 
maintained by different communities. The accusation against the relativist 
approach is that it leads to paralysis or shuts down productive debate. St. 
John, Striphas, and Shepherd (2006) for example argue that theorists in the 
field of communication need to not only locate their perspective horizontally 
across a range of theories but also argue for their perspective vertically in 
terms of why their theory is better than another. This advocates on taking a 
step beyond foregrounding and backgrounding by articulating the implications 
of one lens over another.  The emphasis here is on articulating the 
implications: the critical examination that can then lead to pronouncements of 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ for various situations. The work here does not portray a 
paralysis of choice from relative relativism. Instead it advocates the active 
work of making informed decisions based on examining the foregrounding and  
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backgrounding of choices, the values directing this boundary work, and the 
implications. 
Looking Ahead 
This work explores the developing practice of reflective design for 
research in both HCI and communication. For the field of HCI, I used reflective 
design to inverse a dominant focus on reduction for interpretation in order to 
build interfaces with ineffable experiences. For the field of communication, I 
posited how a reflective design practice provides a useful process based 
method of inquiry to compliment new theories of interpretation and meaning 
making. Although reflective design draws on a rich history of existing theory 
and methods, it is a new practice and one that requires more inductive and 
exploratory work. This dissertation has identified many steps forward in terms 
of design and evaluation strategies, but it has also identified many open 
questions. In the spirit of Craig and Tracy’s (1995) grounded practical theory, 
where they do not seek to test existing theories but generate new ideas, or in 
the spirit of Dewey’s (1934) re-visionary theorizing, it is appropriate to end 
here with several questions before concluding.  
Many of the questions for continuing this work have been posed already 
in the conclusions to the case studies and the chapter examining interpretation 
from an HCI and communication perspective. In particular, although I have 
presented a number of techniques for moving forward in texturing alternate 
ways of approaching the ineffable, what is desired is a more systematic 
approach. This may simply involve conducting more studies and richly 
describing a catalogue of results and varied attributes of interaction. However, 
there are two points regarding this systematic approach that I will highlight for 
further consideration. First, one of the criticisms of inductive case driven  
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research is that it lacks a sufficient level of generalizability. In the previous 
chapter’s discussion of substituting the criteria of generalizability with 
transferability, I have attempted to address this criticism. In many of the design 
strategies and examples explored here, designing for very specific and even 
a-prototypical experiences often leads to designs that appeal to or apply for a 
range of experiences, or at least the designs are rich enough to be re-
appropriated for alternate experiences. What this has to do with the question 
of systematic examinations is that perhaps what the systematic discovery is 
about is charting explored territory in order to point to unchartered territory. In 
other words, it is not about creating a map of the world based on a small 
sample that then reduces the need for further exploration. Instead, it is a guide 
for pointing to where new discoveries can be made.  
The second point regarding systematic discovery however is a caution. 
Describing a design space and articulating strategies for design and 
evaluation is a first step toward creating tool kits, taxonomies and 
standardized practices. In order for a practice to advance, it needs fleshing out 
and acceptance by a larger community. Yet reflective design is about 
examining stagnation in existing practices and must continuously advance 
new practices as opposed to verifying a standard set. This tension between 
convention and invention began my investigation, first through my work with 
innovation practices in companies through to my interest in conventional and 
inventive use of language for making meaning. In returning to the model of the 
funnel of ambiguity, or space for interpretation, presented in chapter four, I 
propose in future work to examine how conventions work to both narrow the 
space for interpretation but how these same conventions may be used  
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productively to flip the funnel and move toward opening the space for 
invention.  
One specific area where the case studies in particular and the practice 
of reflective design in general needs further development is in stimulating 
reflection on experience as well as on the technology for experience. The goal 
of this work has been to do both. In the art museum for instance, I wanted to 
cause reflection on an experience such as participating in the production of art 
or simply reflecting on presence as an object of art-status in the museum. At 
the same time, I wanted people to reflect on the role of technology in the art 
museum. I believe the installations were more effective for the former rather 
than the latter type of reflection. The latter reflection occurred mainly by peer 
designers and researchers whom we pitched our objective to through papers 
and conferences. The Affector case study was more successful in this regard 
but this is due to the fact that the designers were also the users and pushing 
on the boundaries of existing technology designs was a stated objective from 
the start. This raises the question of how to engender this same kind of 
authentic status of designer/user on a larger scale. It also raises questions of 
legitimacy for designers to take on this role of provocateur. I have noted the 
importance of granting users license to participate. What is my license as a 
researcher/designer to create everyday designs that could upend the familiar? 
My last set of questions return to the concept of the ineffable. The goal 
in advancing an interpretation approach to designing for the ineffable is not to 
black-box or turn away from trying to understand the ineffable. It is not an 
attempt to call a halt to abstract theorizing or the process of formalizing 
practices. It is not an argument to simply keep the ineffable a mystery and not 
try to understand it. Instead, the work here is offered as an alternate approach  
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to understanding, one that prioritizes experience over explanation. This 
characterizes the design approaches in the case studies, but it also 
characterizes my call for developing new ways for doing research. In this view, 
the process of research is elevated over the product, both are obviously 
important, but the emphasis is on the former. Product driven research strives 
for explanatory power but process driven research focuses on experiential 
power. Yet this point of view requires demarcating experiences somewhere. 
There is still a need to point to end results but the emphasis on process makes 
this challenging, as does the convergence of design, evaluation and use.  
This leads me to reexamining the boundaries of the ineffable. In the first 
chapter, I outlined several new frontiers including spirituality. A common 
thread uniting the frontiers described in the case studies was a connection 
with the spiritual, whether it was the transcendent and sublime experience of 
art or the mystical vapors of emotional spirits. A speculative question then is to 
wonder what comes next? Once information technology tackles spirituality as 
a whole itself, where will the borders of the ineffable be pushed? Perhaps as 
this work has hinted at, the ineffable is more mundane than the mysterious 
wonder of experiences we hold out as being out of the ordinary. Perhaps the 
ineffable is more closely aligned with Dewey’s idea of the aesthetic 
experience, a heightening of experience but something possible in the 
everyday. Furthermore, as the ineffable may be more applicable to the 
everyday, the more task based easily identifiable experiences that we assume 
are ‘effable’ may push back as well. In other words, the new frontiers of the 
ineffable could be in a worldly as opposed to other worldly direction. This is 
related to Striphas’s (2006) idea that translation is not a marginal and  
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degraded experience in communication, but all communication is a process of 
translation. In this spirit, all experience is an interface of the ineffable.  
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